



































This work by eminent scholars from around the world off ers a provocati ve and deeply insightf ul 
analysis of ‘the politi cs of paralysis and self-destructi on’ that have long hindered eff ecti ve and 
equitable climate policy over the past 20 years. The book is very ti mely, and I hope will help to 
increase the sense of urgency for a deal that will save the planet and billions of poor people around 
the world that bear a disproporti onate impact of climate change.
Prof Chukwumerije Okereke, Director Center of Climate Change and Development
Alex-Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Nigeria
Climate change nego� a� ons have failed the world. Despite more than thirty years of high-
level, global talks on climate change, we are s� ll seeing carbon emissions rise drama� cally. 
This edited volume, comprising leading and emerging scholars and climate ac� vists from 
around the world, takes a cri� cal look at what has gone wrong and what is to be done to 
create more decisive ac� on.
Composed of twenty-eight essays, this volume is organised around seven main themes: 
paradigms; what counts?; extrac� on; dispatches from a climate change frontline country; 
governance; fi nance; and ac� on(s). Through this mul� faceted approach, the contributors 
ask pressing ques� ons about how we conceptualise and respond to the climate crisis, 
providing both ‘big picture’ perspec� ves and more focussed case studies.
This unique and extensive collec� on will be of great value to environmental and social 
scien� sts alike, as well as to the general reader interested in understanding current views 
on the climate crisis. 
This is the author-approved edi� on of this Open Access � tle. As with all Open Book 
publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on the publisher’s website. 
Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary digital material, can also be 
found at h� p://www.openbookpublishers.com
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Introduction:  
Climate Crisis?  
What Climate Crisis?
Steffen Böhm and Sian Sullivan
(At Least) Five Decades of Knowing and (Not) Acting1
In all the talk about the Paris Agreement, reached at the twenty-first 
Conference of Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, it is sometimes forgotten 
that the world’s political leaders have held negotiations about climate 
change at the highest possible level for at least three decades. Many have 
known about climate change for a lot longer. 
It was in the 1860s that the Irish scientist John Tyndall first established 
a link between CO2 and what then became known as the ‘greenhouse 
effect’, which was further evidenced by the Swedish scientist Svante 
Arrhenius (Pain 2009). In 1938, the British scientist and engineer 
Guy Stewart Callendar “documented a significant upward trend in 
temperatures for the first four decades of the 20th century and noted 
the systematic retreat of glaciers” (Plass et al. 2010: online). In 1956, 
the American scientist Gilbert Plass (1956) published a seminal paper 
called ‘Carbon Dioxide Theory of Climatic Change’, creating a clear link 
between increases in the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere and 
global temperature rises. 
1  The first part of this introduction draws on an earlier blog article by Böhm, published 
as ‘The Paris Climate Talks and other Events of Carbon Fetishism’, https://www.
versobooks.com/blogs/2372-steffen-bohm-the-paris-climate-talks-and-other-
events-of-carbon-fetishism. 
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This scientific knowledge has thus been ‘out there’ for a very long 
time, and was also not unnoticed in the political arena. As early as 1965, 
the US President’s Science Advisory Committee 
told President Lyndon Johnson that greenhouse warming was a matter of 
real concern. There could be ‘marked changes in climate,’ they reported, 
‘not controllable through local or even national efforts.’ CO2 needed 
attention as a possibly dangerous ‘pollutant’ (Weart 2021: online). 
In the ‘mother country’ of fossil fuel burning, the United Kingdom, 
politicians became increasingly aware of climate change in the 1960s. In 
1969, the House of Lords (the upper chamber in the UK parliamentary 
system) discussed railway policy and the hereditary peer Jestyn Philipps 
asked the following question: 
[m]y Lords, can my noble friend say whether he and British Railways 
have taken account of the fact that what were abnormal temperatures last 
summer may not be abnormal if we continue to discharge CO2 into the 
air by the burning of various fossil carbons, so increasing the greenhouse 
effect? (Carbon Brief 2019a: online). 
Public opinion, particularly in the highly industrialised, most polluting 
countries, had shifted markedly towards an awareness of environmental 
issues in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1962, Rachel Carson’s influential and 
path-breaking book, Silent Spring, was published, becoming a bestseller 
worldwide. Anti-pollution, conservation and environmental protection 
movements sprang up everywhere. The first ‘Earth Day’ was held in 
the United States in 1970, becoming global in 1990 and marking the 
emergence of environmentalism as a serious social movement and 
political force (as also discussed by Hulme, this volume).2 The world’s 
first green political parties were founded in 1972, in the Australian state 
of Tasmania and in New Zealand. The German Green Party, which 
subsequently became one of the most successful national green parties 
worldwide, was founded in 1979. Climate change was written on the 
banners of these environmental activists from the start.
The rise of environmental consciousness from the 1960s onwards also 
made the bosses of fossil fuel companies take note. We now know that 
the corporate leaders of ExxonMobil, one of the biggest oil companies of 
the world, had known about climate change and the unsustainability of 
2  See https://www.earthday.org/history/. 
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their business models since at least 1977 (Hall 2015), as also clarified by 
Wright and Nyberg, this volume. During the 1980s, Exxon and Shell had 
extensive internal discussions and memos on climate change (Franta 
2018). We are constantly told that companies are always listening to what 
their customers want. Well, already in the 1970s it became clear that an 
increasing number of customers were worried about the degradation of 
nature and climate change in particular. Corporate leaders would have 
been aware of this shift in public consciousness and attention. Given that 
what companies hate most are business risks, and that climate change is 
the biggest risk to an oil and gas company’s business model, it would be 
logical to assume that these companies were making climate change risk 
assessments from these decades.
The 1980s saw the rapid expansion of environmentalism worldwide. 
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) published Our Common Future, which became known as the 
‘Brundtland Report’, named after the Commission’s chairwoman Gro 
Harlem Brundtland. While the Report had a wider remit, focusing on a 
whole range of environmental issues, it clearly stated that there is 
the serious probability of climate change generated by the ‘greenhouse 
effect’ of gases emitted to the atmosphere, the most important of which 
is carbon dioxide (CO2) produced from the combustion of fossil fuels 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 145–46). 
It went on to say:
[a]fter reviewing the latest evidence on the greenhouse effect in October 
1985 at a meeting in Villach, Austria, organized by the WMO, UNEP, 
and ICSU, scientists from 29 industrialized and developing countries 
concluded that climate change must be considered a ‘plausible and 
serious probability’ [...] They estimated that if present trends continue, 
the combined concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere would be equivalent to a doubling of CO2 from pre-
industrial levels, possibly as early as the 2030s, and could lead to a rise 
in global mean temperatures ‘greater than any in man’s [sic] history’. 
Current modelling studies and ‘experiments’ show a rise in globally 
averaged surface temperatures, for an effective CO2 doubling, of 
somewhere between 1.5°C and 4.5°C, with the warming becoming more 
pronounced at higher latitudes during winter than at the equator […]. 
An important concern is that a global temperature rise of 1.5–4.5°C, with 
perhaps a two to three times greater warming at the poles, would lead 
to a sea level rise of 25–140 centimetres. A rise in the upper part of this 
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range would inundate low-lying coastal cities and agricultural areas, 
and many countries could expect their economic, social, and political 
structures to be severely disrupted (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987: 148).
The Brundtland Report and the continued gathering of scientific 
evidence catapulted climate change to the top of the political agenda 
of many countries at the end of the 1980s. On 23 June 1988—more than 
thirty years ago!—Dr James Hansen, then director of NASA’s Institute 
for Space Studies, stated in a landmark testimony before the US Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, that 
[g]lobal warming has reached a level such that we can ascribe with a 
high degree of confidence a cause-and-effect relationship between 
the greenhouse effect and observed warming…In my opinion, the 
greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing our climate now 
(Brulle 2018: online). 
Climate change was no longer only a concern for tree-hugging 
activists—if it ever was confined in that way. Now, NASA scientists and 
the top political class in the richest countries of the world were not only 
informed about climate change but were actively talking about what to 
do about it. 
This recognition of the urgency of climate change, and the high 
risk of not doing anything to turn it around or address its predicted 
impacts, contributed to the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit (Rio Summit) 
in 1992, which brought together leaders from government, business 
and NGOs from across the world, including most heads of state. At the 
Rio Summit, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—an official, international environmental treaty 
with binding obligations—was signed, coming into force in 1994. 
The so-called Conference of the Parties (COP) is the UNFCCC’s 
main decision-making body and meets annually. At COP3 in 1997, the 
Kyoto Protocol was signed, the first international agreement to curb 
global greenhouse gas emissions. At COP21, in 2015, the landmark Paris 
Agreement was reached to commit states across the world to keep global 
warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius. 
Alongside these agreements under the UNFCCC, the United 
Nations has also included ‘Climate Action’ as one of seventeen global 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015, framing 
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SDG13 specifically as a call that governments “[t]ake urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts”.3 
Having arrived at 2021, however, scientific evidence for ongoing 
global temperature rises alongside industrial combustion of fossil 
fuels is now overwhelming. The simple graphic shown in Figure 1 
communicates clearly where we are in terms of global temperature rises 
since 1850.
Fig. 1. Annual average temperatures for the world, 1850–2020, based on data by 
the UK Met Office, Graphics and lead scientist Ed Hawkins, National Centre 
for Atmospheric Science, University of Reading. Creative Commons, https://
showyourstripes.info/. 
Climate scientists now agree 
that 2011–2020 was the warmest decade on record, in a persistent long-
term climate change trend. The warmest six years have all been since 
2015, with 2016, 2019 and 2020 being the top three. The differences in 
average global temperatures among the three warmest years—2016, 2019 
and 2020—are indistinguishably small. The average global temperature 
in 2020 was about 14.9°C, 1.2 (± 0.1) °C above the pre-industrial (1850–
1900) level (WMO 2021: online). 
In other words, we have already seen a 1.2 degrees Celsius temperature 
rise globally, which makes it all but certain that we will fail to meet the 
3  See https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change/. 
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1.5 degrees commitment made by the UNFCCC’s COP21 in Paris in 2015 
– as confirmed in the recently published first instalment of the Sixth 
Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2021). If current trends persist, and even if countries 
meet their Paris Agreement obligations, many climate scientists now 
warn that we are heading towards at least 3 degrees Celsius change 
compared to pre-industrial levels (UN 2019). 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities?
The UNFCCC treaty agreed in Rio in 1992 clearly acknowledged that 
the rich, highly developed and industrialised countries have a historical 
responsibility to take a lead in combating climate change, given that 
countries such as the UK, the US, France, Germany, etc. have been 
pumping greenhouse gases at scale into the atmosphere for at least 
three hundred years. The treaty says in Article 3, Principle 1:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof (UN 1992: 9).
The Kyoto Protocol, the first landmark, international agreement to commit 
to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reductions, repeated this commitment:
[a]ll Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances (UN 1998: 9).
The key phrase here is ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, 
acknowledging that climate change is a global ‘commons’ problem (as 
further discussed in Lankford’s chapter, this volume), but that different 
countries have different responsibilities in relation to their contributions 
to this problem. Carbon emissions do not respect national borders: if 
a large, coal-fired power station is built in one country, it ultimately 
affects the climate on the whole planet. In saying that responsibilities 
are ‘differentiated’, Global South countries are acknowledged to have 
not been the cause of climate change, and to have not emitted massive 
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amounts of GHG for very long, with the inference that they cannot be 
expected to sort out the mess that Global North countries—the rich, 
industrialised nations with their expansionary colonising histories—
have caused. 
A glance at global history reveals how closely energy and GHG 
emissions have been linked to both economic growth and colonial 
expansion. The Netherlands was the first country to develop a taste for 
exponential industrial growth back in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, which would have been unthinkable without the availability 
of cheap domestic peat, as well as timber from Norwegian and Baltic 
forests (Moore 2010). One reason that Britain took over Holland’s 
imperial leadership was due to its vast reserves of coal mined at great 
profit through the use of cheap labour, with the burning of coal taking 
off at the end of the eighteenth century, and growing exponentially in 
the nineteenth century (Malm 2016). Then came oil and gas, which have 
helped make the United States of America the global imperial master 
from the early twentieth century onwards (Foster 2006).
There is thus more than 250 years of fossil fuel burning by the Global 
North to account for. Many climate justice activists advocate for some 
form of reparations to be paid by the North to the poorest countries of the 
planet, particularly those that are already struggling to adapt to a rapidly 
changing climate, whether in the form of rising sea levels, increasing 
drought (as considered in the chapter by Lendelvo and colleagues, this 
volume), failed harvests, or bigger and more forceful weather events 
such as storms. The fact that approximately 80% of historical carbon 
emissions have to be attributed to the rich world (Centre for Global 
Development 2015), and are already causing havoc in many countries 
around the world, cannot simply be wished away.
In the Paris Agreement of 2015, ‘common and differentiated 
responsibilities’ were again mentioned repeatedly, for example in Article 
4, Paragraph 19:
[a]ll Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low 
greenhouse gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 
taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances 
(UN 2015: 6).
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Yet, this principle has gradually been pushed into the background, and 
the discourse of ‘differentiation’ is now almost a fringe occurrence. The 
rapid rises of emissions, particularly in China and India, are often cited 
as reasons for why these fast-industrialising countries now also have 
to curb their emissions. Clearly, they have their own responsibilities 
and they need to be held to account: China, in particular, is now the 
largest GHG emitter by far in the world. Let us bear in mind, however, 
that India’s carbon emissions per capita are still about a seventh of the 
figure for the United States (Carbon Brief 2019b), and China’s rapidly 
rising emissions are to a great extent driven by export-driven industries, 
producing consumer goods for the rest of the world, particularly the 
Global North (Yang, Yuantao et al. 2020). If we add up historical per 
capita emissions over the past three hundred years, then China’s carbon 
emissions—with its vast population—lag far behind those countries 
that industrialised first (Centre for Global Development 2015).
Western European countries like to portray themselves in green, 
responsible colours, highlighting that their carbon emissions are 
significantly lower than the Kyoto baseline of 1990. The UK, for 
example, which is hosting COP26 in Glasgow in 2021,4 frequently and 
happily declares that “[i]n 2019, total UK greenhouse gas emissions 
were provisionally 45.2 per cent lower than in 1990” (Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2020). What is conveniently 
forgotten is that the UK’s apparent success in lowering GHG emissions 
is largely due to the early adoption of gas, which has lower emissions 
than coal and oil, in the early 1990s, i.e. before Kyoto. There are 
clearly carbon reduction successes in many Global North countries. 
The power generation sector in the UK, for example, has now phased 
out coal almost completely,5 which, only four to five decades ago, 
would have been unthinkable. Renewable energy adoption rates are 
high in countries such as Germany. Global North governments have 
made efforts to put their countries on a decisive decarbonisation path 
with the UK being the first country to legislate for a net zero carbon 
emissions commitment by 2050. The UK’s Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) claims there are already signs that there has been a decoupling 
4  See https://ukcop26.org/. 
5  Strangely and controversially, however, the UK government is currently considering 
to approve the establishment of a new coal mine in Cumbria; see https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/explainers-56023895.
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of economic growth and GHG emissions in the country (Office for 
National Statistics 2019), apparently proving that the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve was right to predict that, as countries grow richer, 
their negative environmental impact will reduce (see, for example, 
Grossman and Krueger 1995). The ONS confirms that emissions 
peaked in 2007, and that the country is on the right path to meet its 
2050 net zero commitments. 
But there are four controversies that such statistics and resulting 
political posturing ignore or downplay.
First, most global GHG statistics are still based on the production 
principle: that is, carbon is counted in the countries where it is emitted 
(see discussion in Hannis’s chapter, this volume). Countries such as the 
UK, however, are net importers of carbon emissions, as the ONS report 
rightly points out (Office for National Statistics 2019). If a consumption-
based approach to carbon accounting is taken, the UK’s national carbon 
emissions would be significantly higher than officially reported. How 
much higher is subject to which carbon accounting technique is used. This 
is also true for most Western European countries as well as the United 
States, which have seen increasing rates of deindustrialisation over the 
last two decades with not only jobs but also carbon emissions being 
offshored to countries of the Global South. In return the Global North 
receives cheap consumer goods whose embedded carbon emissions are 
not attributed to itself. Of course, some of the exponential growth in 
carbon emissions by India and China is also due to increases in home-
grown consumption. China apparently now has the largest middle class 
in the world. If we take a consumption-based view, however, then even 
China’s emissions per capita will not reach the US’s current rate for a 
long time. India lags even further behind.
Second, there are three large sectors that are mostly and conveniently 
ignored by any carbon accounting techniques: the military, shipping 
and aviation. As Bigger et al. report in this volume, the US military 
‘bootprint’ is higher than many middle-income countries. Calculating 
the carbon footprint of global military operations is nearly impossible, 
however, as governments do not report details of military fuel 
consumption, emissions and impacts. Some analysts estimate that 
the global ‘bootprint’ of the military could be as high as 6% of 
global emissions (Scientists for Global Responsibility 2020): bigger 
than Russia’s entire share in 2019. The global shipping and aviation 
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industries have also repeatedly evaded their climate responsibilities, 
given that their operations transgress national boundaries. Ships 
mostly operate outside national jurisdictions, and again an effective 
calculation of their carbon footprint is difficult. Estimates exist that put 
shipping and aviation on a combined 5.39% of global GHG emissions 
(Ritchie 2020; Saul 2020)—higher than the GHG emissions of high 
emitting countries such as Russia—and both global shipping and 
aviation emissions are rising fast.
The third area often conveniently forgotten in any national carbon 
accounting scheme concerns the financing of fossil fuel infrastructure. 
Large fossil fuel projects, such as the development of new oil and gas 
fields, or the building of pipelines and dams, requires finance that even 
national governments cannot muster. The largest banks of the world are 
also the largest financiers of fossil fuel developments. The Banking on 
Climate Chaos Report 2021 (Rainforest Action Network 2021) showed 
that the world’s biggest sixty banks have provided $3.8tn of financing 
for fossil fuel developments, since the Paris Agreement was signed in 
2015. JP Morgan Chase, which tops the table, has provided more than 
$300bn of finance alone. These global finance streams again distort the 
national pictures of GHG emissions. Without such finance, oil fields 
could not be developed nor coal-fired power stations built. But which 
country should be responsible and accountable for the carbon emissions 
caused by these new fossil fuel developments? These banks, which are 
normally headquartered in Global North countries, profit from these 
projects, creating economic growth activities in the countries they are 
based in and demonstrating the significant continuing global influence 
of the fossil fuel industry (as emphasised in Wright and Nyberg’s 
chapter, this volume). 
Fourth, but by no means least, we need to account for the fast-
rising emissions associated with so-called ‘green’ industries, such as 
renewable energy. Biomass-burning power stations, such as the UK’s 
Drax, electric vehicles, industrial-scale wind parks, large solar farms, 
nuclear power stations—these are all sold as ‘low-carbon’ solutions 
to the planet’s climate change malaise. Yet, if the GHG emissions of 
the entire life cycle of these technologies are taken into account, their 
carbon footprint is significant, particularly in the context of their fast 
adoption around the world, not to mention their often-forgotten, grave 
social implications (Sullivan 2013a; Ramirez and Böhm 2021). Dunlap’s 
chapter, this volume, thus proposes that industrial-scale renewable 
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energy production should more accurately be labelled as ‘Fossil Fuel+’ 
to acknowledge the continued product-cycle dependence of these 
technologies on fossil-fuel based sources of energy.
Does the Environmental Kuznets Curve, i.e. the suggestion that 
beyond a certain degree of economic growth a society will reduce its 
environmental impacts, account for these four areas of contention? Are 
the rich, Global North countries really on a path of decarbonisation? 
Deepening the intractability of reducing CO2 emissions whilst 
simultaneously maintaining an industrial growth pathway is the 
greenwashing that accompanies renewable energy production on an 
industrial scale. Perhaps only a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 
which governments commit not to extract and exploit fossil fuels, will 
ultimately be the kind of governance mechanism that will prevent the 
exposure of the climate to future fossil fuel emissions—as proposed 
by Newell, this volume. On this point, it is encouraging to see a recent 
ruling by a Dutch court that oil giant Royal Dutch Shell must cut 45% of 
its 2019 greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 so as to contribute to national 
targets agreed under the Paris Agreement of COP21 (Farmer 2021). 
Meanwhile, however, all the global GHG emissions curves go in the 
wrong direction. 
Fig. 2. Annual total CO2 emissions, by world region, 1750–2019, Creative 
Commons, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co-emissions-by-region. 
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Three Decades of Carbon Fetishism
For three decades now, there has been talk and action on climate change 
at the highest possible levels—in politics, business, finance and civil 
society. For three decades, climate change has shaped the consciousness 
of citizens, consumers, politicians, entrepreneurs, farmers—and 
particularly those land-based communities directly affected by climate 
change (see chapters by Dieckmann, Lendelvo et al., and Sullivan this 
volume). We have seen the rise of climate justice movements, such as 
Extinction Rebellion (XR)6 and Fridays For Future7 (as discussed by 
Gardham, this volume). Swedish environmental activist Greta Thunberg, 
whose activism began as a school strike in protest against the very limited 
political action vis-à-vis climate change, has been catapulted into a global 
phenomenon, speaking in front of the UN Assembly and the European 
Parliament. David Attenborough, the famous UK-based conservationist 
and broadcaster, has become an outspoken climate activist, producing 
advocacy films on the dangers of climate change shown around the 
world on platforms such as Netflix. Thousands of parliaments, local 
government authorities and other large public organisations around the 
world have declared Climate Emergencies. Not a day goes by without a 
large company making ‘net zero’ commitments (although see Dyke et 
al. and Bailey this volume for more detail regarding the effectiveness or 
otherwise of net zero policies). 
Take, for example, the most recent, annual letter to the CEOs of 
companies invested in by BlackRock, the asset management company, 
written by Larry Fink, its founder, chairman and chief executive officer:
I believe that the pandemic has presented such an existential crisis—such 
a stark reminder of our fragility—that it has driven us to confront the 
global threat of climate change more forcefully and to consider how, like 
the pandemic, it will alter our lives (Fink 2021: online). 
Fink has committed BlackRock “to supporting the goal of net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or sooner” (BlackRock 2021: online). 
While there is very little detail on how this goal is to be achieved, it 
6  https://extinctionrebellion.uk/. 
7  https://fridaysforfuture.org/. 
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nevertheless is remarkable for Fink to become a corporate ‘climate 
activist’ (Skoglund and Böhm 2020) in a country, the United States, 
where a significant proportion of the population still believes climate 
change is a hoax. His commitment is part of a wider trend in the finance 
industry that is now, apparently, taking environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria, such as climate change, very seriously (as 
also analysed by Kaplan and Levy, this volume). As the Financial Times 
says:
Investment in companies that integrate environmental, social and 
governance factors continues to gain traction across public and private 
markets. Once considered a niche, the zeitgeist has gone past the notion 
of a ‘seismic shift’. Instead, integration of ESG underpins most, if not 
all, debates about the future of the investment industry (Lampen 2021: 
online).
Sounds good, does it not? All this newly found commitment to tackle 
climate change as well as the wider environmental malaise we find 
ourselves in should be welcomed and celebrated. However, a heavy 
dose of scepticism and critical interrogation is also needed (as offered 
by Bracking, this volume), precisely because we have been here many 
times before. 
Our outline above suggests that capitalism (and state socialism, for 
that matter) does not have a good track record in terms of environmental 
performance. For decades now, it has failed to adequately address the 
climate crisis (Böhm et al. 2012). Whatever has been tried has not worked. 
Global GHG emissions are still rising exponentially—as clarified in 
Figure 2. Most analyses indicate that the global COVID-19 pandemic 
will only temporarily halt emissions, with a massive rebound looming. 
This was certainly the case in 2008/09 when the last global crisis meant 
that GHG reduced slightly in most countries, only to continue on their 
path of exponential growth soon after. 
Why is this? Why, despite all the talk and the good intentions by 
many, has the world not managed to reduce GHG emissions since the 
inception of the UNFCCC all those years ago? Why are emissions still 
rising fast? One answer lies in the carbon market instruments that have 
been invented over the past thirty years to deal with the climate crisis.
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Already at COP3 in Kyoto in 1997, the rich world, led by the US, 
demanded ‘flexibility’ in terms of how the highly industrialised 
countries should be allowed to deal with cutting their carbon emissions. 
This demand resulted in a proliferation of market mechanisms, which, 
in proper capitalist market fashion, work by establishing property 
rights for carbon emissions, allowing carbon permits and credits to be 
traded globally (Böhm and Dhabi 2011; Böhm et al. 2015). The ensuing 
creation and ‘primitive accumulation’ of carbon units led to a number of 
Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) being set up across the world, most 
prominently the EU-ETS, which came into force in 2005 (Lohmann 2009, 
2014). 
This market approach is in line with dominant neoliberal governance 
approaches that have been spearheaded by Anglo-Saxon countries, 
mainly the US and the UK, since the early 1980s, and which have since 
spread across the globe ultimately through finance conditionalities set by 
International Financial Institutions (Dunlap and Sullivan 2019). While 
states and their governments have not disappeared, the ideological 
approach by neoliberalism is to let market principles deal with most 
economic and increasingly social and environmental affairs, including 
climate change. But the success of ETSs around the world has been 
limited, to say the least, with only small percentage points of progress 
made towards reducing global GHG emissions. 
A recent paper argues that despite low carbon prices in the EU-ETS, 
this continent-wide carbon trading scheme was responsible for a 3.8% 
cut in total EU-wide emissions between 2008 and 2016 (Bayer and Aklin 
2020). This calculation can be challenged on various grounds, but even 
if such a reduction can be robustly attributed to the EU-ETS, such a 
modest success can hardly be a blueprint for the radical emissions cuts 
needed for any chance of limiting global climate chaos. Many academics, 
commentators and climate activists have argued that neoliberal, market-
based approaches have been nothing more than a delaying tactic, 
allowing the big polluting companies and countries to continue to emit 
carbon at a massive scale, while offsetting their responsibilities through 
clever carbon accounting techniques (Lippert 2014) and the fantasies of 
“green success” they sustain (Watt 2021). 
Carbon has now become a major commodity, traded on stock 
exchanges across the world. This financialisation of climate change 
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is creating new carbon elites, benefitting from the world’s quest to 
urgently curb global GHG emissions and seemingly decarbonise capital 
(Christophers 2019; Langley et al. 2021). Larry Fink and the other 
financiers now riding the ESG boom are sniffing gold. When he talks 
about “capturing opportunities created by the net zero transition” 
he has carbon pricing mechanisms in mind. Whilst these potentially 
financial(ising) instruments have been around since Kyoto in 1997, 
COP21 paved the way for a massive scaling up of voluntary trading of 
carbon units so as, again seemingly, to meet the urgent climate challenges 
facing global society today. For this reason, 
[a] host of top figures from business, finance and academia led by former 
Bank of England Governor Mark Carney have announced a global task 
force to accelerate the development of voluntary carbon markets across 
the private sector, ahead of anticipated surge in demand for CO2 offsets 
as the net zero transition gathers pace (Holder 2020: online).
Carney’s ‘taskforce’ aims for “scaling voluntary carbon markets and 
allowing a global price for carbon to emerge”, which is claimed will give 
companies the “right tools and incentives to reduce emissions at least 
cost” (ibid.). This new initiative conveniently ignores the problematic 
evidence and experience of operating carbon markets, and specifically 
voluntary offsetting schemes, over the past twenty years. 
When in 2009, in the run-up to the COP15 climate change talks in 
Copenhagen, we published the book Upsetting the Offset (Böhm and Dabhi 
2009), our intention was to show the negative and oft-ignored impacts 
of carbon offsetting on the ground in the Global South especially. Tamra 
Gilbertson (2009), for example, in her case of A. T. Biopower, showed 
how what used to be sustainable agricultural practices in Thailand were 
transformed into so-called carbon neutral operations that create profits 
and rents for local elites and international polluters, yet disadvantage 
local people and communities.
In 2014, one of us (Böhm) co-authored in the journal Carbon 
Management an analysis of evidence for ‘Ten reasons why carbon markets 
will not bring about radical emissions reduction’ (Pearse and Böhm 
2014). The article argued that carbon markets do not work because they 
provide plenty of loopholes for the biggest emitters, often going hand-
in-hand with a lack of political will to radically curb GHG emissions 
(see also Bryant et al. 2015). Lobbying by fossil fuel elites is rife and has 
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resulted in dinosaur industries actually benefiting from the introduction 
of carbon markets, and there have also been many cases of corruption. 
Despite their stated commitments to further sustainable development, 
carbon offsetting schemes, which are normally implemented in Global 
South countries, often involve a whole range of negative social and 
environmental ‘side-effects’ not accounted for when ‘net zero’ or ‘carbon 
neutral’ claims are made by investors in this new imaginary of “carbon 
earth” (Sullivan 2010: 113; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013; Asiyanbi 2017). 
Carbon markets can also be regressive in terms of disproportionately 
affecting low-income households. What the carbon market approach 
amounts to is an almost blind belief in market mechanisms to solve the 
climate chaos we find ourselves in. But these carbon mechanisms are so 
complicated, technocratic, and obscure that they are really designed for 
use by corporate and financial elites only. 
The reality and academic evidence presented in this 2014 paper has 
not changed. What has changed is that after almost ten years of bear 
climate markets, the new ESG activists, including Larry Fink, smell an 
opportunity. Whilst perhaps unintended, what the combined Greta 
Thunberg and David Attenborough effect has done is reignite the 
fantasy that carbon markets will solve climate chaos. Fink will always 
take BlackRock where the future money is. Carbon markets, in the guise 
of ‘net zero’ strategies, appear to offer this future.
Let us ask some questions in response. In the other, still ongoing, 
global crisis that is the COVID-19 pandemic, have governments around 
the world relied on markets to deal with the biggest health crisis the 
world has seen for a century? Have they created complicated COVID-
credits that can be traded on global stock exchanges to determine the 
most efficient way of combating the virus? Have they allowed COVID-
offsetting, so that some people or companies could buy themselves out 
of lockdown? No? No, they have not! (Although we note the increasing 
talk of creating and selling so-called ‘Covid bonds’––see Postel-Vinay 
2021). This is because there was no time. The pandemic was and is 
an emergency. Everybody had to go into lockdown, everybody was 
affected. The virus knew and knows no borders, and the countries that 
have most successfully dealt with the pandemic are those where there 
has been decisive government action. It is precisely this kind of political 
will that has been in short supply for combating climate change (as also 
observed by Halme and colleagues, this volume).
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Carbon offsetting and trading schemes will undoubtedly see 
unprecedented growth in the coming years, if ESG activists and 
politicians have their way. Companies and countries will continue to ask 
for maximum ‘flexibility’ in meeting their climate commitments, which 
is code for saying: they want to offset their emissions without cleaning 
up their act at home. 
What all this amounts to is what the critical geographer Erik 
Swyngedouw (2010) has called ‘CO2 fetishism’. For Swyngedouw, 
capitalism’s attempt to deal with the climate crisis is a perfect example 
of ‘post-politics’, generating a lot of talk about what needs to change 
to make our existence on earth sustainable without changing much 
at all. What is important to bear in mind, though, is that this talk 
about change is not all there is. Swyngedouw (2010) also argues that 
capital attempts to materially reconfigure itself through the crisis of 
climate change, precisely by turning carbon (nature) into a commodity 
through putatively decarbonising capital, complementing observations 
of capitalism’s reconfiguration through a ‘financialisation of nature’ 
deemed to effect nature’s care (for example, Bracking 2012, 2019; 
Sullivan 2012, 2013b). 
These innovations make sense as new layers of the commodification 
processes that have run through capitalism’s history. With good reason 
Jason Moore (2015) calls capital an ecological regime, because it has 
always mixed human labour with nature’s generative capacities so as 
to produce and reproduce natures in specific ways in particular times 
and places. Adopting this perspective, we can see how the battle of 
the twenty-first century is to further transform capital-as-ecology into 
capital-as-climate. Such abstractions involve immense economic, social, 
cultural and environmental forces, constituting a process of fetishisation 
in a Marxian sense, spurred on by the realities of the worsening climate 
in parallel with the profit and rent opportunities that emerge from this 
context for elites. Masked by the appearance of the carbon commodity 
that can be traded, then, are the socio-ecological contexts, calculative 
practices, and relations of exchange that permit a unit of carbon to 
assume a monetary value that can be traded. 
Many environmentalists have become successful entrepreneurs and 
many investors are now riding on the ESG bandwagon. This is what 
capitalism does best. It commodifies, and a new commodity to be formed 
and traded is carbon. This is nothing else but what Marx (1976) called 
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‘commodity fetishism’, the process by which social relations appear as 
commodity relations. Without this most basic of all abstractions, capital 
could not appropriate people and things that exist outside its logic, in 
order to bring them into the workings of the capital machinery. Once 
appropriated, they are exploited either extensively (extending the time 
that capital has to work on its subjects) or intensively (squeezing more 
value from within a given time). And once the basic labour process 
cannot be more optimised and appropriation becomes too costly, 
financialisation kicks in. As Moore rightly argues (2015), capitalism 
is doing all of these three things simultaneously: appropriation, 
commodification and financialisation. ‘Climate capitalism’ is no 
different. It too expands through a unique combination of the exercise 
of state violence, business opportunity and cultural shifting. 
This process of the creation of climate capitalism is not unchallenged 
of course. What the climate debate has shown is that this capitalisation 
process is a struggle of forces within capital and associated social actors 
themselves, as foregrounded in the chapters by Mannan and colleagues, 
North, Paterson and Bond, this volume. It is not something that is 
somehow masterminded by an evil force, placed in Washington, D.C. or 
London or even Beijing. It emerges out of the contradictions of capital, 
the outcomes of which are not predictable.
The latter observation also means that the commodity fetishisation 
of carbon is by no means an inevitable process. Given that capitalist 
processes can only deal with such a grave challenge as climate change 
through new layers of commodification that disenfranchise and 
dispossess people from other modes of production, conditions are also 
created that invite contestation and the expression of different concerns. 
The uneven, unequal and highly volatile process of climate capitalisation, 
which elites try to control, cannot help but engender resistance and 
greater consciousness of justice concerns (as considered in the chapter 
by Harris, this volume). Climate justice is not something that should 
somehow come after an acceptance of climate capitalism. A properly 
just response to climate change can only be brought about if we do not 
shy away from questioning the fundamental logic of carbon fetishism 
and the logic of the market that attempts to appropriate, commodify 
and financialise nature, and ourselves. 
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Purpose and Scope
We intend this book to fill a gap in the climate change debate, which 
is normally dominated by environmental, climate and natural science 
perspectives. This volume instead comprises twenty-eight short 
interventions by prominent social scientists and humanities scholars of 
climate change and societal responses, as well as emerging academic 
contributors and voices from climate activism, bearing in mind that 
these categories are not mutually exclusive. Contributors to the volume 
come from many parts of the world and share their perspectives both on 
what is important in climate change debates, and ‘what is to be done’ in 
terms of radical climate action. 
The collection includes new essays as well as republished texts, 
organised around seven themes: paradigms; what counts?; extraction; 
dispatches from a climate change frontline country; governance; finance; 
and action(s). These themes, which we outline briefly below, emerged 
from our reading of the contributions submitted for the collection, 
rather than being established in advance. They thus seem salient as a 
representation of climate change concerns consolidating amongst social 
science and humanities scholars and activists. 
Paradigms
The first section on Paradigms is comprised of contributions that 
address broad perspectives arising in climate change debates. These 
‘big-picture’ essays introduce some key challenges of the climate crisis 
in terms of societal understanding and response. 
The opening chapter in this section, titled ‘One Earth, Many Futures, 
No Destination’, is by geographer Mike Hulme, whose work is widely 
known for its critical engagement with how climate-change as an idea 
becomes deployed, mobilised and disagreed about in public, scientific 
and policy discourse: most recently in Climate Change: Key Ideas in 
Geography (Hulme 2021). Hulme observes that since the first Earth Day, 
more than half a century ago, it has become clear that it is easier to 
generate scientific insight into the ways human systems and behaviours 
are altering the planet than it is to redirect those human systems to lessen 
the planetary impacts predicted through scientific insight. Alongside 
other chapters in this volume, Hulme thus emphasises the significance 
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of divergent human values for the possibility of making choices that 
redirect human systems such that their planetary impact is transformed. 
The chapter that follows, by Minna Halme and colleagues on the 
Finnish Expert Panel on Sustainable Development, foregrounds how 
the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the vulnerability to crises such 
as climate change caused by a current global socio-economic system 
oriented towards short-term financial efficiency. ‘From Efficiency to 
Resilience: Systemic Change towards Sustainability after the COVID-
19 Pandemic’ argues that sustainability at scale can only be effected 
through a replacement of the dominant efficiency paradigm with a 
resilience paradigm. Their chapter outlines key orientations towards 
sectoral planning and governance they consider necessary for society 
to walk a path that effects systemic transformation towards resilience, 
understood as a mutually supportive symbiosis of social and 
natural—socionatural—‘systems’.
The section on paradigms closes with Sian Sullivan’s chapter ‘On 
Climate Change Ontologies and the Spirit(s) of Oil’, which considers 
ontological dimensions at play in societal understandings of the 
causes and implications of climate change. She asks questions of 
how anthropogenic climate change is understood culturally, and of 
what responses may be promoted as appropriate for this systemic 
predicament. By gesturing to culturally-inflected differences in ways 
of seeing and knowing the world, she draws into focus the interplay 
of multiple realities in climate change understandings that may 
contribute to political disagreements around highly divergent values 
and worldviews.
What Counts?
In considering divergence in climate change understandings and 
responses, our first section leads clearly to the question of What Counts? 
in climate change management, as asked in the essays pursuing this 
second theme of the book. This section addresses issues of calculation 
and measurement, given that climate change debates are often about 
numbers, particularly in relation to emissions of GHG. A key aim of the 
contributions here is to look behind the numbers, providing a rationale 
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for why processes of calculation and measurement should also always 
be seen as political and hence as open to contestation.
James Dyke and co-authors kick off the section with an essay 
provocatively titled ‘Why Net Zero Policies Do More Harm than 
Good’. The policy idea and ideal of ‘net zero carbon’, i.e. that socio-
economic activity should generate zero carbon emissions in aggregate, 
is important for a number of subsequent chapters in this book because 
it has been so definitive in proposing a route towards a ‘solution’ for 
managing CO2 emissions globally. As Dyke and colleagues argue, 
however, ‘net zero’ discourse conceals and justifies the deployment of 
highly speculative technologies that pose ‘fairytales’ in terms of their 
CO2 emissions reductions, whilst also nudging society on to a series of 
potentially dangerous technological pathways for which outcomes are 
unknown. They confirm instead that the only way to keep humanity 
safe is through immediate and sustained radical cuts to greenhouse 
gas emissions, acknowledging the simultaneous challenge of doing this 
in ways that are socially just so as to redress, rather than deepen, the 
inequalities bound up with uneven industrialisation endeavours.
In ‘The Carbon Bootprint of the US Military and Prospects for a Safer 
Climate’, Patrick Bigger and colleagues continue by asking searching 
questions of high-tech responses to CO2 emissions reductions in one of 
the most impactful of global industries, namely the US military. They 
foreground how future military CO2 emissions are locked into the US 
military’s expansive and coupled global logistical networks, hardware, 
and interventionist foreign policy. Echoing Dyke et al.’s chapter, they 
argue that apparently well-intentioned calls to ‘green’ the military are 
insufficient to reign in military emissions, urging that for climate change 
management alone the scope of the US military must be dramatically 
scaled back as part of any serious initiative to maintain a safer climate.
David Durand-Delacre and his team of co-authors shift focus in 
the following chapter to modes of counting and their implications 
when directed towards the understanding and management of human 
dimensions of climate change, specifically human migration linked 
with climate change. ‘Climate Migration is about People, not Numbers’ 
examines the large numbers often invoked to underline alarming climate 
migration narratives, and outlines the serious methodological limitations 
linked with the production of these numbers. In arguing for a greater 
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diversity of knowledges of climate migration and emphasising the value 
of qualitative and mixed methods in research, they also question the 
usefulness of excessively inflated numbers to progressive agendas for 
climate action, given the xenophobic fear of climate migration promoted 
by such numbers. In short, they emphasise how decisions based on 
meeting quantitative targets around migration reduction should be 
refocused instead on peoples’ needs, rights and freedoms, and that 
understanding these dimensions of human experience requires a mode 
of listening that does not reduce humans to statistical datapoints alone.
‘We’ll Always Have Paris’ by Mike Hannis turns to the implications of 
the provision for voluntary carbon trading in Article 6 of COP21’s Paris 
Agreement, considering how this can be robustly counted in practice so 
as to ensure the elusive goal of global ‘net zero’ CO2 emissions. Turning a 
sceptical eye to theoretical carbon trading, fantastical Negative Emission 
Technologies (NETs), and voluntary national ‘contributions’, Hannis 
asks questions of how Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
to global CO2 emissions are calculated across the complexities posed by 
voluntary carbon trading possibilities. In placing COP21’s Article 6 in 
the context of the internationalist spirit of 2015 that at least consolidated 
the idea and impression of a globally coordinated effort, he additionally 
asks what impact the resurgent nationalism of the years since may have 
on NDC calculations. Will the new Democrat US presidency be able to 
re-establish US climate leadership and move negotiations back towards 
a position of constructive international engagement on climate issues 
and the NDCs on which emissions reductions rest? How might COP26 
provide a boost to morale in internationalist spirit around climate 
change governance?
Bruce Lankford’s closing chapter in this second section of the book 
considers how CO2 is conceptualised and counted in what he frames 
as ‘The Atmospheric Carbon Commons in Transition’. In his analysis 
Lankford brings to bear the rich concept of “paracommons”, as the 
“commons of material salvages” currently arising from the context 
of climate change crisis requiring that emitted CO2 is systemically 
retrieved or ‘salvaged’. Drawing on analyses of resource commons, he 
argues that the carbon/atmospheric commons can be framed in three 
consecutive stages: a “sink-type atmospheric commons” occurring 
prior to the 1980/90s; a “husbandry-type carbon commons” lasting 
from the 1980/90s to 2030s; and an emergency “carbon paracommons” 
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post-2030s. The first stage sees the atmosphere treated as a dump or 
sink for carbon dioxide (CO2) ‘waste’ resulting in rising CO2 levels. The 
second stage sees climate change mitigation (e.g. carbon sequestration in 
forests) as an Ostromian-commons husbandry that attempts to reduce 
CO2 emission rates but continues to result in levels remaining above 400 
ppm. In the third stage being entered now, the “carbon paracommons” 
treats CO2 and its ‘salvaging’ as a matter of urgency, requiring methods 
of permanent sequestration, non-use and transformation, amidst 
uncertainty as to how in practice these may be instituted and with what 
implications.
Extraction
Given that climate change is caused by the extraction and transformation 
of fossil fuels, the third theme of our book coalesces around Extraction. 
This section is comprised of contributions that critically reflect on our 
uneven addiction to fossil fuel extraction and ask whether the brave new 
world of the nascent renewable energy transition is set to be any more 
sustainable. 
In ‘The Mobilisation of Extractivism: The Social and Political 
Influence of the Fossil Fuel Industry’, Christopher Wright and Daniel 
Nyberg highlight a key paradox: although the worsening climate 
crisis has led to growing social and political demands for meaningful 
climate action and the decarbonisation of economies, the modern global 
economy is defined by fossil fuel energy and its embedded legacy of 
two centuries of economic growth and development. They outline how 
the fossil fuel industry has defined the global economy and defended its 
position as the most powerful industry in the world. This context means 
that assumptions of corporate self-regulation as the logical response to 
the climate crisis will allow for the continuation of a ‘business as usual’ 
approach in which fossil fuel energy is maintained. They argue that an 
emphasis on corporate self-regulation deliberately ignores the urgent 
need for government regulation of carbon emissions. Worse, they 
foreground how current corporate responses to the climate crisis rely on 
a politics of ‘predatory delay’, wherein the fossil fuel industry cynically 
seeks to slow the process of decarbonisation to maximise their financial 
returns in the short term, whilst simultaneously appearing as concerned 
corporate citizens.
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‘End the “Green” Delusions: Industrial-Scale Renewable Energy 
is Fossil Fuel+’, by Alexander Dunlap, matches this concern, arguing 
that industrial-scale renewable energy does little to remake exploitative 
relationships with the earth. In representing the renewal and expansion 
of the present capitalist order, particularly given the fossil fuels 
embedded in the making of these technologies, Dunlap considers 
instead that industrial-scale renewable energy production should 
be more accurately understood as “fossil fuel+”. He urges a radical 
re-thinking of the socio-ecological reality of so-called renewable energy 
so as to create space for the step-change of strategies needed to mitigate 
and avoid climate and ecological catastrophe.
In ‘I’m Sian, and I’m a Fossil Fuel Addict: On Paradox, Disavowal 
and (Im)Possibility in Changing Climate Change’, Sian Sullivan draws 
on research with people who have known lives not determined by 
access to fossil fuels to face the reality of being completely personally 
dependent on fossil fuel extraction and the products made possible 
by fossil fuels. Her essay is an attempt to fully face the contradiction 
between maintaining hope for binding international climate agreements 
that have teeth, whilst being aware of her dependence on the fossil 
fuel extracting and emissions-spewing industrial juggernaut that 
permeates all our lives. Drawing critically on twelve-steps thinking and 
psychoanalytic literature, the chapter constitutes a reflection on fossil 
fuel addiction, highlighting the destructive paradox of not being able to 
live up to internalised but unreachable values regarding environmental 
care in a fossil-fuelled world.
Dispatches from a Climate Change Frontline Country—
Namibia, Southern Africa
The fourth section of the volume changes tack to focus in on dimensions 
of climate change impacts and understanding for a single country 
at great risk of small systemic changes in climate parameters. In 
recognising that climate change debates are dominated and even 
colonised by perspectives from the Global North, Dispatches from 
a Climate Change Frontline Country—Namibia, Southern Africa, 
comprises contributions from and about one country with heightened 
potential vulnerability to small changes in climate due to its status as an 
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arid or semi-arid ‘Global South’ country. These chapters are set against 
the background of amplified risk of climate change posed by present 
oil exploration in Namibia’s north-east Kavango Region, bordering 
Botswana, and current frenzied excitement within the oil industry that 
Namibia might “become the biggest oil story of the decade” (Leigh 2021), 
although the essays here do not explicitly address this rapidly shifting 
situation. The section builds on long-term research collaborations in 
Namibia by one of us (Sullivan).8
Selma Lendelvo and colleagues in the opening chapter for this 
section draw attention to a specific set of climate change-related 
interactions that pose particular implications for women in some 
rural areas of Namibia. ‘Gendered Climate Change-Induced Human-
Wildlife Conflicts amidst COVID-19 in Erongo Region, Namibia’ argues 
that the risks of climate change for drier countries have become more 
pronounced, with small increments in temperature changes considered 
to pose serious consequences for dry countries such as Namibia and 
neighbouring Botswana, both of which have experienced significant 
and sustained drought in recent years. Lendelvo and co-authors draw 
attention to one effect of such changes, namely the amplified intensity of 
interactions between people and wildlife, such as elephants, as drought 
in the drylands of west Namibia concentrates humans and wildlife 
around available water sources. They focus on some of the particular 
implications for women as a vulnerable social group that is bearing 
the brunt of climate change-induced ‘human-wildlife conflict’, and 
foreground how women here are adjusting to these pressures. In closing, 
Lendelvo and colleagues ask us to remember that climate change impacts 
are differentiated and that the most vulnerable social groups—women, 
the poor and others—tend not to be present at international round-table 
discussions such as COPs to share their experiences of dealing and living 
with the impacts of climate change in their daily lives. Their chapter is 
intended as a short communiqué to foreground the types of concerns 
8  We gratefully acknowledge here two research grants that have supported this 
international collaboration with Namibian researchers and contexts: Future Pasts 
(www.futurepasts.net, supported by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC), and Etosha-Kunene Histories (www.etosha-kunene-histories.
net) supported by the AHRC and the German Research Foundation (DFG).
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women in rural dryland communities might wish to voice if they were 
able to be present at COP26.
Rick Rohde and colleagues follow with ‘Environmental Change in 
Namibia: Land-Use Impacts and Climate Change as Revealed by Repeat 
Photography’, a chapter that draws attention to a specific environmental 
history methodology for understanding environmental change within 
a recent historical timeline. They demonstrate how repeat landscape 
photography can be used to explore and juxtapose different cultural and 
scientific understandings of environmental change and sustainability in 
west Namibia. Change in the landscape ecology of western and central 
Namibia over the last 140 years has been investigated using archival 
landscape photographs located and re-photographed or ‘matched’ with 
recent photographs. Each set of matched images for a site provides a 
powerful visual statement of change and/or stability that can assist 
with understanding present circumstances in specific places. Sometimes 
these image sets show trajectories of vegetation change that diverge 
from modelled climate change projections and scenarios, demonstrating 
the importance of drawing on multiple sources of information to 
contextualise, and perhaps complexify, projected and predicted 
environmental futures.
In ‘On Climate and the Risk of Onto-Epistemological Chainsaw 
Massacres: A Study on Climate Change and Indigenous People in 
Namibia Revisited’, Ute Dieckmann asks searching questions of what 
may be lost in the process of trying to translate indigenous environmental 
knowledges and experiences into internationally acknowledged scientific 
frameworks. She revisits a commissioned World Bank Trust Fund study 
on climate change and indigenous people in Namibia in which she was 
involved, to highlight the predicament of short-term ‘participatory’ 
research with indigenous communities on climate change, and the 
ways in which imposed conceptual frameworks may act to subordinate 
indigenous peoples’ ontologies to ‘western’ ontologies. She reflects that 
the ‘compartmentalising’ necessitated by such a methodology risks 
losing the most important aspects of indigenous ecological knowledge 
related to climate change, thereby perpetuating both climate and 
epistemic injustices.
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Governance
The fifth theme on Governance steps back into a ‘wide-angle’ view, 
emphasising that the failure to address global climate change so far has 
been a failure of governance at global and national levels. Contributions 
in this section reflect on this governance failure and outline a series of 
practical solutions for moving forwards, beyond COP26.
The section opens with ‘Towards a Fossil Fuel Treaty’ by Peter 
Newell, a clarion call for a new approach for tackling climate change 
that focuses explicitly on fossil fuels. Like Wright and Nyberg, Newell 
also highlights the power of fossil fuel lobbies to delay effective climate 
action, urging that it is time to reign in the power these actors have over 
our collective fate, through international agreements and laws which 
effectively and fairly leave large swathes of remaining fossil fuels in 
the ground. He proposes a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT) 
based, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the three pillars of 
non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use, as an instrument of 
international governance that could fulfil this purpose.
In ‘How Governments React to Climate Change: An Interview 
with the Political Theorists Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann’ by Isaac 
Chotiner, we republish an interview with leading theorists of climate 
change governance that considers how to approach the global politics 
of climate change. Their conversation foregrounds several different 
potential futures for our warming planet. They argue that a more 
forceful international order, or “Climate Leviathan”, is emerging, but 
warn that this configuration remains unlikely to mitigate catastrophic 
warming.
‘Inside Out COPs: Turning Climate Negotiations Upside Down’ 
by Shahrin Mannan and colleagues highlights the complexities of 
negotiations by the Conference of Parties (COP), observing that COP25, 
the longest in history, did not achieve its intended outcomes. Government 
negotiators failed to agree on core issues meaning that implementation 
of the Paris Agreement (COP21) has been pushed further away. COP 
negotiations tend to be dragged into overtime and appear inefficient, 
a perspective not helped by the arcane language of the adopted texts. 
The chapter advocates for the entire negotiating process to be rethought: 
through the alternative concept of ‘inside out’ COPs, wherein actions 
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on the ground to implement the Paris Agreement are given greater 
prominence than political negotiations around a patchwork of 
compromises for implementation. They affirm that many different 
actors, including civil society, private companies, cities, universities, 
indigenous communities, young people and others pressing for action, 
should be placed centre-stage in devising and delivering outcomes that 
may be more real than those spun in COP Agreement texts run through 
with constructed ambiguities.
Shifting towards governance by national governments, in ‘Local 
Net Zero Emissions Plans: How Can National Governments Help?’ Ian 
Bailey clarifies the support needed from national governments in order 
that local government bodies can act on urban and regional initiatives 
that catalyse capacity building, knowledge exchange, and practical 
action on climate change and other sustainability issues. Bailey affirms 
that while local government initiatives equally should not be viewed 
as a substitute for robust international and national action on climate 
change, they can provide important arenas for mobilising local actors, 
formulating policies and developing institutions to complement national 
strategies. This chapter examines three main areas where support from 
central governments for local climate change responses is needed: the 
creation of supportive national policy environments; ensuring local 
governments are enabled to exercise their delegated powers to influence 
emissions; and the provision of finance to support emissions-reduction 
activities.
In the final chapter for this section on governance, Paul Harris 
foregrounds relationships between global climate governance and 
climate justice. ‘Reversing the Failures of Climate Governance: Radical 
Action for Climate Justice’ again recognises that global governance of 
climate change has failed. Emissions of the greenhouse gas pollution 
that causes climate change are still increasing globally, and little has been 
done to help the most vulnerable communities adapt to the inevitable, 
potentially existential, impacts. Harris argues that radical action is 
needed to avert and cope with the most dangerous consequences of 
climate change but will require focused attention on identifying the most 
vital sources of failure in climate governance and overcoming them. He 
suggests that much, if not most, of the failure of climate governance 
can be attributed to a lack of multiple kinds of climate justice—a lack 
of ecological and environmental justice, a lack of social and distributive 
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justice, and a lack of international and global justice—and that averting 
climate catastrophe will require governance practices that embrace and 
implement all forms of climate justice.
Finance
Extending the theme of governance, our sixth section on Finance 
consists of two incisive essays regarding the complex roles of finance 
in climate change governance. Financing climate change mitigation and 
adaptation will be arguably a much bigger undertaking than what has 
been witnessed so far in terms of the global response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The financial resources needed to combat climate change are 
considered to be immense and the climate finance industry has been 
growing steadily over the past twenty years. As clarified by the chapters 
in this section, however, this growth does not in itself demonstrate 
success in terms of climate change management. The question of how 
to design and institute sustainable climate finance futures that are also 
equitable remains. Is it possible to do this in a capitalist global economy 
that tends towards the concentration of financial(ised) assets, and the 
fetishised concealment of multiple contradictions?
Sarah Bracking’s opening chapter in this section grapples head-on 
with these contradictions. ‘Climate Finance and the Promise of Fake 
Solutions to Climate Change’ illuminates how promises of money from 
global institutions and governments have financialised people’s hopes 
and expectations of government action to adapt to climate change 
and slow the emission of greenhouse gases. Bracking asserts that the 
cultural power of money in our understanding of the world means that 
climate finance has had the particular effect of signifying action while 
delivering very little. She argues that moving forwards with the actual 
material changes to energy, infrastructure, production and income 
distribution lying at the heart of an effective response to climate change 
will require acceptance that largely fictional promises of money that 
“can change things” are a phantasmagorical expression of meaning 
acting as a “firewall” that prevents real change. The essay traces the 
small disbursement figures for the main pots of climate finance. In 
doing so, Bracking offers a stringent critique of the obfuscating power of 
the language of finance and its propositions in the financing of climate 
change governance.
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Rami Kaplan and David Levy’s chapter on ‘The Promise and Peril 
of Financialised Climate Governance’ emphasises the rise of investor-
driven, “financialised governance” of corporate practices in relation 
to the natural environment. Investors and investment managers are 
demonstrating greater concern that the value of assets, from stock 
markets to real estate, is increasingly subject to climate risks. Financialised 
climate governance (FCG) puts investors and fund managers at the 
centre of efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, which suggests both 
the promise and peril of this advanced form of “climate capitalism”. 
They describe these developments and point towards the peril that 
relying on investors and business self-interest is unlikely to result in the 
rapid structural shifts needed for full decarbonisation.
Action(s)
The volume’s final section on Action(s) extends the practical and 
affirmative suggestions made elsewhere in the book to foreground 
specific proposals for negotiating responses that are both effective and 
equitable in addressing and averting the climate crisis.
Peter North’s opening question ‘What Is to Be Done to Save the 
Planet?’ is a good place to start. The essay reviews the impacts of 
radical social movement activity on the climate based on observations 
over the past fifteen years or so. It considers experiences of grassroots 
prefiguration and experimentation such as transition initiatives, 
experiments for eco-localisation, and small business networks, 
contrasting these initiatives with more antagonistic, direct, action-based 
movements such as the climate camps, mobilisations around the COPs 
and Extinction Rebellion. The intervention concludes by discussing the 
perceived efficacy of these varied movements, suggesting a need for 
more strategic action to effect system change via a ‘Green New Deal’.
In ‘Climate Politics between Conflict and Complexity’, Matthew 
Paterson similarly foregrounds how climate politics needs both 
moments of sharp, highly politicising, even over-simplifying moves 
to keep pressure up, but at the same time a sort of patient, careful 
attention to the complexity of socio-technical systems to work out how 
to generate radical shifts in infrastructure and practice. He observes 
that these different logics are in tension: the post-political/agonistic 
logic can reduce to slogans and deflect from how society may become 
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decarbonised in practical terms; the observance of how to effect change 
through complex socio-technical systems can culminate in technocratic 
projects. Paterson’s chapter navigates the question of how to keep both 
these logics and their affirmative engagements alive in political praxis 
linked with climate change.
Rebecca Sandover’s chapter on ‘Sustainable Foodscapes: Hybrid Food 
Networks Creating Food Change’ connects food production practices 
specifically with climate change governance, asserting that food matters, 
from modes of production to global supply chains, to what we eat and 
how we address food waste. Considering that Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU) activities account for some 21–37% of total 
net anthropogenic GHG emissions it is clear that food practices shape 
not only climate and ecological breakdown but also human health and 
well-being including within our food producing communities, and in 
issues associated with unequal access to food, food justice and animal 
welfare. Sandover’s chapter foregrounds in particular how place-based 
community groups have been self-organising and connecting with 
different national organisations whose campaigns overlap to form 
hybrid food networks, in the midst of a present food policy vacuum in 
England. It explores the dynamic potential of these hybrid networks in 
working towards place-based sustainable food solutions through a case 
study of Devon.
In ‘Telling the “Truth”: Communication of the Climate Protest 
Agenda in the UK Legacy Media’, Sharon Gardham draws on the results 
of a thematic discourse analysis of UK media coverage of climate strike 
actions that took place in 2019, reflecting on the importance for the wider 
adoption of climate protest messages of how protester claims-making 
and identity are framed. Gardham’s chapter revisits a key question 
for the organisers of such protests regarding how they can overcome 
the potential conflict between ensuring their actions pass the test of 
newsworthiness required to ensure media attention, without failing the 
tests of claims-making legitimisation necessary for an issue to become 
accepted as a societal problem that requires urgent resolution.
Picking up themes considered elsewhere in the volume regarding 
climate justice, Patrick Bond, in ‘Climate Justice Advocacy: Strategic 
choices for Glasgow and Beyond’, urges “non-reformist reforms” in 
climate action. He critiques the lack of ambition and action in the main 
UN processes, but also critically analyses the ‘Glasgow Agreement’ 
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promoted by leading civil society activist groups. Drawing parallels 
with South Africa’s resistance strategies to defeat apartheid, he calls for 
climate justice movements to similarly not cave in to the internal logic of 
the climate governance system, instead confronting its core dynamics by 
delegitimising the system of oppression on which it is overlain. What we 
need, instead, he argues, is to give confidence to critical ideas and social 
forces that can question climate capitalism wholesale. 
In the penultimate chapter of the book, Lorraine Whitmarsh reviews 
‘Public Engagement with Radical Climate Change Action’, arguing that 
it is a mistake to understand people’s role only in terms of their actions 
as consumers of apparently low-carbon products and urging that it is 
critical that people are also engaged as political, social and professional 
actors to achieve the scale of societal transformation needed. Whitmarsh 
discusses the varied roles the public can play in decision-making 
and in taking rapid and radical climate action, their current levels of 
engagement with climate change, and how to foster further public 
action. She lands her chapter on a positive note: affirming that we have 
a unique opportunity now to build back society post-COVID-19 in a 
way that might lock in low-carbon habits created during the pandemic, 
and that builds on the growing social mandate for bold policy action to 
support sustainable lifestyles.
We close this collection with a republished intervention by artist-
activists Isabelle Fremeaux and Jay Jordan. Their text clarifies––with 
poetic and gritty integrity––their choice to publicly refuse participation 
in an event (Agir Pour le Vivant / Action for the Living, in Arles in France, 
August 2020) on the grounds of the dissonance between the event’s 
intentions and its sponsorship by a series of fossil fuel extractors and 
financiers. ‘Five Questions whilst Walking’ invites consideration of the 
sorts of choices that need to be made if we are collectively to walk away 
from the forces propelling global climate crisis.
***
Clearly, no book could be completely comprehensive regarding climate 
change, the multifaceted challenges it poses, and societal responses to 
these challenges. This book is rather posed as an intervention, collecting 
together indicative contributions regarding what social scientists, 
humanities scholars and climate activists around the world think needs 
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to be done in terms of both understanding why climate action has failed 
to dramatically reduce emissions to date, and proposing some routes 
towards radical climate change action now. That is, the book is intended 
to provide an affirmative set of ideas about what is to be done and how 
it can be done, to bring about radical climate change governance so that 
we have a chance of avoiding runaway climate change.
We are publishing this collection of essays in the months leading 
up to the high-profile and eagerly awaited COP26 UN climate change 
conference, due to take place in Glasgow (Scotland, UK) in November 
2021. At this conference, all the major stakeholders of the global climate 
change negotiation process will be present, including heads of state, 
large national government delegations, policy advisers, NGO and social 
movement activists, multinational corporations, industry associations, 
and inter-governmental institutions. There will be significant media 
interest in COP26, reaching millions of people around the world, linked, 
for example, with the re-entering of the agreement by the US, the newly 
entwined crises of COVID-19 and climate change, and negotiations 
around the form and content of Green New Deal proposals. We hope 
that this collection of essays will contribute to this discussion. 
Despite more than thirty years of high-level, global talks on climate 
change, we are still seeing emissions rising dramatically around the 
world. Whatever we have done on this planet in terms of climate 
mitigation over the past thirty plus years has not worked. Given that 
most climate scientists believe we are soon running out of time, the 
authors contributing to this volume ask what has gone wrong and what 
now needs to be done. We hope the essays collated here will help us 
move more radically and urgently in the direction needed.
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1. One Earth, Many Futures,  
No Destination
Mike Hulme
Since the first Earth Day, more than half a century ago, it has 
become clear that it is easier to generate scientific insight into the 
ways human systems and behaviours are altering the planet, than 
it is to redirect those human systems to lessen their planetary 
impact. At the heart of this conundrum are divergent human 
values.
Earth Day 19701
More than fifty years ago, twenty million Americans gathered in 
public streets, squares and parks across America to demonstrate their 
concern about the state of the planet. The first Earth Day rode the 
tide of late 1960s radicalism and protest in Western democracies and 
sought to “force the environmental issue into the political dialogue 
of the nation” (Lewis 1990: 10). Although it succeeded in doing so, 
and continues to do so more widely today in a very different world, 
it is questionable whether the larger ambitions of 1970 Earth Day to 
bring about a more sustainable civilisation have been met, not least 
with respect to a changing climate.
There is a paradox here. In the half century since 1970 it has been 
relatively easy for science to bring forward knowledge about the 
1  This article was first published as Mike Hulme, ‘One Earth, Many Futures, No 
Destination’, One Earth, 2(4) (2020), 309–11, Copyright Elsevier. It has been lightly 
edited for this book volume.
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dynamics of the Earth system and identify the dangers of unmitigated 
climate change, knowledge that has now gained widespread public and 
political attention. And yet it has been manifestly harder to use such 
knowledge to orchestrate and deliver systematic change in the human 
sphere to mitigate future climatic risks. 
In this essay I seek to analyse what is sometimes referred to as this 
‘knowledge-action gap’ in three steps. First, I explain why facts alone 
can never be sufficient to drive policy and, second, I show that the facts 
of climate change can be consistent with different stories—sometimes 
radically different stories—that embody people’s beliefs about the 
past, present and future. Third, this then explains why what I call 
‘climate solutionism’ is the wrong framework within which to operate. 
I conclude by suggesting a focus less on the destination—i.e., ‘stopping 
climate change’—and more on enhancing the political conditions of the 
journeying.
Why Facts Are Not Enough
As recently argued or observed, ‘listening to the science’ would appear 
to be the sine qua non of the new wave of climate protest movements 
(Schinko 2020; Kenis 2021). Making sure that “objective facts” are laid 
“on the table” is believed to put pressure on “obstructionist states” 
to deliver political change (Schinko 2020: 22). Or as the late Rajendra 
Pachauri asserted back in November 2014 at the launch of the IPCC’s 
5th Assessment Report, “all we need is the will to change, which 
we trust will be motivated by … an understanding of the science of 
climate change”. This ‘science first’ argument guides the consensus 
messaging campaign that seeks to emphasise above all else the 
“97% of scientists” who agree that human actions are changing the 
world’s climate. It also leads cognitive psychologists such as Stephan 
Lewandowsky to develop climate science communication strategies 
based on “inoculation theory” (Cook et al. 2017). This theory asserts 
that people can be made immune to falsehoods by being exposed, 
ahead of time, to those falsehoods they are most likely to encounter on 
social media and elsewhere.
But facts are never enough. With regard to climate change, seeking 
merely to ‘hit the numbers’—whichever one you choose: 2°C, 1.5°C, 
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350ppm, net zero—is not enough. It fuels what I have elsewhere 
called “climate reductionism” (Hulme 2011) and “climate deadline-
ism” (Asayama et al. 2019) and encourages the type of “climate 
solutionism” of which I am critical (see below). ‘Closed’ timetables 
and emergency imperatives fail to respect the diverse moral horizons 
that characterise—and complicate—the difficult politics of climate 
change. Mere technique and technology crowds out wider explorations 
of human meaning and ethical purpose. Dan Sarewitz explains the 
flaw in this position: 
[…] our expectations for Enlightenment ideals of applied rationality 
are themselves irrational. We are asking science to do the impossible: to 
arrive at scientifically coherent and politically unifying understandings 
of problems that are inherently open, indeterminate and contested 
(Sarewitz 2017: para. 25). 
Which Story?
Establishing scientific facts about climate change (or offering scientific 
projections of future change) does not on its own drive political change. 
Consensus messaging, for example, fails to work because risk is socially 
constructed and value driven. So, if, as Sarewitz says, climate change 
is “inherently open, indeterminate and contested”, if in fact there is a 
surfeit of competing narratives each with different solutions to climate 
change, what should be our strategy? What are the wider resources 
beyond science—the motivational moral commitments that Jürgen 
Habermas refers to as “missing” in secularist societies (Habermas 
2010)—that can enact and guide change? To illustrate what may be 
missing, I suggest below four different meta-narratives—guiding myths 
if you will, or ideologies—which are advocated by different voices to 
guide action in response to climate change. They differ from each other 
in various ways, sometimes profoundly. These future visions are rooted 
in different cultural values and often are antagonistic to each other 
(also see Dieckmann’s and Sullivan’s chapters, this volume). But they 
are similar in so far as they each require science and technology to be 
placed in a subservient role to their normative vision of how the world 
should be.
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The first of these I group loosely under the label of ‘eco-modernism’. 
The argument here is that modernity can, so to speak, both have its cake 
and eat it. Yes, climate change is an outcome of rapid and penetrating 
technological expansion and economic and population growth. But 
it is through adjusting and redirecting these very great achievements 
of modernity towards more just and ecologically sensitive ends that 
climate change can be arrested. Thus, for example, the Ecomodernist 
Manifesto claims that humans need to use all their “growing social, 
economic, and technological powers to make life better for people, 
stabilise the climate, and protect the natural world” (Asafu-Adjaye 
2015: 6). 
A second ideology—or motivational discourse—is that of ‘ecological 
civilisation’. In essence, ecological civilisation is seen as the final goal 
of social, cultural and environmental reform within a given society. It 
argues that the changes to be wrought by climate change in the future 
can only be headed off through an entirely new form of civilisation, one 
based centrally on ecological principles. There are radically different 
techno and romantic versions of this envisioned future. The techno 
version of ecological civilisation has been embedded since 2012 in 
China’s Communist Party’s constitution. But it is very different from 
the romantic version espoused by deep ecologists and new cultural 
movements such as the Dark Mountain Project, which seek an unweaving 
of the core tenets of Western civilisation (Kingsnorth and Hine 2014). 
A third narrative guiding political action in response to the challenges 
of climate change is the radical eco-socialist critique of capitalism. 
Following Naomi Klein’s 2015 book This Changes Everything: Climate vs 
Capitalism, this has been articulated even more decisively by the new 
social movement Extinction Rebellion (XR) and in some versions of the 
Green New Deal (Pettifor 2019). XR have a clear belief that the only 
adequate response to climate change is the overturning of the social 
order and the capitalist economic system. The real enemy of a stable and 
benign climate is ‘racialised capitalism’ and its fetishing of economic 
growth and the centralisation of wealth and power that capitalism fuels. 
XR is rooted in what for many are the political extremisms of anarchism, 
eco-socialism and radical anti-capitalist environmentalism. The ‘civil 
resistance model’ espoused by XR is intended to achieve mass protest 
accompanied by law-breaking, leading eventually to the disruption of 
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“business-as-usual” through the movement’s calls to “tell the truth”, 
“act now” and “go beyond politics”2 (see discussion in Gardham, this 
volume). 
A fourth guiding myth was given new focus in 2015 through the 
publication of Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato ‘Si: On Care for our Common 
Home (Pope Francis 2015). Here, the facts of climate change ‘reveal’ an 
emaciation of the human spirit which is having adverse repercussions for 
the material world. Pope Francis is concerned first and foremost to offer a 
vision of human dignity, responsibility and purpose. He draws upon the 
rich traditions of Catholic theology and ethics, notably the idea of virtue 
ethics which is valorised above utilitarian and deontological modes of 
ethical reasoning.3 On Care for our Common Home offers a powerful story, 
an inspirational account of divine goodness and healthy human living. 
It escapes the confines of a narrowly-drawn science and economics and 
shows the power, vitality and inspiration of a Christian worldview. Pope 
Francis draws attention to the centrality for the Christian faith of the 
idea of transformation, claiming “the ecological crisis is also a summons 
to profound interior conversion” (Pope Francis 2015: 158).
These ideologies offer different motivational commitments to 
tackling climate change and guide political action and public policy 
in different ways. For example, securing ‘green growth’ through a 
reformed capitalism is incommensurable with the eco-socialist ambition 
to dismantle the fetishism of growth upon which capitalism relies. 
Tackling climate change through inner spiritual transformation sits 
uneasily with the techno-modern vision of an ecological civilisation 
espoused by China’s Communist Party. The Dark Mountain Project 
wants ‘less’ modernity; eco-modernists want ‘more’. These meta-
narratives illustrate why providing a coordinated global roadmap for 
climate action to deliver the 2°C target, in which all the pieces dovetail 
neatly into a single jigsaw, is not achievable.
2  Editors’ note: see https://extinctionrebellion.uk/ and https://rebellion.global/. 
3  Editors’ note: virtue ethics focus on the morally virtuous dispositions of individuals 
that contribute to the flourishing of society more broadly, in contrast with a 
focus on actions designed for the purpose of generating broadly useful outcomes 
(utilitarian), or so as to be morally right in themselves, regardless of consequences 
(deontological). 
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Against Climate Solutionism
The belief that climate change can be solved can be traced back to its 
emergence in public life following the 1970 Earth Day as the latest in 
a series of environmental challenges facing the modern world. These 
challenges grew in scale from the merely local to the regional and 
then to the global. Climate change was in a line which can be traced 
back to Rachel Carson’s intervention in the early 1960s about DDT 
(Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) and chemical pesticides, and which 
then progressed through concerns about river and ocean pollution, 
smog, acid rain, the ozone hole and, eventually, in the late 1980s to the 
fully-developed awareness of the challenge of global climate change. 
Although inheriting this problem/solution framing, what ‘solving’ 
climate change actually means has always been harder to establish. It is 
not as simple as eradicating DDT, installing sulphur scrubbers on power 
stations or eliminating CFCs (Chlorofluorocarbons). 
Uniting behind science, putting ‘objective facts on the table’ and 
thinking that solutions will flow naturally from them—what I mean by 
‘climate solutionism’—will not do. Science on its own offers no moral 
vision, no ethical stance, no political architecture for delivering the sort 
of world people desire. As Amanda Machin and Alexander Ruser have 
recently argued, 
[…] emblematic numbers and the production of political thresholds, 
targets and truths will not smooth out or settle down the political 
disputes over climate change. The reliance upon emblematic numbers 
may ignite a sense of urgency, but it may also fuel the suspicion of 
politicians, scientists and climate change policy (Machin and Ruser 2019: 
223).
My examples above of different meta-narratives which give meaning 
to climate change show that the solutions to climate change are under-
determined by the facts. In other words, climate change is a wicked 
problem (Hulme 2009), a problem that has no definitive formulation and 
no imaginable solution. Wicked problems are insoluble in the sense that 
solutions to one aspect of the problem reveal or create other, even more 
complex, problems which in turn demand further solutions. Proposed 
solutions to climate change can only ever be partial; they set in train 
secondary and tertiary consequences which always exceed what can be 
anticipated. This is the condition pointed to by the nomenclature of the 
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Anthropocene: namely, the modernist instinct for mastery, planning, 
optimisation and control is no longer an appropriate paradigm for 
living in the world of the twenty-first century. 
Climate solutionism, driven by metrics, masks the contested politics 
and values diversity that lie behind different personal and collective 
choices—who wins, who loses, whose values count. It is a form of moral 
attenuation. Metrics are alluring because they simplify complex realities 
into ‘objective’ numbers and because they appear to short-circuit the 
need for difficult moral judgement. Metrification “may make a troubling 
situation more salient, without making it more soluble” (Muller 
2018: 183). The circulation of ubiquitous carbon metrics operates as a 
facilitative and immanent mode of power. Morality by numbers also 
marginalises other modes of moral reasoning which cannot be reduced 
to calculation (also see chapters by Durand-Delacre et al. and Hannis, 
this volume). These other modes offer richer narrative contexts that 
enable the wisdom of different choices to be deliberated, interpreted 
and judged. Wise governance of climate—as indeed in the application 
of wisdom in everyday life—emerges best when rooted in larger and 
thicker stories about human purpose, identity, duty and responsibility. 
No Destination 
We have reached beyond a stage (if there ever was one) when steering 
the planet towards some long-term commonly agreed normative goal or 
benign state was feasible. At best, consensus messaging and inoculation 
theory may yield a thin veneer of agreement about the reality of human-
caused climate change. But there is no trick that will force a convergence 
of human values. The stories people tell about themselves, their past, 
their futures, their place on the planet will continue to divide. Mobilising 
some new “solution science” (Doubleday and Connell 2020) resting on a 
putative cultural authority of science will not eradicate political conflict. 
We live on one Earth, but we imagine many futures and hence are not 
susceptible to alignment of our actions toward securing a common 
single destination.
We rather have to abandon the dream that a sustainable ecological 
equilibrium that works for everyone can be designed, implemented and 
reached. Securing a predetermined agreed destination, such as the 2°C 
target, is an illusion; delivering “Earth system management” (as proposed 
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by Schellnhuber and Tóth 1999) is a chimera. What should be aimed 
for are less ambitious, more incremental and multi-scalar projects, that 
emerge from a humbler disposition toward the future and anticipating 
perverse outcomes. These interventions should be driven from the bottom 
up rather than by a top-down narrative of securing a singular global 
target. For example, there are many different local, culturally-sensitive 
policies that can be designed to progress toward securing one or more of 
the 169 UN Sustainable Development Targets. These interventions do not 
rely upon globally coordinated action, nor a commitment to one shared 
ideology, nor do they measure success according to just one index. 
The corollary of this disposition is that investing in new participatory 
and agonistic forms of democracy (Mouffe 2006), where value-conflicts 
and political disagreements are acknowledged, voiced and worked 
with, is as important—perhaps more important—than investing in new 
scientific or technical knowledge. There is a balance to be struck between 
the twin dangers of, on the one hand, the crisis politics of emergency and, 
on the other, perpetually ‘kicking the can down the road’. But good politics 
requires agonistic listening—the pursuit of what Nicholas Rescher (1993) 
calls ‘acquiescence’ in a decision—rather than consensual agreement. 
Have all interested parties been heard? Has their case been understood? 
Have their concerns been recognised? Over-emphasising the epistemic 
force of narrow science-based indicators—like global temperature or net 
zero emissions, or the emotional rhetoric of ‘only 10 more years’—are 
poor substitutes or short-cuts for political forms of closure. 
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2. From Efficiency to Resilience: 
Systemic Change towards 
Sustainability after the COVID-19 
Pandemic
M. Halme, E. Furman, E.-L. Apajalahti, J. J. K. Jaakkola, L. 
Linnanen, J. Lyytimäki, M. Mönkkönen, A. O. Salonen, K. 
Soini, K. Siivonen, T. Toivonen and A.Tolvanen
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the vulnerability of 
current socio-economic systems and thrown into question the 
dominant global paradigm geared towards short-term financial 
efficiency. Although it has been acknowledged for several decades 
that this paradigm has detrimental impacts on the climate, the 
environment and global welfare, the pandemic has now offered 
a grim ‘rehearsal round’ for more serious crises that are to come 
with the accelerating climate emergency, loss of biodiversity 
and growing human inequalities. Along with worsening climate 
change, there are looming risks for mass migrations and armed 
conflicts as habitats capable of supporting human wellbeing 
become scarce, such as through the loss of potable water, an 
increasing lack of suitable land for agriculture, or the rise of 
unliveable temperatures. Although the COVID-19 pandemic 
has temporarily decreased some of the climate impacts, e.g. in 
the energy and transportation sectors, it has at the same time 
accelerated several global welfare problems. In this chapter, 
we claim that the way out of the crisis scenario is to replace 
© 2021 Minna Halme et al., CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.02
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the dominant efficiency paradigm with a resilience paradigm. 
Against the backbone of the key societal systems outlined in the 
Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR 2019), we show 
how the pursuit of narrowly-defined efficiency hampers present 
and future sustainability, and chart some key actions on the path 
to transforming these systems towards resilience.
The Problem of Extreme Efficiency
The efficiency paradigm ruling global business has led to the 
dominance of global trade and supply networks, in which a British 
citizen is dependent on medicine manufactured only in China, or in 
which a citizen of the Nordic countries, in the barren midwinter, buys 
tulips grown in Kenya by Dutch companies, and Brazilian farmers 
depend on seeds supplied by multinational corporations. Efficiency 
has become a taken-for-granted organising principle for the global 
economy (Martin 2019), meaning we seldom pause to think about the 
‘costs’—widely defined—accompanying the efficiency of the current 
global economy. Many times, efficiency actually refers to low cost—
cheap clothes, electronics, food—but often not to better products with 
lower overall costs. Efficiency often generates what in economics are 
called ‘externalities’—uncosted costs or benefits for third parties, 
including ‘the environment’—and has limited capacity to bring about 
a reduction in use of natural resources and accumulation of waste on 
a global scale (also see Lankford, this volume). Furthermore, gains in 
efficiency leading to lower prices are likely to be offset by increased 
consumption, which in turn has led to increased overall emissions 
and resource use (Heindl and Kanschik 2016; Alcott 2005), and 
compromised the resilience of economic and ecological systems (Martin 
2019) (recognising that these ‘systems’ are also interconnected). 
The Socio-Ecological Price of Efficiency
On the social side, the efficiency paradigm has led to the exploitation 
of those that have weak negotiating power in the (global) marketplace. 
Despite the benefits that international trade has brought to a number of 
people, trade also comes with externalities, such as salaries pushed below 
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a living wage, human rights violations in supply chains, and increasing 
economic inequality (GSDR 2019, authored by Independent Group 
of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General, Global Sustainable 
Development Report 2019; Shorrocks et al. 2016). The sharpening 
inequalities indicate that efficiency currently disproportionately benefits 
those in power: executives and shareholders of global firms or local 
elites in developing countries. 
On the ecological front, efficiency as the organising principle 
externalises costs related to climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, 
and dwindling natural resources. One of the key enablers of efficiency is 
incomprehensible and weak environmental legislation that allows these 
externalities to exist, creating possibilities for companies and consumers 
to avoid paying the costs of environmental damage such as carbon 
emissions that will be borne by society as a whole, and making the slow 
response to climate change “the biggest environmental market failure 
in human history” (Auffhammer 2018). This dynamic is exacerbated by 
global supply chains, in which a company headquartered in a country 
with stronger environmental legislation can take advantage of lax 
environmental laws in supplier countries. 
Towards Resilience 
The COVID-19 pandemic has made visible the vulnerabilities of current 
efficiency-based systems, and generated an urgent need to create more 
resilient societies. Resilience can be defined as a symbiosis of human and 
natural systems that can support one another to survive and transform 
through natural and manmade shocks (Walker et al. 2004; Elmqvist et 
al. 2019). This means that the processes of natural systems are sustained 
by supportive societal actions, and social systems are sustained by well-
functioning natural systems. The Global Sustainable Development Report 
(GSDR 2019) proposes a universal framework for transforming six 
connected dimensions of societal organisation towards sustainability. In 
the rest of this essay, we provide a rough idea of how extreme efficiency 
hampers these six systems and how they could be organised so as to 
lock-in greater resilience.
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1. Economy
Current global trade has been widely extolled as a prime example of 
efficiency, but its efficiency gains do not materialise at the whole system 
level. Mainstream business models are based on selling high volumes 
of easily breakable products and many externalities follow from low-
cost sourcing in countries with lax regulations and old technologies. 
Further, global freight shipping, one of the cornerstones of global trade, 
comes with an ecological price: its CO2 emissions would make it the 
ninth biggest country in the world (EU Edgar database) and its NOx 
emissions make thousands of people ill annually. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the vulnerability of global 
supply chains: when one part of the chain is disabled, negative impacts 
are felt by many (O’Rourke 2014). When China closes down factories 
that manufacture up to 70% of ingredients of common drugs, or India 
limits exports of drugs like paracetamol or popular antibiotics, those 
in need of medicines in the Global South, but also in the US or Europe, 
suffer the consequences. Further, the efficiency quest has made us believe 
that labour is an expense that should be minimised. At its extreme, the 
low-wage trend has meant that employees cannot make a living with 
their wages, and need social benefits. As a result, the wider economy 
suffers when taxpayers end up paying employers’ costs. In societies 
with no social benefits available, the low-wagers suffer from unfulfilled 
basic needs. In a resilient economy firms would focus on long-term 
productivity. Means to avoid the above negative impacts include curbing 
the excess concentration of ever larger firms, re-deploying smart trade 
barriers and reducing the widening wealth gaps that breed social unrest 
and populism (Edelman Trust Barometer 2020). Curbing the size of 
firms would leave room for smaller, often innovative, competitor firms 
and, through firm diversity and genuine competition, build resilience 
at the system level (Martin 2019). Reducing the dominance of large 
corporations would pave the way for a resilient economy where other 
stakeholders could bargain for institutions, which in turn could divide 
economic benefits more justly (Piketty 2013). 
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2. Food
The efficiency-driven agricultural system, based on large monoculture 
farming, commercial fertilisers, chemical pest control, fossil fuels and 
global logistics, comes with underlying problems of loss of fertile top 
soils and biodiversity, large-scale use of antibiotics in meat production 
and the subsequent threat of antibiotic resistance in humans, and the 
lack of affordable, healthy food. As a result, the number of people 
suffering from severe food insecurity is about 750 million, and about 
two billion people lack regular access to nutritious and sufficient food, 
whereas at the same time, about two billion people suffer from obesity 
and related illnesses, including thirty-eight million children (FAO, 
IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO 2020). Resilience can be built instead by 
localising food production (as also argued by Sandover, this volume), 
switching to organic farming and agroforestry to provide alternatives 
to monocultures, increasing the organic matter content in soils, and 
carbon sequestration through the agroecological practices adapted to 
local conditions. Ensuring land property rights and other support for 
the 600–750 million smallholder farmers that are likely to be operating 
in 2030 will be a key component of a resilient food system (Thornton et 
al. 2018). The COVID-19 pandemic may have led to 83–132 million more 
undernourished people in 2020 (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO 
2020). Acknowledging that modern agriculture and food production 
cannot escape the realities of ecological food chains is key for preventing 
the emergence and spread of vector-borne diseases. A shift toward 
plant-based diets adds resilience by reducing the high demand for land 
for livestock, the climate impacts of meat production, and the overuse 
of antibiotics, and also supports innovations against food loss in local 
production chains by enhancing the viability of local businesses. 
3. Energy
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the weaknesses of the 
current centralised fossil fuel paradigm. During the first quarters of the 
pandemic, coal demand fell by 8% and oil demand fell by 5%, leading 
to serious financial crises for fossil fuel-based energy producers (Global 
Energy Review 2020). At the same time, the demand for renewable 
energy continued to grow due to a larger installed capacity and priority 
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dispatch1 (Global Energy Review 2020). Three persistent structural 
vulnerabilities were revealed in our fossil fuel-dependent economy and 
energy systems. First, declining system efficiency is a result of decreases 
in Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of fossil fuels. This means that, 
although oil deposits exist, extracting oil is becoming increasingly costly 
and difficult with larger environmental damage. Second, the rebound 
effects of improving energy efficiency have decreased emissions per 
unit, but the absolute amount of emissions continues to increase. Third, 
indirect energy use, i.e. energy embedded in products and services, 
continues to grow due to increasing consumption and global trade. 
Moving from a centralised fossil fuel-based structure toward distributed 
renewable energy systems will be key to enabling more resilient energy 
systems. Resilience provided by off-grid technologies and localising 
energy production and consumption (O’Brien and Hope 2010) will 
be critical for mitigating the poor infrastructure in large urban centres, 
extending the grid to rural areas and enhancing just, secure, and 
affordable energy for all. Furthermore, reducing consumption-based 
carbon footprints with new sufficiency measures will be important in 
order to reach climate targets (see Linnanen et al. 2020). 
4. Urbanisation
COVID-19 has hit the 4.2 billion people living in cities around the 
world particularly hard. Dense urban structures have made urban areas 
hotspots of virus spread. This situation highlights the need to rethink 
urban structures from a new, more local perspective, embracing resilience 
over efficiency. Maximising urban efficiency from the viewpoint of 
infrastructure and economics easily leads to urban environments 
with fewer green areas, sparse service networks, long commutes and 
distant food production. Cities that have emphasised human scale in 
their planning are likely to be more resilient, not only during crises 
like pandemics but also when confronting disturbances from climate 
events. Furthermore, diversity in urban structure and flexible use of 
buildings and open areas are beneficial for cities and citizens in general 
(Jacobs 1961), because neighbourhoods with high social capital are able 
to provide a support network and social resilience. Well-functioning, 
1  Editors’ note: wherein the dispatch of energy from renewable generators is 
prioritised ahead of other generators.
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locally connected administrations equipped with up-to-date data 
and analytical practices are also considered crucial for increasing the 
resilience of cities and their populations. Planning cities for people goes 
hand-in-hand with building more sustainable and resilient cities that 
are also better prepared for future crises. 
 5. Human Wellbeing and Capabilities
From the perspective of extreme efficiency seeking, the main roles for 
humans are top-performing professionals, cheap labour and consumers 
constantly buying new products and services. Individuals who do 
not meet these standards become framed as ‘friction’ in an otherwise 
efficient system. In organisational contexts, performance measurement, 
with its roots in industrial efficiency, has penetrated to all sectors, 
including healthcare and education. Each societal actor assesses their 
actions based on the efficiency and profitability of only their own sector. 
Maximisation of efficiency in the short run, however, leads to inefficiency 
in the long term, as well as to a lack of holistic wellbeing. The illusion 
of efficiency contributes to the crises of our time and risks reducing the 
capabilities of humanity in total. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed 
the lack of resilience also in societies with substantial material wealth. 
It has widened inequalities that affect wellbeing, e.g. between different 
categories of labour: some people can work from home, others, often 
in low-paid jobs and more vulnerable positions based on their socio-
economic income levels, cannot. This has resulted in situations where 
people working in low-paid jobs either lost their income completely or 
were exposed to the virus. Resilience can be strengthened by supporting 
the agency and diversity of human capabilities, sustaining cultural 
practices connected to identities, raising awareness about ecological 
problems connected to remediating practices, as well as by fostering 
global belonging and ecological citizenship (Duxbury et al. 2017). 
Instituting lower pay differentials and a basic income for all would also 
increase human wellbeing and create space for capability building. 
A holistic view of health and wellbeing is needed to complement 
specialised healthcare and contribute to a substantial shift from curative 
to preventive action and to increase preparedness, so as to improve the 
resilience of communities, societies and humanity in the face of grand 
challenges.
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 6. Global Environmental Commons
Economic growth has been largely enabled through intensive and 
wide-scale exploitation of resources in terrestrial and ocean ecosystems. 
Thus, global environmental commons provide ‘source material’ for the 
efficiency paradigm and are also where the consequent externalities are 
most visible. Despite relative efficiency gains, since 1970 global material 
extraction has more than tripled (Oberle et al. 2019) to fulfil the needs 
of the growing population and higher economic growth. Species loss, 
habitat destruction, pollution, the spread of invasive species, and 
climate change reflect the overexploitation of Earth’s resources, which 
constitutes a threat to human health and wellbeing (Montanarella et al. 
2018). By threatening the environmental commons, we are also enabling 
emerging zoonotic2 diseases. The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasised 
how human wellbeing is intimately connected with the wellbeing of the 
natural environment. Increasing resilience in this system calls for active 
measures aimed at a putative ‘no-net loss’ in biodiversity and other 
environmental commons. Proposals include the conservation of large 
parts of the Earth (Wilson 2016), and the restoration of certain degraded 
habitats to fully compensate for the loss and degradation of habitats 
elsewhere (Moilanen and Kotiaho 2018). These bold conservation 
objectives, however, conflict with other demands for land use.3 Thus, 
even though it is likely that increased resilience in the five other systems 
will have positive impacts on global environmental commons, resilience 
requires concerted cross-sectorial action, e.g. tackling the drivers of land-
use change. For example, without the above outlined transformation of 
the food system, the protection of global biodiversity will be in conflict 
with affordable food provision (Leclère et al. 2020).
2  Zoonotic diseases are diseases that “pass from an animal or insect to a human. Some 
don’t make the animal sick but will sicken a human” (see https://www.healthline.
com/health/zoonosis).
3  Editors’ note: such proposals also require caution since they can act to devalue land-
use practices and modes of production by communities who may have sustained 
biodiversity over the long term.
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Conclusions: Towards a Resilience Transformation
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the fundamental problems in 
current efficiency-driven, global socio-economic systems. A way out is to 
promote radical changes in the six key systems discussed in this chapter 
(GSDR 2019), so as to foster a transition towards resilience. Mitigating 
climate change is not simply a case of reducing emissions, but rather 
requires parallel changes in all of the six global systems discussed here. 
Despite posing a major threat to humanity, the COVID-19 crisis also 
paradoxically gives us hope that this kind of change is possible. First, 
the forced economic slowdown has demonstrated that considerable and 
rapid changes in emissions and pollution levels to reduce climate impacts 
are possible, but require considerable alteration and transformation of 
the current efficiency paradigm to make the impact durable. Second, and 
more importantly, the reactions to COVID-19 in many countries have 
shown that it is possible to change behaviours fast when the evidence 
shows that current paths are unsustainable. This may create new hope 
and invigorate our belief in the possibility of transformation through 
evidence-informed decisions. Simply put, the economy is governed not 
by natural laws, but by routines, conventions, rules, and policy decisions 
made by human individuals and communities that can be adjusted. This 
experience has shown the power of the crisis and supports the idea of 
declaring a climate emergency as a global climate crisis.
The COVID-19 pandemic shines a light on the co-benefits for 
humanity and nature that can be achieved by a series of interconnected 
activities aimed at resilience. Moving aspects of production processes 
closer to where consumption takes place reduces dependency on 
long supply networks. It would also provide a ‘face’ to production 
workers, making extreme forms of labour exploitation more difficult. A 
transition toward more plant-based diets is not only healthier, but also 
reduces CO2 emissions and helps maintain biodiversity, as less space 
is needed for feeding livestock. Renewable-based distributed energy 
production creates more jobs and opportunities for income amongst 
local communities and households who produce wind and solar energy 
(although see Dunlap’s critique of industrial-scale renewable energy, 
this volume). The resilience transformation could also be called ‘the 
transformation to a globally informed, but more localised economy’. 
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Removing externalities, which are the main economic drivers of 
unsustainable development, requires more comprehensive and global 
environmental governance. Localised economies with globally coherent 
environmental governance would not harm the economy as a whole, 
but would rather give more opportunities and hope to those who have 
been losers in the extreme efficiency paradigm. To raise hope, it is this 
aspect of the resilience story that we must first start talking about, so 
that we can then start walking the talk.
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3. On Climate Change Ontologies 
and the Spirit(s) of Oil
Sian Sullivan 
The last major UNFCCC COP Agreement—the so-called Paris 
Agreement of COP21 in 2015—emphasised international 
cooperation through market-based instruments. International 
carbon trading was insisted on, so as to (seemingly) allow 
mitigation, rather than reduction/cessation, of emissions from 
industrial production. Repeated utterances of the positive 
impacts of carbon markets in terms of reducing emissions and 
speeding the transition to a low-carbon economy, however, were 
also met with equally repetitive and forceful claims that carbon 
markets have failed. The polarised disagreement between these 
positions and the numbers supporting them demonstrates 
that climate management and carbon markets are not merely 
technical problems that can be fixed by measurement, modelling 
and technocratic solutions. They are political problems 
representing highly divergent values and worldviews. This 
essay asks questions about how anthropogenic climate change is 
understood, and which responses are promoted as appropriate 
for this systemic predicament. It argues that ontological 
dimensions are at play here, arising from different ways of 
seeing and knowing the world. 
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The Push and Pull of Climate ‘Agreements’1
In building up to the 26th United Nations Conference of the Parties 
(COP26) on the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
it is worth recalling the intense debate, planning and redrafting of 
texts preceding the so-called Paris Agreement of COP21 in 2015. In 
the run-up to any UN COP (or ‘Summit’), government negotiators 
engage in multiple redrafts of the deal to be agreed by the Convention 
deadline.2 Their every edit is scrutinised by those with varying interests 
in the exact wording of the deal (Yeo 2015).
Market-based instruments (MBIs) play a key but controversial role 
in these negotiated texts regarding how climate change mitigation is to 
be achieved. The International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) thus 
submitted to the 2015 Conference Working Group a call for the Paris 
Agreement to support the use of market mechanisms to help countries 
achieve the targets laid down in their Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) (ICAP 2015). Other organisations argued 
instead that carbon pricing, trading and markets fail to do what they are 
repetitively promised to do. 
Many social movements and environmental NGOs campaign 
vigorously against the ‘false solution’ of carbon markets. They see 
market mechanisms as legitimising capitalist structures at the root of 
fossil fuel production and consumption, as well as of growing global 
1  This essay develops a blog by the same title first published in November 
2015 by the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute for their series 
of blogs coinciding with the 2015 Paris UNFCCC COP—see http://speri.
dept.shef.ac.uk/2015/11/19/speri-spotlight-on-the-un-climate-summit-
part-2/ (longer version at https://the-natural-capital-myth.net/2015/11/19/
on-climate-change-ontologies-and-the-spirits-of-oil/).
2  See, for example, texts produced by the UN Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform For Enhanced Action (ADP), including an eighty-six-page ‘Negotiating 
Text’ released on 12 February 2015, followed by a seventy-six-page ‘Draft 
Agreement’ released on 24 July, greatly reduced to a twenty-page ‘Draft Agreement’ 
by the Conference co-chairs, Dan Reifsnyder from the US and Ahmed Djoghlaf 
from Algeria, released on 5 October 2015: UNFCCC Negotiating Text (Unfccc.
int, 2015), https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/negotiating_
text_12022015@2200.pdf; UNFCCC Draft Agreement (Unfccc.int, 2015), https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/4infnot.pdf; UNFCCC Draft Agreement 
(Unfccc.int, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/8infnot.pdf. 
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inequities in wealth concentration,3 emphasising poor outcomes of 
carbon pricing in realising deep decarbonisation (Rosenblum et al. 
2020). Echoing campaigns at previous COPs, climate justice activists 
mobilise instead for much more ambitious international collaboration 
and cooperation, their activities at COP21 framed around setting out the 
minimal necessities for a liveable planet as “red lines” that must never 
be crossed (Hudson 2015). For COP26, carbon markets are set to again 
be a critical dimension of concern for activists seeking to “stop climate 
chaos” (Stop Climate Chaos Scotland 2020). 
These contrary positions—the notion that pricing and trading 
carbon on markets is essential for reducing climate-forcing carbon 
emissions versus the notion that carbon markets make money for trading 
parties but fail to reduce carbon emissions—drive the push and pull 
of international climate negotiations. Polarised disagreement between 
these positions and the numbers used to support them demonstrates, 
however, that climate management and carbon markets are not only 
technical problems that can be fixed by measurement, modelling and 
technocratic solutions. As Hulme, Bigger et al., Durand-Delacre et al., 
Hannis, and Bracking also clarify in this volume for different dimensions 
of climate change measurement and management, they are political 
problems revealing highly divergent values and worldviews.
High Stakes / End Times? 
It has become normal in pre-summit moments to assert that the stakes 
are high. How high they may be is connected with observations of a 
series of rapidly accelerating changes in socioeconomic and earth system 
indicators associated with global economic and human population 
growth since World War II (Steffen et al. 2015). These changes include 
marked increases in atmospheric methane and carbon dioxide levels, 
both of which correspond with higher climate temperatures. Methane 
and carbon dioxide are now at levels that constitute a data outlier 
whose prediction would have been improbable if simply extrapolating 
from levels over the previous 800,000 years (IGBP 2015). Given that 
3  For figures, see ‘Global Inequality’ (Inequality.org, 2020), https://inequality.org/
facts/global-inequality/. 
28 Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
the previous 800,000 years indicate that climate temperature is tightly 
coupled with levels of both atmospheric methane and carbon dioxide 
(IGBP 2015 and references therein), it is reasonable to assume that 
climate temperature levels will rise too. And since temperature is a factor 
in the geographical presence or absence of species, it is also reasonable 
to assume that significantly rising temperatures will have significant 
implications for species, not to mention for human cultural and economic 
activity. This is why there is a UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, and why people are so concerned about the probable impacts 
of actual and predicted climate change. As Naomi Klein (2015) asserts, 
“this changes everything”.
Moreover, the connected and recursive feedback loops at play 
between atmospheric gases, climate temperatures and biocultural 
materialities suggest that the momentum of changing values is 
becoming greater in magnitude. These circumstances indicate the sorts 
of ratcheted up interactions that chaos and complex systems theories 
predict will generate significant but not necessarily predictable system 
shifts (Prigogine 1997), implying “a massive, imminent phase transition 
in human historical experience” (Danowski and Viveiros de Castro 
2017: 18). The linking of COVID-19 with habitat changes linked in turn 
with climate change, might constitute one of these kinds of system shifts 
(The Lancet 2020). If this is indeed the case, then we are on the cusp of 
changes which contemporary calculative and forecasting practices may 
be unable to foretell with any degree of accuracy. The horizon of the 
future is increasingly murky, giving rise to a sense that we are Living in 
the End Times, as philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2011) has put it. 
But crises are opportunities too (Klein 2008). Credit Suisse (2020) 
proclaims “Climate change—Decarbonizing the economy” to be a 
“Supertrend” for investment, its relevance underpinned by “the global 
COVID-19 pandemic”. Economists, accountants and financiers tinker 
with methodologies for designing and embedding calculated and priced 
units of nature further into economic spreadsheets and capital asset 
reports, seeking ‘solutions’ to the impacts of these system changes that 
simultaneously sustain economic momentum (Asiyanbi 2017; Sullivan 
2018). Climate change management and ecological health thus become 
further enmeshed with an economic machine that is itself an engine of 
volatility, leaving societal and environmental damage in its wake. Yes, 
the stakes are high.
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What’s Ontology Got to Do with It?
To put this differently, a shift in the complex dynamic system we call 
Earth is being generated by an expansionary economic culture based on 
particular practices of extraction, measurement, calculation, accounting 
and accumulation of ‘value’. This ‘culture’ is itself built on recursivity 
(i.e. positive feedback). Capitalist values and production practices drive 
the accumulation and concentration of ‘surplus’ value and monetised 
assets, such that capital concentrates exponentially (Marx 1974[1867]; 
Luxemburg 2003[1913]). Notwithstanding the efficiency drive invoked 
by Halme and colleagues, this volume, the movements of commodity 
prices demonstrate trending and volatility, rather than unrisky ‘market 
efficiency’: they are characterised by an abundance of seemingly 
improbable or erratic price swings, rather than by a normal distribution 
around a mean (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2006).
Yet this hegemonic economic ‘culture’ is conventionally perceived to 
be efficient, rational, potentially equitable and predictable. In projecting 
its own image on to beyond-human natures, it misperceives the 
complex biophysical system within which it is embedded. Seeing only a 
complicated but predictable and accountable machine, its truth claim is 
that management may be perfected simply through better measurement 
and calculation of the  carbon and ‘natural capital’ ‘units’ of which it is 
considered made (EU 2014). 
Such measurement, however, selectively determines what becomes 
visible to markets, whilst disavowing the recursive and unpredictable 
nature of the interacting biophysical phenomena exceeding the balance 
sheets that thereby arise. In acting to consolidate forms of wealth 
that are amenable to such calculation, they may amplify, rather than 
reduce, system parameters that enhance volatility (Sullivan and Hannis 
2017). Claims to pragmatism and superior expertise framed as beyond 
ideology (Helm 2015) additionally occlude different knowledges and 
values, effecting a climate management colonialism that denies the self-
determination of cultural perspectives that think—with consistency and 
coherence—otherwise (Clastres 2010). 
Through these multiple collisions of phenomena that are complex, 
organic and unpredictably emergent with thinking that is complicated, 
calculative and predictably additive, conditions for improbable 
catastrophic events are likely to be enhanced rather than reduced. These 
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are, in part, ontological concerns arising from different ways of seeing 
and knowing the world: from different ways of understanding both the 
nature of nature, and the nature of appropriate forms of use, value and 
appreciation that humans negotiate with the beyond-human natures 
with which we co-exist and retain evolutionary kinship. Ontology is the 
study and naming of the fundamental, assumed, and known nature of 
reality (Sullivan 2017). It defines what entities exist, into what categories 
they can be sorted, and by what practices and modes of verification they 
can be known. Cultural and historical differences and agreements shape 
ontological perception and understanding, and imply the possibility 
of diverse, consistent and coherent explanations of causality regarding 
socioecological change and appropriate responses to this (Burmann 
2017; also see Dieckmann, this volume), as considered further below. 
On The Spirit(s) of Oil
Let us step for a moment towards the cosmology of Sápara (‘Zapara’) 
peoples of Pastaza in the upper Amazon Forest of Ecuador. I learned 
a little of their shared worldview through meeting, some years ago, 
Manari Ushigua, formerly Vice-President of the Confederation of all the 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and later President of 
the Bi-National Sápara Federation of Ecuador and Peru (Ushigua and 
Tryon 2020).4 Fewer than 600 Sápara live on land sustaining biological 
diversity with which Sápara culture, language, and cosmology have 
long been entangled. Only four individuals, Manari included, now 
speak the Sápara language,5 which in 2001 was recognised by the UN’s 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a 
unique “depository” of intangible cultural heritage and memory of the 
people and the region.6 
4  Manari travelled to the UK through the support of the Pachamama Alliance 
(https://www.pachamama.org/) and the School of Movement Medicine (https://
www.schoolofmovementmedicine.com/), with whom I was studying dance 
movement at the time. 
5  Naku North, ‘The Sapara History and Legend’ (Nakunorth.com, 2020), https://
nakunorth.com/sapara/. 
6  See UNESCO, ‘Oral heritage and cultural manifestations of the Zápara people’ 
(Ich.unesco.org, 2020), https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/oral-heritage-and-cultural- 
manifestations-of-the-zapara-people-00007. 
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For several years, Sápara have engaged in intense struggles to retain 
their land and the integrity of the forest that is their home, in the face 
of enormous pressure for the extraction of oil from beneath Sápara 
territory. Sápara legally own their land, and Ecuador has appeared 
to be a leading light on environmental issues due to its constitutional 
recognition of the “Rights of Nature” (Republic of Ecuador 2008). 
Nonetheless, the Ecuadorean government claims rights to below-ground 
fuels and minerals, meaning that huge areas of the Amazon are cut up 
into blocks franchised for prospecting—and potentially for extraction—
to international oil corporations (as shown in Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Indigenous territories and tendered oil blocks in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, 2018. ©Amazon Watch, public domain, https://amazonwatch.org/
news/2017/1026-amazonian-indigenous-peoples-reject-ecuadors-plans-for-new-
oil-tender
In October 2019, sustained resistance by Sàpara to oil extraction from 
these lands led to the extraordinary granting by Ecuador’s Ministry of 
Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources of a force majeure request 
to the company concerned—Andes Petroleum Ltd Ecuador (Amazon 
Watch 2019). Although succeeding to halt oil extraction for the time 
being, we can see here how fossil fuel momentum unfurled even in 
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the midst of more than two decades of climate change negotiations 
intent on managing and reducing carbon emissions. In this case, the 
normalisation of fossil fuel extractive rights continued, even though 
the area is considered by ecologists to be amongst the most biodiverse 
localities on the planet, its sustenance arguably simultaneously 
entwined with that of Sápara language and knowledge (see, for e.g., 
Gorenflo et al. 2012).
Sápara ontology, as spoken of by Manari Ushigua, affirms the 
presence of spirit beings deep in the earth associated with the oil found 
there. These spirits confer vitality to the oil, also nourishing different 
spirit beings around five metres below the surface of the soil, which in 
turn animate the roots of plants that burst through the surface of the soil 
to provide food and habitat to animals and humans dwelling above the 
earth’s surface. In this spirited understanding of the connected nature of 
being—in which mineral, plant and animal-human entities are animate 
and mutually nourishing—extraction of the earth’s potent below-
ground materials disrupts the lifeforce of the connected entities above 
ground. This perspective affirms that the zone of life on earth referred 
to as the ‘biosphere’ by environmental scientists, is intractably entwined 
with fluids and minerals found deep in the earth. Above-ground socio-
ecological health and diversity is connected with the spirited liveliness 
of intact below-ground fluids and minerals. 
There are echoes of this spirited earth ontology in many other 
cultural contexts. U’wa of Colombia reportedly understand oil as the 
blood of a mothering earth, and in the late 1990s threatened collective 
suicide in protest against the affront of oil exploitation by US-based 
corporation Occidental Petroleum (Global Nonviolent Action Database 
2011). American Indian Movement activist the late John Trudell (2000) 
describes another potent mineral—uranium—as a spirited “DNA” of 
the earth, from which industrial mining-refinement processes create a 
mutated form of power that ultimately is toxic to life. 
These perspectives and the distinct, but diverse, ‘indigenous 
paradigm’ they invoke suggest that the effects of pulling fuel and 
minerals out of the earth may be more unpredictable, mysterious and far-
reaching than the echoes of an Enlightenment mechanistic worldview 
are able to register. They give weight to an understanding that the holes 
puncturing earth through mining processes, coupled with changes in 
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atmospheric composition caused by pumping mined elements into the 
layer of gases permitting life to thrive on earth, are causing sickness in 
the living, breathing body of the earth itself.
Compassion in an Apocalyptic Moment?
Of course, there is complexity here too. Manari flew to the UK using the 
substance whose exploitation threatens his people with extinction. We 
are all caught within the web of industrial-techno-capitalism in ways 
that make it impossible to fully shrug off our culpability in systemic 
planetary changes that many consider are drawing us towards broad 
spectrum catastrophe (discussed further in Sullivan, Chapter 11 in this 
volume). And seeking to learn from those living in the recent echo 
of colonialism’s extractive impetus might be construed as one more 
colonising engagement, this time to capture and extract “indigenous 
knowledge” (see Dieckmann this volume).
These paradoxes constitute critical challenges for our times. To sit 
with compassion for our own accountability for the losses now occurring; 
whilst acting for the possibility of systemic change that prevents these 
losses. To face what can seem to be the impossibility of reorienting 
the global compass bearing away from financial profit and economic 
growth; whilst keeping hope alive for a systemic re-orientation towards 
equitable socio-ecological relationships in which a diversity of beings 
and cultures may flourish.
Placing indigenous realities at the heart of UNFCCC negotiations 
requires taking seriously perspectives and ontologies that view the 
nature of climate change differently. Perhaps it is for this reason 
that indigenous concerns have tended to be sidelined in the COPs, 
even though a widening of the circle of perspectives regarding this 
critical juncture for humankind is desperately needed to strengthen 
the legitimacy of these talks that affect us all. To echo Yukon leader 
Stanley James, commenting on the slow pace of negotiations at COP15 
in Copenhagen in 2009: “we need to have the aboriginal people at 
the table with those government people … then things will change, I 
think” (CBC News 2009).
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4. Why Net Zero Policies Do 
More Harm than Good
James G. Dyke, Wolfgang Knorr and Robert Watson
Although well-intentioned, net zero policies have licensed a 
reckless ‘burn now, pay later’ approach, in which continuing with 
climate impacts is justified via promises of future technological 
salvation. Net zero thinking continues a three-decades-long 
process of mitigation delay in which academia has at times played 
an underappreciated role. 
Introduction
Sometimes realisation comes in a blinding flash. Blurred outlines 
snap into shape and suddenly it all makes sense. Underneath such 
revelations is typically a much slower-dawning process. Doubts at the 
back of the mind grow. The sense of confusion that things cannot be 
made to fit together increases until something clicks. Or perhaps snaps. 
Collectively we three authors of this article must have spent more than 
eighty years thinking about climate change. Why has it taken us so long 
to speak out about the obvious dangers of the concept of net zero? In our 
defence, the premise of net zero is deceptively simple—and we admit 
that it deceived us.
The threats of climate change are the direct result of there being 
too much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. So it follows that we 
must stop emitting more and even remove some of it. This idea is 
central to the world’s current plan to avoid catastrophe. In fact, there 
are many suggestions as to how to actually do this, from mass tree 
planting, to high-tech direct air capture devices that suck out carbon 
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dioxide from the air (Hanna et al. 2021; also see Lankford’s chapter, 
this volume). The current consensus is that if we deploy these and 
other so-called ‘carbon dioxide removal’ techniques at the same time 
as reducing our burning of fossil fuels, we can more rapidly halt 
global warming. Hopefully around the middle of this century we will 
achieve ‘net zero’. 
Net zero is the point at which any residual emissions of greenhouse 
gases are balanced by technologies removing them from the atmosphere. 
This is a great idea, in principle. For example, it is currently hard to 
see how all emissions from agriculture will be zeroed out in time. 
Consequently, there will need to be some drawdown of carbon dioxide 
in order to offset such emissions. Unfortunately, in practice it helps 
perpetuate a belief in technological salvation and diminishes the sense 
of urgency surrounding the need to curb emissions now.
We have now arrived at the painful realisation that the idea of net 
zero has licensed a recklessly cavalier ‘burn now, pay later’ approach 
which has seen carbon emissions continue to soar. It has also hastened 
the destruction of the natural world by increasing deforestation today, 
and greatly increases the risk of further devastation in the future. In fact, 
already in 2008, when the G8 were discussing a target of 50% reduction 
by 2050, one of us [Knorr] co-authored a paper which pointed out that 
in order to stabilise the climate, net zero will be a necessity in the long 
term and remaining emissions would have to be balanced out by a 
residual “artificial sink” (House et al. 2008). In the IPCC’s projections, 
this ‘artificial sink’ grew out of proportions creating a fantasy world 
of planetary-scale carbon removal. The shocking revelation is that by 
bringing the need for net zero on to the table, we have also given licence 
for its abuse.
To understand how this has happened, how humanity has gambled 
its civilisation on no more than promises of future solutions, we must 
return to the late 1980s, when climate change awareness broke on to the 
international stage.
Steps towards Net Zero
On 22 June 1988, James Hansen was the administrator of NASA’s 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, a prestigious appointment but 
someone largely unknown outside of academia. By the afternoon of 
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the 23 June he was well on the way to becoming the world’s most 
famous climate scientist. This was as a direct result of his testimony 
to the US congress, when he forensically presented the evidence that 
the Earth’s climate was warming and that humans were the primary 
cause: “[t]he greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing 
our climate now” (United States Congress Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources 1988).1
If we had acted on Hansen’s testimony at the time, we would have 
been able to decarbonise our societies at a rate of around 2% a year in 
order to give us about a two-in-three chance of limiting warming to no 
more than 1.5°C. It would have been a huge challenge, but the main 
task at that time would have been to simply stop the accelerating use of 
fossil fuels while fairly sharing out future emissions. This would have 
required increasing the efficiency of fossil fuel use in transportation, 
buildings, and industry. 
Four years later, there were glimmers of hope that this would be 
possible. During the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, all nations agreed to 
stabilise concentrations of greenhouse gases to ensure that they did not 
produce dangerous interference with the climate (Grubb et al 2019). 
The 1997 Kyoto Summit attempted to start to put that goal into practice 
(UNFCCC 1998). But as the years passed, the initial task of keeping 
us safe became increasingly harder, given that climate forcing was 
increasing due to increasing carbon emissions from fossil fuel use along 
with increased emissions of methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated 
chemicals.
It was around that time that the first computer models linking 
greenhouse gas emissions to impacts on different sectors of the economy 
were developed. These hybrid climate-economic models are known as 
Integrated Assessment Models (Gambhir et al. 2019). They allowed 
modellers to link economic activity to the climate by, for example, 
exploring how changes in investments and technology could lead to 
changes in greenhouse gas emissions. They seemed like a miracle: you 
could try out policies on a computer screen before implementing them, 
saving humanity costly experimentation. They rapidly emerged to 
become key guidance for climate policy, a primacy they maintain to this 
1  Editors’ note: see https://www.sealevel.info/1988_Hansen_Senate_Testimony.
html. 
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day. Unfortunately, they also removed the need for deep critical thinking. 
Such models represent society as a web of idealised, emotionless buyers 
and sellers and thus ignore complex social and political realities, or 
even the impacts of climate change itself. Their implicit promise is that 
market-based approaches will always work. This meant that discussions 
about policies were limited to those most convenient to politicians: 
incremental changes to legislation and taxes.
Around the time they were first developed, efforts were being made 
to secure US action on the climate by allowing it to count carbon sinks 
of the country’s forests (Dessai 2001). The US argued that if it managed 
its forests well, it would be able to store a large amount of carbon in 
trees and soil which should be subtracted from its obligations to limit 
the burning of coal, oil and gas. In the end, the US largely got its way. 
Ironically, the concessions were all in vain, since the US Senate never 
ratified the agreement. Postulating a future with more trees could in 
effect offset the burning of coal, oil and gas now. As models could easily 
churn out numbers that saw atmospheric carbon dioxide go as low as 
one wanted, ever more sophisticated scenarios could be explored which 
reduced the perceived urgency to reduce fossil fuel use. By including 
carbon sinks in climate-economic models, a Pandora’s box had been 
opened. It is here we find the genesis of today’s net zero policies.
That said, most attention in the mid-1990s was focused on increasing 
energy efficiency and energy switching (such as the UK’s move from 
coal to gas) and the potential of nuclear energy to deliver large amounts 
of seemingly carbon-free electricity. The hope was that such innovations 
would quickly reverse increases in fossil fuel emissions.
But by around the turn of the new millennium it was clear that such 
hopes were unfounded. Given their core assumption of incremental 
change, it was becoming more and more difficult for economic-climate 
models to find viable pathways to avoid dangerous climate change. 
In response, the models began to include more and more examples of 
carbon capture and storage, a technology that could remove the carbon 
dioxide from coal-fired power stations and then store the captured 
carbon deep underground indefinitely. This had been shown to be 
possible in principle: compressed carbon dioxide had been separated 
from fossil gas and then injected underground in a number of projects 
since the 1970s. These Enhanced Oil Recovery schemes were designed 
to force gases into oil wells in order to push oil towards drilling rigs and 
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so allow more to be recovered—oil that would later be burnt, releasing 
even more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
Carbon capture and storage offered the twist that instead of using the 
carbon dioxide to extract more oil, the gas would be left underground and 
removed from the atmosphere. This promised breakthrough technology 
would allow climate-friendly coal and so the continued use of this fossil 
fuel. But long before the world would witness any such schemes, the 
hypothetical process had been included in climate-economic models. In 
the end, the mere prospect of carbon capture and storage gave policy 
makers a way out of making the much-needed immediate cuts to 
greenhouse gas emissions.
The Rise of Net Zero
When the international climate change community convened in 
Copenhagen in 2009, however, it was clear that carbon capture and 
storage was not going to be sufficient, for two reasons. First, it still did 
not exist. There were no carbon capture and storage facilities in operation 
on any coal fired power station and no prospect the technology was 
going to have any impact on rising emissions from increased coal use 
in the foreseeable future. The biggest barrier to implementation was 
essentially cost. The motivation to burn vast amounts of coal is to 
generate relatively cheap electricity. Retrofitting carbon scrubbers on 
existing power stations, building the infrastructure to pipe captured 
carbon, and developing suitable geological storage sites required huge 
sums of money. Consequently, the only application of carbon capture in 
actual operation then—and now—is to use the trapped gas in enhanced 
oil recovery schemes. Beyond a single demonstrator, there has never 
been any capture of carbon dioxide from a coal fired power station 
chimney with that captured carbon then being stored underground 
(Power Technology 2021).
Just as important, by 2009 it was becoming increasingly clear that 
while emissions reductions were both technically and economically 
feasible, there remained a serious lack of political action. The 
amount of carbon dioxide being pumped into the air each year meant 
humanity was rapidly running out of time. With hopes for a solution 
to the climate crisis fading again, another magic bullet was required. 
A technology was needed not only to slow down the increasing 
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concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, but actually 
reverse it. In response, the climate-economic modelling community—
already able to include plant-based carbon sinks and geological 
carbon storage in their models—increasingly adopted the “solution” 
of combining the two.
So it was that Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage, or BECCS, 
rapidly emerged as the new saviour technology (Hickman 2016). By 
burning ‘replaceable’ biomass such as wood, crops, and agricultural 
waste instead of coal in power stations, and then capturing the carbon 
dioxide from the power station chimney and storing it underground, 
BECCS could produce electricity at the same time as removing carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere. That is because as biomass such as trees 
grow, they suck in carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. By planting trees 
and other bioenergy crops and storing carbon dioxide released when 
they are burnt, more carbon could be removed from the atmosphere. 
With this new solution in hand the international community regrouped 
from repeated failures to mount another attempt at reining in our 
dangerous interference with the climate. The scene was set for the 
crucial 2015 climate conference in Paris.
A Parisian False Dawn
As its general secretary brought the twenty-first United Nations 
conference on climate change to an end, a great roar issued from the 
crowd. People leaped to their feet, strangers embraced, tears welled up 
in eyes bloodshot from lack of sleep. The emotions on display on 13 
December 2015 were not just for the cameras. After weeks of gruelling 
high-level negotiations in Paris a breakthrough had finally been 
achieved. 
Against all expectations, after decades of false starts and failures, 
the international community had finally agreed to do what it took to 
limit global warming to well below 2°C, preferably to 1.5°C, compared 
to pre-industrial levels. The Paris Agreement was a stunning victory for 
those most at risk from climate change. Rich industrialised nations will 
be increasingly impacted as global temperatures rise. But it is the low-
lying island states such as the Maldives and the Marshall Islands that 
are at imminent existential risk. As a later UN special report made clear, 
if the Paris Agreement was unable to limit global warming to 1.5°C, the 
number of lives lost to more intense storms, fires, heatwaves, famines 
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and floods would significantly increase (IPCC 2018) (on the Paris 
agreement, also see Hannis, this volume).
But dig a little deeper and you could find another emotion lurking 
within delegates on 13 December. Doubt. We struggle to name any 
climate scientist who at that time thought the Paris Agreement was 
feasible. We have since been told personally by some scientists that 
the Paris Agreement was “of course important for climate justice but 
unworkable” and “a complete shock, no one thought limiting to 1.5°C 
was possible”.2 Rather than being able to limit warming to 1.5°C, a senior 
academic involved in the IPCC concluded we were heading beyond 3°C 
by the end of this century. Relying on untested carbon dioxide removal 
mechanisms to achieve the Paris targets when we have the technologies 
to transition away from fossil fuels today is plain wrong and foolhardy. 
Instead of confronting our doubts, we scientists decided to construct 
ever more elaborate fantasy worlds in which we would be safe. The price 
to pay for our cowardice: having to keep our mouths shut about the 
ever-growing absurdity of the required planetary-scale carbon dioxide 
removal.
Taking centre stage was BECCS because at the time this was the 
only way climate-economic models could find scenarios that would 
be consistent with the Paris Agreement. Rather than stabilise, global 
emissions of carbon dioxide had increased some 60% since 1992. 
Alas, BECCS, just like all the previous solutions, was too good to be 
true. Across the scenarios produced by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) with a 50% or better chance of limiting 
temperature increase to 1.5°C, BECCS would need to remove billions of 
tonnes of carbon dioxide each year. BECCS at this scale would require 
massive planting schemes for trees and bioenergy crops.
The Earth certainly needs more trees. Humanity has cut down some 
three trillion since we first started farming some 13,000 years ago. But 
rather than allow ecosystems to recover from human impacts and 
forests to regrow, BECCS generally refers to dedicated industrial-scale 
monoculture plantations regularly harvested for bioenergy, rather than 
carbon stored away in forest trunks, roots and soils.3 Currently, the two 
most efficient biofuels are sugarcane for bioethanol and palm oil for 
2  Personal communications.
3  Editors’ note: whose conservation and financing is envisaged through the 
UN REDD+ programme (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries), see https://redd.unfccc.int/. 
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biodiesel—both grown in the tropics (Chiriboga et al. 2020). Endless 
rows of such fast growing monoculture trees or other bioenergy crops 
harvested at frequent intervals devastate biodiversity.
It has been estimated that BECCS could demand an area of land 
approaching twice the size of India (Furman et al. 2020). How will 
that be achieved at the same time as feeding eight to ten billion 
people around the middle of the century or without destroying native 
vegetation and biodiversity? Large-scale monoculture tree plantations 
can adversely impact water availability for agriculture as well as 
drinking. Increasing forest cover in higher latitudes can have an overall 
warming effect because replacing grassland or fields with forests 
means the land surface becomes darker (Mykleby et al. 2017). This 
darker land absorbs more energy from the Sun and so temperatures 
rise. Focusing on developing vast plantations in poorer tropical nations 
comes with real risks of people being driven off their lands. The 
massive amount of offsetting needed for most net zero scenarios with 
the aim of staying within safe climate limits cannot be met by leaving 
nature alone. It demands fast growing, mostly alien species that are 
cut down often and regularly, thereby releasing carbon. We are already 
seeing the beginning of this in European forests. The consequences 
of net zero can look almost as scary as those of climate warming. As 
these impacts are becoming better understood, the sense of optimism 
around BECCS has diminished.
Pipe Dreams
Given the dawning realisation of how difficult Paris would be in the 
light of ever rising emissions and the limited potential of BECCS, a new 
buzzword emerged in policy circles: the “overshoot scenario” (Ricke et 
al 2017). Temperatures would be allowed to go beyond 1.5°C in the near 
term, but then be brought down with a range of carbon dioxide removal 
by the end of the century. This means that net zero actually means 
‘carbon negative’. Within a few decades, we will need to transform the 
global economy from one that currently pumps out forty billion tons of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year, to one that produces a 
net removal of tens of billions. Mass tree planting, for bioenergy or as 
an attempt at offsetting, had been the latest attempt to stall cuts in fossil 
fuel use. But the ever-increasing need for carbon removal was calling 
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for more. This is why the idea of direct air capture, now being touted 
by some as the most promising technology out there, has taken hold. It 
is generally more benign to ecosystems because it requires significantly 
less land to operate than BECCS, including the land needed to power 
them using wind or solar panels.
Unfortunately, it is widely believed that because of its exorbitant 
costs and energy demand (Lebling et al. 2021), direct air capture—if 
it ever becomes feasible to be deployed at scale—will not be able to 
compete with BECCS with its voracious appetite for prime agricultural 
land (Hanssen et al. 2020).
It should now be getting clear where the journey is heading. As the 
mirage of each magical technical solution disappears, another equally 
unworkable alternative pops up to take its place. The next is already on 
the horizon—and it is even more ghastly. Once we realise net zero will 
not happen in time, or even at all, geoengineering—the deliberate and 
large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system—will probably be 
invoked as the solution to limit temperature increases. One of the most 
researched geoengineering ideas is solar radiation management—the 
injection of millions of tons of sulphuric acid into the stratosphere that 
will reflect some of the Sun’s energy away from the Earth (Reynolds 
2019). It is a wild idea, but some academics and politicians are deadly 
serious about it, despite its significant risks. The US National Academies 
of Sciences, for example, has recommended allocating up to US$200 
million over the next five years to explore how geoengineering could 
be deployed and regulated. Funding and research in this area is sure to 
significantly increase.
It is astonishing how the continual absence of any credible carbon 
removal technology never seems to affect net zero policies. Whatever 
is thrown at it, net zero carries on without a dent in the fender. The 
argument appears to be that net zero technologies will work because 
they have to work. But beyond fine words and glossy brochures there is 
nothing there. The emperor has no clothes.
Difficult Truths
In principle there is nothing wrong or dangerous about carbon dioxide 
removal proposals. In fact developing ways of reducing concentrations 
of carbon dioxide can feel tremendously exciting. You are using science 
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and engineering to save humanity from disaster. What you are doing 
is important. There is also the realisation that carbon removal will be 
needed to mop up some of the emissions from sectors such as aviation 
and cement production. So there will be some small role for a number of 
different carbon dioxide removal approaches. The problems come when 
it is assumed that these can be deployed at a vast scale. This effectively 
serves as a blank cheque for the continued burning of fossil fuels and 
the acceleration of habitat destruction.
Carbon reduction technologies and geoengineering should be seen 
as a sort of ejector seat that could propel humanity away from rapid 
and catastrophic environmental change. Just like an ejector seat in a jet 
aircraft, it should only be used as the very last resort. But policymakers 
and businesses appear to be entirely serious about deploying highly 
speculative technologies as a way to land our civilisation at a sustainable 
destination when these are no more than fairytales. The only sure way 
to keep humanity safe is the immediate and sustained radical cuts to 
greenhouse gas emissions in a socially and economically just way.
Academics typically see themselves as serving society. Those 
working at the climate science and policy interface desperately wrestle 
with an increasingly difficult problem. Similarly, those that champion 
net zero as a way of breaking through the barriers holding back effective 
action on the climate also work with the very best of intentions. This 
was certainly the motivation of a key group of international academics 
and activists that can be seen as one of the important centres for the 
emergence of the net zero concept (Darby 2019). This important work 
was designed around ways to accelerate actual mitigation that would be 
required in order to limit warming to well below 2°C. The tragedy is that 
their collective efforts were never able to mount an effective challenge 
to a climate policy process that would only allow a narrow range of 
scenarios to be explored.
Most scientists feel distinctly uncomfortable stepping over the 
invisible line that separates their day job from wider social and political 
concerns. There are genuine fears that being seen as advocates for or 
against particular issues could threaten their perceived independence. 
Scientists inhabit a largely trusted profession. Trust is very hard to build 
and easy to destroy.
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But there is another invisible line, the one that separates academic 
integrity and self-censorship. As scientists, we are taught to be sceptical, 
to subject hypotheses to rigorous tests and interrogation. But when 
it comes to perhaps the greatest challenge humanity faces, we often 
show a dangerous lack of critical analysis. In private, scientists express 
significant scepticism about the Paris Agreement, BECCS, offsetting, 
geoengineering and net zero. Apart from some notable exceptions, in 
public we quietly go about our work, apply for funding, publish papers 
and teach (Anderson 2015). The path to disastrous climate change is 
paved with feasibility studies and impact assessments. Rather than 
acknowledge the seriousness of our situation, we instead continue to 
participate in the fantasy of net zero.4 What will we do when reality 
bites? What will we say to our friends and loved ones about our failure 
to speak out now?
The youth of today and future generation will look back in horror 
that our generation gambled with catastrophic changes in climate 
and biodiversity for the sake of cheap fossil fuel energy when cost 
effective and socially acceptable alternatives were available. We have the 
knowledge needed to act. The most recent IPCC and IPBES assessments 
clearly show we are failing to meet any of the agreed targets for limiting 
climate change or loss of biodiversity.
The time has come to voice our fears and be honest with wider 
society. Current net zero policies will not keep warming to within 1.5°C 
because they were never intended to. They were and still are driven by a 
need to protect business as usual for as long as possible, not the climate. 
If we want to keep people safe then large and sustained cuts to carbon 
emissions need to happen now. That is the very simple acid test that 
must be applied to all climate policies and it needs to be solidly on the 
negotiating table at COP26. The time for wishful thinking is over.
4  Editors’ note: It is also alarming to observe the proliferation of this ‘netting’ fantasy 
into other areas of environmental management. In conceiving of so-called ‘natural 
capital’ in aggregate, for example (cf. Helm 2015), a fairytale can be sustained in 
which biodiversity will gain from its measurable harm in the course of development, 
so as to produce a ‘no net loss’ or ‘net gain’ in biodiversity ‘units’, even though losses 
have occurred (for a critical engagement with aggregate thinking in environmental 
governance, see Sullivan 2017). 
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5. The Carbon Bootprint of the US 
Military and Prospects for a  
Safer Climate
Patrick Bigger, Cara Kennelly,  
Oliver Belcher and Ben Neimark
The United States military is the largest institutional consumer 
of fossil fuels in the world, but until recently accurate data on its 
fuel consumption were not widely available. Using Freedom of 
Information Act requests, we compiled data on how much fuel 
the US military consumes and calculated its ‘carbon bootprint.’ 
We explain how the US military’s expansive and coupled global 
logistical networks, hardware, and interventionist foreign policy 
paradigms help to ‘lock-in’ future military emissions. Even 
though they are well-intentioned, calls to ‘green’ the military are 
insufficient to rein in military emissions. Instead, the scope of 
the US military must be dramatically scaled back as part of any 
serious initiative to maintain a safer climate. 
The US Military’s Carbon Bootprint
The United States military’s carbon bootprint is enormous. Like corporate 
supply chains, it relies on an extensive global network of container 
ships, pipelines, trucks, and cargo planes to supply its operations 
with everything from bombs to hydrocarbon fuels to humanitarian 
aid. This is no coincidence: historically, many of the parts of complex 
global logistics networks were developed by the US military (Cowen 
2014), including the containerisation of freight (Levinson 2016) and 
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even online shopping portals (Fryar 2012). We have traced these global 
logistical networks and conducted multiple Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests on recent US military fuel purchases to understand the 
extent and intensity of the climate impacts from fossil fuels by sprawling 
US military operations. 
Calculations of greenhouse gas emissions usually focus on civilian 
energy and fuel use. Recent work also shows that the US military is one 
of the largest institutional polluters in history, consuming more liquid 
fuels and emitting more climate-changing gases than most medium-
sized countries (Belcher et al. 2019; Crawford 2019).1 If the US military 
were a country, its fuel usage alone would make it the forty-seventh 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, sitting between Peru 
and Portugal. In 2017, the US military bought about 269,230 barrels of 
oil a day and emitted more than 25,000 kilotons of carbon dioxide. It 
effectively takes the capacity of one medium-sized refinery operating 
at full tilt to keep up with military fuel demand. These US military 
fuels are sourced from, and consumed at, thousands of sites around the 
world: from Hampton Roads, VA, the largest naval installation in the 
world, now threatened by rising sea levels, to remote forward operating 
bases throughout Afghanistan in support of the nearly twenty-year-old 
war there. 
Indeed, the US military operates more than 800 bases around the 
world through its ‘lily-pad’ network that renders all the globe a potential 
theatre of war. These bases all house energy-hungry equipment. 
Regarding specific branches, in 2017 alone the US Air Force purchased 
US$4.9 billion worth of fuel, and the Navy US$2.8 billion, followed by 
the Army at US$947 million and the Marines at US$36 million. These 
figures reflect the overwhelming amount of jet fuel (JP-8) purchased and 
consumed by both the Air Force and the Navy, which is both the highest 
among all fuel types in total volume burned, and amongst the most 
climate damaging in terms of emissions, since nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
1  See too the important work by Scientists for Global Responsibility, who have 
tracked environmental effects of militaries more broadly, especially Stuart Parkison, 
‘The Carbon Boot-print of the Military’ (Sgr.org, 2020), https://www.sgr.org.uk/
resources/carbon-boot-print-military. 
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gases contained in the fuel have greater radiative forcing potential when 
combusted higher in the atmosphere (Fahey et al. 2016). 
It is no coincidence that quantitative assessments of US military 
emissions tend to be absent in climate change studies, although 
there is a robust and growing literature on various intersections of 
militarism and global change (Dalby 2020), itself building on decades 
of scholarship on the environmental impacts of military intervention, 
training, and discourse more broadly (see Westing 2008). The absence 
of military emissions totals stems, in part, from the difficulty of 
accessing consistent data from the Pentagon and across US government 
departments. This difficulty is arguably an intended consequence of 
specific policy positions, given that the US insisted on an exemption for 
reporting military emissions in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Nelson 2015). 
This loophole was closed by the Paris Agreement of 2015, but reopened 
when the Republican Trump administration withdrew from the accord 
in 2017. Although Biden has enlisted the US military to focus on climate 
change as a recurring threat to US national security, we have seen very 
little movement in terms of transparency of DoD emission reporting out 
of the new administration. 
We arrived at these volumes of fuel and associated CO2 emissions 
through data retrieved from multiple FOIA requests to the US Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA). The DLA is the massive, and often shadowy, 
bureaucratic agency tasked with managing the US military’s supply 
chains, including its hydrocarbon fuel purchases and distribution. 
As has been well documented (Ali and Stone 2018), it is effectively 
impossible to audit the US military’s budget, and the DLA has recently 
been embroiled in accounting scandals as the scope of wasteful, or 
outright reckless, spending throughout the ‘War on Terror’ has come 
into focus (Lindorff 2018). The Department of Defense (DoD) is by 
far the largest of all federal agencies relying on discretionary budget 
allocations. Despite protestation from a few lonely corners of Congress, 
the DoD effectively had a blank check for much of the twenty-first 
century (Lindorff 2018). Even at $8.7 billion, however, fuel comprises 
less than 2% of the total DoD spending of $523.9 billion in 2017, a figure 
that does not include other channels through which war is pursued, like 
the CIA drone programme. 
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The US military is particularly ideal to study. It is the third largest 
active military personnel, next to China and India. It boasts over 
thirteen thousand aircraft, and eleven aircraft carriers—the second 
closest are China, Italy and UK with two each (GlobalFirepower 2021). 
It operates one of the largest and most complex material supply chains, 
responsible for enormous built infrastructure (e.g. forward operating 
bases, roads and airports), yet its socio-environmental effects remain 
relatively unexamined in most major climate and environmental policy 
agreements. The US military is the largest single logistical operation in 
the world that is still exempt from having to report its carbon emissions 
(Neslen 2015). To put this another way, although the CO2 emissions 
of the US military count very significantly in terms of their global 
contribution to total emissions, they did not count in global carbon 
emissions reporting until the US rejoined the Paris Agreement.
Threat Multipliers
While the US military continues to emit globally significant volumes of 
greenhouse gases, it has also long understood that it is not immune from 
the potential consequences of climate change—recognising this as a 
‘threat multiplier’ that can exacerbate other risks on top of the possibility 
of environmental change itself producing new conflicts (Gilbert 2012). 
In forward-looking public documents, the US military envisions a 
dangerous future that returns to great-power geopolitics alongside the 
murky, diffuse, and emergent threats that may be called into being by 
environmental change (also see Durand-Delacre et al.’s critique in this 
volume of xenophobic discourses around migration ‘floods’ attributed 
to climate change). The military’s response in this regard is somewhat 
tautological. Because climate change will produce new threats, the 
military will continue to build its interventionist capacity—as can be 
seen through the massive build-up of US forces across Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Turse 2018), in turn continuing to burn massive volumes 
of fuel and thus exacerbating the exact threats to which the military 
will respond (also see Chapter 11 by Sullivan, this volume). The very 
discourse of ‘threat multipliers’ threatens to bring into being the very 
situation it describes, putting vast swathes of the globe at more, rather 
than less, risk. 
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While US climate policy has been inexcusably slow and ineffective 
due to a politics mired in climate denialism and state capture by 
oil firms, the military has some degree of autonomy in defining and 
responding to threats. As far back as the 1990s, climate change has in 
fact been identified as one of those threats (White House 1991), and 
many, although not all, military bases have been preparing for climate 
change impacts such as sea level rise (Mathews 2019). Nor has the 
military ignored its own contribution to the problem, having dabbled 
in developing alternative energy sources such as biofuels (generating 
considerable pushback from lawmakers in oil-producing states in the 
process). Alternative energy sources comprise only a tiny fraction of 
military spending on fuels, however, and also may generate their own 
socio-environmental problems (as explored in more detail in Dunlap’s 
chapter, this volume). 
Turn Down the Furnace
The American military’s climate policy remains contradictory. There 
have been attempts to ‘green’ aspects of its operations by increasing 
renewable electricity generation on bases (Gardner 2017), but it remains 
the single largest institutional consumer of hydrocarbons in the world 
(Bigger and Neimark 2017). It has also locked itself into hydrocarbon-
based weapons systems for years to come, by depending on existing 
aircraft and warships for open-ended operations. The F-35 fighter, 
for example, a product of one of the most costly and delayed military 
acquisition programmes in history (Sullivan 2016), could hypothetically 
run on third generation biofuels were they available at the scale required 
to power the fleet. But these fuels are not currently, or for the foreseeable 
future, available at the scale needed (Banerjee et al 2019), plus the 
large-scale production of feedstock for biofuels already creates serious 
environmental (Cruzen et al. 2016) and social (Neville and Dauvergne 
2016) problems (also see Dyke et al., this volume). 
As these new fighters are rolled out and pilots perform regular 
training missions, despite the complete absence of air battles for the 
last thirty years, fossil fuels will thus continue to power the DoD’s 
fleet of more than 6,500 airplanes, 6,700 helicopters, untold numbers of 
HumVees, APCs, base vehicles, non-nuclear ships, and diesel electricity 
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generators that power a stunning number of bases around the world 
(Vine 2015). This massive volume of kit, if kept operational, represents 
a significant level of fossil-fuel lock-in (Unruh 2000; Urry 2003). 
It is also worth considering the overarching role of the US military 
in producing and enforcing a fossil-fueled global economic system 
(Surprise 2020). At this point, it would be relatively uncontroversial 
to state that much ongoing US overseas intervention was, at least 
initially, predicated on securing access to, and the distribution of, fossil 
fuels from the Middle East. This observation has been confirmed (to 
whatever extent can be believed) in statements by former US President 
Trump, claiming that the US should “take” Iraqi oil as recompense for 
the cost of sixteen years of occupation (Borger 2016). Even leaving this 
adventurism aside, significant resources—both material and in terms 
of relationship maintenance—are devoted to maintaining the free flow 
of oil around the world, especially through key shipping routes. In this 
way, the US military not only locks-in its own fuel consumption, but 
also ensures oil supplies remain cheap, plentiful, mobile, and accessible. 
Don’t Just Green the Military. Shrink It. 
While new spending initiatives like Biden’s 2021 Infrastructure plan 
include significant (though still insufficient) outlays for decarbonisation 
and climate adaptation, the military’s contribution to environmental 
change remains off-radar. Indeed, rather than scaling back military 
spending to pay for urgent climate-related spending, initial budget 
requests for military appropriations are actually increasing even as some 
US foreign adventures are supposedly coming to a close (Macias 2021). 
This includes vast outlays for new or retrofitted fuel-intensive vehicles, 
from tanks to new fleets of aircraft that will continue to demand liquid 
fossil fuels for decades to come. For any green initiative of national scope 
to be effective, the US military’s carbon bootprint must be addressed in 
domestic policy and international climate treaties.
Action on climate change demands shutting down vast sections of US 
military machinery. There are few activities on Earth as environmentally 
catastrophic as waging war. Significant reductions to the Pentagon’s 
budget and shrinking its capacity to wage war would reduce demand 
from the biggest consumer of liquid fuels in the world. This is critical in 
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a world awash in cheap oil in which the US military continues to have 
vast resources for its acquisition. Indeed, we might speculate that the US 
military may function as a buyer of last resort for some fraction of global 
output (especially given political influence in procurement decisions), 
so as to delay the closure of marginal production and refining facilities 
(Surprise 2020). 
It does no good in terms of anthropogenic climate change 
management to tinker around the edges of the US war machine’s 
environmental impact. In considering alternatives, the money spent 
procuring and distributing fuel across the US empire could instead be 
spent as a peace dividend, helping to fund a Green New Deal that is 
international in outlook, and includes significant technology transfer 
and no-strings-attached funding for adaptation and clean energy to those 
countries most vulnerable to climate change, who bear little historic or 
contemporary responsibility for emissions (Belcher et al. 2020). There 
is no shortage of policy priorities that could use a funding bump. With 
Lai et al. (2017), we agree that any of these options would be better than 
continuing to wastefully fuel one of the largest military forces in history.
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6. Climate Migration Is about 
People, Not Numbers
D. Durand-Delacre, G. Bettini, S. L. Nash, H. Sterly, G. 
Gioli, E. Hut, I. Boas, C. Farbotko, P. Sakdapolrak, M. de 
Bruijn, B. Tripathy Furlong, K. van der Geest,  
S. Lietaer and M. Hulme
It has become increasingly common to argue that climate change 
will lead to mass migrations. In this chapter, we examine the large 
numbers often invoked to underline alarming climate migration 
narratives. We outline the methodological limitations to their 
production. We argue for a greater diversity of knowledges about 
climate migration, rooted in qualitative and mixed methods. We 
also question the usefulness of numbers to progressive agendas 
for climate action. Large numbers are used for rhetorical effect to 
create fear of climate migration, but this approach backfires when 
they are used to justify security-oriented, anti-migrant agendas. In 
addition, quantification helps present migration as a management 
problem with decisions based on meeting quantitative targets, 
instead of prioritising peoples’ needs, rights, and freedoms. 
Introduction
Perhaps counterintuitively—in a volume calling for actions to tackle the 
climate crisis—this contribution cautions against the casual use of one of 
the primary narratives through which the climate crisis is signified and 
urgent action invoked. That is, the dramatic estimates and projections of 
a looming migration crisis caused by climate change. We problematise 
the numbers through which the spectre of such a crisis is supported and 
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communicated. Our critique of these numbers takes place on several 
levels. We begin by pointing to the many methodological challenges 
in producing robust numbers. Estimates remain imprecise and highly 
uncertain, despite some significant developments in methods and 
datasets. We also diagnose more fundamental epistemological issues 
about the kinds of knowledges required to understand the climate-
migration nexus. Numbers and quantitative estimates fail to capture 
crucial dimensions of human mobility. Migrants’ decisions to move 
can be forced but also voluntary, are highly subjective, and need to be 
understood as situated, political, and non-deterministic. 
Ultimately, however, our concern has less to do with what numbers 
can or cannot tell us about climate migration than with the ways 
in which numbers are (mis)used. On the one hand, a focus on mass 
migration numbers is intended to construct climate migration as a 
crisis. However, framing this crisis as a humanitarian issue has done 
little to protect migrants and more to stoke the fires of anti-immigrant 
populism, providing arguments for more stringent border controls and 
increasingly restrictive migration policies across the Global North. At 
the same time, the promise of quantification creates the impression 
that this crisis can be clearly defined, and managed, as long as better 
numbers are made available (also see Hannis, this volume). Attempts 
to use numbers to address issues of climate justice and responsibility 
are undercut by the focus on quantification itself, which tends to limit 
debates to technical questions about how many will move and how this 
movement can be organised.
This critique of headline estimates should not be misinterpreted as 
a denial of the impacts that climate change is having and will continue 
to have on peoples’ mobilities. Climate change impacts related to sea-
level rise, drought, increased frequency of wildfires and storms—and 
the associated declines in livelihoods—pose serious and differentiated 
challenges with which we must contend (as also highlighted by 
Lendelvo et al., this volume). Rather, our aim is to point to how a focus 
on numbers reduces political imaginaries of our response to climate 
migration to a narrow range of possibilities. We argue that a different 
approach is needed.
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A Brief Overview of Climate Migration Numbers and 
their Methodological Limitations
The environmentalist Norman Myers (1934–2019) initiated efforts to 
estimate the impact of climate change on migration when he predicted in 
the early 1990s that there would be 150 million “environmental refugees” 
by 2050 (Myers 1993). He later updated his estimate to 200 million by 
2050 (Myers and Kent 1995; Myers 1997, 2002). The latter figure remains 
one of the most widely cited climate migration numbers to date. Myers’ 
estimations were based on linear extrapolations of demographic and 
displacement figures in what he considered “environmental hotspots”. 
These methods were rapidly challenged as too simplistic, notably 
because they assumed a linear relationship between environmental 
impacts (such as sea-level rise or desertification) and out-migration 
from affected areas. They were also not based on any actual inquiry into 
the causal mechanisms involved and ignored potential in-situ adaptation 
strategies. Myers’ approach relied on aggregate global forecasts, rather 
than specific case studies that could bring empirical grounding to these 
assumptions (Black 1994, 2001; Suhrke 1994; Castles 2002). Myers’ 
numbers have been reproduced in many prominent reports since their 
publication (as critiqued by Saunders 2000). More recently, numbers 
larger than a billion people have also been disseminated in academic 
articles, NGO or think tank reports, and the press (see Table 1). Myers 
himself later admitted that coming up with the final estimates required 
“heroic extrapolations” (Brown 2008).
Despite this situation, many subsequent reports—mostly published 
by NGOs and (inter)governmental organisations—either reproduced 
Myers’ numbers or provided other estimates based on analogous 
methods (see methodological notes in Table 1). These numbers are 
rounded to the nearest ten or hundred million, an indication of the 
crude methods employed to derive them. Most problematic is the 
prevalence of simple additions of annual figures and an extrapolation 
of such trends into the future, which can produce nothing other than 
a continuously rising graph (for a recent example, see Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2020).
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Recognising the deep flaws in the methods employed to derive these 
numbers, quantitative social scientists and modellers have sought 
to develop more sophisticated datasets and methods to improve the 
credibility of numerical estimates. In doing this, they contend with the 
unavailability of data, particularly at small scales or in disaggregated 
form, its poor quality, and its limited comparability (Brown 2008; Tejero 
et al. 2020). On the condition that the necessary data could be gathered, 
reviewers of the field have repeatedly emphasised the need for more 
longitudinal studies, a multi-scalar research, analysis disaggregated 
along gender, age, ethnic, caste, and class lines, and consideration of a 
wider range of environmental drivers beyond precipitation changes or 
sea-level rise (Brown 2008; Piguet 2010; Obokata et al. 2014; Vinke and 
Hoffmann 2020). 
As a result of these responses, some refinements to datasets and 
methods have been made. Most researchers also now present overall 
climate migration numbers with much greater care than was the case 
for earlier estimates. They largely acknowledge limitations and warn 
readers not to overinterpret results by pointing to numerical ranges 
and associated uncertainties. Nonetheless, reviews and meta-analyses 
of quantitative studies still conclude that many analytical problems 
persist. They find that models allow few confident causal claims about 
the environment’s influence on migration except “in broad terms and 
at fairly large spatial scales” (Obokata et al. 2014: 127); and that results 
remain heavily influenced by the methods used. Ultimately, they find it 
remains exceedingly difficult for modellers to defend any single factor 
as the primary driver of migration (Piguet et al. 2011; McLeman 2013; 
Obokata et al. 2014; Beine and Jeusette 2018; Cattaneo et al. 2019). In 
other words, it remains extremely difficult to definitely link migration 
to climate change.
A Greater Diversity of Knowledges of Climate 
Migration Is Needed
In addition to these methodological shortcomings, a focus on climate 
migration numbers obscures the need for other forms of knowledge 
about the climate-migration nexus. Producing these knowledges 
requires more use of mixed and qualitative methods. These are better 
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suited than quantification alone to study the multi-causal, highly 
situated, and subjective dimensions of climate migration. Attempts 
to isolate migration drivers related to climate change, and to identify 
and count ‘climate migrants’, are at odds with most social scientists’ 
understanding of migration. From a social science perspective, human 
mobility is well-accepted to be a multi-causal and complex phenomenon. 
This implies that migration drivers—be they social, political, economic, 
environmental, or demographic—interact with and mutually influence 
each other (Black et al. 2011).
Our trouble with numbers is also motivated by fundamental 
questions on how migration itself should be understood. Attempting 
to reduce migration to a number is akin to the “migration map trap” 
whereby individual experiences of migration become “faceless pixel[s] 
in a big threatening arrow” (Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2020: 210). 
This approach not only overlooks the situated complexities already 
highlighted, but also obliterates the important subjective dimensions of 
migration.
To be clear, accounting for those subjective dimensions is not merely 
about looking at the faces behind the numbers. The problem with 
this methodological ‘reversal’ would be to individualise processes 
that are in fact emergent and collective, thereby interpreting peoples’ 
experiences and extrapolating singular stories as representative of 
millions. Rather, we suggest that it is important to fully acknowledge 
that mobility itself is a cultural construct, and that distinct ontologies 
and epistemologies of mobility are embodied in and inform migrants’ 
choices and experiences (also see Sullivan Chapter 3, and Dieckmann’s 
chapter, this volume on the relevance of ontological concerns for 
situating choices and understanding). This subjective dimension of 
migration stresses its non-deterministic character and, in line with 
a general shift in migration studies, calls into question the dominant 
focus on ‘root causes’ and migration ‘management’. Viewing migration 
and mobilities as autonomous (which is not a synonym for voluntary 
or individual) practices suggests that they must be investigated well 
beyond institutional constraints and categories (De Genova and Peutz 
2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Scheel 2013).
In practical terms, we are calling for approaches that engage with the 
subjective diversity of migrant mobilities and situate people involved 
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and their perspectives more prominently in the research process (Casas‐
Cortes et al. 2015). This orientation requires deep qualitative work—
usually based on interviews and ethnographic fieldwork—and a general 
move away from an emphasis on legal and governmental frameworks 
and the economic determinism of the labour market.
A Climate Mobilities Approach to Diverse and  
Situated Mobilities
A climate mobilities approach is a promising way to understand the 
mechanisms behind the decision to migrate (or to stay) (Boas et al. 
2019). This approach, based largely on qualitative research, does not 
aim to cut through causality and isolate ‘the environment’ from other 
‘contextual’ factors, or to identify the dominant factor in migration 
decisions. Instead, it considers causation as always multi-faceted, 
situated, and nonlinear. The changing climate remains a relevant factor, 
but climate only exerts its influence on the world through the matrix 
of social, economic, environmental, cultural, historical, and political 
processes that comprise the social world (Hulme 2011). In this way, 
the climate is not privileged as an influence on mobilities but is also 
recognised as a pluralistic phenomenon worthy of multi-pronged 
empirical investigations.
These investigations need to be pursued using a rich vocabulary 
capturing the many nuances and forms that (im)mobilities take. 
Indeed, social science research has shown that climate mobilities can 
be short-term or long-term, but also circular or seasonal (Zickgraf 
2018). What may start as a short-distance, temporary move can turn 
into a long-distance, permanent one (Van der Geest 2010). Some people 
choose to remain in their homes in full cognisance of the risks involved 
(McNamara and Gibson 2009; Adams 2016; Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016; 
Farbotko 2018), while others are trapped and experience involuntary 
immobility (Black et al. 2013), or embark on long-distance movements 
because everyday short-distance mobilities to markets or healthcare are 
disrupted (Blondin 2020). In addition, it is crucial to understand the 
situated dynamics and local contexts in which migration (or immobility) 
occurs. Socio-cultural, political, and environmental dynamics change 
 716. Climate Migration Is about People, Not Numbers
from place to place, and can differ significantly even within a single 
community.
To better understand the complexity of migratory movements, we 
can also turn for example to “trajectory ethnographies” (Schapendonk 
and Steel 2014; Schapendonk et al. 2018), “geographies in and of 
movement” (Brachet 2012), or life history approaches (Singh et al. 2019). 
These in-depth approaches study how mobility unfolds, what shapes it, 
and how mobility decisions are made. The first two involve interviews 
in multiple locations, at different moments and stages relevant to a 
journey, while the latter explores personal narratives of mobility. Such 
methods provide a detailed picture of the circuitous routes people take; 
of the obstacles, meetings, and separations that punctuate them; and of 
peoples’ perceptions, aspirations, and memories. 
Of course, such methods also have their limitations. Questions 
can be raised about the power dynamics between researchers and 
research participants, and the latter’s degree of representation (Cabot 
2016; Khosravi 2018; Boas et al. 2020). Can we—as often privileged 
academics—really put ourselves in the shoes of affected individuals? 
Trajectory approaches allow researchers (to some degree) “to practice 
mobility and to reveal mobility-immobility relations that otherwise 
would remain hidden”, but it is important to stay reflexive (Boas et al. 
2020: 144).
This is not to say that better numbers cannot be produced in the 
course of estimating climate change and migration interconnections. 
Besides improving quantitative methods and data, however, we argue 
that progress will only be achieved through greater collaboration 
with qualitative social sciences of the kind just described. We see as 
promising the mixing of methods in work that ‘grounds’ big data with 
site-based fieldwork, so as to challenge assumptions made from afar and 
detect important dynamics that big-data research would otherwise miss 
(Boas et al. 2019). Collaborative work integrating behavioural migration 
theories and concepts of “place attachment” into agent-based models 
is also helping to increase the sensitivity of model results to variations 
in individual and community-level responses to environmental hazards 
(Adams and Kay 2019). Lastly, the recent uptake in mobilities research 
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of tools such as Q methodology1 also reveals a range of shared subjective 
understandings, attitudes and perceptions of climate change and human 
mobility (Van der Geest et al. 2019; Oakes 2019).
The Misuses of Climate Migration Numbers
If we insist on epistemological and methodological diversity beyond 
quantification alone, it is because social science studies on numbers—
not just of climate migration but in other spheres too—have repeatedly 
shown their potential for misuse (Porter 1995). The point is not to 
do away with numbers, but to exercise caution at all stages of their 
production, communication, and use. Below we detail two specific areas 
of concern.
Climate Mobility Is Not a Crisis
Our first concern with headline numbers is how they are used to 
construct climate migration as a crisis. The intention behind such 
rhetoric may be laudable: to stimulate action on climate change and to 
assist its victims. But there are many problems with using fear of mass 
displacement as a rallying cry. There is absolutely no guarantee that 
crisis narratives underpinned by large numbers are an effective way to 
achieve these aims.
On the contrary, press releases and the news media tend to 
highlight a single number, usually drawn from the upper range of 
estimates presented in the original source. In some cases, the numbers 
lose all specificity, with headlines pointing only to ‘millions’ or even 
‘billions’ of people on the move (also see discussion of the constructed 
and historical dimensions of ‘environmental refugees’ in Saunders 
2000). Sometimes, they do not even refer to a specific source. In such 
a discursive context, the specifics of the number and the underlying 
1 The aim of Q methodology is to identify the shared views of study participants on 
a given issue. Participants are asked, as a group, to rank a set of statements on a 
scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The statements are selected to 
be representative of known existing opinions on the issue. In addition, participants 
are asked to explain their decisions, providing qualitative commentary to the 
quantitative sorting exercise.
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methodology matter little, as long as it is high. Numbers are used to 
rhetorical effect.
The dystopian futures thus created are often associated with a 
tendency to discuss migratory flows in hydrological metaphors, such 
as in assertions of ‘waves’, ‘floods’ or ‘rising tides’ of migrants. Such 
invocations connect with a wider racist motif that contributes to an 
alarming imaginary wherein the ‘Global North’ will be overwhelmed 
by migrants from ‘Global South’ contexts (Bettini 2013; Methmann 2014; 
Pallister-Wilkins 2019). Worse still, the ‘hotspots’ approach on which 
these narratives are based tends to erase colonial histories and naturalise 
structural violence, neutralising local contexts and conditions. By 
reducing large parts of the Global South to a “hotspot”, this perpetuates 
a dangerous othering exercise, denigrating large parts of the world as 
merely disaster-ridden, dangerous, overpopulated places from which 
people can only aspire to flee (Giuliani 2017). This narrative actively 
reproduces the figure of the climate migrant as a security threat, and 
ultimately, as a highly racialised entity (Baldwin 2013).
Researchers who seek to publicise their work on the climate-
migration nexus must grasp these racist and simplifying dangers, as 
too should policymakers, practitioners, and journalists who promote 
these narratives. We argue that the stories of affected people ought to 
be central in such reporting, even if—perhaps especially if—their stories 
run counter to our intuitions and estimated numbers. It is people who 
matter, not numbers.
Climate Mobility Is Not a Management Problem
The promise of better numbers also reinforces the impression that the 
climate migration crisis can be managed because it can be quantified. 
Numbers hold a privileged place in contemporary political discourses 
and policymaking, as they are associated with rigour and objectivity in 
the public and scientific imagination (Porter 1995; Espeland and Stevens 
2008; Hansen and Porter 2012). Migration policy has not escaped 
this trend. To a large extent migration expertise is understood to be 
associated with researchers’ ability to quantify their findings, so they 
can be used in managerial practices that place statistical methods at the 
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centre of decision-making (Takle 2017). While numbers have their place 
in policymaking, we argue that the qualitative methods and subjective 
perspectives highlighted above should be centred in policymaking on 
climate mobilities. This will only be possible if the rhetorical power of 
numbers is acknowledged and challenged.
Adopting a managerial approach to climate migration, guided by 
flawed numbers, risks disregarding many of the dangers associated 
with climate migration numbers discussed above. This practice can 
be understood in terms of “strategic ignorance”. While policymakers 
are widely aware of migration data quality issues, and associated 
uncertainties, they still maintain a picture of migration as an “easily 
measurable, intelligible reality” that can therefore be managed by 
numbers (Scheel and Ustek-Spilda 2019). In this way, they avoid the 
difficult political questions—notably around responsibility—that a 
more head-on engagement with migration’s complex realities would 
require (Betts and Pilath 2017; Kelman 2019).
In a political context where critical migration scholars struggle 
to make themselves heard, this situation is particularly concerning. 
Mobilities scholars often find that while many policymakers are willing 
to engage in discussion, these exchanges do not have any meaningful 
bearing on policy design (Baldwin-Edwards et al. 2019; Héran 
2020). Researchers have even expressed concerns that findings of the 
migration research funded by the EU are disregarded by the EU’s own 
policy processes (Kalir and Cantat 2020). In this light, the constant drive 
under migration management processes for “more and better data” can 
have the counterproductive effect of ignoring already well-established 
knowledge in migration research—whether quantitative or based on 
other methods. 
Conclusion
Estimates of climate migration numbers present a facade of objective, 
authoritative and unemotional facts. But these numbers are highly 
contentious. Such estimates need to be recognised as being grounded in 
normative, epistemological and methodological assumptions which are 
often hidden and rarely challenged. At the very least, migration scholars 
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should expose these assumptions so that audiences better understand 
how migration numbers are constructed (for a recent example, see 
McMichael et al. 2020). In many cases, the estimates of people moving 
in the context of climate change are methodologically questionable or 
else nebulous. 
Migration numbers need to be understood against this background. 
But they also do not stand alone. They are attached to various narratives 
and are presented in multiple ways. Even rigorous, cautiously 
communicated estimates can become decoupled from the complexities 
of human mobilities. The significance of a discourse is not simply about 
how it is constructed, and by whom, but also lies in how the discourse is 
received, and how the narratives which package migration numbers are 
filtered and interpreted. Complexities that may initially be presented 
alongside the numerical estimates become erased. Numbers alone 
become the headline, thus distracting from important political questions 
about humanity, justice, and responsibility.
A common narrative with which climate migration estimates are 
coupled (either by their authors or during their reproduction and 
dissemination) is one that conceptualises human mobility in the 
context of climate change as a crisis. The large numbers of people 
imagined to be on the move are employed to signify the looming crisis 
and used to invoke urgent action. There comes a point where these 
numbers are instrumentalised by political movements whose values—
expressed in xenophobic narratives and anti-immigrant agendas—are 
at odds with those who champion these numbers to call for bolder 
climate action. 
The relationship between climate change and human mobility 
should not be seen as a security problem, as a managerial issue, or as a 
number to be controlled. The policy focus should be on people—their 
vulnerabilities, rights and freedoms—so as to help prise open political 
spaces for policy interventions beyond building walls, real or rhetorical, 
designed to control rather than to care.
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7. We’ll Always Have Paris
Mike Hannis
Many were rightly sceptical of the Paris Agreement’s 
choreographed performance of success, given its reliance 
on theoretical carbon trading, fantastical Negative Emission 
Technologies (NETs), and voluntary national ‘contributions’. 
But was COP21 the high-water mark of climate co-operation? 
Can COP26 rekindle the internationalist spirit required to keep 
even the idea of a globally co-ordinated effort alive, in the face of 
resurgent nationalism and the proliferation of apparently more 
immediate crises? This article explores the chances of COP26 
reinvigorating international co-operation, and with it the flagging 
credibility of the whole Paris process. It focuses in particular on 
the Paris Agreement’s controversial Article 6 rules on voluntary 
carbon trading, and the urgent need to prevent emissions traded 
across international borders from counting towards Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs).
All Eyes on Paris1
For a few weeks in late 2015, all eyes were on Paris. High-level delegates 
from almost every country on Earth attended the 21st Conference 
of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—more snappily known as COP21, or the Paris 
Climate Conference. Civil society and media swarmed in too. There are 
subsidiary climate COPs every year, but major ones follow a five-year 
cycle, making COP26 in Glasgow the next ‘last chance to save the world’.
1 Parts of this chapter were first published in The Land magazine, 27 (2020), 18–20; 28 
(2021), 4.
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Before Paris, 2009’s COP15 in Denmark had failed to live up to 
its ill-advised branding as Hopenhagen. A tentative goal of limiting 
temperature increases to two degrees above pre-industrial levels was 
agreed, subject to review in 2015, but no progress was made on any 
practical steps towards actually achieving this, or towards any kind of 
legally binding agreement.
2015’s COP21 in Paris did see a genuine breakthrough. This was 
achieved, however, by abandoning attempts to create a legally binding 
system, and instead adopting the voluntary Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 
2015). The Agreement upheld the below 2℃ warming target, and 
even added an aspiration to keep warming within 1.5 degrees. Each 
Party (UNFCCC member states, plus the EU) agreed to set out its 
planned reductions in emissions, now termed Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs). Reviewed every five years, NDCs can be 
amended to be ‘more ambitious’, but are never supposed to be revised 
downwards. This review process is intended to ‘ratchet up’ commitment 
to emissions reduction, but detailed discussion of how the new system 
would actually work in practice was deferred.
Before diaries were ripped up by the COVID-19 pandemic, COP26 
was scheduled for November 2020. In time for this Glasgow meeting, 
Parties had been asked to set long-term decarbonisation goals, as 
well as to undertake the first five-yearly review of their shorter-term 
NDCs (Gabbatiss 2021). This process was to be governed by a ‘Paris 
rulebook’, details of which were intended to have been agreed and 
finalised in advance of COP26. These rules are supposed to make NDCs 
transparent, fair and robust by ensuring that all countries calculate 
them using agreed common methodologies, rather than doing the 
sums in whatever way works to their advantage. Standardisation would 
also allow the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
and others to plausibly translate the aggregated NDCs into global 
temperature change forecasts.
Carbon Trading Rules
Intermediate COPs since Paris largely saw fudges and grandstanding 
rather than real progress, but nonetheless the Paris rulebook was mostly 
agreed by the end of COP24 (held in Katowice, Poland in 2018), albeit 
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with the significant exception of rules on voluntary carbon trading. 
These are known as Article 6 rules, after the somewhat obscure but 
critically important part of the Paris Agreement they relate to (UNFCCC 
2015: 4–5). 
This trading issue is significant. The Paris Agreement explicitly 
allows countries calculating their NDCs to include emissions reductions 
elsewhere over which they have somehow gained ‘ownership’, as well 
as those actually achieved within their own territory. In so doing, it 
arguably makes voluntary carbon trading a more prominent mechanism 
for delivering emissions reductions than it ought to be. For clarity, the 
relevant UNFCCC COP21 Agreement Article 6 rules are as follows:
Article 6
1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary 
cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined 
contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and 
adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and 
environmental integrity. 
2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative 
approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote 
sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and 
transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting 
to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with 
guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Agreement.
3. The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve 
nationally determined contributions under this Agreement shall be 
voluntary and authorized by participating Parties. 
4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established 
under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement for use by Parties 
on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement, and shall aim: 
(a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while 
fostering sustainable development; 
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(b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by 
a Party; 
(c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, 
which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission 
reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally 
determined contribution; 
and (d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions. 
5. Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in 
paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement 
of the host Party’s nationally determined contribution if used by 
another Party to demonstrate achievement of its nationally determined 
contribution (UNFCCC 2015: 4–5). 
The voluntary carbon trading framework established by Article 6 
risks legitimising a wide range of questionable practices whereby 
richer countries offset their polluting activities by paying for allegedly 
emission-reducing or carbon-capturing activities in poorer ones. For 
instance, if the Norwegian government pays for some reforestation in 
Indonesia, or a British company pays to install a scrubber to remove 
potential carbon emissions from the chimney of a chemical plant in 
India, the resulting greenhouse gas reductions will be reported as part 
of the Norwegian or British NDCs (as provided for in Article 6.5). 
One problem immediately arising here is that the ‘host Party’, in this 
example Indonesia or India, might also want to report the resulting 
reductions in their own NDC. 
Article 6 is clear that such double counting would not be allowed (see 
6.2 and 6.5 above), which at first sight seems fair. But is it? Should the 
host really have to also identify and enact a second set of reductions which 
will count towards its own target? Would this not mean it was taking on 
a disproportionate share of the overall work? This kind of argument has 
been forcefully put, for example by Brazilian delegates concerned with 
retaining sovereignty over the Amazon Forest, but also by consultants 
(e.g. Streck 2020) whose creative interpretation of what constitutes 
double counting relies on the idea that private sector voluntary trading 
schemes (as opposed to government actions) should not be counted as 
part of NDCs. This apparently technical dispute masks a bitter standoff 
between countries hoping to offset their own activities by, for example, 
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funding preservation of the Amazon through carbon offset purchases, 
and a Brazilian government insisting on full sovereignty over the area’s 
resources. Neither is on the side of the angels.2
OMG(E)!
There are also tricky practical questions about standards and 
verification. Who is supposed to make sure that any given scheme is 
not counted twice? How exactly might this be done? The answer may 
well be different for bilateral deals between two countries (covered 
by Article 6.2), and for trades undertaken within the regulated global 
carbon trading market mechanism envisaged by Article 6.4, but neither 
is clear.
The latter mechanism is intended to supersede the earlier Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), a dysfunctional voluntary trading 
scheme established by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC. Some 
countries hold vast numbers of old CDM credits, and have argued that 
they should be able to count these against future NDCs. In the case of 
Australia, cashing in these CDM credits would at a stroke have achieved 
(on paper) more than half the emissions cuts required to meet its NDC 
target of reducing emissions to 26–28% below 2005 levels by 2030. One 
Australian economist has described this situation as “tantamount to 
a drunk guy waving an expired Starbucks coffee voucher around in a 
McDonald’s and acting surprised that nobody wanted to give him a 
coffee” (Denniss 2020). In the face of such ridicule this strategy was 
eventually dropped (Doherty 2020).
The overarching issue here is whether voluntary trading actually 
results in ‘Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions’ (OMGE), meaning 
a genuine net reduction, rather than just serving as a way for emissions 
in one place to be offset elsewhere, thereby allowing business-as-usual 
to continue (as also foregrounded in Lankford’s discussion in this 
2 This summary of post-Paris COP negotiations is largely derived from comprehensive 
coverage at www.carbonbrief.org. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015: 
4–5) addresses “[voluntary] use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
[ITMOs] to achieve nationally determined contributions”: for background, see 
https://www.carbon-mechanisms.de/en/introduction/the-paris-agreement-and-
article-6. For an insider account of the recent bilateral agreement claimed to be 
“the first instrument that provides access to the voluntary carbon market to ITMOs 
under the provisions of the Paris Agreement”, see Elgart and Secada 2020.
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volume regarding the necessity and difficulty of securing permanent 
CO2 ‘salvage’, and in Dyke et al.’s chapter on the difficulties of achieving 
net zero emissions overall). 
This issue was discussed at the Paris COP, and while detail is lacking, 
the principle of OMGE is acknowledged in Article 6.4 as an objective 
of the proposed global trading scheme. Worryingly, however, no such 
objective is included in Article 6.2 on bilateral trading, although this 
Article does explicitly mention the need to avoid “double accounting” of 
emissions reductions. As things stand there appears to be no watertight 
obligation to ensure that any given offsetting transaction between two 
countries actually results in a net emissions reduction. It has been 
largely left to the Association of Small Island States, whose territories 
are already literally disappearing under the waves, to point out how 
disastrous this could be (Dizzanne 2019).
COP25 (held in Madrid in 2019) was supposed to see all these 
arguments settled. To the dismay of many but the surprise of few, 
once again this did not happen. Newly minted climate celebrity Greta 
Thunberg captured the mood when she told a restive plenary hall that 
the COP seemed to have “turned into some kind of opportunity for 
countries to negotiate loopholes” (Evans and Gabbatis 2019: online). 
The lamentable failure to agree Article 6 rules before COP26 means that 
the five-yearly review of NDCs is happening without agreement on 
crucial elements of what these can or cannot contain. This raises a real 
danger that Parties’ emissions reductions may be inflated beyond what 
has actually been achieved, meaning that the world is even further from 
achieving ‘net zero carbon’ than reported figures suggest. 
Better Late than on Time?
Quite apart from the sorry outcome of preparatory negotiations, there 
was widespread relief that COP26 did not have to take place against 
the backdrop of the US’s formal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 
which came into effect on 4 November 2020, just before the original 
Glasgow dates. Trump’s contrarian refusal to co-operate on climate had 
of course been an elephant in every COP negotiating room since 2017. 
The incoming Biden administration wasted no time in rejoining the Paris 
Agreement, and has submitted a relatively ambitious NDC promising 
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a 50–52% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 from a 2005 
baseline, alongside goals to create a “carbon pollution-free power sector 
by 2035” and a “net zero greenhouse gas emissions economy by no 
later than 2050” (White House 2021: online). Nonetheless while US 
re-engagement provides a much-needed boost to the flagging credibility 
of the whole Paris process, there are several lost years to make up before 
optimistic Democrat claims about ‘re-establishing climate leadership’ 
will appear credible. Veterans of former US President Obama’s Paris 
negotiating team have been recruited to assist, and will be working hard 
in Glasgow.
Climate economist Nicholas Stern claimed that the delay gave time 
to prepare for a big push at the Glasgow COP towards ensuring that 
rather than propping up business as usual, the massive funds being 
poured into pandemic recovery fund a transition to a sustainable and 
resilient economy (Harvey 2020). Was his optimism realistic? How 
will the new world of post-COVID international relations handle the 
need to co-operate? It is still too soon to say whether Stern’s vision of 
pandemic recovery funds kick-starting a new global economy “in closer 
harmony with the natural world” (Harvey 2020: online) will come 
true, but early signs are not good. While there have been encouraging 
noises from the EU about making sure its COVID recovery plans are 
at least congruent with its NDC targets, there are (as ever) questions 
around whether this rhetoric will be matched by action. Elsewhere, 
many countries have given massive bailouts and loans to airlines and 
fossil fuel companies, without even attaching conditions on improved 
environmental performance (Bailoutwatch 2021; Transport and 
Environment 2020). This financial stimulus risks locking in business-as-
usual for decades to come. Meanwhile, researchers identify a growing 
trend towards ‘cutting green tape’ as politicians accept arguments from 
business that climate-related regulation is hindering economic recovery 
(Bond et al. 2020). This tendency is happening in many countries but 
again the most egregious example has been the US, where the former 
Trump-led Republican administration seized on recovery rhetoric to 
justify its existing plans to rescind or weaken a truly alarming number 
of environmental regulations (Popovich et al. 2020).
The context here was not only climate denial and cronyism (as also 
flagged by Bigger et al. in this volume), but a wholesale repudiation 
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of international agreements of all kinds. Trump withdrew the US not 
only from Paris, but also from numerous other international treaties on 
issues from nuclear arms control, to human rights, to the militarisation 
of space. His administration even quit the World Health Organisation 
in the middle of a pandemic. Clearly, internationalism of any kind 
was firmly off the table and it will not be politically easy to turn this 
supertanker around. It would take a very brave Democrat to stand up 
and say that America is no longer First. 
Meanwhile, varieties of Trumpism live on in countries such as Brazil, 
Australia and India—all major players in climate negotiations. China is 
setting stronger domestic targets, but has never been noted either for its 
multilateralism or for its altruistic stance on global affairs. Despite the 
fall of Trump, this does not appear to be an auspicious time for Paris-
style voluntary co-operation (Sachs 2019).
UK, EU, CO
2
Squirming in the COP26 host’s spotlight will be a UK government 
incongruously obsessed with the idea that the country should make its 
own buccaneering way in the world, beholden to no-one. A desperate 
scramble to sign trade deals with anyone other than the EU led UK 
negotiators to accept that any US/UK deal must not even mention 
climate change (Hannis 2020). Whether this will change under Biden 
remains to be seen. 
As the host of COP26, the UK is expected to set an example, and 
virtue-signalling on climate is also seen as an easy way for a newly 
isolated blond populist to build bridges with the Biden administration. 
Unfortunately, talking up the UK’s climate commitment now takes the 
distinctly Trumpian form of claiming that a clean, high-tech Britain is 
forging ahead of the dirty old EU, not to mention the rest of the world. 
In the proud new era of unchallenged sovereignty, no opportunity 
is missed to make clear that Britain is Best. Even when the UK drugs 
regulator licensed a COVID vaccine created in Germany by a Turkish 
couple, for a US drug company to manufacture in Belgium, puppyish 
cabinet minister Gavin Williamson explained that this proved British 
scientists were “the best in the world”, and that “we’re a much better 
country than every single one of them” (Euronews 2020: online). If 
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still in post, Williamson may perhaps get deployed to Glasgow. His 
breathless, fact-free enthusiasm would be perfect for press releases like 
this:
The UK’s new target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—our Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Climate Agreement—is 
among the highest in the world and commits the UK to cutting emissions 
at the fastest rate of any major economy so far. Today’s target is the first 
set by the UK following its departure from the EU, demonstrating the 
UK’s leadership in tackling climate change (BEIS 2020a: online).
The UK NDC promises to reduce emissions “by at least 68% by 2030, 
compared to 1990 levels”, meaning that “UK emissions per person will 
fall from around 14 tCO2e [tonnes of CO2 equivalent] in 1990 to fewer 
than 4 tCO2e in 2030” (BEIS 2020c: 1, 28). This sounds impressive, but 
most of this reduction has already happened, due largely to the historic 
move from coal to gas power stations between 1990 and 2015 (Thomas 
et al. 2019). The per person figure for 2019 was 5.3 tonnes, so the new 
target in fact proposes a less impressive cut of only around a quarter 
of this amount over the next decade (Evans 2020). The equivalent EU 
target is a cut of 55% by 2030 (Climate Action Tracker 2020). This is 
certainly a lower headline figure than the UK’s proposed 68%, but it 
is also an average across twenty-seven countries facing many different 
challenges. Current EU average per capita annual emissions are around 
6.7 tonnes, and if the 2030 target were met this would reduce to around 
five, meaning that a similar drop of around a quarter from today’s levels 
is envisaged by 2030 (Eurostat 2021). 
Even ten years ahead seems a very long time under present conditions, 
but these 2030 targets are intended as stepping stones towards reaching 
the current holy grail of ‘zero carbon by 2050’, to which both the UK and 
the EU have committed, along with a growing list of other countries. A 
timely measure of how hard this will be is provided by work estimating 
that the dramatic drop in global economic activity caused by the 
pandemic will impact global temperature by no more than 0.01 degrees 
(Forster et al. 2020). 
Oddly, the UK’s NDC announcement carried endorsements from 
banks, energy companies, Tesco and Coca Cola Europe (BEIS 2020a). 
Their enthusiasm may in part be explained by the fact that the NDC 
target does not include any emissions elsewhere in the world, such as 
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those arising from the production of goods for UK consumption, or 
from overseas activities of UK-registered companies. It also excludes 
international aviation and shipping. 
The Return of Article 6
On the face of it, the UK’s NDC does at least commit to achieving 
reductions by actually emitting fewer greenhouse gases, rather than 
by international offsetting or voluntary carbon trading. But perhaps 
inevitably, voodoo carbon economics reappear in the small print:
While the UK intends to meet its NDC target through reducing emissions 
domestically, it reserves the right to use voluntary cooperation under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Such use could occur through the 
linking of a potential UK emissions trading system to another emissions 
trading system or through the use of emissions reductions or removals 
units (BEIS 2020b: 27).
Meanwhile the recent Energy White Paper proclaims in now-familiar 
triumphal tones:
Having left the EU, we are ready to lead the world again. 
We will establish a UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to replace the 
UK’s participation in the EU ETS. [...] the UK is open to linking the UK 
ETS internationally [...] we are considering a range of options, but no 
decision on our preferred linking partners has yet been made (BEIS 
2020c: online).
An unlinked UK ETS would be implausible, and the only realistic ‘linking 
partner’ will be the much bigger EU scheme, so it seems inevitable that 
any UK ETS will effectively become an offshoot of the EU ETS, sharing 
the many flaws of that scheme while having lost the ability to influence it 
(Gabbatiss 2020). Post-Brexit threats to genuine decarbonisation will of 
course come not only from the disingenuous carbon trading facilitated 
by Article 6, but also from old-fashioned physical trade. Importing 
and exporting goods across the world rather than across the English 
Channel is not exactly going to help with reducing carbon emissions. 
More broadly, EU law and oversight have been the key upward drivers of 
UK climate and environmental standards for decades. No-one seriously 
believes that the sacred ‘divergence’ will result in UK environmental 
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standards being higher than those in the EU. But they will be British 
standards, so of course they will be better.
Beware the Bubble
If the retreat from global co-operation continues in Glasgow, one 
outcome might be that Article 6.4’s projected global carbon trading 
mechanism never gets off the ground. As discussed above this might 
well encourage further growth in poorly regulated bilateral offset 
deals under Article 6.2. There are worrying signs that the UK may seek 
to become a hub for brokering such deals, given its stated aspiration 
to “position the UK, and the City of London, as a leader in the global 
voluntary carbon markets” (BEIS 2020d; for background see also 
Mikolajczyk and ‘t Gilde 2020).
There may, however, be a more constructive option, and indeed one 
which should appeal to those sceptical about international co-operation. 
Could failure to achieve a global trading regime encourage the Parties to 
actually take responsibility for their own emissions? Nothing in the Paris 
Agreement stops a country producing an honest NDC based on genuine 
reductions in emissions, with no reliance either on carbon trading or on 
fanciful ‘negative emissions technologies’ (Hannis 2017; Herzog 2018). 
Such honesty would also mean including emissions associated with 
everything the country consumes, no matter where it was produced. The 
Johnson Government has so far shown little interest in work mapping 
out what this could mean for the UK (see, for example, Allwood et al. 
2019; Allen et al. 2019). Genuine leadership at COP26 could start here, 
rather than with attempts to reflate the carbon trading bubble.
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8. The Atmospheric Carbon 
Commons in Transition
Bruce Lankford
Originally conceived to discuss water in irrigation systems, this 
chapter adapts the concept of ‘paracommons’ to CO2 governance. 
The paracommons is ‘a commons of material salvages’, occurring 
within the context of multiple pathways for resources salvaged 
from wastage/waste and via reduced consumption. The 
carbon/atmospheric commons can be framed in three consecutive 
stages, with implications for how carbon dioxide is conceived, 
counted and managed to achieve reductions in global emissions 
and levels: a ‘sink-type atmospheric commons’ occurring prior to 
the 1980/90s, a ‘husbandry-type carbon commons’ lasting from the 
1980/90s to the 2030s, and an emergency ‘carbon paracommons’ 
post-2030s. The first stage sees the atmosphere treated as a dump 
or sink for carbon dioxide (CO2) ‘waste’ resulting in rising CO2 
levels. The second stage sees climate change mitigation (e.g. carbon 
sequestration in forests) as Ostromian-commons husbandry 
that attempts to reduce CO2 emission rates but continues to 
result in levels remaining above 400 ppm. In the third stage, the 
paracommons treats CO2 and its ‘salvaging’ as a matter of urgency 
leading to permanent sequestration, non-use and transformation. 
A ‘Commons’ Framing of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide
This article frames carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere as three sequential 
stages of commons,1 as illustrated in Figure 4: a sink-type commons 
1 An area or collection of resources for use by individuals and groups often held ‘in 
common’ but subject to varying pressures and ownership modalities.
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for carbon dioxide2 waste;3 a ‘husbandry-type’ Ostromian commons 
for governing CO2 emissions; and a ‘paracommons’ where salvaged 
CO2 products (such as liquid or frozen carbon dioxide) are created, 
permanently sequestered and un-used. The first stage, where wastes of 
combusting fossil fuel were dumped with little regard for their impact 
on climate change, occurred prior to the 1990s (but has continued), 
causing increases in atmospheric CO2 levels. The second stage, running 
from the 1990s to the near future (2030), sees increasing management or 
‘husbandry’ of terrestrial and atmospheric carbon and carbon emissions. 
It is suggested that the third stage will consolidate over the next twenty to 
thirty years as a scarcity or emergency-driven ‘paracommons’ concerned 
with controlling the means, amounts, pathways, and ownership of CO2 
‘salvages’ in order to drive down atmospheric levels. These commons are 
described in more detail below. 
Fig. 4. Three frames and stages of the global atmospheric/carbon commons. Image 
by chapter author.
2 With limited space only carbon dioxide (CO2) amongst greenhouse gases is 
discussed.
3 CO2 is a gas wasted during fossil fuel conversion that is difficult to capture and 
recycle (usually termed a wastage), but can be captured with technological 
innovation.
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The Atmospheric Commons: A Sink-Type Commons
The term ‘atmospheric commons’ observes carbon dioxide as a wastage/
waste dumped into the atmosphere: 
One may argue that the atmosphere can also be regarded as a commons, 
exploited by all yet owned by none. Most significantly the atmosphere 
has been abused as a ‘common sink’. Until relatively recently it 
provided a completely free waste disposal system for a whole range of 
anthropogenic pollutants. It also constitutes the ultimate ‘public good’, 
that is to say if resources are expended on improving air quality, it is 
impossible to exclude people from enjoying the benefits (Vogler 2001: 
2427).
The word ‘sink’ has been used by others to cast the atmosphere as a 
commons (Edenhofer et al. 2012) consistent with Vogler’s “exploitation 
by all” and also invoking Hardin’s controversial Tragedy of the Commons 
hypothesis (Hardin 1968). As Brown et al. (2019: 61) argue, however, 
“this pervasive framing of climate change as a commons tragedy limits 
how we confront the climate challenge”. 
The Carbon Commons: A Husbandry-Type Commons
Brown et al. (2019) thus critique this sink-type view of the commons 
by reminding us of Ostrom’s ‘parable’ of collective action regarding 
resources held in common and their management (Ostrom 1990) and 
joint governance (Schrijver 2016). Observing three characteristics, 
this ‘carbon commons’ invokes an Ostromian ‘husbandry’ of carbon 
and CO2 emissions and levels, including: 1) recognition of the limited 
atmospheric headroom for further increases in CO2 because of its causal 
contribution to climate change; 2) implementation of CO2 mitigation 
tools to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (e.g. by carbon offsetting and 
raising fossil fuel efficiency), and; 3) questions of distribution regarding 
who is using and has used the carbon commons the most by emitting 
the most atmospheric carbon (Meyerson 1998; Pierrehumbert 2012).
Given accelerated climate change, however, the concern here is that 
‘business-as-usual’ husbandry of the carbon commons is increasingly 
insufficient. Current governance will be ineffective, or not effective 
enough, in bringing down CO2 levels within a rapid time-frame. 
Although carbon emissions will flatten out under present approaches to 
mitigation (Lovell et al. 2009), this ‘emissions-focused’ husbandry will 
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not deliver stringent decreases in CO2 concentration levels to less than 
350 ppm, as required in order to avert climate volatility (cf. Rockstrom 
et al. 2009). Extending Brown et al.’s (2019) critique of a ‘Tragedy of 
the Commons’ framing of the ‘sink’ of atmospheric carbon, then, we 
should consider how a husbandry-type Ostromian commons also limits 
how we conceive of and confront escalating climate change (Rabinowitz 
2010).
A Carbon Paracommons: An Emergency-Driven Resource-
Salvaging Commons
This is where an adaptation of the ‘paracommons’ concept comes in. 
Drawing from analyses of efficiency gains and their variable uptake 
in irrigation systems (Lankford 2013, 2018), the term ‘paracommons’ 
describes a commons of ‘conserved’ or ‘salvaged’ resources arising from 
efficiency gains and managed non-consumption of natural resources. 
The Greek prefix ‘para’, meaning ‘alongside’, is used to signal that 
the commons here is of salvaged wastages that emerge from, and sit 
alongside, the primary commons resource under consideration (i.e. 
water in irrigation systems and atmospheric carbon in fossil-fuel-
dependent industrial production).
Inspiration for the paracommons idea came from identifying why 
and how water resources believed to be ‘lost’ in inefficient irrigation 
systems became the focus of competition if these ‘losses’ could be 
‘salvaged’. Conceptually, four parties may compete for these salvages: a 
‘proprietor’ making the efficiency gain (usually the irrigators managing 
an irrigation system); their ‘immediate neighbour’ (communities often 
placed near the periphery of the irrigation system gaining from or losing 
water ‘losses’ emanating from the irrigation system); ‘society’ more 
broadly; and ‘nature’, when water is freed up to benefit environmental 
processes beyond the irrigation system.
In adapting the paracommons concept to global carbon management, 
the following eight features can be identified: 
Scarcity and emergency. The irrigation paracommons sees that 
‘salvages of irrigation losses’ become valuable when water scarcity 
boosts competition for ‘losses freed up’ through efficiency gains. 
In a post-2030 climate future, however, circumstances for carbon 
management will presumably be different, although analogous in 
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certain respects. Atmospheric CO2 will not become valuable or sought 
after under demand-driven conditions of scarcity, but by viewing climate 
change as an “emergency” (Gills and Morgan 2020), and as a form of 
scarcity (Asayama et al. 2019), three features will reshape how we view 
CO2 ‘salvage’ from the atmosphere. First, a regulated scarcity of CO2 
headroom emission possibilities will mean that CO2 levels can no longer 
grow. Second, greater financial and societal values afforded to CO2 
salvages permanently removed from the atmosphere will potentially 
create much greater interest in taking such salvage action. Connected 
to this valorisation, broad spectrum ownership of effective carbon 
salvaging technologies at all levels of society will give an appearance of 
competition for salvaging CO2 amongst many players, sitting within a 
broader cooperative endeavour. 
Salvage. A definition for ‘salvage’ as a verb is to retrieve, utilise or 
preserve something from potential loss, with ‘salvage’ as a noun being 
short-hand here for any means by which CO2 within, or destined for, 
the atmosphere is removed from, or stopped from passing to, the 
atmosphere, thus signalling the production of negative emissions. 
Examples of CO2 salvage include its transformation and sequestration 
into organic liquids and solids (e.g. trees and algae-based fuels), or into 
liquid or frozen and stored CO2, or fossil and man-made organic solids 
and liquids whose oxidation or burning is avoided or minimised (on the 
complexities posed by such ‘salvage’ technologies, also see Dyke et al. 
this volume). 
Transience and impermanence. In complex systems represented by 
water and carbon, the amounts, boundaries and pathways of the 
resources and their salvaging are leaky and transient (Murray et al. 
2007). This means that without strict controls, most husbandry attempts 
to sequester carbon dioxide into, for example, soil organic matter or 
trees, are impermanent beyond a time scale of twenty to fifty years. A 
related problem is the difficulty of accurately accounting for carbon in 
ways that value and record permanent sequestration (Gifford 2020), as 
also signalled in the chapters in this volume by Bigger et al. and Hannis. 
Consumption rebound. An effect of transience and leakiness is that 
unused or temporarily salvaged products in one part of the economy 
may be prone to a consumption rebound elsewhere. This is akin to the 
Jevons paradox (Stoknes and Rockström 2018; Ruzzenenti et al. 2019), 
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arising, for example, when an increase in vehicle fuel efficiency is 
undermined by increases in the number of vehicles in use.
Exteriorising and making visible the wastes. In the paracommons, 
potential wastes/wastages need to be made visible and exteriorised 
(Lankford 2018), meaning their presence needs to be seen as an integral 
part of the unused and untransformed resource. Progress in the public 
understanding of climate change, for example, means that many people 
now see that oil and coal reserves are not only fuels for energy but 
also constitute the future atmospheric loading of CO2 ‘wastes’. The 
CO2 in the fossil fuel has been made visible, and society’s changing 
relationship with the properties of fossil fuels has become a discussion 
about what becomes exteriorised as they are used, and with what socio-
environmental effects. 
Exteriorising (making visible) the salvage. The second ‘making visible’ 
that exists in the CO2 paracommons involves the transformation of 
wastes/wastages into salvage. In irrigation the waste that previously 
is ‘lost’ water becomes a gain, because through efficiency innovations 
losses are recovered or water withdrawals (and their internal losses) 
are foregone, making more water available for reuse and repurposing 
(Lankford 2018). With carbon dioxide, various visible salvages exist: 
CO2 is permanently evacuated in the form of timber or frozen CO2; 
CO2 is not produced because fossil fuel extraction and burning is 
foregone; or CO2 is turned into carbon-salvaged fuels (more or less 
emission-neutral) that replace fossil fuels (generating additional CO2 
emissions).
A distributive and destination puzzle. Being concerned with controlling 
CO2 salvages in a notoriously leaky environment where many possible 
carbon pathways, distributions and destinations exist, a paracommons 
framing asks ‘who gets the final salvage’. As introduced above, this 
question identifies four parties acting as destinations for the salvages. 
Determining these CO2 pathways and destinations is about bearing 
down on leakage and the rebound effect in order to ensure salvages 
permanently end up where they need to be so as to prevent further 
emissions. As an illustrative example, in the ‘husbandry-commons’ (as 
per the description above) vehicle, fuel efficiency results in reduced 
emissions per driver-kilometre in the short term, but may lead to an 
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uptick in fuel consumption elsewhere either with the same driver (the 
‘proprietor’) or their partner (the ‘immediate neighbour’) making more 
journeys, or with more people driving overall (‘society’), because it has 
become more efficient and less costly to do so. Here, then, the salvage 
(fuel not burnt) passes to the proprietor, their immediate neighbour, 
or to society, but is not passed to, or withheld permanently, ‘in nature’. 
This example can be extrapolated analogously to the sorts of thorny 
discussions regarding whether or not voluntary carbon trading in 
actuality supports effective CO2 ‘salvage’, or if it instead mostly passes 
the emitted CO2 elsewhere (as also highlighted in Hannis’s chapter, this 
volume).
What or who is nature here? The paracommons concept proposes 
schematically that ‘nature’ is one of four parties that may benefit from 
conserved resource salvages, either by recovering the salvages to ‘the 
environment’ or by not consuming resources in the first place. In the 
case of irrigated river basins, irrigation ‘wastes’ recovered to nature 
should see ecological/environmental water flows restored. In a CO2 
paracommons, nature is defined schematically as a benefitting party 
when levels of CO2 in the atmosphere are decisively reduced. Nature 
in this simplified CO2 budget is thus not forest, biochar or organic 
sediment, if these carbon stores are set to re-release their CO2 back 
into the atmosphere within twenty-five to thirty years, such that the 
trajectory of carbon dioxide levels will remain upwards, undulating 
or flat (Figure 4). In these urgent terms, mechanisms for permanently 
sequestering CO2, such as, for example, in warehouses containing 
frozen CO2, would proffer a clearer salvage pathway ‘to nature’. That 
said, such ‘fixes’ pose their own CO2 and other complexities, since to 
industrially process and store CO2 in ways that do not increase CO2 
levels requires a considerable growth in renewable energy (these 
concerns are also highlighted in the chapters by Dyke et al., Bigger et 
al., and Dunlap in this volume). However, in this unreserved ‘crisis’ 
definition of ‘nature’ in a CO2 paracommons is complicated by the 
many overlapping ‘ecosystem services’ also harmed or benefited by a 
shifting carbon cycle (O’Connor 2008). 
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Illustrating the Three Commons for Carbon/CO
2 
Management 
These three types of commons can be illustrated by imagining an 
industrial mining company that owns one gigatonne of carbon dioxide 
in coal reserves. In the sink-type commons, the coal is entirely burnt 
within ten years, dumping waste CO2 into the Earth’s atmosphere. 
In the husbandry-type commons, attempts to reduce the company’s 
emissions of CO2 are made. The gigatonne of coal CO2 is emitted over 
a longer twenty-year period because the company reduces annual 
combustion responding to pricing charges for emissions. Lower emission 
rates are also offset with a programme of afforestation leading to a forest 
with a lifespan of thirty years. But after thirty years practically all of the 
coal’s CO2 ends up in the atmosphere.
A paracommons view of the husbandry-type commons asks where 
CO2 ‘salvaged wastes’ (including coal not burnt) end up during attempts 
to manage, offset or be more efficient with this coal and its yet-to-be-
released CO2. The paracommons argues that four parties compete over 
the salvaged gain but ‘predicts’ that with the leakiness of the husbandry-
type commons none of these options is easy to trace or constitutes the 
‘salvage’ needed to meet the 350ppm target. 
For example: the industrial company (the proprietor) may sell or 
burn any non-consumed coal after the period under focus; an immediate 
neighbour (e.g. a community connected to land afforested through 
offsetting mechanisms) may use the forest resulting in this carbon 
released back into the atmosphere; ‘society’ may use fossil carbon from 
other sources, thereby failing to make the necessary reductions in net 
consumption; and unused coal retained in the ground may produce 
‘atmosphere-nature’ gains from non-released CO2. The paracommons 
model envisages that gains are most likely to pass to the proprietor, 
its immediate neighbour, and society. Without strong social, political 
and economic regulation, a permanent salvage is least likely to protect, 
pass to, or be retained within ‘nature’. Unsurprisingly, then, these 
observations suggest that a nature-safeguarding paracommons needs to 
be actively designed and regulated so as to genuinely lower atmospheric 
CO2 levels.
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Designing an Effective Paracommons to Serve ‘Nature’?
How, then, might we treat the Earth’s atmosphere as a purposively 
governed paracommons wherein future carbon/CO2 salvages 
assuredly protect nature? The points below sketch some principles 
in moving forward, demonstrating the very real challenges faced in 
creating meaningful societal structures that combine both CO2 and 
decarbonisation: 
• Recognising the leakiness and impermanence of the carbon 
cycle, the paracommons emphasises carbon dioxide levels 
over emissions. A vision for averting dangerous climate 
change is that salvaged CO2 must be permanently locked 
away, as defined by a lowering of CO2 concentration below 
350 ppm within a defined time period (e.g. one hundred 
years). 
• The carbon paracommons asks for a switch to an economy 
and society that highly values salvaged carbon dioxide 
products, thus calling for a substantial enablement, reward 
and valorisation (Luque and Clark 2013) of CO2 salvage. 
At the same time, however, such valorisation needs to be 
considered against the sorts of financialising dynamics, 
complexities and inequities considered in the chapters by 
Bracking and Kaplan and Levy, this volume. 
• Carbon storage could be enabled by volume-dense cold-
storage carbon warehousing, created and managed by a 
mix of public and private entities and companies. Carbon 
storage is a provocative ‘techno-fix’, but consider the 
following figures. Trees and tree-planting to lock up CO2 
work well in the right conditions: they have a low unit 
price, are scalable, can be planted by many actors, and of 
course already exist. But they are slow growing, relatively 
impermanent, and not ‘CO2 dense enough’ to constitute 
carbon salvage at the rates needed. This is of course not 
to argue ‘against trees’, but to draw a storage comparison 
with large-scale warehousing of CO2. Assuming an 
effective annual tree-based CO2 sequester of 30 t/ha/year 
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(from absorption per tree of 20 kg/year and a tree density 
of 1500/hectare), a target of CO2 removal at 2.2 ppm/
year (17.2 Gt/yr) would require 5,727,333 sq km.4 (In 
other words, an area three-quarters the size of Australia 
would effectively need to be afforested, kept forested on a 
rolling basis, plus the timber products would need to be 
locked away after trees had been harvested). The same 
hundred-year total of 1718,2 Gt of CO2 in warehousing at 
60% effective storage would require a total of 2864 cubic 
kilometres of volume or a warehouse footprint of 28,637 
km2 to be built (in one-hundred-metre-high buildings at 
an approximate density of 1 tonne CO2 to 1 cubic metre 
CO2) which is 0.376% of the size of Australia.5 Put another 
way, CO2 warehousing outclasses trees on an area basis by 
200 to one. The permanence of warehousing of CO2 would, 
however, need to be powered by a considerable increase 
of renewable energy generation with its own associated 
environmental impacts.6 
• Household storage of permanently evacuated carbon 
could become a normalised everyday activity, with the 
storing of several tonnes of liquid or frozen carbon dioxide 
on a private property (and provision of energy to do so) 
becoming a rational response to the urgent need for carbon 
salvage. 
• As already noted, carbon salvage would require an 
immense expansion of renewable energy to power 
carbon transformation, and direct air capture and carbon 
storage. There is a serious paradox here in that energy, 
and the cost of energy, cannot be the limiting factor in 
creating a carbon-salvaging paracommons. This paradox, 
4 Drawing on Smith et al. (2006). Furthermore, the figure of 2.2 ppm/year for a 
span of 100 years is set as an example of a rate that would both counter on-going 
emissions plus bring net reductions in atmospheric CO2 levels to 350 ppm within 
100 years. This is equivalent to a target sequestration of 1718.2 Gt over 100 years.
5 A volume of 2864 cubic kilometres in 100 years is equivalent to building 
approximately 2600 Tesla Nevada gigafactories each year at 60% effective storage. 
6 Alternatives to warehousing include deep-sea storage (Hume 2018) and evacuation 
to space.
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and its accompanying emissions-linked complexities, is 
scrutinised in Dunlap’s chapter, this volume. 
• Carbon dioxide transformation is also exemplified by all 
carbon fuels being sourced from man-made biological 
sources (powered by renewable energy). 
• Highly accurate carbon accounting to track and trace the 
products, size, pathways and final destinations of salvaged 
CO2 is required with tangible monitoring and targets vital to 
an exteriorised ‘making visible’ of salvaged/stored carbon 
‘gains’ (Allen 2009). As Hannis, this volume, clarifies, 
however, it is fiendishly difficult to secure accounting 
practices that provide certainty in this regard. 
• Onerous standards and specifications on paracommoners 
and new institutional rules to salvage carbon will be required 
(Bosselmann 2019), in a context where environmental 
‘red tape’ is elsewhere being contested as a constraint to 
economic growth and post COVID-19 economic recovery. 
Concluding Remarks
Governing the global atmosphere as a sink- or husbandry-type carbon 
commons brings attendant concerns over whether and how we will 
reduce carbon dioxide levels sufficiently and quickly enough. Clearly, 
we should see the permanent and rapid reduction of CO2 levels in 
the atmosphere as a matter of urgency. In a paracommons framing, 
carbon dioxide, its conversion products, storage and non-generation 
are seen through the lens of emergency and scarcity that results in new 
economic, financial, legislative, technological and behavioural solutions 
to bring down its concentration in the atmosphere. By being aware of 
the different leaky/impermanent or permanent pathways that CO2 
takes, the paracommons then asks how we solve this leaky pathway 
uncertainty to ensure that we put carbon dioxide permanently away 
when attempts to salvage CO2 are made.
The framing of an atmospheric, climate and carbon commons needs 
to be expanded, but also better defined (Schrijver 2016; Edenhofer et al. 
2012). Debating this conceptual challenge will bring forward alternative 
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framings fit for the next hundred years. New commons metaphors 
and parables, of which the paracommons is an example, should aim to 
stretch our conceptual space in which the target of <350 ppm CO2 is to 
be achieved. 
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9. The Mobilisation of 
Extractivism: The Social and 
Political Influence of the Fossil 
Fuel Industry
Christopher Wright and Daniel Nyberg
The worsening climate crisis has led to growing social and political 
demands for meaningful climate action and the decarbonisation 
of economies. And yet, the modern global economy is defined 
by fossil fuel energy which has shaped the last two centuries of 
economic growth and development. In this chapter, we outline 
how the fossil fuel industry has defined the global economy and 
defended its position as the most powerful industry in the world. 
We examine how assumptions of corporate self-regulation as the 
logical response to the climate crisis allow for the continuation 
of a ‘business as usual’ approach in which fossil fuel energy is 
maintained. We argue that this approach deliberately ignores the 
urgent need for government regulation of carbon emissions, and 
that current corporate responses to the climate crisis rely on the 
politics of ‘predatory delay’.
Introduction
A new wave of activism has emerged in response to the worsening 
climate crisis. Following popular environmental protest movements 
such as Extinction Rebellion and the School Strike for Climate, a 
growing range of lawsuits are now targeting governments and fossil fuel 
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corporations for their contributions to the climate crisis. Moreover, there 
is now active discussion amongst governments and global organisations 
about the need for urgent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, 
with even fossil fuel corporations committing to carbon neutrality 
by 2050. However, there have been similar commitments before (e.g. 
BP’s Beyond Petroleum rebranding) and since the 1970s the fossil fuel 
industry has actively misled societies about the impact of its activities, 
using its innovative capacities to open up new carbon frontiers such as 
deep-water and Arctic oil drilling, tar sands processing and shale gas 
fracking (Wright and Nyberg 2015). The domination of the fossil fuel 
industry is based on its political tactics and this needs to be laid bare in 
order to be effectively resisted.
In this chapter, we outline how the fossil fuel industry has defined the 
global economy and defended its position as the most powerful industry 
in the world. We examine how assumptions of corporate self-regulation 
as the logical response to the climate crisis allow for the continuation of 
a ‘business as usual’ approach in which fossil fuel energy is maintained. 
We argue that this deliberately ignores the urgent need for government 
regulation of carbon emissions and that current corporate responses to 
the climate crisis rely on the politics of ‘predatory delay’.
Fossil Energy and the Climate Crisis
The origins of the global fossil-fuelled economy date back to the beginnings 
of the industrial revolution in Britain in the late-eighteenth century and 
the development of the coal-fired steam engine. Coal power provided 
the basis for rapid industrialisation across manufacturing and expanded 
global markets through the transformation of transport (Malm 2016). 
With the growth of the railway, steel and chemical industries during the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, oil emerged as a further 
fossil fuel underpinning economic expansion. In the post-World War II 
decades, the power of the fossil fuel industry grew dramatically, driving 
economic expansion and the emergence of Western consumer lifestyles 
requiring a growing energy demand (Mitchell 2013). In recent decades, 
the globalisation of the economy and continued economic growth have 
relied upon the ever-increasing consumption of the world’s fossil fuel 
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reserves. Global distribution networks of pipelines, tankers, refineries, 
ports and rail systems have further reinforced fossil fuel investments 
and path dependency (as also highlighted in Bigger et al.’s chapter, 
this volume). The emergence of Asian economic powerhouses, such as 
Japan, South Korea and, most recently, China and India, has broadened 
the scale of fossil fuel consumption. 
The pervasive impact of fossil fuels across energy, resource 
extraction, manufacturing, transport, agriculture, and food production 
make it hard to imagine how our society could be organised differently. 
National governments are key supporters of the expansion of fossil fuel 
energy through public financing of infrastructure, financial subsidies, 
discounted royalties and favourable tax regimes; a system critics have 
labelled “fossil fuel welfare” (Lenferna 2019). Fossil fuels provide 
over 80% of the world’s total primary energy supply and underpin the 
global financial system not only as the most heavily capitalised sector 
but also a dominant source of finance and investment for the world’s 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds (RAN 2020). The global 
market economy is thus fundamentally defined by fossil fuels; we live 
within what some have termed a “petro-market civilization” (DiMuzio 
2012). 
Fossil fuel energy provided the basis for the expansion of global 
capitalism, but has also incurred an existential environmental cost. The 
extraction and combustion of coal, oil and gas has over the last two 
centuries resulted in the release of huge quantities of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) (principally carbon dioxide CO2 and methane CH4), resulting 
in an unprecedented human perturbation of the Earth’s carbon cycle 
and energy balance (Mann and Kump 2015). From a pre-industrial level 
of around 280 parts per million (ppm), the combustion of fossil fuels 
and the diminution of forests and other carbon sinks has led to a rapid 
increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. In 2018, 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations exceeded 410ppm, a level not seen on 
this planet for several million years (Mooney 2018). Moreover, research 
has found that close to two-thirds of cumulative worldwide emissions 
of industrial GHGs between 1751 and 2010 are the result of just ninety 
‘carbon major entities’ (large fossil fuel corporations and state-owned 
entities), with half of these emissions released since 1986 (Heede 2014). 
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Organising a Climate Change Denial Industry
In 1966, the US coal industry publication Mining Congress Journal 
published an article which identified with surprising candour the 
link between coal as an energy source and the disruptive effects of the 
resulting carbon emissions upon the Earth’s climate (Young 2019). This 
article, along with similar documents produced within the oil industry 
during the 1970s, highlighted the fact that major fossil fuel companies 
have long known of the terrible impact that their products were having 
on the planet’s climate system (Supran and Oreskes 2017). Rather than 
developing adaptive strategies to transition to a low-carbon economy, 
however, the fossil fuel industry created a politically organised 
climate denial movement, which has proven remarkably successful in 
preventing any meaningful form of emissions mitigation (Oreskes and 
Conway 2010).
In the United States (US), corporations from the fossil fuel, energy 
and manufacturing sectors came together during the early 1990s to 
form the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) in order to push back against 
proposals for the regulation of carbon emissions (Levy and Egan 
1998). Wider corporate resistance included financial contributions to 
political parties, funding for major advertising campaigns and appeals 
to broader conservative ideological values. Fossil fuel interests played a 
key role in swaying conservative politicians against carbon regulation, 
stressing ‘uncertainty’ and ‘doubts’ over climate science, highlighting 
the economic costs of cutting emissions, and promoting the views of 
climate ‘sceptics’ in government representations, media and publications 
(Dunlap and McCright 2011; Oreskes and Conway 2010). This vehement 
opposition to emissions reductions by the global fossil fuel industry not 
only hobbled national governments’ attempts to respond to climate 
change, but also undermined international collaboration.
From Denial to Delay
While the fossil fuel industry has proven remarkably successful over 
the last thirty years in limiting carbon regulation through a strategy 
of organised climate denial, the growing social and political discourse 
around climate change now appears to fundamentally threaten the 
industry. Following the release of catastrophic scientific projections of 
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the world’s climate future (IPCC 2018), a new wave of climate activism 
has erupted around the world through groups such as Extinction 
Rebellion (Blackall 2019), and the school climate strikes initiated by 
Swedish teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg (Watts 2019) (see 
chapters by Gardham, North and Paterson, this volume). Combined 
with social movements for fossil fuel divestment (Mangat et al. 2018), 
legal actions against governments and fossil fuel corporations (Powers 
2018), and growing concerns amongst regulators and institutional 
investors over the financial implications of climate change (Carney 
2015), a tipping point may well have been reached. Indicative of recent 
shifts in the political and legal context have been: a growing procession 
of nations publicly proclaiming a commitment to achieve ‘net zero’ 
carbon emissions (Black et al. 2021; on the complexities of achieving 
net zero, however, see Dyke et al., this volume); a recent report by the 
International Energy Agency which declared no new coal, oil or gas 
extraction can occur if the world is to reach a net zero emission goal by 
2050 (IEA, 2021); and the recent decision by a Dutch court that oil giant 
Shell is liable for its contributions to climate change which undermine 
basic human rights and require dramatic reductions in its global 
carbon dioxide emissions by the end of the decade (Juhasz 2021). This 
accelerating social and political critique of the fossil fuel industry has 
forced the industry to develop new justifications to defend its position.
The first step in this changed industry response has been public 
statements accepting the reality of climate change and a desire for 
‘climate action’ broadly defined. This progressive stance was first 
highlighted by the European oil majors BP and Shell which developed 
a more engaged public stance on climate change than their conservative 
US counterparts (Levy and Egan 2003). Most famously, in 2000 BP 
rebranded itself as ‘beyond petroleum’ which promoted the oil giant as 
an environmentally aware energy company. While this marketing pivot 
soon faltered under a change of CEO and the infamous 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil disaster, more recently BP has returned to its focus on 
climate change, emphasising reductions in operational emissions and 
commitments to climate science (Ferns and Amaeshi 2019; Ferns et al. 
2019). 
Indeed in 2020, with an unprecedented downturn in oil demand 
following the outbreak of the global coronavirus pandemic, oil 
companies unleashed a bevy of public announcements about their 
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climate ambitions. First out of the gate was new BP CEO Bernard Looney 
who, in February 2020, announced to stunned media and analysts that 
he intended to make the company a net zero carbon emitter by 2050 
through reductions in direct and embedded emissions. This goal 
involved a projected ten-fold increase in green energy investment and 
development, an approximately 40% reduction of oil and gas production, 
an end to new oil exploration, and the selling-off of its petrochemicals 
business. Within months, Shell and Total also announced 2050 net 
zero emissions goals and even American oil giants ExxonMobil and 
Chevron made announcements signalling an intention to reduce their 
contribution to carbon emissions (Kusnetz 2020).
Fossil fuel corporations have also sought to promote the moral 
worthiness of their activities through marketing and public relations 
activities, which stress the benefits of fossil energy. For instance, US 
coal giant Peabody Energy’s ‘Advanced Energy for Life’ campaign 
(developed by New York public relations firm Burson-Marsteller) 
has proclaimed the benefits of coal-based electricity for citizens in 
developing countries as a way in which the industry is contributing to 
solving global energy poverty (Sheppard 2014). In a similar manner, 
oil companies promoting the exploitation of the Canadian Alberta tar 
sands, developed an extensive public relations campaign promoting 
what they have termed “ethical oil”, which promotes Canada’s liberal 
democratic political system as a more morally worthy context for fossil 
fuel extraction (Hickman 2011).
In acknowledging the reality of climate change, coal, oil and gas 
companies have also marketed possible technological ‘solutions’ 
while maintaining fossil fuel extraction and use. Key amongst these 
has been the discourse of ‘clean coal’ which argues that more efficient 
coal-fired electricity production can dramatically reduce the industry’s 
climate impacts. Examples include the promotion of ‘high efficiency 
low emissions’ (HELE) coal-fired power plants and carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technologies (Hudson 2017). The declining 
competitiveness of coal-fired electricity has also led to the promotion of 
rival fossil fuels such as methane (promoted by the industry as ‘natural 
gas’) as a ‘transition fuel’ in the move towards future decarbonisation.
However, rather than reducing the world’s carbon emissions, these 
industry responses can be seen more as a process of ‘predatory delay’ in 
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which the fossil fuel industry seeks to slow the process of decarbonisation 
to maximise their financial returns in the short term while appearing 
as concerned corporate citizens (Nyberg et al. 2013; Steffen 2016). For 
instance, the rush by different companies to declare a goal of net zero 
emissions by mid-century is also a way to placate the growing social 
criticism of corporate climate denial. More specifically, the details of 
these commitments and future responses are reliant on technologies 
that have yet to be developed (e.g. bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) and direct air capture) (Anderson and Peters 2016) 
(for more detail regarding BECCS, see Dyke et al.’s chapter, this volume). 
Despite the discourses of ‘natural gas’ and ‘clean coal’, researchers note 
that when fugitive emissions are accounted for, methane has a similar 
climate impact to coal, and, despite billions of dollars of government 
funding worldwide, only two large-scale Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) plants have ever been completed with limited emissions capture, 
and these have turned out to be far more expensive than renewable 
solar and wind energy. Indeed, a recent analysis of the practice of the 
major oil corporations over the last fifteen years found no evidence of 
operational decarbonisation and that, while the public discourse had 
shifted towards a more climate-focused stance, the most progressive 
European-based oil companies were simply hedging their bets through 
limited diversification and risk mitigation (Green et al. 2020). Viewed 
from this perspective, the oil majors’ recent apparent conversion on 
the issue of climate change appears more part of a longer-term pattern 
of skilful marketing and defensive justification in the face of growing 
social and political critique (Brulle et al. 2020).
A Turning Point for Fossil Energy?
Since February 2020, the world has been plunged into the greatest energy 
shock since World War II as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. As 
the International Energy Agency has outlined, the economic contraction 
resulting from the pandemic led to the biggest fall in global energy 
investment in history, with plunging demand for coal, oil and gas 
resulting in dramatic reductions in the value of fossil fuel stocks, and 
the likelihood of fossil fuel reserves becoming ‘stranded assets’ while 
renewable energy costs continue to fall (IEA 2020). This rapid decline in 
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the value of fossil fuel corporations was vividly demonstrated in August 
2020 when one of the biggest of the oil majors, ExxonMobil, ended its 
ninety-two-year run on the Dow Jones industrial average as its market 
value collapsed to about a third of its 2008 high-point of US$500 billion. 
Oil and gas companies now make up only 2.3% of the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) 500, compared with 15% in 2008 (Grandoni 2020). At 
the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic shows no sign of abating 
and the severity of the global economic impacts have yet to fully play 
out. Together with the market, technological and political challenges 
to hydrocarbon energy, the fossil fuel sector is now facing its greatest 
challenge since the beginning of industrialisation.
Despite growing awareness of a worsening climate crisis, however, 
tangible action in terms of mitigating carbon emissions, let alone 
reining in fossil fuel production and use, has been limited. Proposals for 
carbon emissions reductions have continued to rely upon market-based 
measures that have failed to dent the steady increase in global emissions. 
Up until the 2020 pandemic, the global fossil fuel burn continued to 
increase year by year, hitting an all-time high in 2019 of 11.7 Gtoe (billion 
tonnes of oil equivalent), up from 7.1 Gtoe in 1990 (Saxifrage, 2020). 
While the pandemic has resulted in a short-term contraction in global 
carbon emissions during 2020 of 6% on 2019 levels (Tollefson 2021), 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to increase 
(World Meteorological Organization 2020).
In carbon-intensive economies, such as the US, China, Canada, 
Australia and Saudi Arabia, the fossil fuel industry continues to 
expand, assisted by government subsidies and financial incentives 
(Lenferna 2019). In the US, the so-called ‘fracking revolution’ has 
led to the country becoming the world’s largest producer of oil 
and gas (Downie 2019). China is now the world’s largest producer 
and consumer of coal (constituting over half of the world’s total 
consumption), with significant foreign investments in new fossil fuel 
developments in developing economies through its ‘Belt and Road’ 
initiative (Umbach and Yu 2016). In Canada and Australia, expansion 
of fossil fuel extraction has led to dramatic growth in energy exports, 
with Canada’s Alberta tar sands delivering oil to the US and China 
(Bloomberg 2019), and Australia is now the world’s largest exporter of 
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coal and gas (Kilvert 2019). Moreover, the election of Donald Trump 
in 2016 as President of the US provided a huge boost for the fossil fuel 
industry, as evidenced by the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate 
Agreement, the removal of environmental regulations dating back to 
the 1970s, and the promotion of prominent fossil fuel executives and 
climate deniers to key government positions (De Pryck and Gemenne 
2017)—and discussed further in the chapter by Hannis, this volume. 
While the recent election of Democrat President Joe Biden in late 2020 
has led to far more progressive announcements from the US on climate 
change and growing international momentum for reductions in carbon 
emissions, it is unclear whether this will be sufficient to overcome 
the profound political divisions that still exist in many countries over 
climate change, let alone lead to the decarbonisation and reinvention of 
a global economy defined by and reliant upon fossil energy.
Conclusion
The unprecedented decline in the demand for fossil fuel energy resulting 
from the current worldwide pandemic offers a unique opportunity for 
the global economy to break free of its carbon addiction and commit 
to a genuine and far-reaching energy transition. As we have pointed 
out, however, global capitalism and the assumptions of compound 
economic growth have to date been constructed upon the extracted 
energy of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas. This structural dynamic 
has in turn made the fossil fuel industry amongst the most powerful 
actors in the world, able to draw on political capital in determining 
the policy decisions which shape the future of human civilisation. 
While the recent social demands for meaningful climate action and 
growing political commitments to avoid dangerous climate change are 
heartening, it remains to be seen whether we are at a watershed moment 
in confronting the climate crisis, or whether the fossil fuel industry 
will succeed in its strategy of ‘predatory delay’, such that this decade 
becomes another missed opportunity to reduce the harm of a rapidly 
worsening climate crisis.
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10. End the ‘Green’ Delusions: 
Industrial-Scale Renewable 
Energy is Fossil Fuel+
Alexander Dunlap
Industrial-scale renewable energy does nothing to remake 
exploitative relationships with the Earth, and instead represents 
the renewal and expansion of the present capitalist order. This 
chapter argues that industrial-scale renewable energy is more 
accurately understood as ‘fossil fuel+’. The purpose is to re-think 
the socio-ecological reality of so-called renewable energy to 
create space for the step-change of strategies needed to mitigate 
and avoid climate and ecological catastrophe.
Industrial-Scale ‘Renewable Energy’ Is a False Solution
Renewable energy is not the solution we think it is. We have inherited 
the bad/good energy dichotomy of fossil fuels versus renewable energy, 
a holdover from the environmental movement of the 1970s that is 
misleading, if not false. Fossil fuels are correctly understood to be at 
the heart of capitalism, industrialism, and state formation, the results 
of which have been ecologically catastrophic (Malm 2016). Meanwhile, 
industrial-scale renewable energy has emerged as the protagonist of 
our times, positioned as the solution to our ever-increasing energy 
consumption. Along with market-based conservation and ‘natural 
capital’ policy making, it is taken to be among the central mitigating 
forces against climate change and ecological degradation (as critiqued 
by Sullivan 2009; Huff and Brock 2017).
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With the rise of the green economy and climate change legislation, 
renewable energy includes harnessing wind, solar, and other 
apparently infinite ‘natural resources’ to meet energy consumption 
on an unprecedented, ever expanding scale. Contrary to the claims 
of its proponents, however, it by no means adequately addresses the 
materially real problems posed by current levels of energy consumption, 
which are driven by capitalist growth imperatives that ultimately cause 
the ecological degradation and climate change we see today. A focus on 
the technocratic issue of energy consumption often leaves unchallenged 
the political-economic violence intrinsic to the production system that 
such energy powers (as also highlighted in Sullivan Chapter 11, this 
volume).
Industrial-scale renewable energy does nothing to remake the 
exploitative relationships with the earth and ecosystems created and 
reproduced by ‘industrialised humans’—people acclimated to, and 
dependent upon, an industrial, capitalist way of life. The excessive 
concern with possible energy solutions within capitalism, as opposed 
to more fundamental social transformations, expresses our inability 
to imagine any other way of living, blinding us to the deeper socio-
ecological insurrection that climate change makes necessary.
Industrial-scale renewable energy and the grid-centric systems it 
powers represent the renewal and expansion of the present political 
and capitalist order. Not only are existing social discontents such as 
inequality, discrimination, and exploitation reinforced by renewable 
energy, but the amount of infrastructure it presently requires clearly 
indicates the ecological costs involved in its full implementation. The 
wind and solar parks that span across fields and hillsides as far as the 
eye can see are harbingers of what this new energy system looks like. 
Questions need asking: where does all this metal come from? How much 
energy can this new energy system produce? What ecological impact 
does it have? And what kind of society does it propel and enable?
On Energy Extractivism
In 1980, American Indian Movement (AIM) activist Russell Means 
explained the uncomfortable reality of energy extractivism relating 
especially to uranium mining in Native territory (and echoed in the 
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similar concerns expressed by AIM activist the late John Trudell, in 
Sullivan Chapter 3, this volume). Confronting a room of revolutionary 
Communists about their desire for industrialism, Means (1985: 25) said:
Right now, today, we who live on the Pine Ridge Reservation are living in 
what Euro society has designated a “national sacrifice area.” What this 
means is that we have a lot of uranium deposits here and Euro culture 
(not us) needs this uranium as energy production material. The cheapest, 
most efficient way for industry to extract and deal with the processing of 
this uranium is to dump the waste byproducts right here at the digging 
sites. Right here where we live. This waste is radioactive and will make 
the entire region uninhabitable forever. This is considered by industry, 
and the white society which created this industry, to be an “acceptable” 
price to pay for energy resource development. Along the way they also 
plan to drain the water-table under this area of South Dakota as part 
of the industrial process, so the region becomes doubly uninhabitable. 
The same sort of thing is happening down in the land of the Navajo and 
Hopi, up in the land of the Northern Cheyenne and Crow, and elsewhere. 
Over 60 percent of all U.S. energy resources have been found to lie under 
reservation land, so there’s no way this can be called a minor issue. For 
American Indians it’s a question of survival in the purest sense of the 
term. For white society and its industry it’s a question of being able to 
continue to exist in their present form.
We are resisting being turned into a national sacrifice area. We’re 
resisting being turned into a national sacrifice people. The costs of this 
industrial process are not acceptable to us. It is genocide to dig the 
uranium here and to drain the water-table, no more, no less. So the 
reasons for our resistance are obvious enough and shouldn’t have to be 
explained further. To anyone.
As with the mining of fossil fuels and uranium, the siting and 
implementation of renewable energy systems entails the creation of 
such sacrifice zones, often on Indigenous land. These projects have 
thus confronted considerable pushback from rural and Indigenous 
populations, and the struggles around extraction outlined by Means 
have continued to intensify (Avila 2018; Dunlap 2017, 2019; Franquesa 
2018; Lawrence 2014; Lucio 2016; Siamanta 2019). By clinging to ideas 
like ‘sustainable development’ and the ‘green economy’, progressives 
and other conscientious citizens are staking the future of the planet on 
dubious mechanisms of oversight, rife with conflicts of interest. The 
proliferation of voluntary UN standards, corporate social responsibility 
initiatives, private auditing firms (Brock and Dunlap 2018), and 
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free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) are but “band aids of good 
intentions” (Dunlap 2018). They ultimately conceal the true costs of 
extractivism, especially for the Indigenous people most affected by it.
The distinctions drawn between fossil fuels and renewable 
energy involve a sleight of hand that masks the continued ecological 
degradations necessary for the continuation of consumer society and 
its ecological modernisation (see Bond and Downey 2012). Renewable 
energy requires immense amounts of mineral and fossil fuel resources, 
both in the construction of machinery necessary for extraction and for 
the manufacturing, transportation, construction and operation of wind 
turbines and other industrial-scale renewable energy systems.
For all these reasons, instead of conceiving renewable energy as a 
‘green’ environmental solution, industrial or utility-scale renewable 
energy is more accurately referred to as ‘Fossil Fuel+’.
Wind Energy as Fossil Fuel+
Let us focus the discussion on a single source of renewable 
energy: wind. Wind energy is something of a poster child for 
renewable energy in general, and is increasingly becoming a 
preeminent approach to climate change mitigation. Through 
fieldwork in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec region of Oaxaca, Mexico, 
where I was embedded for six months in a polícia comunitaria,1
I witnessed firsthand the struggles and negative outcomes involved in 
the implementation of this form of renewable energy, even as it continues 
to be encouraged and incentivised by national and international climate 
change mitigation programmes.
Consider, for example, the resources required to construct a single 
two-megawatt wind turbine. One of these turbines uses roughly 150 
metric tons of steel for reinforced concrete foundations, 250 metric 
tons for the rotor hubs and nacelles, and 500 metric tons for the tower 
(Smil 2016a), as well as 3.6 tons of copper per megawatt (Smith 2014). 
1 The communitarian police were initiated after local Zapotec and Ikoots took over a 
town hall and expropriated the municipality’s police truck (in 2013). This incident 
spawned the self-organisation of an unpaid community police force (polícia 
comunitaria) by Zapotec farmers and fishers to stop wind companies, politicians 
and others from entering the region to exploit their habitat/ecosystem.
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Industrial steel production is currently impossible without burning 
coal, as metallurgical or coking coal is a vital ingredient in the process 
(Dıez and Barriocanal 2002; Smil 2016b). Now, imagine regions like 
the Isthmus of Tehuantpec, where roughly 1,700 wind turbines operate 
to provide energy to Walmart, Grupo Bimbo, industrial construction, 
mining, and other companies and industries (Dunlap 2019). These 
turbines require significant amounts of mining, and every stage of 
the mining process—from extraction, to processing, manufacturing, 
transport, construction and, to some degree, operation—requires a 
large expenditure of fossil fuels, a fact often neglected in the ecological 
accounting of wind energy (as similarly observed for ‘clean energy’ 
produced from uranium in Sullivan 2013). According to Guezuraga et 
al. (2012: 40) the main consumers of energy and producers of CO2 for 
the turbines are “the production of stainless steel, followed by concrete 
and cast iron,” while “plastic production represents the most energy 
intensive process of all materials”. 
From the perspective of carbon accounting, steel, concrete, and cast 
iron production are the main consumers of energy, with the ecological 
costs of mining and processing the rare earth minerals required to 
create permanent magnet generators in wind turbines being relatively 
disregarded. But where do these minerals come from, and what is the 
ecological cost of their extraction? Many of the rare earth minerals 
required for the operation of the turbines—such as dysprosium, 
praseodymium neodymium, terbium—come from places like Baotou, 
Inner Mongolia, and Ganzhou, South East China, which have produced 
some 85–98% of rare earth minerals used in wind turbines, electric cars, 
smart phones and other technologies between the late 1980s and 2015 
(Hongiao 2016). The socio-ecological costs of this extraction are high. 
The Costs?
A BBC report from 2015 called the Baotou mining and processing area 
“hell on Earth”: a terrifying, dystopian industrial environment filled 
with pollution and cluttered with factories, pipelines, high-tension 
wires, and artificial lakes oozing “black, barely-liquid, toxic sludge” that 
“tested at around three times background radiation” (Maughan 2015; 
also see Klinger 2017).
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Rare earth mining is also disastrously inefficient. Mined with open 
pit, underground, or leached in-situ methods, rare earth ore deposits 
contain “low concentrations [of desired minerals] ranging from 10 to a 
few hundred parts per million by weight” (Yang et al. 2013: 133). Most 
concerning, however, is that, 
[t]he mining and processing steps for refining of rare earths tend to be 
energy, water and chemical intensive with significant environment risks 
affecting water discharges (radionuclides, mainly thorium and uranium; 
heavy metals; acid; fluorides), tailing management and air emissions 
(Haque et al. 2014: 621).
Echoing the observations on uranium extraction by Russell Means quoted 
above, wind energy thus similarly involves socially and ecologically 
destructive mining processes that produce large amounts of mining 
tailings (or waste) containing heavy metals, thorium, and radioactive 
materials that enter the air, water, soil, animals and people. The quantity 
and intensity of this pollution is difficult to measure, for both political 
and scientific reasons, making accounting for all ecosystem impacts not 
only costly, but impossible.
While in theory wind turbines can be built without rare earth 
minerals (as in geared turbines), this is not currently the case for the 
majority of utility-scale wind parks—especially wind turbines located 
offshore or in areas with extremely strong winds. This is because rare-
earth-based PMSG (permanent magnet synchronous generator) turbine 
technology allows for the construction of more compact turbines which 
require less maintenance, making them more profitable to operate. The 
bigger the turbine, the more there is to gain for the operator by installing 
PMSG models (Lovins 2017). 
Like other industrial enchantments (such as computers or smart 
technologies), wind farms continue to require levels of extraction that 
generate toxic and radioactive waste excluded from carbon accounting 
and often exempt from outdated life-cycle assessments (Kiezebrink et 
al. 2017; Klinger 2017). 
While further research on the exact levels of ecocide and political 
violence is necessary, the fact remains that the green economy is 
expanding demand for destructive mining of iron ore, copper, oil, and 
rare earth minerals. This in turn is part and parcel of the creation and 
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expansion of sacrifice areas engulfing entire regions of China and the 
mountains, rivers, and forests across the world.
The political and environmental costs of implementing these 
renewable wind energy systems are also high. Scale, placement, 
mitigation practices, and energy-use are foundational for assessing the 
viability and long-term socio-ecological sustainability of wind turbines. 
This means taking cognisance of the quantity and location of large-scale 
turbines, as well as the various political and socio-geographical factors 
involved in their construction.
For example, while it is ill advised to place them on lands used 
for semi-subsistence production by Indigenous groups, within 1.5 
kilometres of people’s homes, or in areas with fresh groundwater, 
farming, and fishing areas, this is precisely what has happened on 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Dunlap 2019), from which the following 
observations derive. The construction and placement of wind turbines 
requires the creation of roads that clear trees and animal habitats and 
compact soil. They also require the creation of wind turbine foundations 
that range, depending on the site, between 7–14 metres (32–45 ft.) deep 
and about 16–21 metres (52–68 ft.) in diameter. The foundations require 
the filling of groundwater with solidifying chemicals before filling them 
with steel reinforced concrete. During operation, leaking oil seeps into 
the ground where animals graze and into water wells where people 
drink. And this leaves aside the effects of concrete production, as well 
as the violence involved in building wind or other renewable energy 
systems on Indigenous territory. On top of all this, each wind turbine 
only has roughly a 30–40 thirty-to-forty-year lifespan before it needs to 
be decommissioned and, hopefully, recycled (Habib and Wenzel 2014).
Fossil Fuel+
These unpleasant facts are why renewable energy should really be called 
fossil fuel+. The plus sign indicates the added benefit of the renewable 
component or multiplier present in renewable energy systems, while 
simultaneously acknowledging their dependence on fossil fuel based-
technologies and extractivism. The ‘+’, or renewable, component is 
dependent on fossil fuels, and thus is not entirely positive in CO2 
emissions terms. A focus on the benefits of renewable energy systems 
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additionally overlooks the simple but paramount question: what is all 
this energy used for?
Renewable energy is opening and widening new wind, solar, and 
other natural resource frontiers, and in doing so it is renewing capitalism 
as well. In addition to private industry, militaries are beginning 
to take an increased interest in renewable energy systems (as also 
observed in Bigger et al.’s chapter, this volume). The same techniques 
and technologies that are helping corporations expand in ostensibly 
‘green’ directions will be applied to power military infrastructures and 
equipment. Whether the question is of solar in the Middle East, wind 
power in Mexico, or aircraft carriers that run on biofuels, these relations 
support the expansion of capitalism whilst obscuring its gut-wrenching 
crises and obstructing effective action (Al-Waeli et al. 2017; Bigger and 
Niemark 2017; Dunlap 2017).
Industry and security forces are beginning to acknowledge their 
ecologically destructive operations, and repressive forces are looking 
for ways to become ecologically ‘sustainable’. Such “sustainable 
violence” is not just the result of “bad governance” (Dunlap 2017). It is 
inextricably bound with industrial extraction and efforts to economise 
on the destructive and repressive actions of governments, industry and 
security forces involved in the expansion of industrial-scale renewable 
energy systems.
Fossil fuel industries—whether coal, natural gas, or oil—are also 
beginning to invest and use renewable industry to legitimise their 
resource extraction operations and diversify their energy-related 
holdings (as outlined by Wright and Nyberg, this volume). Examples 
range from Gas Natural Fenosa, which is investing in wind parks in 
Mexico (Dunlap 2019), to RWE in Germany, operator of the largest 
coal mine in the country, which is setting up their own green daughter 
company—Innogy—to invest in wind energy and other ‘renewables’ 
after spending years subverting and lobbying against them (Brock and 
Dunlap 2018). Grupo Mexico is also buying wind in Mexico and solar 
parks in the US to cloak their company in a ‘green’ image. Meanwhile, 
they are powering the extraction of raw materials with renewable sources 
(Dunlap 2019; GrupoMexico 2016). With Andrea Brock, I have called 
this the “renewable energy-extraction nexus”, which demonstrates 
the intimate relationship between forms of extraction—whether 
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wind, natural gas, coal, or copper—necessary for renewable energy 
development and the continued subsumption of the Earth and its 
inhabitants to industrial society (Dunlap and Brock 2021).
The Renewable Energy-Extraction Nexus
The renewable energy-extraction nexus also renews the multiple and 
self-reinforcing extractivisms comprising the material structure of the 
state: becoming part of the intricate web of subsidies, collaboration 
and, at times, competition that feeds the techno-industrial machine, 
spreading its infrastructure and values across the planet. This expansion 
happens at a great disregard for the costs involved, whether for people 
(particularly Indigenous or rural communities in both the Global North 
and South), animals, plants or geophysical nature.
The preceding considerations allow us to recognise renewable energy 
as renewing destruction (Dunlap 2019). It entails revived and intensified 
relations of domination that have much in common with colonial and 
centre-periphery dynamics. When people embrace renewable energy 
systems, many do not realise that they require various forms of violence 
against people, environments, and animals, which must remain hidden 
for obvious reasons. These systems, which require concrete, steel, 
copper, rare earth minerals and, by extension, fossil fuel and mineral 
extraction, are made to appear acceptable through their placement out 
of sight and out of mind, in the materially poor, rural, and Indigenous 
territories of the Global South and North.
When liberals, progressives, ‘the Left’, and even environmental 
justice activists applaud the large-scale transition to renewable energy, 
they ignore the many hazards that would otherwise be unacceptable to 
them. 
Displacing fossil fuel industries to the Global South, where there are 
fewer environmental regulations and political rights, also enables the 
use of excessive forms of state-private security violence against anyone 
who might protest them. The material necessary for renewable energy 
can only result in an increase in extractivism in the Global South and 
all the negative consequences this entails for people on the ground. 
If we do not confront these facts, then the solution of today—like 
previous energy systems and regime changes—will likely result in the 
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complicated tyrannies of tomorrow. Recognising renewable energy as 
Fossil Fuel+ is a first step to combat the fairytale of renewable energy. 
By highlighting the myths surrounding renewable energy, we also 
create the groundwork for greater environmental considerations and 
the enactment of radical ecological alternatives that address the roots of 
consumer society and its marketed solutions.
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11. I’m Sian, and I’m a Fossil Fuel 
Addict: On Paradox, Disavowal 
and (Im)Possibility in Changing 
Climate Change 
Sian Sullivan
In recent years I have returned to west Namibia to work with 
elders of families I have known for more than two decades. Oral 
histories, recorded as we find and revisit places my companions 
knew as home, have increasingly struck a chord as a record of 
lives lived largely untouched by fossil fuels. As the complexity 
of these pasts has come further into focus, it has become 
impossible to avoid the gulf between this kind of attunement 
to environmental contexts and my own life, especially the 
reality that I am completely dependent on fossil fuels and the 
products they make possible. This essay is an attempt to fully 
face this paradox of maintaining hope for binding international 
climate agreements that have teeth, whilst being aware of my 
dependence on the fossil fuel extracting and emissions-spewing 
juggernaut that permeates all our lives. Drawing critically on 
twelve-step thinking and psychoanalysis literatures I reflect on 
fossil fuel addiction, and the destructive paradox of not being 
able to live up to internalised but unreachable values regarding 
environmental care in a fossil-fuelled world.
© 2021 Sian Sullivan, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.11
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Once Upon a Time in the Wild West
Sometimes life brings experiences that give pause for thought.
In recent years I have returned to west Namibia to work with elders 
of families I have known for almost thirty years—a legacy of a childhood 
split between Britain and southern Africa. We have been documenting 
histories of land connections prior to a series of clearances of people 
from large areas of the west Namibian landscape that occurred some 
decades ago (Sullivan and Ganuses 2020, 2021; Sullivan in press).1 
Often now perceived as an untouched and pristine wilderness, our 
work instead draws into focus a landscape intimately known, named 
and remembered by people who once lived there (as conveyed in Figure 
5). Oral histories recorded as we find and revisit places my companions 
knew as home, have increasingly struck a chord as a record of lives lived 
largely untouched by fossil fuels.
In the contemporary terms defined by modernity, industrialisation 
and capital, theirs was an economically impoverished existence. But 
this is not how they define and describe their experience. Beyond the 
nostalgia that people tend to have for times past, their prior existence 
is valued in some of the following ways. For the freedom to move to 
locations where particular foods could be acquired, and for the pleasure 
of meeting and sharing food, songs and dances with friends associated 
with different places. For harvesting a series of highly appreciated 
foods enabling their subsistence in an extreme, dryland environment: 
the endemic cucurbit (melon-plant) !nara (Acanthosicyos horridus) 
processed from ‘fields’ managed far west in the dunes of the Northern 
Namib Desert (see Video 1); the seeds of sâui (Stipagrostis spp.) and 
bosûi (Monsonia spp.) collected from harvester ant nests found further 
inland (Sullivan 1999); and the fruits of xoris (Salvadora persica) found 
in ephemeral rivers traversing the landscape. For sweet honey (danib) 
pulled from hives harvested over decades, and diverse animals lived 
with, hunted and appreciated as sentient, intentional beings with whom 
people could communicate. For a life filled with nights of songs and 
healing dances when times of abundance were celebrated,2 and when 
1 I am grateful to Sesfontein residents Welhemina Suro Ganuses and Filemon |Nuab 
for their multi-year collaboration and leadership in this field research.
2 See The Music Returns to Kai-as, online at https://vimeo.com/486865709.
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the skills for living in an environment considered one of the most hostile 
on earth were valued highly. 
Fig. 5. ǁOeb: Cousins Noag Mûgagara Ganaseb (L) and Franz |Haen ǁHoëb (R) 
revisit places in the westward reaches of the Hoanib River where they used to live. 
Here they are close to ǁOeb, now the site of a high-end eco-tourism lodge called 
Hoanib Camp, located on the south side of the bend in the Hoanib River just to 
the right of centre in this image. When Franz, Noag and their families lived in this 
area they would alternate between harvesting !nara (Acanthosicyos horridus) from 
their !nara plants near the springs of Auses / !Uiǁgams, and walking southwards 
to Kai-as and the !Uniab River where different foods as well as !nara could be 
found. In the 1950s the coastal dunes were opened for diamond mining. Then in 
1971 the lower Hoanib River was gazetted as part of the Skeleton Coast National 
Park. As these areas became opened for extractive industry and conservation, they 
became closed to habitation by those who once lived there. Photo: Sian Sullivan, 
November 2015, composite made with Mike Hannis using three 10 x 10 km aerial 
images from Directorate of Survey and Mapping, Windhoek, July 2017, as part 
of a series of images for the exhibition Future Pasts: Landscape, Memory and Music 
in West Namibia: see https://www.futurepasts.net/memory. © Future Pasts, 
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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Video 1. Hildegaart |Nuas of Sesfontein / 
!Nani|aus, Kunene Region, north-west Namibia 
remembers harvesting !nara (Acanthosicyos 
horridus) in the dune fields of the Hoanib 
River. Video by Sian Sullivan (2019), https://
vimeo.com/380044842, © Future Pasts, 
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. 
As the complexity of these pasts has come further into focus, it has 
become impossible to avoid the gulf between this kind of attunement 
to environmental contexts and my own life. Like many in ‘the West’, 
I would describe myself as concerned with environmental and social 
justice. All my work has been energised by such concerns, as well as 
by an animist sense of the natures with which we live, which seems 
resonant with aspects of the lifeworlds of those Indigenous people with 
whom I have interacted and worked (Sullivan 2019).
At the same time, the reality is that I am completely dependent 
on fossil fuels and the products they make possible. This dependence 
exists even as I simultaneously and publicly acknowledge the serious 
implications of pumping more climate-forcing gases into the atmosphere. 
There is almost nothing manufactured in the world around me, or in my 
life as it is currently structured, that exists independently of fossil fuels. 
The basic things with which I write and share these reflections—from 
the plastic refillable pencil I scribble notes with, to the laptop I write on 
and the Wi-Fi system I am now connected with—are shot through with 
fossil fuels.
Facing It
Under current structural circumstances, I am completely unable to 
unhook myself from fossil fuel production and consumption. Even 
consciously ‘low-impact’ and low-carbon lifestyles are bound with the 
fossil fuel industry and the apparent necessity of economic growth this 
supports (Böhm 2015). The solar panels on my roof at home installed to 
foster an ‘off-grid’ lifestyle are made and transported using fossil fuels—
not to mention the host of other substances involve in their fabrication 
whose extraction and associated wastes are seriously environmentally-
damaging (see Dunlap, this volume).
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Documenting the fossil-fuel-free pasts of people like Franz and 
Noag above means I fly to Namibia and then drive a diesel-fuelled 
4x4 so as to go with small groups of people to the far-flung locations 
where they lived. Maybe I should simply give up this research so as to 
be more congruent with a stringently decarbonised lifestyle? But apart 
from personal love for this research—for the places it takes me to, the 
people I work alongside, and the diversity I am exposed to and learn 
from—I do this work in a context of local desire for such pasts to be 
documented and made public,3 institutional support for contributions 
along these lines, and professional pressures to continue with work that 
consolidates and internationalises earlier research effort. Like others 
working to engage with and bear witness to justice issues in various 
global contexts—issues frequently associated with fossil fuel extraction 
and emissions management—all my research and activist engagements 
are paradoxically fuelled by fossil fuels.
Of course, I can assuage my conscience by purchasing carbon offset 
credits—perhaps using a carbon credit card through which every dollar 
I spend will apparently reduce my carbon footprint4—or by planting 
trees somewhere else. But I do not really accept a model that sees the 
earth in terms of aggregates (an aggregate carbon budget, an aggregate 
level of ‘natural capital’, etc.5), the composition of which can be traded, 
exchanged and substituted between times and places so as somehow to 
cancel out emissions. I am generating carbon emissions through my life 
and work, full-stop. There is no ‘elsewhere’ for these emissions.
As someone who cares about planetary health and is also concerned 
about the perpetuation and deepening of grotesque economic inequity, 
I rationalise my activities by considering the documentation I am doing 
with others in Namibia to be worth it—in terms of making visible 
currently occluded pasts, experiences of displacement, and different 
possible ways of living with diverse natures-beyond-the-human. Such 
3 Most recently this work has been drawn on by an Ancestral Land Commission 
appointed in 2019 by the Namibian Government, in its final report to the Office 
of the Prime Minister making recommendations for Parliament to enact “ancestral 
land rights claim and restitution legislation” (GRN 2020).
4 For example, ‘Eco-friendly Credit Cards’ (Thalesgroup.com, 2021), https://www.
thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/banking-payment/
cards/eco-friendly-credit-card.
5 As advocated, for example, in Helm (2015).
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rationalisations, which are amongst those we engage in all the time so 
as to exist amidst unavoidable contradictions, go some way towards 
cognitively smoothing the dissonances described above.6
In facing these contradictions and the dependences they mask, 
it becomes harder to simultaneously maintain a stringently critical 
position towards fossil fuel extractors (I need the substances they 
produce, dammit!), states and negotiators in the worlds of climate 
change management. Indeed, motivating this essay is a sense that I 
am not alone in deploying psychic compartmentalisations so as to act 
affirmatively in the world, whilst simultaneously damning the fuels, 
technologies, organisations and structures that make these actions 
possible—thus ultimately also damning myself. I am wondering if it 
is increasingly important to recognise the prevalence of such internal 
divisions, particularly the destructive paradox of not being able to live 
up to internalised but unreachable values.
I am influenced here by a provocative meditation on the natures of 
authoritarianism: The Guru Papers: Masks of Authoritarian Power, by Joel 
Kramer and Diana Alstad.7 In The Guru Papers, Kramer and Alstad (1993: 
228) speak of “the hypocrisy masking so much of social interaction 
where people pretend to be far more virtuous than they are”. They 
highlight the destructive authoritarianism that arises as internalised 
‘good’ / ‘bad’ dualities pit aspects of the self against each other. And 
they connect this internalised conflict with social contexts in which 
assumptions and projections of superior morality maintain problematic 
authoritarianisms. They argue that such everyday authoritarianisms act 
to avert equality in social relationships, whilst also reducing possibilities 
for strengthening self-trust and for improving broader awareness of the 
structural dissonances preventing systemic change.
Acknowledging the implications of such internal and social conflicts 
and inconsistencies seems critical right now, when so many ecological, 
psychological and social indicators—not least a global pandemic that 
has erupted since I first drafted this essay—suggest we need systemic 
change in spades.
6 I discuss such dissonances in more detail in Sullivan 2018.
7 Thank you to Ya’acov Darling Kahn for drawing my attention to this text.
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What on Earth Is Going on?
When re-emerging from periods of field research in west Namibia 
where Internet coverage is very sparse, into more-or-less constant 
Internet reality, I have often felt like I am viewing events unfolding in 
the world from a sort of bemused and horrified distance. An example 
comes from December 2015, in the moment when the 21st Conference 
of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was taking place in Paris.
As I sat in a small hotel in Windhoek readying myself to return to 
the UK just after journeying between Sesfontein / !Nani-|aus and the 
Skeleton Coast with Franz and Noag pictured above, I wrote about the 
following constellation of events.
So, the world’s government negotiators are meeting for the twenty-
first time to attempt to agree to systemically adjust economic activities 
so as to decarbonise the global economy (UNFCCC 2015). For months 
now, climate justice activists have also been mobilising protests and 
actions (for example, Global Justice Now 2015). Of particular concern 
is the corporate agenda considered to be preventing the UNFCCC COP 
from reaching a binding international agreement that has real teeth in 
terms of emissions reductions. Corporate sponsors supporting the Paris 
COP include airlines, energy corporations and banks (Mcdonnnell 
2015; Team Ecohustler 2015). Great effort by (h)activists has gone 
into designing possibilities for radical play to disrupt the ‘mesh’ of 
the formal summit and its associations with “austerity-dictating 
politicians, fossil fuel corporations, industry lobbyists, peddlers of 
false solutions and greenwashers” (McDonald 2015: online); as well 
as to deflect the policing “sidekicks” of the COP (referred to as “Team 
Blue”). Protests in Paris on the eve of the COP were met by “team 
blue” with tear gas and police baton charges (Fieldstadt and Grimson 
2015).
Simultaneously, the chilling pre-summit attacks in Paris by ISIL 
(‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’) in mid-November (BBC News 
2015) have precipitated further fossil fuel-intensive military strikes 
by the West against sites in the Middle East (Marcus 2015), as well 
as a potentially indefinite state of emergency in France under which 
public demonstrations are banned (Osborne 2015). The right of public 
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assembly so as to contest the climate change negotiations of COP21 is 
curbed under these emergency powers (Chan 2015).
Meanwhile, within hours of a yes vote in the UK parliament 
(Sparrow and Perraudin 2015), RAF bombers joined allies who have 
been bombing Syrian oil fields since 2014 (LoGiurato 2014). The speed 
by which bombers were deployed suggested it was farcical to think 
there could have been an alternative outcome to the parliamentary vote. 
Justified as striking at the source of oil finance for ‘the terrorist group 
Daesh’, it seems beyond irony that at this intense moment of global 
climate change negotiations in Paris, wells supplying the supposedly 
scarce and climate-forcing substance of oil are being bombed, entailing 
huge emissions into the atmosphere in a situation that would not look 
out of place in a post-apocalyptic Mad Max film.
And here I am nodding to another irony, in that the last Mad Max 
film—Fury Road (The Future Belongs to the Mad) of 2015—was filmed 
in the sensitive desert landscapes of west Namibia, not far from where 
I started this essay, its destructive impacts causing fury amongst 
environmentalists and scientists there. The film uses the stark beauty 
of the Namib Desert as the backdrop for a post-apocalyptic desert 
wasteland where the scarcest of resources are petrol, water and fertile 
women, and violence is the means whereby control of these precious 
items is maintained . . .
In any case, apart from the heart-breaking humanitarian disaster of 
military intervention in Middle East contexts over the last twenty-plus 
years of international climate negotiations (Sullivan 2003; UN Security 
Council 2015), such tactics surely contradict ‘the West’s’ avowed 
allegiance to reduce climate change emissions (Graham 2015). The 
ferocity with which Western corporations carved up Iraq’s oil fields 
as they worked to remove Saddam Hussein in 2002–2003 (Beaumont 
and Islam 2002) should remind us that aggressive access to fossil fuels 
infuses international policy too. Indeed, current military adventure by 
the West in Syria appears a bloodsoaked strategy to beat Russia and Iran 
to the significant ‘hydrocarbon potential’ of Syria’s offshore resources 
(Ahmed 2015). These geopolitical issues are not even close to the public 
negotiating table in Paris.
Consider, as well, a couple of announcements made as government 
climate negotiators were meeting in Paris in 2015. The environment 
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minister(!) of the Australian government justified recent approval 
of the $16bn Carmichael coal mine in Queensland, to be operated by 
Indian company Adani, on the grounds that Australia is not a neo-
colonialist power that tells poor countries what to do (Taylor 2015). 
Construction of the mine is ongoing, amidst an array of challenges 
on environmental and Indigenous title grounds (Currell et al. 2020; 
Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council 2020). Botswana reportedly 
announced the sale of fracking rights to a UK company covering 
half the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, an area also associated with 
Indigenous San / Bushmen (Barbee 2015). Although refuted in 2016 
by the Botswana government, alarm in the region has now shifted to 
exploratory drilling for oil in neighbouring northern Namibia, by a 
Canadian company—Recon Africa—that reportedly also has a licence 
to prospect for oil in northwestern Botswana (Tan 2020). Initial drilling 
has been touted in industry publications as potentially yielding “the 
biggest oil story of the decade” (Leigh 2021). Meanwhile, in the US 
in 2015, Oklahoma was experiencing an “earthquake boom” (Chow 
2015: online), recognised as linked to some extent by oil and gas 
related processes, including the injection of water into basement rock 
in extracting natural gas from bedrock, i.e. fracking (US Geological 
Survey 2020). 
Fast forwards to the present moment: the build up to the twenty-
sixth COP of the UNFCCC, to be held in November 2021 in Glasgow, 
UK.8 Postponed twice due to the COVID-19 pandemic, COP26 is taking 
place in a world that has tilted on its political axis towards right-wing 
populism and consolidated plutonomy (Greven 2016): viz. the elections 
of presidents Trump (US) (reprieved by the tight Democrat presidential 
win in December 2020), Bolsonaro (Brazil), Erdoğan (Turkey), and 
the ascent of Johnson to Prime Minister in the UK. The green hopes 
stimulated by a COVID-19-induced pause in especially flying, which is 
stranding fossil fuel assets everywhere (Kusnetz 2020), are being dashed 
as recovery packages for oil companies are announced (Harvey 2020), 
as also observed in Hannis, this volume. Clearly, the contradictions 
continue.
8 See https://ukcop26.org/.
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Disavowal and Doublethink
In trying to generate a coherent picture from these fragments, I feel 
acutely sensitive to the difficulty of maintaining hope for binding 
international climate agreements that have teeth, whilst being aware 
of the fossil fuel extracting and emissions-spewing juggernaut that 
permeates all our lives.
Humans are adept at deploying the layers of our consciousness to 
simultaneously maintain sometimes diametrically opposed realities. The 
pioneer of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud, in a succinct essay published 
in 1938, identified this human ‘talent’ as the Splitting of the Ego in the 
Process of Defence. He asserted that in order to accommodate traumatic 
and dangerous reality the ego may behave in remarkable ways. In short, 
a defensive splitting can be deployed such that the threat associated 
with particular behaviours is both acknowledged and systematically 
turned away from (Freud 2009[1938]). Attention is instead transferred 
to fetishised solutions that facilitate continuation of the dangerous but 
satisfying behavior, at the same time as constituting symptoms of the 
acknowledged reality of this danger (see discussion in Sullivan 2017). 
Freud used the term ‘disavowal’ to describe this simultaneous defence 
against, and displaced acknowledgement of, dangerous reality. 
In carbon management, offsetting mechanisms designed to mitigate 
emissions production can be seen as paradigmatic of such a fetishised 
‘solution’ (Fletcher 2013; Watt 2021). They signal simultaneous 
acknowledgement and sustenance of harms caused. As a fetishised 
solution to anthropogenic climate change, offsets are directing oceans 
of creative energy and resources towards the production of metrics to 
fabricate equivalence between carbon produced and stored at different 
sites, and away from achieving reductions in emissions production 
(Moreno and Speich Chassé 2015). This is why critics of such exchange 
and market-based approaches to emissions management cry “false 
solutions” (REDD Monitor 2014).
‘Doublethink’ was the term that George Orwell, in his dystopian 
novel 1984, used for such practices of structural disavowal. He defined 
doublethink as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s 
mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them” (Orwell 2013[1949]: 
244), identifying enforcement of this practice as at the heart of 
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maintaining a systemically unequal totalitarian regime. He wrote further 
that the prevailing mental condition associated with doublethink was 
“controlled insanity”—a state necessary to forever avert human equality 
(Orwell 2013[1949]: 226).
Disavowal and doublethink enable hope for emissions-reducing 
agreements to succeed, even as oil fields are being bombed by the same 
powers making those promises. They enable acceptance of Western 
governments as liberal democracies, even as freedom of assembly is 
severely constrained under arrangements which in France in 2015 were 
precipitating rushed changes to the constitution. They perhaps also 
run through the internal psychological divisions enabling impassioned 
pleas for the cessation of fossil fuel emissions production to be made 
using technologies, gadgets and transports fuelled by fossil fuels.
Fossil-Fuel(led) Culture
All of us contesting climate change and railing against the activities of 
fossil fuel companies are doing this using technologies, infrastructures 
and materials that are fossil-fuelled. Every single one of our online 
posts working to organise social movements for climate justice are made 
possible by fossil fuels. They are embedded in our computers, in our 
mobile phones, in all our mechanised transport systems, in our bikes, in 
the transport of our foods, however organic and fairly traded they are.
Fossil fuel corporations might be blamed for their hunger to capture 
oil under the land of indigenous peoples in Ecuador and elsewhere 
(see Sullivan Chapter 3, and Fremeaux and Jordan, this volume), 
and cynicism may be justified regarding the will and/or ability of 
government negotiators to agree a summit text that is binding in terms 
of national emissions reductions and fossil fuel investments (see Hannis, 
this volume). But, given the systemic nature of our dependence on fossil 
fuel products and infrastructure it is starting to feel uncomfortable and 
inaccurate to engage in divisive communications around the issue of 
fossil fuel dependence. Just about everything around us and with which 
we are entangled—much of which we might appreciate and even love—
is fuelled by and/or made with fossil fuel. 
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Addiction and Taking Steps
Recently, and quite frequently, our fossil-fuelled culture has been 
framed in terms of substance addiction (see also Wright and Nyberg, 
this volume). It seems clear that we need nothing short of a complete 
global energy, and thus societal, revolution to unhook us from fossil fuel 
addiction.
Fossil Fuel Addiction (FFA) and its associated denials, dismissals, 
disassociations and rationalisations has been identified as a key aspect 
of climate change negotiations, requiring intervention which climate 
justice activists, with their perhaps clearer grasp of the desperate 
reality approaching us, are considered well-placed to offer. Thus, “the 
climate justice movement must perform a planned intervention with a 
professional who helps the Addict to see the truth in their polluting” 
(Hornack 2015).
In the famous twelve-step process of Alcoholics Anonymous and 
associated programmes, the first step is to recognise that you are indeed 
addicted. That you are bound to a substance over which you do not have 
control, such that this substance has become your ‘higher power’, its 
material qualities and structures of access determining one’s activities 
and choices in the world. Subsequent steps include acknowledging that 
external help is needed so as to disrupt patterns of habit and addiction.
Referring again to Kramer and Alstad in The Guru Papers, however, 
such solutions may also sustain perhaps destructive divisions between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours, promoting powerlessness and internal 
warring in ways that may prevent psychological integration and self-
trust regarding choices. To take this back to fossil fuels, in integrating 
some realities about my own structural dependence on fossil fuels I 
am starting to feel something a little unfamiliar: something more akin 
to empathy for the challenge facing government negotiators in the 
various COPs, all of whom are as wrapped up in a system of intractable 
dependencies as myself. Even less familiar is something approaching 
appreciation for the power of fossil fuels and their provision by those 
organisations I tend to view with intense suspicion and dislike. As 
Gunster et al. (2018: 12) write, these kinds of perceptual shifts are 
relevant since 
 15111. I'm Sian, and I'm a Fossil Fuel Addict
frank recognition of the [climate] hypocrisy of those who possess 
environmental sympathies can open up space for understanding the 
structural forces that generate the gaps between intention and action and 
thus promote a more complex understanding of the relations between 
social and political change and individual practices. Embedded within 
reflexive, sympathetic and dialogic venues of communication, the (often 
uncomfortable) feelings that attend such recognition can become a 
spur to reflection, conversation and, most importantly, modes of agency 
and action that dismantle (rather than enforce) conventional liberal 
distinctions between public and private, political and economic, citizen 
and consumer. 
In addition to demystifying and working to transform the structural 
forms driving deepening inequality and environmental damage, then, 
twelve-step thinking can add some ingredients of its own. In encouraging 
honest and open acknowledgement of the grip of fossil fuels, combined 
with inventory of the harms caused by this grip, it can further support 
whatever choices are possible to reduce consumption and decarbonise 
one’s own life, without losing sight of the systemic and infrastructural 
nature of one’s dependence. Importantly, whilst prompting honesty 
about one’s own substance (ab)use, twelve-step thinking also 
foregrounds compassion for the (im)possibility of unhooking from an 
addiction that is societal and structural, as much as individual. 
In doing so, the emphasis shifts to asking for, and providing support 
to, fellow addicts. This is not necessarily a competition. We are all in 
this together, although clearly there are gaping inequities in intentions, 
uses and impacts. We need to work with each other now in order to 
unhook ourselves, our groupings and our societies from fossil fuels. 
Only blaming and entering into conflict with those needed as allies in 
this transformation potentially hinders the possibility of systemic and 
supportive reimagining and reconstitution. This includes fossil fuel 
producers. I of course find this step difficult; but I cannot escape the fact 
that they have made both the delights and the difficulties of our current 
lives possible, and perhaps they too need non-violent communications 
and support in order to divest from and/or to fuel systemic change 
(although see Fremeaux and Jordan, this volume). At the same time, 
clearly they need to be radically reconfigured and regulated so as to 
be weighted more clearly towards people and planet, rather than profit 
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(Paterson, this volume, also grapples with these systemic connections 
and complexities). 
A re-oriented perception of the nature of fossil fuels may also help. 
Indigenous peoples have known oil as the blood of a feminised nurturing 
earth and as saturated with spirit beings considered to nourish the 
spirits infusing all plant and animal life (see Sullivan Chapter 3, this 
volume). Such worldviews may limit the possibility of extraction when 
perceived as fundamentally damaging to the systemic and nourishing 
health of life, and thus as morally wrong. Whimsical perhaps? But 
knowing oil and other potent minerals to be precious energisers of the 
earth, as opposed to disembedded materials whose value exists only in 
their burning to fuel industrial processes and economic growth, may 
be part of a toolkit that foundationally shifts human relationships with 
these substances.
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12. Gendered Climate Change-
Induced Human-Wildlife 
Conflicts amidst COVID-19 in 
Erongo Region, Namibia
Selma Lendelvo, Romie Nghitevelekwa and Mechtilde Pinto 
The risks of climate change for drier countries have become 
more pronounced. Small increments in temperature changes are 
considered to pose serious consequences for dry countries such 
as Namibia and Botswana, both of which have also experienced 
significant drought in recent years. In this chapter, we discuss 
climate change-induced human-wildlife conflicts (HWC) as 
they relate to gender, for communities in Erongo Region, west 
Namibia. We draw attention to the experiences of women as a 
vulnerable social group that is bearing climate change-induced 
HWC, and foreground how they are adapting to these pressures. 
Setting the Scene
Namibia is one of the driest countries in southern Africa with a semi-
arid climate characterised by low and highly variable rainfall (Bann and 
Wood 2012). The average annual rainfall for Namibia is 350mm, ranging 
from 50mm in the west to 650mm in the north-eastern part of the 
country. In addition to variable rainfall, Namibia experiences increased 
unpredictability in weather patterns associated with extreme events 
such as frequent floods and droughts (for consideration of climate and 
environmental change and stability over the longer timeframe of the last 
150 years, see Rohde et al.’s chapter, this volume). 
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During the period from 2002 to 2013 drought spells were recorded 
(Kapolo 2014; Schnegg and Bollig 2016). In the successive years from 
2013 through to 2019 severe droughts were experienced, necessitating 
the country’s president to declare a state of emergency in 2013, 2016 and 
2019. Farmers lost close to 90,000 livestock between October 2018 and 
June 2019, due to severe drought (Shikangalah 2020).
The impacts of these recent droughts were felt on many sectors of 
the economy including agriculture, livestock, water, and conservation. 
While these impacts can be measured quantitatively and effects on the 
country’s Gross National Product (GDP) can be pronounced nationally, 
qualitative impacts at local communities’ levels are equally important if 
somewhat less visible.
For the wildlife and biodiversity conservation sector, direct impacts 
of droughts have been documented. For instance, a report by Kaula 
Nhongo observed for Erongo Region that in drought conditions thirsty 
elephants (Loxodonta africana) raid villages to eat crops and drink water 
from the storage tanks, describing how “elephants destroy houses, 
water points, gardens and fences and this has caused an uproar with 
most communities who are now threatening to take matters into their 
own hands” (Nhongo 2019: online). The implications are not only for 
the material well-being of the communities and/or the country at large, 
but can also lead to the loss of human lives. The encounter related below 
lays bare the reality of such experiences ‘on the ground’:
[o]ne of the farmers, who is still haunted by a vicious encounter with 
an elephant, is 37-year-old Tjitemiso (nickname) who was attacked in 
2017 while accompanying his friend home in the night. Tjitemiso and 
his friend crossed paths with the elephant which chased them into the 
bush. They tried to hide behind a tree, but the elephant discovered them. 
He managed to escape but his friend was trampled to death. Although 
he lived to tell the tale, his life will never be the same again. “I watched 
my long-time friend get trampled to death by an elephant, a picture that 
will remain with me for the rest of my life... the government needs to act” 
(Nhongo 2019: online).
And again, 
in 2017, a man in Omatjete villages was killed by an elephant on his 
way from visiting friends. This incident combined with others triggered 
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this community to tender a petition to MET [Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism, now MEFT] to have elephants removed from the Daures 
Constituency (cited in Hartman 2017). 
We interpret this incident as an example of climate change manifesting 
through drought-induced human-wildlife conflict (discussed further 
below). Namibia has been hailed for its progressive legislation and 
policies for wildlife protection, but events like this one may reverse the 
social acceptability of its conservation programme. Wildlife legislation 
in Namibia, through enactment of the Nature Conservation Amendment 
Act of 1996, allows for the involvement of local communities in Namibia’s 
remaining communally managed areas if they organise themselves into 
formal organisations called conservancies (NACSO 2004; Weaver and 
Petersen 2008). Namibia’s community-based conservation initiative has 
been further hailed for bringing economic benefits for communities 
and the country at large through tourism and conservation hunting 
alongside increased wildlife populations (Jacobsohn and Owen-
Smith 2003; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2004; Lendelvo et al. 2012: Silva and 
Mosimane 2014). 
Battling the Triple Threat: Climate Change + Human-
Wildlife Conflict + COVID-19 Pandemic
While communities in the conservation sector are already battling the 
impacts of climate change-induced human-wildlife conflict (HWC), 
the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has greatly exacerbated the 
situation. As we have indicated, Namibia’s frequent droughts over 
the past few years have encouraged the movement of wildlife such as 
elephant closer to human settlements, searching especially for water and 
resulting in competition with people for already scarce resources. As in 
Kenya, where climate change has also been observed to contribute to 
HWC, particularly with elephants (Mukeka et al. 2019), these combined 
circumstances have escalated HWC in communities in Namibia’s 
communal-area conservancies.1 Instead of revenues from conservation 
1 The location and tenure of communal-area conservancies are an outcome of 
Namibia’s specific historical circumstances. This history gave rise to a division 
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hunting and tourism being spent on addressing developmental 
challenges facing communities, they are being rerouted to address 
climate change-induced human-wildlife conflict. 
Recent funding acquired from the Green Climate Fund through the 
Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia has thus been prioritising 
water infrastructure maintenance in the conservancies to address 
the current water situation for conservation and reducing human-
wildlife conflict.2 Apart from supporting water infrastructure, different 
insurance schemes have also been put in place to cover the cost of HWC 
in communities in Namibia, as well as globally (Leslie et al. 2019). 
During 2020, already hard-hit revenues from the conservation and 
tourism efforts of local communities, became further severely affected 
by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which halted the inflow 
of tourism and conservation hunting revenue into conservancies, 
because of the closure of international borders which disrupted tourism 
arrivals. These events seriously limited revenue inflow and slowed 
down conservation and monitoring interventions including addressing 
human-wildlife conflicts, thereby additionally increasing communities’ 
vulnerabilities in rural, wildlife-rich areas (Lendelvo et al. 2020). 
We trace these interconnections in more detail for two specific 
communal-area conservancies below, drawing on a survey with which 
we were involved.3 This survey formed part of the project Integrated 
Approach to Proactive Management of Human-wildlife Conflict and Wildlife 
Crime in Hotspot Landscapes in Namibia (UNDP 2020), carried out for 
Namibia’s Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Tourism (MEFT), 
and supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) through the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
between surveyed freehold farms allocated to settlers by the country’s colonial and 
apartheid governments, separated from areas forming so-called ‘Native Reserves’ 
and ‘Homelands’ where peoples autochthonous at the advent of colonial rule were 
constrained to live, and that have remained after independence under communal 
forms of tenure and management (Sullivan 2018).
2 Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia (EIF), CBNRM EDA Project (Eif.org.
na, 2020), https://www.eif.org.na/project/eda1-project.
3 Lendelvo and Nghitevelekwa co-led the stakeholders’ assessment and gender 
analysis for this project.
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Local Experiences of Climate Change-Induced Human-
Wildlife Conflict
Otjimboyo and Ohungu are communal-area conservancies located in 
the Erongo Region, west Namibia (see Figure 6). The two conservancies 
are registered and gazetted by the Namibian government and form 
part of the country’s acclaimed Community-Based Natural Resources 
Management (CBNRM) Programme. The conservancies lie along major 
westward-flowing ephemeral rivers called the Ugab (!Uǂgāb) and Huab 
(ǁHuab), whose riverine vegetation constitutes important habitat for 
different wildlife species, including the desert-adapted elephant and 
lion (Panthera leo) (MET/NACSO 2018), as well as for livestock. 
Fig. 6. Map showing the location of the Otjimboyo and Ohungu conservancies in 
Namibia, adapted by the authors from public domain image at http://www.nacso.
org.na/conservation-and-conservancies. Areas shaded orange are communal-
area conservancies; those in green are national parks and other state conservation 
areas. © NACSO, CC BY 4.0. 
Because of their location in the driest part of the country, livestock 
farming rather than crop production is the primary source of local 
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livelihood, with conservancies relying on the same landscapes for 
wildlife conservation to diversify and strengthen local livelihoods 
(MET/NACSO 2018; Kamupingene et al. 2016). The post-independence 
conservancy approach was embraced by these communities to generate 
income from tourism and conservation hunting, and particularly to 
engage in organised wildlife conservation so as to reduce the cost of 
livestock predation by indigenous fauna amongst these pastoralist 
communities (MET/NACSO 2018). 
Gender-Differentiated Experiences of Climate Change-
Induced Human-Wildlife Conflict 
Women in so-called developing nations are especially vulnerable 
to climate-related events such as droughts, a situation that is further 
exacerbated by existing cultural norms, unequal distribution of roles 
and responsibilities at household levels, and inequalities in access to, 
and power over, resources (Lendelvo et al. 2018; Yavinsky 2012). In 
addition, economic disparities between men and women at household 
levels in many rural communities in Africa persist, and are further 
exacerbated by the triple threat of climate change, HWC and the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Women in the communal area conservancies of 
Otjimboyo and Ohungu associate climate change with the interruption 
of natural patterns and events upon which culture and traditions are 
reliant (as similarly recorded in Sullivan 2002). Norms and practices 
within these communities are strongly connected with seasons because 
seasonal rainfall patterns drive productivity and thus the availability 
of different resources, including water and forage.4 Climate change and 
the widening variability of climatic conditions affect human-wildlife 
conflict through their effects on food and water supply for wildlife. In 
particular, recurrent droughts and rising temperatures cause frequent 
food and water shortages for herbivores, and contribute to greater 
wildlife mobilities and the likelihood of contacts between wildlife, 
people and livestock (Mukeka et al. 2019).
4 Editors’ note: for more detail regarding the implications of unpredictably varying 
rainfall on the dryland ecologies and production systems of west Namibia, see 
Sullivan (1996) and Sullivan and Rohde (2002).
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Livestock farming (pastoralism) is both culturally important and 
provides wealth for households. Although livestock have traditionally 
been predominantly owned by men, women in the two conservancies 
also own mainly small stock, primarily goats, and some also own 
donkeys used for transport. In our survey, most women indicated that 
farming helps to generate income for the school education of their 
children, and to provide for their needs and provisions through sales or 
bartering. Donkeys are especially important for transportation, assisting 
in fetching water, taking people to key services such as hospitals and 
pension grant pay-points, and enabling them to attend social gatherings 
such as community meetings, funerals and weddings. In one of the 
interviews, a respondent shared that
an elderly woman lost her donkey to predators […] and after that it was 
a challenge for her to travel to the centre for her pension (pers. comm. 
Otjimboyo 2019).
The frequency of droughts experienced in these two communities has led 
to poor pasture in these areas, meaning that livestock are forced to travel 
long distances from homesteads, exposing them as prey to predators. 
Donkeys in particular were subjected to high mortalities or becoming 
vulnerable to predators due to limited food sources. A large proportion 
of the impacts of HWC during 2018 and 2019, for example, was linked 
to the devastating country-wide drought, which left many poor 
households destitute, and especially those which were female-headed 
(MET/NACSO 2018; Shikangalah 2020). Human-wildlife conflict has 
been found to exacerbate female-headed households’ vulnerabilities 
and to negatively affect household wealth, as livestock ownership in 
these households tends to be characterised by low numbers and the 
inability to afford herders (Kamupingene et al. 2016). 
Kamupinge et al. (2016) additionally report that: the common type 
of HWC incidents experienced in these communities include livestock 
predation, damage to property and attacks on and loss of human lives. 
Severe drought increases HWC as herders experience difficulties with 
kraaling animals; and these impacts are set in a context wherein Erongo 
region is also reported to have inherent water problems which have 
been aggravated by poor rainfall resulting in a receding water table 
and drying up of water bodies. Respondents in our study narrated that 
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during drought, cattle may travel long distances from villages (between 
10 and 15 km) to where water can be found, and in most cases do not 
return home the same day. While men can go after the livestock or hire 
livestock herders, households headed by women are more affected by 
livestock losses as they are less likely to be able to leave their household 
to follow animals grazing large distances away (Sadie n.d).
Conversely, degradation of natural resources close to villages 
may mean that women and children must travel long distances and 
spend more time in the field in search of resources important to their 
livelihoods, such as firewood, mopane worms,5 items for craft production 
products, and medicinal or edible plants. Drought enhances their fear of 
encountering dangerous animals such as elephants when travelling far 
from their homes. 
These observations are set in a context wherein climate change is 
also believed to have disrupted wildlife movement patterns, resulting 
in different species frequently moving close to homesteads and 
their movement becoming unpredictable, either causing damage to 
property or livestock predation (MET/NACSO, 2018: 45). Farmers 
in Erongo Region are experiencing livestock predation, whilst those 
along the Ugab river area are more affected by elephant-related 
conflicts. Thus, “[p]eople in Erongo Region along the Ugab River 
landscape, had freedom of movement restricted to their homesteads, 
and they disappeared into their houses just at dusk for fear of their 
lives” (National Council of Namibia 2017). 
Indeed, the presence of elephants is the HWC that communities fear 
the most. Although livestock predation is prevalent, predator conflict 
seemed to be more manageable. For example, not all women in our study 
expressed that predation is a problem, but most of them expressed that 
human-elephant conflict is a key concern, referring especially to the 
man killed by an elephant in Ohungu conservancy. 
In addition to unpredictable wildlife movements, the presence of 
elephants makes women feel helpless and with little or no options, due 
to elephants moving up to homesteads in search of water and food. 
Human-elephant encounters may leave the poor more destitute as their 
property, including food storage facilities, gardens and infrastructure 
5 Editors’ note: caterpillars of the emperor moth Gonimbrasia belina.
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such as fences and water points, is destroyed. Furthermore, women fear 
for their children and grandchildren when they go to school, look after 
livestock, or fetch water, in case they encounter wildlife.
Human-Wildlife Conflict Policy Compensation 
Scheme
The national HWC management policy compensation scheme is a control 
measure designed to mitigate against effects of human-wildlife conflict 
and is carried out by conservancies in collaboration with the MEFT and 
supporting NGOs. The scheme is perceived to be problematic, however, 
because in most cases compensation is delayed, does not provide market 
value of lost livestock, and does not reach all affected parties due to 
the nature of evidence required for compensation payments. To allow 
for compensation of lost livestock, the human-wildlife conflict policy 
regulations require evidence and reporting within twenty-four hours. 
For women in particular, to get this evidence within the timeframe is 
often impossible and a particular problem is that affected parties are 
often not able to provide evidence of the cause of death of their livestock, 
because incidents happen far from their home and at times evidence 
disappears before they discover the missing animal. 
Further, whilst the HWC management policy makes provisions for 
cash compensation, this might not be the ideal form of compensation for 
affected parties who may prefer direct replacement of the lost animal(s). 
Services such as electricity and provisions such as household feeding 
schemes may instead go a long way to assist communities affected 
by climate-induced or -exacerbated HWC. Electricity helps to keep 
elephants away, leading people in the community to start using light-
based deterrents to chase away elephants, especially at night (Shaffer et 
al. 2019). More protection and/or compensation in terms of repairs for 
properties and water infrastructure damaged by elephants are needed 
to prevent the reported situation that
the little income we have left, is what we use to repair some damages 
caused by elephants to get water for households, livestock, and even to 
protect our people (female respondent, Ohungu Conservancy).
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For women, fencing off villages or households to prevent elephants 
from invading villages and homesteads may be desired. In this context, 
women also remain disadvantaged in terms of accessing information to 
enable them to make informed decisions or benefit from opportunities. 
Men tend to be more mobile, networked, connected and are likely to 
access information quicker than women in these contexts. A situation 
of minimal information shared among women tends to create fear, 
affecting their day-to-day livelihood activities such as gathering 
firewood, fetching water, caring for and sending children to schools 
and/or harvesting foods and medicines. 
Conclusion
In addition to changes in land use, climate change is among the key 
factors predicted to cause losses of natural resources during the coming 
decades in southern Africa (Biggs et al. 2008; Kupika et al. 2017; 
Khalife 2020). National and international efforts have provided crucial 
information for planning, formulating policies, and implementing 
programmes aiming to address climate change. For about twenty-five 
years, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change have congregated to deliberate on the risks of climate change, 
but with limited substantial outcomes that make a difference on the 
ground for the most affected communities at risk in dryland countries 
such as Namibia. Communities at local levels experience climate 
change in different ways. For the Otjimboyo and Ohungu communal 
area conservancies of Namibia’s Erongo Region, their tale is one of the 
intersecting effects of climate change, HWC, and now, COVID-19. 
While the impacts of these phenomena are felt broadly, they are also 
gendered. Women in these communities are finding it difficult to adapt 
to the effects of climate change due to limited opportunities, combined 
with already existing inequalities and vulnerabilities. The combination 
of climate change and HWC presents complexity for women farmers 
by negatively impacting their farming and household economy. There 
is a need for regular support with gardening and income opportunities 
to supplement their vulnerable livestock farming. Regarding the fear 
of lack of awareness about the presence of problem animals and other 
relevant information, an early warning system using simple technology 
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is needed. Such a system might use existing communication structures 
in the conservancies to bring forth information warning of the 
proximity of problem animals and HWC incidents. Diversified means 
of information sharing, such as using local leadership structures, social 
grouping, media (mainly the radio) and mobile phones, could assure 
that most people are reached, irrespective of gender, age, and other 
social categories. 
As world leaders, scientists and civil societies gather at COP26 in the 
hope of finding the best solutions to climate change, let us remember 
the local communities in the remotest parts of our planet: communities 
such as those inhabiting the Otjimboyo and Ohungu conservancies in 
rural Namibia. Let us also remember that climate change impacts are 
differentiated and that the most vulnerable social groups—women, the 
poor, and others—tend not to be present at international negotiations 
such as the UNFCCC COPs to share their experiences of dealing and 
living with the impacts of climate change in their daily lives. This chapter 
is intended as a short communiqué to foreground the types of concerns 
women in rural dryland communities might wish to voice if they were 
able to be present at COP26.
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13. Environmental Change in 
Namibia: Land-Use Impacts and 
Climate Change as Revealed by 
Repeat Photography
Rick Rohde, M. Timm Hoffman and Sian Sullivan
This essay draws on repeat landscape photography to explore 
and juxtapose different cultural and scientific understandings 
of environmental change and sustainability in west Namibia. 
Change in the landscape ecology of western and central 
Namibia over the last 140 years has been investigated using 
archival landscape photographs located and re-photographed, 
or ‘matched’, with recent photographs. Each set of matched 
images for a site provides a powerful visual statement of change 
and/or stability that can assist with understanding present 
circumstances at specific places. The chapter shows in a practical 
way an innovative possibility for documenting and analysing 
environmental and social change, helping us to contextualise 
projected and predicted environmental futures, and sometimes 
offering complexity with regard to modelled climate change 
projections and scenarios.
© 2021 Rick Rohde et al., CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.13
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Historicising Environmental Change through Repeat 
Landscape Photography
Fig. 7. Repeat photos of Mirabib inselberg in the Namib Desert. Composite image 
© Rick Rohde, drawing with permission on images by John Jay, Frank Eckhardt, 
Rick Rohde and Timm Hoffman. 
The above composite image illustrates a key method drawn on in 
exploring environmental change in west Namibia. The image depicts 
the Mirabib rocky outcrop in Namib-Naukluft National Park at three 
different moments in time. The first view (the small black and white 
photo) is a still from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey which director 
Stanley Kubrick used for some of the opening scenes. The film’s still 
photographer, John Jay, took this photo in 1965. This image was 
re-photographed in 1995 (the image on the clipboard) by University of 
Cape Town geomorphologist Frank Eckardt; followed by a third retake 
in 2015 by Rick Rohde and Timm Hoffman.
Repeat landscape photography can be used to explore and juxtapose 
different cultural and scientific understandings of environmental change 
and sustainability. Sometimes this method reveals ecological markers of 
historical events and climate change trends that contradict both popular 
and scientific assumptions. The material brought together through this 
method can tell stories of environmental change that are different to 
those assumed in popular imagination and scientific predictions alike. 
In this essay we summarise some findings from repeat photography 
research for changes in the landscape ecology of western and central 
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Namibia for a longer time period than the effects of recent drought 
reported for the same area in Lendelvo et al.’s chapter, this volume. 
We have revisited and re-photographed sites that were originally 
photographed as long ago as 1876, analysing ecological changes these 
‘matched’ images record. We select examples from a large dataset of 
repeat images brought together since the 1990s by Rick Rohde and 
Timm Hoffman from the University of Cape Town. Each set of matched 
images for a site provides a powerful visual statement of change and/
or stability that can assist with understanding present circumstances 
at specific places and across regions. They help us to contextualise 
projected and predicted environmental futures linked, for example, 
with understandings and assumptions about climate change. 
Historical Ecology1
Given the dramatic events that have shaped the present socio-economic 
landscape of central and west Namibia—the establishment of colonial 
enterprise, a genocidal colonial war, seven decades of apartheid rule, 
and the ushering in of broadly neoliberal policies since independence in 
1990—it is not surprising that traces of past impacts are inscribed on the 
landscape. These traces create layered landscape ‘palimpsests’2 in which 
past influences can be read and deciphered in the present. 
In the archive image below, for example, we see the kraal of Maherero, 
the first Paramount Chief of the pastoralist ovaHerero, who was 
powerful in central Namibia prior to German colonisation in the 1880s. 
The photograph was made by the photographer who accompanied 
British colonial magistrate W. C. Palgrave as he travelled from Cape 
Town to central Namibia in 1876, seeking the possibility of establishing 
colonial ‘Protection Treaties’ with the diverse autochthonous peoples 
1 For more detail on the research informing this first part of the chapter see Rohde 
and Hoffman 2012.
2 Human and cultural actions in relation to landscapes are sometimes framed 
metaphorically as akin to writing on a page, leaving behind signs that can be read 
by future inhabitants. The overlaying of multiple workings of the land thereby 
make a landscape something of a palimpsest—a text overlain by successive writings, 
the earliest writings never quite completely erased. In other words, landscapes are 
multi-layered and readings of them invite an unpicking of these layers, and an 
awareness of the influence and interplay of earlier inscriptions on those that follow 
(as explored more fully in, for example, Rohde 2010; Heatherington et al. 2019).
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inhabiting the territory (Coates Palgrave 1877; Stals 1991). What was 
then a pastoral scene of grassland savanna with umbrella acacias (Acacia 
tortilis) providing some shade for dung-plastered dwellings and kraaled 
animals, is now a cluster of twenty-first-century settler houses built like 
Bavarian castles on high square stone or concrete plinths, surrounded by 
electric fences and barbed wire. The vegetation changes are astonishing. 
Where once there was a wide ephemeral river bordering the receding 
Namibian grasslands (centre left in the top image), there is now hardly 
an opening in the thornveld canopy. Some of the riverine Ana trees 
(Fairdherbia albida) in the bottom image are now gigantic—like old 
grandparents care-worn and haggard surrounded by a new generation 
of hungry dependents. The lush flowering grasses in the bottom image 
are breast-high in places.
Fig. 8. Maherero’s kraal (1876) above, and present day Okahandja (2009) below. 
Sparse riverine Ana trees and thornveld savanna have been replaced by alien tree 
species such as eucalyptus (Australian) and prosopis (North American) that 
now obscure the view of the upper reaches of the Swakop River. These social 
and environmental changes are emblematic of the reshaping of central Namibian 
landscapes since colonial times. (Above) W. C. Palgrave Collection (National 
Library of South Africa), out of copyright, used with permission; (below) © R. F. 
Rohde and M. T. Hoffman.
The photographic evidence from many sites in central Namibia reveals 
a complex story of radical political, cultural and socio-economic change 
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amounting to an ecological revolution associated with colonialism and 
an expanding global capitalist economy. 
In 1876 the grazing lands of central Namibia were more grassy and 
less woody; rangelands were highly shaped by large pastoral herds, 
transhumance routes, temporary settlements and the use of fire to 
manage grasslands. During the 1890s, however, several cataclysmic 
events converged to bring about radical change. These included the 
rinderpest epizootic of especially 1897, smallpox, and a colonial war 
of the German state against autochthonous Namibians that intensified 
in 1904–1907, all of which effectively decimated indigenous peoples 
and their herds (Esterhuyse 1968; Olusoga and Erichsen 2010; Wallace 
2011). As illustrated in Figure 9, the resulting hiatus in land use resulted 
in ecological changes that persist in the landscape today as a signature 
of events of a century ago. 
Fig. 9. River Skaap, Hatsemas Central Highlands, central Namibia. Matched 
photographs spanning 1876 (left) to 2005 (right). Camelthorn individuals have 
colonised previously bare or sparsely vegetated river terraces, probably in a single 
recruitment event. The increase in small trees and shrubs on the rocky pediments 
and hill slopes is indicative of regional bush encroachment patterns. For scale, 
note the white tent and ox-wagon of the Palgrave expedition at the bottom left 
quadrant of the 1876 image. (L) W. C. Palgrave Collection (National Library of 
South Africa) out of copyright, used with permission; (R) © R. F. Rohde and 
M. T. Hoffman. 
The change in riverine habitats lining the margins of an ephemeral river 
in the pastoral landscape shown in Figure 9 is immediately apparent 
when viewing these images alongside one another. Considering the 
large size of individual trees and the uniform population structure of 
these long-lived camelthorn trees (Acacia erioloba), it is likely that they 
originated as a seedling cohort sometime between 1876 and 1910. It 
is reasonable to assume that they recruited in response to the sudden 
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release of pastoral grazing pressure when indigenous pastoral groups 
were effectively displaced by disease, war and subsequent German 
colonisation. This woodland thus endures as an ecological marker of 
historical events with political, social and environmental dimensions. 
Other repeat image pairs from this collection show the development 
of towns and settlements, such as in the open uninhabited savanna 
of central Namibia, now dominated by the Presidential Palace and 
the extensive southern suburbs of the capital, Windhoek: as shown in 
Figure 10. 
Fig. 10. Windhoek southern suburbs, looking south-west from Wassenberg. 
Matched photographs spanning 1919 (left) to 2014 (right). Bush thickening is 
evident throughout the landscape, not to mention the sprawl of urban residential 
housing and the new Presidential Palace built by a North Korean company, 
completed in 2008. (L) I. B. Pole-Evans (South African National Biodiversity 
Institute), out of copyright, used with permission; (R) © R. F. Rohde.
Bush thickening (‘bush encroachment’) has become an increasing 
problem in central Namibia, reducing the available grazing for cattle and 
in many instances closing the thornbush canopy to grazing altogether, 
as illustrated in the matched images in Figure 11. Palgrave’s 1876 photo 
depicts a newly established mission station inhabited by several hundred 
indigenous pastoralists situated around a wetland in a tributary of the 
Swakop River. Intermittent conflict, cattle theft and violent confrontation 
took place between Nama and ovaHerero until the 1890s when a police 
station was established here by the German colonial administration. 
Otjisewa farm was bought from the local ovaHerero chief in the early 
1900s and has remained a privately owned commercial cattle farm 
owned by a succession of German and Afrikaner families. Although a 
problem for cattle farmers, the thickening of thornbush savanna here 
forms a massive carbon sink that might be advantageous in a global 
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context of increased anthropogenic greenhouse gases and atmospheric 
CO2 fertilisation. At the same time, however, and illustrating the complex 
trade-offs involved between different production / protection choices, 
the management of bush encroachment often involves clearing woody 
plants for conversion to saleable charcoal (Dieckmann and Muduva 
2010), or converting the “bothersome biomass” of bush encroachment 
into biomass fuel to power Biomass Industrial Parks (Heck 2021). Both 
strategies contribute significant emissions. 
Fig. 11. Otjisewa, central Namibia. The change from the savanna landscape in 1876 
(above) to the image of 2006 (below) illustrates how bush thickening typifies 
these more mesic (i.e. moist) highland areas of Namibia today. (Above) W. C. 
Palgrave Collection (National Library of South Africa), out of copyright, used 
with permission; (below) © R. F. Rohde and M. T. Hoffman.
In contrast, many of the more arid rangelands in the South of Namibia 
have remained stable and relatively unaltered over long periods of 
political, socio-economic and climatic change. The ephemeral Guireb 
River in the Karas Region of southern Namibia is a stunning example: 
see Figure 12. These more arid areas are less impacted by land use and 
have remained relatively stable over long periods of time. Patterns of 
little or no woody vegetation cover change are correlated with Mean 
Annual Precipitation (MAP) below a threshold of around 250 mm, 
regardless of land tenure system or land-use practice.
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Fig. 12. Aub / Gurieb River, southern Namibia. In spite of the contrast of the 
dry, sparsely populated, pastoral landscape depicted in 1876 and the lush grass 
and flowing river during the exceptional rainy season of 2009, woody vegetation 
species and the extent of cover has hardly changed. (L) W.C. Palgrave Collection 
(National Library of South Africa), out of copyright, used with permission; (R) © 
R.F. Rohde and M.T. Hoffman.
Bush encroachment (as per Figures 10 and 11) is positively correlated 
with MAP above 250mm and associated with land-use practices such as 
commercial cattle ranching arising in the wake of colonialism, drought, 
and the epidemics and epizootics of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. Legacies of demographic collapse, land-use change 
and landscape fragmentation are evident in these more mesic savannas. 
We see no evidence of recovery from bush-encroached to open grassland 
over the timescale of this study. 
Repeat Photography and Assessing Climate Change
In order to assess the impacts of climate change in west Namibian 
landscapes we examined a dataset of one hundred repeat landscape 
images compiled over the past twenty-five years in the western desert 
landscapes of the Pro-Namib and Namib Desert. These arid and 
hyper-arid areas have been less impacted by human development 
and historical events than many of the more mesic parts of Namibia. 
A detailed vegetation survey was conducted and changes in dominant 
species cover was ascertained (Rohde et al. 2019). 
One of the main obstacles to researching climate change in the Namib 
Desert is the paucity of historical climate data. Because woody vegetation 
in this relatively undisturbed environment is strongly influenced by 
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climate, we regard long-term vegetation change as a proxy for changes 
in climate. These repeat photo sites cover an area of approximately 
40,000 square kilometres and the average time between the date of the 
original image and the repeat photograph is seventy-eight years.
Illustrating the diversity of habitats characterising west Namibia, 
these sites were categorised into four broad groups: Large Ephemeral 
Rivers; Fogbelt, Grasslands & Shrublands, Savanna Transition—the 
latter three being largely determined by rain and fog. These groupings 
are shown in Figure 13, together with the locations of the repeat 
photographs used in our analysis.
Fig. 13. Location of repeat photo sites in each of four vegetation types, west and 
central Namibia. Image by chapter lead author. 
The region is characterised by a distinct environmental gradient from 
the hyper-arid coastal areas to the savannas of the plateau. Mean annual 
precipitation (fog and rain) is relatively low for sites in the coastal 
fogbelt and inland grass/shrubland sites, but increases in the savanna 
areas and sites within large ephemeral rivers farthest from the coast. 
Mean annual temperature is lowest in the first 60 km within the fogbelt 
zone and is higher further inland, although considerable variability 
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exists between sites. The number of fog days declines steeply away from 
the coast and provides relatively little moisture input for sites further 
than 100 km from the ocean.
Fogbelt
The sparse woody cover in the coastal western portion of the Fogbelt (9 
km to 35 km from coast) increased by 0.36% per year3 while sites between 
40 km to 74 km from the coast showed very little change (+0.003% per 
year) (Figure 14). Over the study period woody cover declined in only 
two of the thirteen fogbelt sites, both of which were located towards the 
eastern margin of this vegetation zone.
Fig. 14. Fogbelt site near Rössing uranium mine (33km from coast) showing 
examples of the long-lived shrubs between 1919 (top) and 2016 (below) displaying 
the same individuals in each image (white dots). The population of this species 
has doubled during the last ninety-seven years (green dots) due to increased 
fog. Mortality of individuals is shown as red dots. (Top) I. B. Pole-Evans (South 
African National Biodiversity Institute), out of copyright, used with permission; 
(below) © R. F. Rohde and M. T. Hoffman.
3 Woody cover change per year is calculated by dividing the total change over time by 
the total number of years between the original and repeat photo, recognising that 
vegetation growth increments are not necessarily smooth, i.e. they will not in fact be 
the same every year as they will be coupled with other dynamic factors.
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Grasslands and Shrublands
The average percentage cover of woody vegetation in the grass/
shrubland zone was more than twice the average value for the fogbelt 
zone. Unlike in the fogbelt zone however, woody cover in the majority of 
sites in the grass/shrublands did not increase over the sampling period 
(Figure 15). The average change in woody cover was only +0.007% per 
year. Variability in woody cover change was also relatively low in this 
vegetation zone. In seven of the eight sites located in the more eastern 
part of the grass/shrublands (i.e. 92 km to 125 km from the coast) 
woody plants, more typical of the savanna transition vegetation zone 
have increased in cover.
Fig. 15. Grass/shrublands (Aukas East). Matched photographs of Euphorbia 
damarana, Calicorema capitata shrubland (110km from coast) illustrating slight 
decrease in cover over ninety-seven years between 1919 (left) and 2016 (right). 
The replacement of E. damarana by savanna species (white dots) such as Acacia 
reficiens, A. mellifera, Adenolobus pechuelii, and Maerua parvifolia and Commiphora 
spp. is indicative of the westward expansion of savanna rainfall. (L) I. B. Pole-
Evans (South African National Biodiversity Institute), out of copyright, used with 
permission); (R) © R. F. Rohde and M. T. Hoffman.
Savanna Transition
The savanna transition zone is comprised of a large number of woody 
species but is dominated by acacia and subtropical savanna tree and 
shrub species. In the repeat photographs, average values for woody 
plant cover were nearly twice those of the grass/shrubland zone (Figure 
16). Woody plant cover declined in one site only and remained the 
same in four of the twenty-four sites in the savanna transition zone. 
The average rate of increase in woody plant cover was 0.07% per year. 
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Species composition in savanna transition sites varied in relation to 
latitudinal position where the hotter northern sites were dominated 
by Colophospermum mopane in contrast to southern sites where acacia 
species predominated.
Fig. 16. North Usakos Railway. Savanna transition showing significant increase in 
woody cover between 1919 (left) and 2014 (right), indicating the influence of a 
westward shift in summer rainfall. (L) I. B. Pole-Evans (South African National 
Biodiversity Institute); (R) © R. F. Rohde and M. T. Hoffman.
Large Ephemeral Rivers
The sites located within or adjacent to large ephemeral rivers are 
dispersed throughout the fogbelt, grass/shrubland and savanna zones. 
Woody plant cover was greatest in this vegetation zone with values as 
high as 75% woody cover recorded at one location. A wide range of 
woody plants dominated the ephemeral rivers and although changes 
in woody plant cover varied considerably between sites in this zone, 
it nearly doubled over the study period with average values of 0.26% 
increase per year. Only two sites exhibited a decline in woody cover 
with relatively modest reductions in cover. Each of the five ephemeral 
rivers in the study area present distinct traits in relation to vegetation 
change: e.g. the Khan River is the most stable in terms of species and 
percentage cover (although this may have been affected since by the 
opening of Husab Uranium Mine in the area), the Kuiseb appears to be 
the most dynamic (see Figure 17), and the Swakop the most impacted 
by anthropogenic disturbance and alien species.
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Fig. 17. Large ephemeral river (Kuiseb). Matched photograph from Gobabeb 
(55km from coast) illustrating significant thickening and size increase of riverine 
woody cover over fifty years between 1965 (left) and 2015 (right). Dominant 
riverine species: Faidherbia albida, Tamarix usneoides, Acacia erioloba, Salvadora 
persica. (L) photographer unknown (Gobabeb Namib Research Institute), out of 
copyright, used with permission; (R) © R. F. Rohde.
Discussion
Past climate trends are not predictors of future environments but they 
do inform our understanding of the causes of present conditions. A 
tipping point might reverse a historical trend, but at present we see no 
evidence of such a shift from our analysis of woody vegetation change 
in the Namib and Pro Namib. 
For example, we see no evidence for the expansion of desert and 
arid shrublands into higher rainfall savanna areas, nor do we find 
any evidence of a predicted decrease in groundwater or increased 
evaporation as a result of global warming. Rather than an expansion of 
more arid-adapted species into more mesic environments, our analysis 
documents the incursion of savanna species into more arid environments 
and an increase in woody plant cover in most localities. 
Preliminary analysis of the changes in woody vegetation lead us to 
the following four possible explanations: 
• That increased vegetation in the fogbelt is associated 
with a change to a colder, more intense Benguela Current 
upwelling in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Namibia. 
This cooling in turn generates more coastal fog, making 
more moisture available to plants in the coastal areas of 
west Namibia. This enhanced fog moisture has combined 
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with recent increased occurrences of the Benguela Niño 
climate fluctuation (associated with desert rainfall events) 
that have supported population recruitment of coastal fog 
dependent woody vegetation species such as Arthraerua 
leubnitziae and Zygophyllum stapffii. 
• Further inland, increased temperatures in the grasslands/
shrublands areas have resulted in the reduced incidence of 
fog and the desiccation of woody vegetation apart from the 
ecotone bordering the savanna where increased summer 
rainfall has resulted in an expansion of more savanna 
species. 
• The savanna transition areas show increases in vegetation 
consistent with increased rainfall and atmospheric CO2 
fertilisation in the more eastern landscapes. 
• The large increases in woody vegetation along the azonal 
large ephemeral rivers may be due to upstream dams and 
fewer recent large flood events (which can uproot and 
wash trees and shrubs downstream).
These observations add to current debates regarding trends that are 
predicted or contradicted by various modelled future scenarios and that 
posit intensification (or weakening) of cold Benguela Current upwelling, 
leading to increased (or decreased) fog near the coast and desiccation 
further inland. Researchers have described hypothetical scenarios based 
on the modelling of the climatic gradient across central and western 
Namibia. None have done so, however, by showing the relationships 
between woody cover change, climate change and land use derived 
from historical sources in order to substantiate past and present trends 
across different kinds of vegetation communities. 
The research presented here thus offers a summary of the empirical 
evidence for historical changes in Namibia’s vegetation and climate. It has 
significant implications for understanding global phenomena such as the 
effects of historical events on contemporary landscapes and vegetation 
diversity, bush encroachment, rainfall and temperature trends, and 
hence climate change. It can also contribute to understandings of the 
effects of global warming on the intensity of the Benguela Eastern 
Boundary Upwelling System, and its associations with global synoptic 
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moisture fluxes from the southeast Atlantic, southwest Indian Ocean, 
Sea Surface Temperature (SST) anomalies and the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO). 
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14. On Climate and the Risk of 
Onto-Epistemological Chainsaw 
Massacres: A Study on Climate 
Change and Indigenous People in 
Namibia Revisited
Ute Dieckmann 
On behalf of a Danish organisation (Charapa Consult), in 2012 
the Legal Assistance Centre in Windhoek undertook a research 
study on climate change and indigenous people in Namibia. 
Charapa Consult had itself been commissioned by the World 
Bank Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Development to undertake a regional research project in Africa, 
and parallel studies for Asia and Latin America had also been 
commissioned. As a researcher involved in the Namibia study, 
in this essay I critically assess its methodological challenges and 
dilemmas in relation to the global framework within which it 
was conducted. I place special emphasis on the predicament of 
short-term ‘participatory’ research with indigenous communities 
on climate change. I also outline the challenges arising from the 
necessity of squeezing indigenous environmental knowledge 
and experience into internationally acknowledged scientific 
frameworks, an approach which implies a subordination of 
indigenous peoples’ ontologies to western ontologies. The 
compartmentalising necessitated by such a methodology risks 
© 2021 Ute Dieckmann, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.14
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the loss of the most important aspects of indigenous ecological 
knowledge related to climate change.
Introduction
Who better to lead during this time of dramatic climate change than 
peoples who know or can recollect in their indigenous traditions of 
TK [Traditional Knowledge] and/or TEK [Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge] practices of sustainability and indigenous ingenuity—
Indigenuity? Can you imagine a world where nature is understood as 
full of relatives not resources, where inalienable rights are balanced with 
inalienable responsibilities and where wealth itself is measured not by 
resource ownership and control, but by the number of good relationships 
we maintain in the complex and diverse life-systems of this blue green 
planet? I can (Wildcat 2013: 515).
In this essay, I draw on a number of methodological challenges 
encountered during a study on climate change and indigenous people 
in Namibia as a starting point for a critique of climate change studies 
that attempt to integrate indigenous knowledge into dominant scientific 
frameworks. I was involved in the study as an anthropologist employed 
by the implementing organisation as part of a multi-disciplinary team. 
I illustrate what happens when we try to compartmentalise indigenous 
knowledge in order to fit it into our own conceptual frameworks. 
Complementing Sullivan’s Chapter 3 (this volume), I outline what 
we would gain from taking indigenous onto-epistemologies seriously, 
in the context of climate change and beyond. In short, I argue that 
avoidance of onto-epistemological chainsaw massacres, and the opening 
up of more possibilities for radical (re-)learning so as to avert ecological 
crisis, requires putting normalised ‘western’ frameworks aside in order 
to stop, listen and think carefully. I am drawing here on theoretical 
physicist Karen Barad’s (2003) call for a revised “onto-epistem-ology”, 
and borrow the term “chainsaw massacres” from Dianne Rocheleau’s 
(2005: 339) analysis of the risks in cartography on fixing indigenous 
onto-epistomologies into the “iron grid of Descartes” (ibid: 328).
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The Study
In 2012, the World Bank Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development (TFESSD) commissioned a Danish 
organisation (Charapa Consult) concerned with human rights and 
development1 to undertake a regional research project on indigenous 
peoples and climate change in Africa, having commissioned similar 
regional studies for Asia and Latin America. The research in Africa, 
coordinated by Charapa with a number of implementing partners, 
looked at three ecological sub‐regions of the African region: the tropical 
forest zone (Republic of Congo); arid/desert areas in southern Africa 
(Namibia); and lakes and wetlands (Kenya) (Charapa Consult 2012: 
7). The overall research initiative had three main objectives: to analyse 
how indigenous peoples were affected by climate change; to identify 
indigenous peoples’ local and traditional knowledge, practices and 
adaptation strategies; and to support strengthening of indigenous 
peoples’ capacities for their engagement and direct participation in the 
formulation of public policies regarding climate change. 
In Namibia, the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC)2 in Windhoek, having 
an excellent record of research regarding marginalised/indigenous 
communities, was contracted to undertake the research for this project. 
Two indigenous Namibian communities were selected as case studies: 
the Topnaar (ǂAonin) and Haiǁom communities, both speaking 
Khoekhoegowab but living in different parts of the country (see Figure 
18). These two communities were selected due to the difference of 
environmental circumstances in which they live, as well as the prior 
research experience of the lead author (for example, Dieckmann 2007, 
2012). Both communities belong to the most marginalised people in 
Namibia (Odendaal and Werner 2020).
As requested by the organisations commissioning the study, the 
main components of the research were literature review, field research—
including focus group discussions, household surveys, trend lines, 
ranking of livelihood strategies, mapping of well‐being, knowledge 
1  See http://www.charapa.dk/. 
2  See http://www.lac.org.na/. 
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and political assets and semi‐structured interviews—and data analysis 
(Charapa Consult 2012: 10).
Fig. 18. Locations of Topnaar and Haiǁom research communities in Namibia. 
Dieckmann et al. (2013), http://www.lac.org.na/projects/lead/Pdf/climate_
change.pdf, p. 35, CC BY 4.0. 
On Ethics and Frameworks
Undertaking ‘participatory’ research regarding climate change in 
communities that are severely marginalised and struggling for daily 
survival felt extremely inadequate to me, especially given the limitations 
on participation caused by having to follow a pre-determined framework 
and methodology. The Topnaar and Haiǁom communities today lack 
access to land and only have very limited access to natural resources. 
In post-colonial Namibia they experience high unemployment, low 
levels of education, very limited political representation and serious 
discrimination. 
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During the study people wanted to talk about their current situation 
and needs, rather than climate change and anticipated impacts. In 
addition, the limitations in access to land and natural resources meant 
that the direct impacts of climate change seemed to be minimal compared 
to other urgent threats to their livelihoods, at least in 2012. 
These research observations and experiences led to fundamental 
questions being asked of the common conceptual framework being 
deployed so as to make the research consistent with the wider study: 
as shown schematically in Figure 19. This framework drew on the 
vulnerability concept developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2007), combined with the framework used for 
the World Bank study on Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change in 
Latin America and the Caribbean Region (Kronik and Verner 2010), 
itself adapted from the UK Department of International Development’s 
(DFID) Sustainable Livelihood Framework as a tool to assess the 
vulnerability of different socio-economic groups and their adaptive 
capacity.
Fig. 19. Conceptual framework deployed in the World Bank Trust Fund for 
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD) study. 
Dieckmann et al. (2013), http://www.lac.org.na/projects/lead/Pdf/climate_
change.pdf, p. 27, CC BY 4.0. 
This conceptual framework analytically distinguishes between the 
impacts of climate change hazards and the conditions established by 
the contexts in which indigenous communities live. The framework 
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is based on specific scientific assumptions operating within a specific 
scientific logic, although even in a western ontology, separating climate 
change-related impacts from other factors such as governance, access 
to land, and socio‐economic status—which are interrelated and have a 
cumulative impact on indigenous peoples—seems highly problematic 
(also see Barnes et al. 2013: 543). This conceptual separation runs the 
risk of de-politicising and re-naturalising climate change in turning the 
attention away from the unevenly distributed anthropogenic/industrial 
causes of climate hazards.
Furthermore, merely providing a slot for “local and traditional 
knowledge systems” implies—as Mario Blaser (2009: 15) points out 
for the context of conservation—that “Indigenous environmental 
knowledges and practices” are “translated into discrete packages 
of knowledge that can be integrated into the toolkit of conservation 
practitioners, often as mere informational inputs”. When applied in 
specific localities, the usefulness of the framework and its underlying 
assumption becomes highly questionable.
On Non-Existent and Non-Fitting Concepts
The issue of frameworks is closely connected to the question of concepts. 
Neither the Haiǁom nor the Topnaar had prior knowledge of the concept 
of climate change as such, an observation also reported for indigenous 
Baka and Babongo communities participating in the parallel Republic 
of Congo study (Charapa Consult 2012: 11). As Charapa (2012: 12, 
emphasis added) state in their final report: “[w]hen attempting to 
compare scientific and indigenous notions of climate change and related 
impact, it becomes clear that these are not immediately comparable”. 
It is not only that these notions may not be immediately comparable 
nor translatable, however, but that at times they may simply be 
incompatible (as also documented for Khoekhoegowab-speaking 
communities in north-west Namibia by Sullivan (2002), and more 
recently for Andean circumstances in Bolivia by Burman (2017)). To 
complexify matters further, this situation is not limited to the rather 
abstract concept of climate change—a concept whose definition even 
scientific experts disagree on—but relates also to additional associated 
terms such as drought, weather and environment. 
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During our fieldwork, Haiǁom participants came up with three terms 
for drought. Eventually, the community involved with the study agreed 
that |khurub should be used. This term also means hunger or no food. It 
is not only related to a lack of rain or dry environment but also includes 
impacts on the community. Complexifying matters, a frost that kills 
bushfood can also cause |khurub, meaning that the term and concept is not 
limited to low rainfall alone. The difficulty of comparing the concept of 
|khurub with ‘drought’ is thus evident: while ‘drought’ in science relates 
to a climate phenomenon, ‘drought’ for Haiǁom relates more specifically 
to associated broad spectrum impacts resulting in a loss of foods for 
humans that may have multiple climatic causes. Such complexities are 
also apparent elsewhere: Turkana and Maasai participants in the overall 
study had similar concepts combining drought and hunger (Charapa 
Consult 2012: 53; also see Goldman et al. 2016).
The concept of ‘weather’ is another telling example. Thomas Widlok 
(2017: 4) points out that the translation of the English term ‘weather’ 
in the Khoekhoegowab spoken by Haiǁom constitutes a compound 
of agentive forces: |nanutsiǁhaotsiǂȏab literally translates as ‘rains-
and-clouds-and-wind’, although this term is rarely used in everyday 
discourse. ǂNūkhoen (Damara), who like Haiǁom and Topnaar (ǂAonin) 
speak Khoekhoegowab, use the term ǂoab tsî ǀnanub (wind and rain) for 
weather (Schnegg 2019). 
‘Environment’ is another instance where understandings do not fit. 
According to Widlok, translations such as ǂnamibeb and !ha!hais were 
originally coined by official language committees, but are also hardly used, 
and he suggests that for Haiǁom, ‘environment’ mainly refers to man-
made environmental features (e.g. houses/huts or fire places) (Widlok 
2017: 5). This understanding also points to other relevant concepts, 
especially the western dichotomy of natural and human/cultural, which 
do not exist in the same form in many indigenous understandings, 
Haiǁom (Widlok 2009, 2017) and other Khoekhoegowab-speaking 
peoples (Sullivan and Hannis 2016) included. The distinction between 
natural and supernatural agencies also seems to be non-existent or at 
least blurred in these contexts (Schmidt 2014; Sullivan and Low 2014; 
Widlok 2017: 5–6; Dieckmann 2021a).
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In sum, central terms used for key concepts in climate change 
discourse either do not exist in, or do not seamlessly translate into, 
indigenous languages. 
On Relationships and Agency
Arguably, then, events and developments that scientists place in the 
context of climate change and relate in certain ways (mostly causally) to 
each other, may be perceived differently by indigenous peoples through 
their distinct experiences of being-in-the-world and accompanying 
explanations of causality (also see Charapa Consult 2012: 66–67). 
During the studies in Namibia and the other African countries, it was 
thus a challenge “to directly relate and compare the perceptions and 
experiences of the indigenous communities participating in this study 
with, for example, the climate change phenomenon and first order 
impacts identified through the literature review” (Charapa Consult 
2012: 52). Similarly, it was often impossible to provide sufficient room for 
the interpretations most meaningful to the participating communities.
Khoekhoegowab-speaking communities experience and establish 
relationships, including their drivers and effects, that may be different to 
scientific models. Some match with scientific explanations (cf. Sullivan 
1999), while others do not. Some indicative fragments are provided 
below.
Haiǁom regard the pied crow (!kha-nub) as a protected bird, because 
according to Haiǁom tales, it brings back the rain after it is taken 
away from them by the animal “married to the rain”, i.e. the elephant 
(Dieckmann 2012: 12–13), again indicating that there is no clear-cut 
distinction between the world of myth, legend, and the supernatural 
and the natural world.
Haiǁom, like other Khoe and San peoples, report the existence of 
‘water snakes’ that protect waterholes, such that if the snake is killed 
or dies the water will dry up (Hoff 1997; Sullivan and Low 2014; 
Dieckmann 2021a). 
ǂNūkhoen connect winds and rain, and moreover associate both 
with non-human agents, speaking of the power of winds, good and bad 
winds, and gendered winds (Low 2007; Schnegg 2019). The strongest 
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spirit-being (ǁgamab) for Haiǁom is the spirit of the rain (Dieckmann 
2021a: 121). 
Haiǁom look to the moon to see what will happen in the next season, 
as indicated schematically in Figure 20. When it is half-moon, there will 
be no rain in the season (1); when it is half‐moon but one side is higher, 
the rain will start (2); and when the left side is even higher, it will be a 
sign of death and no rain (3).
Fig. 20. Position of the moon in Haiǁom rain forecasts. Dieckmann et al. (2013), 
http://www.lac.org.na/projects/lead/Pdf/climate_change.pdf, p. 91, CC BY 4.0. 
These are just a number of snippets connected to what scientists and 
most westerners would commonly call weather or climate, suggesting 
‘deviations’ from scientific models based on western ontologies that 
assume dichotomies of nature vs. culture, human = animated vs. 
nature = unanimated and natural vs. supernatural. As brief and 
decontextualised examples, they nonetheless illustrate that rain and 
wind, celestial bodies, certain animals and more are regarded as 
agents. Khoekhoegowab-speaking communities, like other indigenous 
communities, seem to have an animistic understanding of the world 
(cf. Sullivan 2010; Low 2014) wherein the world is deemed “full of 
persons, only some of whom are human” (Harvey 2006: 11). As invoked 
above, the world is also inhabited by a variety of agential spirit-beings, 
connected—inter alia—to weather, animals and ancestors. 
In these Namibian indigenous contexts, humans are an integral part of 
a wider ecology animated by other non-human agents, past and present. 
Relationships are thereby conceptualised in fundamentally different 
ways to the scientific framework of the Charapa study and most other 
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scientific studies on climate change. This situation also appears true for 
other indigenous peoples worldwide (Yeh 2016; Goldman et al. 2018). 
Why Does This Matter?
The above examples are provided as potentially puzzling onto-
epistemological snippets to serve as illustrations of the epistemic 
violence—or chainsaw massacre—that can happen when knowledge is 
removed from its context. While the authors (both of the Namibian and 
the other African studies) tried to make space to mention at least some 
of these nuanced understandings and relationships, they remained odds 
and ends in their final reports. Because they were not overtly connected 
to scientific notions, they were also subsumed under headings such 
as ‘beliefs’ or ‘culture’ (see e.g. Charapa Consult 2012: 57), further 
undermining their relevance to the main business of understanding 
climate change. While certain aspects of indigenous ‘ideas’ may be called 
knowledge, namely those that can be made to correspond with scientific 
understandings, others are framed as beliefs unworthy as contributions 
to science. 
A number of interrelated arguments—political, ethical, 
methodological, theoretical, philosophical—suggest that the above 
challenges should be taken seriously in the context of climate change.
Disempowering Indigenous People
The study discussed above is just one of many international studies which 
“attempt to combine ‘expert assessment’ with processes of ‘stakeholder 
consultation’” (Scoones 2009: 548; also see Brosius 2006; contributions 
in Cameron, Leeuw and Desbiens 2014; Yeh 2016). Admittedly, the 
Charapa study (like many other studies) tried to do justice to indigenous 
peoples’ needs and rights, and the partners explicitly agreed on general 
principles for the research to this end (see Charapa Consult 2012: 9): but 
did we meet these needs? 
In retrospect, I would reply with a rhetorical question: whose 
ontology counts? 
The study followed the familiar road of one ontology and the belief 
that this ontology can come to be known by different epistemologies. 
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Blaser calls this a “multiculturalist” perspective on indigenous 
knowledge, “according to which cultural differences are ultimately 
negotiable because they are mutually commensurable via what is 
common to all: a world or reality ‘out there’” (Blaser 2009: 15; see also 
Goldman et al. 2016: 28).
This conceptualisation has been disputed in certain branches of 
academic thought (e.g. philosophy, post-colonial studies, feminism, 
science and technology studies, see e.g. Blaser 2013; Mol 2002). 
Relatedly, almost two decades ago, Karen Barad, a trained theoretical 
physicist, pointed to the Cartesian origin of the analytical separation of 
epistemology and ontology and stressed the analytical inseparability of 
the two: 
[t]he separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of a 
metaphysics that assumes an inherent difference between human and 
nonhuman, subject and object, mind and body, matter and discourse. 
Onto-epistem-ology—the study of practices of knowing in being—is 
probably a better way to think about the kind of understandings that are 
needed to come to terms with how specific intra-actions matter (Barad 
2003: 829, emphasis in original).
Whilst there are now attempts in academic argumentation to 
overcome these separations, it is important to acknowledge that many 
indigenous philosophies did not distinguish between them. Indeed, the 
inseparability of the two is an essential feature of so-called relational 
ontologies (Sidorkin 2002: 91), in which relationships constitute beings 
or persons (including non-human beings) rather than vice-versa. This 
perspective stands in stark contrast to the atomistic or substantivist 
ontology dominant in the western world. 
I thus argue that by conceptually separating how-we-know from what-
we-know, studies like the one described in this essay further disempower 
indigenous people by squeezing their knowledge into scientific 
conceptual straightjackets or subsuming it in a side note as ‘beliefs’ or 
‘culture’, despite the stated intention to do otherwise (also see Muller et 
al. 2019: 402). 
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Preventing (Radical) Learning
As long as ‘we’ try to shoehorn indigenous knowledge into our onto-
epistemological frameworks, we will never reach the roots of the 
problem. Climate change is the outcome of practices entangled with 
a specific western philosophical heritage, by the dominant ‘western’ 
onto-epistemology. With this acknowledgement, it would be wise to 
look beyond this tradition for possible paths forward as ‘humanity’ has 
much more to offer. Although many thinkers have already stressed this 
possibility (e.g. Rose 2005; Sullivan 2013, 2017; Umkeek 2014; Castree 
2016), there is still a tendency in much climate change research to ignore 
these calls. To my point of view, indigenous ontologies offer a variety 
of interrelated aspects in response to the current climate and ecological 
crisis, a few of which are encouraged below.
Take relational onto-epistemologies seriously. As soon as we acknowledge 
the inseparability of how-we-know and what-we-know, we can stop 
the bizarre fighting about one nature/several cultures or one culture/
several natures. We can also stop fighting about many other things, e.g. 
‘the truth’, as ‘truth’ evolves in the field of relations between different 
beings. We have different, partly overlapping, onto-epistemologies 
which we need to consider holistically or, in Escobar’s words, we have 
a “pluriverse” as “a world where many worlds fit” (Escobar 2011: 139). 
‘Dethrone’ the human. Although many philosophers, posthumanist 
scholars and other academics have already pointed to the need to 
conceptually and practically re-integrate the human into ecology, many of 
them, based on Eurocentric scholarship, (still) tend to pay no or very little 
attention to indigenous knowledges, perspectives and ontologies (see 
also Bignall and Rigney 2019). Disclosing a western onto-epistemology 
as particular to a specific area and period and philosophising about new 
approaches to imagine the world are useful endeavours, but it might 
be less abstract and less theoretical to encourage more learning from 
concrete cases of existing or past alternatives of human-environment 
relationships as lived by particular groups of indigenous peoples.
Re-learn mutual respect and relatability by (re-)animating nature. 
Indigenous ways of being-in-the-world and onto-epistemologies 
epitomise what is needed in dealing with climate change (Wildcat 2013; 
Umeek 2014). The necessity to maintain ethical and mutual relationships 
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to non-human others is a central part of their experience, an experience 
which appears lost in post-Enlightenment European thought. The 
objectification of nature is an important cause for the current ecological 
crisis and technology on its own will not bring salvation (see e.g. Umeek 
2014: 7). What is needed is a ‘relational turn’ (e.g. Dépelteau 2015), not 
only in science but in the western approach to life. 
Focus on local knowledge and acknowledge people’s connection to/knowledge 
of the land. The points above refer to general principles connected to 
indigenous onto-epistemologies. The concept of onto-epistemology 
also stresses the importance of place, i.e. of locality with regard to 
knowledge evolution, and thus of the situatedness of knowledge. While 
the relational ontologies of indigenous peoples located in continents 
beyond Africa have been studied and compared extensively, case 
studies focusing on onto-epistemological issues of indigenous peoples 
in Africa have rarely been considered in comparative discussions 
within the field of ‘new animism’ (although see Sullivan 2010; Low 
2014; Dieckmann 2021b: 25–26) or indeed linked to the ecological crisis 
(with few exceptions, e.g. Goldman et al. 2016; Sullivan 2017; Schnegg 
2021). Khoekhoegowab-speaking communities in southern Africa, 
being severely affected by climate change, deserve special attention in 
this regard. These communities have lived for millennia with a harsh 
environment but due to their degree of marginalisation, their voices 
have hardly found their ways into official discourses. Muller et al. (2019: 
405–07) provide a number of promising examples from other continents, 
where indigenous peoples’ onto-epistemologies have been integrated 
into environmental management and legal provisions. 
What if Topnaar or Haiǁom experiences of the world and their 
acknowledgement of the importance of mutual relationships between a 
variety of human and non-human actors (including winds, rain, animals 
and plants) could find their ways into the Namibian (and global) climate 
change discourse? What if these communities could be integrated into 
the management of the national parks established on parts of their 
ancestral lands? What if these national parks became legal persons? 
Would ‘other’ people around the world change their/our behaviour if 
they/we took these ways of engaging with their surroundings as our 
example? How might this unfold?
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15. Towards a Fossil Fuel Treaty
Peter Newell
We need a new approach to tackling climate change. We need 
to start using the ‘f’ word much more: fossil fuels. The Paris 
Agreement does not even mention fossil fuels. The deliberate 
neglect by the climate regime of the largest source of greenhouse 
emissions is as shocking as it is unsurprising in a world in which 
fossil fuel lobbies still wield such power and have delayed effective 
climate action for so long that climate chaos is now upon us. This 
chapter urges that it is time to rein in the power these actors have 
over our collective fate, through international agreements and 
law which effectively and fairly leave large swathes of remaining 
fossil fuels in the ground. A Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(FF-NPT) based, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the 
three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use, 
could fulfil that purpose.
The ‘F’ Word
We need a new approach to tackling climate change. We need to start 
using the ‘f’ word much more: fossil fuels. The Paris Agreement does 
not even mention fossil fuels. The deliberate neglect by the climate 
regime of the largest source of greenhouse emissions is as shocking 
as it is unsurprising in a world in which fossil fuel lobbies still wield 
such power and have delayed effective climate action for so long that 
climate chaos is now upon us. These companies have long wielded 
such power (Newell and Paterson 1998; Kolk and Pinkse 2007)—as also 
documented by Wright and Nyberg, this volume. But if further evidence 
of their influence were needed, it is observable in the distribution of 
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bailout funds in response to the COVID crisis where G20+ countries 
have pledged over $207 billion so far to fossil fuel projects, according to 
the Energy policy tracker.1 
It is time to reign in the power these actors have over our collective fate. 
Just six of the largest listed oil and gas companies alone hold reserves that 
together would use up more than a quarter of the remaining 2°C budget 
(McKibben 2012). And, historically speaking, only ninety companies 
have caused two-thirds of anthropogenic global warming emissions, 
including companies such as Chevron, Exxon, Shell and BP, with half 
of the estimated emissions produced in the past twenty-five years when 
the scale of the climate threat was clear (Heede 2014). Governments are 
complicit in this situation by planning to produce about 50% more fossil 
fuels by 2030 than would be consistent with a 2°C pathway, and 120% 
more than would be consistent with a 1.5°C pathway (SEI et al. 2019).
The long-neglected supply-side needs to occupy a central place 
in collective efforts to address climate change (Erikson et al. 2018; 
Gaulin and Le Billon 2020), starting with the Glasgow COP. The IPCC 
Special Report on 1.5 degrees published in October 2018 makes clear 
that realising the ambition of the 2015 Paris Agreement to keep global 
warming below 1.5°C requires deep and rapid decarbonisation. 
A crucial, yet neglected, aspect of this is the need for international 
agreements and laws which effectively and fairly leave large swathes 
of remaining fossil fuels in the ground. A Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (FF-NPT) could fulfil that purpose (Newell and Simms 2019).
Though there have been calls for a Coal Elimination Treaty (Burke 
and Fishel 2020), it is clear we now need a more general fossil fuel treaty 
since the majority of remaining oil and gas reserves also need to remain 
in the ground. Such a treaty could have three pillars, modelled on the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The first pillar is non-proliferation. This would imply a moratorium on 
further expansion in rich OECD+ countries, underpinned by a model-
driven assessment of which reserves of fossil fuels are un-burnable 
carbon and need to stay in the ground to be Paris compliant. This would 
underpin negotiations about the sequencing of commitments regarding 
different fossil fuels and the point at which other groups of countries 
take on commitments. 
1  https://www.energypolicytracker.org/.
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The second pillar is disarmament, which here refers to the 
accelerated phaseout, and managed decline of, existing investments 
and infrastructures in fossil fuels. It would be underpinned by the 
principle of a just transition to address both historical responsibility and 
the capacity to diversify away from fossil fuels, providing support for 
countries to do so (Kartha et al. 2018; Le Billon and Kristoffersen 2019; 
Muttitt and Kartha 2020). 
The third pillar is peaceful use. This pillar refers to the financial and 
technological support to developing countries that will be needed for the 
adoption of renewable energy pathways. This support could be achieved, 
in part, by redirecting finance from fossil fuels, both public and private, 
and including the US$10 million a minute the IMF calculates that the 
world spends on fossil fuel subsidies (Coady et al. 2015), into a global 
transition fund to finance technology, retraining and compensation (see 
the chapters by Bracking and by Kaplan and Levy, this volume, on the 
complexities of climate finance).
There is precedent for international treaties which ban or regulate 
particularly harmful substances—think of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), the Ottawa Treaty to 
ban landmines and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Internationally, 
there are also precedents for bans on fossil fuels such as the moratorium 
in place for mining projects in Antarctica (Article 7 of the Environmental 
Protocol of the Antarctic Treaty). The International Council on Mining 
and Metals has committed its members (including the World Coal 
Association) to neither explore nor mine in World Heritage Sites and 
to “respect legally designated protected areas” (ICMM 2003). Likewise, 
there are calls for banning oil drilling in the Arctic Sea and to halt 
exploitation in protected areas and on indigenous lands. Meanwhile, the 
2017 Lofoten Declaration, signed by over 500 organisations, highlights 
the need to put an end to fossil fuel development and manage the decline 
of existing production.
There is much to be worked out in terms of overarching principles, 
modalities and procedures to ensure a fair, workable and effective fossil 
fuel treaty. But criteria for allocating and sequencing responsibility might 
include that (i) the costs of action should be borne disproportionately 
by those who have the greatest ability to pay defined by per capita 
income levels and who are best placed to redirect finance, production 
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and technology towards lower carbon alternatives; (ii) the greatest 
emitters of GHG emissions from the direct burning of their own fossil 
fuel reserves should act first; and (iii) cumulative emissions are assessed 
to take adequate account of historical responsibility and use of fossil 
fuels to date. 
These three criteria would imply that OECD countries, plus the 
Russian Federation (OECD+), take the lead in the first instance with near-
term targets and timetables for the phaseout of fossil fuels. Multilateral 
responses may be attractive to powerful countries wanting to ensure 
other states do not free-ride on commitments they are now making 
to leave fossil fuels in the ground. They would likely be supported in 
such an endeavour by the climate vulnerable groupings in the climate 
change negotiations such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 
the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (Newell and Simms 2019). 
A universal treaty like the UNFCCC might not be required. Hence, 
even if major fossil fuel producers would not join a Fossil Fuel Non-
Proliferation Treaty at first, there is still a strong rationale for initiating 
a treaty process led by a group of first movers who encourage others to 
join to avoid free-riding and problems of leakage. Supply-side policies 
adopted could also of course be included under countries’ Nationally 
Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement, providing a 
further incentive to participate in negotiations for a new treaty. Though 
negotiating the nuclear NPT took three years, this treaty would take 
longer and needs to be supplemented by other strategies aimed at 
keeping fossil fuels in the ground.
But there is momentum in this direction. Initial moves in this 
direction would include the formation of a first movers alliance, 
such as the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), building on the 
precedent of the Powering Past Coal Alliance of countries. A number 
of countries in recent years have adopted bold supply-side policies in 
the form of moratoria, bans, production limits and so on, including 
most prominently Costa Rica, New Zealand, Denmark, Spain, France 
and Belize. France announced in December 2017 that it would phase 
out oil and gas exploration and production, a move then followed by 
Belize (which announced a moratorium on all offshore oil activity in 
late December 2017), Denmark (which implemented a ban on onshore 
oil and gas exploration in February 2018), New Zealand (which banned 
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new offshore oil exploration licences in April 2018), and Ireland (which 
enacted a ban on future oil exploration licences in September 2019) 
(Carter and MacKenzie 2020). Gaulin and Le Billon (2020), drawing on 
a fossil fuel cuts database, found that 1302 initiatives were implemented 
between 1988 and 2017 in 106 countries across seven major types of 
supply-side approaches. This demonstrates both a rapid growth in the 
number of supply-side initiatives taken during the past decade, but also 
their highly uneven adoption across the world, underscoring the need 
for a multilateral approach. 
There is no underestimating the scale of the challenge of deliberately 
and legally calling time on the fossil fuel era that has provided such 
riches for some of the world’s most powerful actors. Although it can 
appear daunting, it is worth recalling that many of the world’s largest 
and most powerful private fossil fuel companies have their home base in 
OECD+ countries. This is key to avoid problems of carbon leakage and 
to improve compliance. An important move in this direction, and around 
which there is already some support, would be a public transparent 
registry of existing and planned sites of fossil fuel extraction that would 
form the basis of negotiations about which and whose reserves would be 
put beyond limits for reasons of avoiding further climate chaos. 
An FF NPT is clearly not the only way forward. Any multilateral 
agreement to restrict the supply and production of fossil fuels will 
take many years to be negotiated. The urgency of the climate crisis and 
the need to improve the speed and depth of action in the way called 
for in the IPCC SR152 means that other routes to action must also be 
pursued in the meantime or alongside a multilateral endeavour. If 
an international agreement is to be achieved, it will likely only come 
about due to a confluence of political and economic factors favouring 
more ambitious action and a new approach to the issue. With regard 
to supply-side policies, this might include changes in the price and 
availability of alternatives to fossil fuels, particularly renewable energies 
such as wind and solar whose prices have fallen dramatically in recent 
years (notwithstanding the problems associated with industrial 
renewable energy production identified by Dunlap, this volume), and 
improvements in battery storage capacity. For many countries, further 
2  i.e. the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report 15, see 
https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
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investments in a fossil-based infrastructure could lock in a higher cost 
fossil energy path and lead to stranded fossil fuel infrastructure assets 
and decreased competitiveness in a global energy market moving in 
the opposite direction and where ‘peak demand’ is also a growing 
consideration (Van de Graaf 2018). 
Momentum is also likely to come from social movements and 
pressure groups both in terms of resistance to new sites of exploration 
at fossil fuel frontiers involving environmental defenders and other 
groups and advocacy around specific proposals for new mines and 
airport expansions, for example. Temper et al.’s (2020) analysis finds, 
for example, that over a quarter of fossil fuel projects encountering social 
resistance have been cancelled, suspended or delayed. Another source of 
pressure comes from the recent waves of litigation targeted at fossil fuel 
producers in recent years. The Urgenda case in the Netherlands stands 
out as the first case that successfully enforced the implementation of 
stricter national emission targets, followed up by the ruling in May this 
year in the Netherlands against Shell demanding that the oil company 
reduce its emissions within a more ambitious timeframe.
Proposing a new fossil fuel treaty is a bold thing to do. Let us not 
be naïve about the prospects that any such treaty will emerge in the 
very near future. Opposition will be immense. But really, if not this, 
then what? It is clear the vast majority of fossil fuels need to remain in 
the ground. Activism and resistance aimed at cutting off finance and 
resisting new infrastructures on the ground is vital. But we also need a 
multilateral approach to fairly agree who leaves which resources in the 
ground and helps poorer countries meet their energy needs in a lower-
carbon way. This would complement, not replace, the Paris Agreement, 
but has the advantage of getting to the root of the problem. As cities, 
NGOs, citizens and even some businesses, as well as leading figures, 
such as former Irish President Mary Robinson, lend their support to this 
proposal,3 it may be an idea whose time has come. 
3  See https://www.fossilfueltreaty.org/. 
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16. How Governments React to 
Climate Change: An Interview 
with the Political Theorists Joel 
Wainwright and Geoff Mann 
Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann  
(Interviewed by Isaac Chotiner)
In Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future (2018), Joel 
Wainwright, Professor of Geography at Ohio State University, and Geoff 
Mann, Professor of Geography and Director of the Center for Global 
Political Economy at Simon Fraser University, consider how to approach 
the global politics of climate change. They look at several different 
potential futures for our warming planet, and argue that a more forceful 
international order, or “Climate Leviathan,” is emerging, but unlikely to 
mitigate catastrophic warming. An edited and condensed version of our 
conversation about the book follows.
Chotiner: Does global warming fundamentally change how you 
evaluate international politics and sovereignty and the idea of the 
nation-state, or is it more evidence of a crisis that already existed?
Wainwright: One of the arguments in our book is that, under pressure 
from the looming challenges of climate change, we can expect changes 
in the organisation of political sovereignty. It’s going to be the first major 
change that humans have lived through in a while, since the emergence 
of what we sometimes think of as the modern period of sovereignty, 
as theorised by Thomas Hobbes, among others. We should expect that 
after, more than likely, a period of extended conflict and real problems 
© 2021 Joel Wainwright et al., CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.16
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for the existing global order, we’ll see the emergence of something that 
we describe as planetary sovereignty.
So, in that scenario, we could look at the current period with the crisis 
of liberal democracies all around the planet and the emergence of figures 
like Bolsonaro [President of Brazil] and Trump [former US President] 
and Modi [Indian Prime Minister] as symptoms of a more general crisis, 
which is simultaneously ecological, political, and economic. Maybe this 
is quibbling with your question, of trying to disaggregate the causal 
variable. Which comes first—is it the ecological or the political and 
economic?—is a little bit difficult because it’s all entangled.
Mann: I think we’re going to witness and are already witnessing, in 
its emergent form, lots of changes to what we think of as the sovereign 
nation-state. Some of that change right now is super-reactionary—some 
groups are trying to make it stronger and more impervious than it’s been 
in a long time. Then, other kinds of forces are driving it to disintegrate, 
both in ways we might think of as pretty negative, like some of the things 
that are happening in the E.U., but also in other ways that we might 
think of as positive, in the sense of international cooperation (also see 
Newell, this volume). There’s some discussion about what to do about 
climate migration, at least.
I think one of the interesting things that’s happening right now is that 
we have so few political, institutional tools, and, I would say, conceptual 
tools to handle the kinds of changes that are required. Everyone knows 
climate change is happening and it’s getting worse and worse, and 
everyone’s trying to fight off the worst parts of it, but we’re not really 
getting together as everyone thinks that we need to.
I think that the nation-state is one of the few tools that people feel 
like they have and so they’re wielding it in crazy ways. Some people 
are trying to build walls. Other people are trying to use their powers to 
convince others to go along with their plans. I think we have so few tools 
to deal with this problem that the nation-state is kind of being swung 
around like a dead cat, with the hope that it’ll hit something and help.
One of the most depressing and scary parts of this is that global 
warming is exacerbating economic problems, and migration- and 
refugee-related problems, that are actually making the political 
dynamics within these countries worse and opening up a window for 
people like Trump.
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Wainwright: I think your hypothesis, of a cyclical undermining of 
the global liberal order, is potentially valid. In fairness, it’s not exactly 
what Geoff and I are saying in the book. You may be right and you may 
be wrong. If you wanted to strengthen that hypothesis, you’d have to 
clarify in exactly what way the authoritarian, neoliberal, climate-denialist 
position that we see represented by those diverse figures—again Modi, 
Bolsonaro, Trump, et cetera—represents the opposite of something else.
Part of the reason we wrote the book is because—I think Geoff and 
I would both say—there’s a lot of talk right now in places like Canada 
and the United States about what we have and what we need, that when 
it comes to climate change is pretty vague on the political, philosophical 
fundamentals. What exactly do Trump and Modi represent? Where does 
it come from, and why is it so clearly connected to climate denialism, and 
in what way is that crazy ensemble—or what appears to us as crazy and 
new—connected to the liberal dream of a rational response to climate 
change that’s organised on a planetary basis?
Chotiner: This gets to some of the scenarios you lay out in the book, 
and why you are so pessimistic about the current order. What are those 
scenarios?
Mann: In the book, we lay out what we think of as possible futures. 
They’re really, really broad, and there’s lots of room for maneuvers in 
them and they could blur a bit.
One of them, which we think is quite likely, is what we call ‘Climate 
Leviathan’. Another one is ‘Climate Mao’—that would be a sovereign, 
but it would operate more on the principles of what we might think of 
as a Maoist tradition, a quasi-authoritarian attempt to fix climate change 
by getting everyone in line. Then there’s the ‘Behemoth’ [their term for a 
reactionary order]. We, at the time we started to work on the book, had 
in our heads the caricature of Sarah Palin, because that was the moment 
of “Drill, baby, drill.”
The last thing we call ‘Climate X’, and that’s the hopeful scenario. 
That is the sense we both have that the way to address climate change 
is definitely not international meetings that achieve nothing over and 
over again, in big cities all over the world. The attempts by liberal 
capitalist states like Canada or the US to regulate tiny bits here and 
there, implement tiny little carbon taxes, to try to get people to buy 
solar panels. This is not anywhere near enough, nor coordinated in any 
meaningful way to actually get us out of this problem.
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I think Joel and I really feel strongly that Climate X describes a 
whole array of stuff that isn’t attached to this completely failing set of 
institutions. So, with Climate X, we’re going to see activity happening at 
local levels, bridges across boundaries that you don’t think about now, 
institutions refuting the state entirely, like so many indigenous people 
from Canada going ahead and doing things on their own, building new 
alliances, discovering ways of managing the collapsing ecosystems and 
political institutions in creative ways. We don’t see a map to this and 
the attempts to map it thus far have been a total and complete failure. 
Our hope is that we reinforce what is already happening in so many 
communities.
Chotiner: Climate change has caused me to think not just about what 
kinds of action are needed but also about whether our whole moral 
framework should change. I don’t want people in Bangladesh to start 
blowing up Chinese coal plants, but I also wonder whether we need to 
start thinking about what is and is not O.K. differently because this is 
so dire.
Wainwright: We agree with you completely. What’s notable is the 
disjuncture between what any clear-eyed observer will see really needs 
to happen fast and the depth of the seeming incapacity in the world’s 
political and economic arrangements to move beyond even the first basic 
steps. So, the masses as well as many élites are realigning in all these 
strange combinations and producing figures like Trump and Bolsonaro.
As far as refugees go, the world has a large number of people who are 
sometimes called climate refugees today. There is still no international 
definition of a climate refugee that is generally accepted. If we take a 
reasonably capacious definition of a climate refugee, it’s someone who 
has been displaced, at least in part, because of climate change. There 
are probably already tens of millions of climate refugees in the world 
today, including a pretty significant number of people from places like 
Honduras and Guatemala and Mexico, who have come to the United 
States, although we don’t tend to talk about them that way.
Some estimates are as high as two hundred million climate refugees 
by 2050 or so, although that’s really speculation because no one really 
knows (on the complexities of these numbers, see Durand-Delacre et al., 
this volume). It could easily creep into [several] hundreds of millions if 
the expectations of flooding in places like Bangladesh and the Caribbean 
and Indonesia come to pass.
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In the face of all that, the present liberal-capitalist international 
order has utterly failed, as we’ve all said, and we can’t expect people 
to just do nothing. They’re going to look elsewhere for answers to their 
problems. To make a huge generalisation, they’re not turning toward the 
mainstream ideological resources of liberal modernity. They’re turning 
to variations on religious metaphysics and often, unfortunately, forms 
of ethnic and religious exclusion. Hence the desperate need for us to 
develop a new political theory of this moment and new utopian ideas.
I don’t think that’s entirely wrong, but, at least in the United States, 
people say they don’t believe in climate change because there’s been a 
systematic campaign to lie to them. Exxon documents are coming out in 
lawsuits all the time. It is one thing to say, “Well, this is a failing of the 
liberal order,” and people looking for alternatives, which I think is true, 
but it’s also true that people are being taken advantage of and lied to, 
and maybe the critique of capitalism is that it allows people like Rupert 
Murdoch to shape the perceptions of large chunks of the country.
Mann: You’re right, there’s tons of media flying around, there’s all 
sorts of efforts to hide the truth, to hide the science, to twist things to get 
people to naïvely take up positions that are not only against everyone’s 
interests but against their own as well, and in the interests of the most 
powerful.
It’s also the case that these are generally characterised, and accurately 
so, as class issues. One aspect of the critique of capitalism that you 
mentioned is the way in which capitalism produces and reinforces class 
divides that lead to a situation in which, to some extent, we’re seeing 
different factions of the élite struggle over the support of the masses. So, 
in many ways, the problem can be attributed to the fact that so many 
voters don’t believe in climate change, but in actual fact, I would say 
that the problem really is a failure of the liberal order that can produce a 
situation in which, for one thing, that can occur, but secondly, in which 
the élites who control the state water down all its attempts to confront 
climate change.
Even here in Canada, where of course the problems are bad, but not 
as bad as they are in the US, we have a state that says it’s fully committed 
to addressing climate change, but it actually is doing no more than 
Trump. So we’re in a situation where it’s hard to believe that it’s only 
conspiracy theory that has prevented us achieving anything. I really do 
think it’s much more systematic than that.
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Chotiner: How do you want people to think and respond to 
something like what Bolsonaro is proposing with the rain forest?
Mann: I think both Joel and I would say that the most effective 
mechanisms are supporting those in Brazil who oppose Bolsonaro, and 
there are millions and millions. We sometimes forget that a lot of leaders 
are in power with the support of far less than half their population, 
just because of the way that the elections work. So it’s not like there’s 
not an enormous part of Brazil that is terrified of Bolsonaro and doing 
everything they can to stop him. I think that our reaction from far 
away, of course, should take into account the fact that we can’t restart 
imperialism in the interest of climate change, but we can figure out ways 
to support those who are doing their best to stop this from happening.
Some of that, of course, could be something as simple as a consumer 
boycott, but I think that, fundamentally, it’s going to require alliances 
and support that reach much further down in the political, economic 
strata of Brazil. Figuring out how to get in there and help those people, 
that’s a challenge in and of itself.
Chotiner: We’ve heard a lot about how Western countries 
industrialised at a time when we didn’t really know climate change was 
happening, and we here in the West got really rich. Now countries in 
the rest of the world want to go through the same process to raise the 
standard of living for their people, but at the same time we know that 
climate change is happening. I’m curious how you, as leftists, think 
about a situation where rich countries start telling poor ones what they 
can and can’t do and enforcing that in some way, even if it’s in the service 
of an end that we all think is beneficial to the planet.
Mann: That scenario you just described is a pretty big part of what 
Joel and I call Climate Leviathan. That’s not what we’re hoping for, but 
we think it’s very likely.
Wainwright: I would say that, right now, the core powerful capitalist 
societies are in fact telling developing and poor countries what to do 
about all kinds of things. But their general encouragement—whether it’s 
through financial policy or trade policy or military bases or what have 
you—tends to be in the direction of locking in fossil-fuel extraction and 
consumption. There is no way around the fact that the US government 
has played a major role in building, reinforcing, and protecting the global 
oil industry—Saudi Arabia is just the best-known illustration. What 
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Geoff and I would point to instead, as an alternative to imperialism, is 
a lot more old-fashioned transnational solidarity on behalf of ordinary 
people all over the world, in the name of climate justice (on which, see 
Harris, this volume). That’s what we desperately need.
On this point about transnational, trans-class solidarity and climate 
justice, it might be worth taking a look at Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato 
Si (2015), which has probably been, to my mind, the most important 
book on these questions in my lifetime. In a series of statements that 
Pope Francis makes in that text, he reconfigures Catholic theology as a 
process of forging a planetary solidarity for humanity, in a world still 
to come. O.K., we’re not Catholics. Geoff and I aren’t directly quoting 
Francis and saying, “You see, the Pope has it all figured out,” but we’re 
basically stretching and pointing in the same direction.

17. Inside Out COPs: Turning 
Climate Negotiations  
Upside Down
 Shahrin Mannan, Saleemul Huq and  
Mizan R. Khan
By now it is known that COP25, the latest UNFCCC conference 
of the parties (COP) and the longest in history, could not achieve 
its intended outcomes, as negotiators failed to agree on the core 
issues, thus pushing further away the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement. COPs that overrun, since it is now a standard 
practice to drag negotiations into overtime, appear an extremely 
inefficient process, which is not helped by the arcane language 
of the adopted texts. We argue that it is time to rethink the entire 
process and propose the concept of ‘inside out COPs’. This 
proposal affirms that actions on the ground to implement the 
Agreement should be given greater prominence than political 
negotiations agreeing to a patchwork of compromises over 
its rulebook for implementation. The many actors, including 
civil society, private companies, cities, universities, indigenous 
communities, youth and others pressing for action, should be 
put at centre-stage, which will allow for space to deliver results 
on the ground, as opposed to fetishising the skilful weaving of 
texts run through with constructed ambiguities.
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COP Negotiations: A History of Inequitable and 
Inefficient Process
The climate change negotiations during the UNFCCC Conference 
of Parties (COPs) portray the underlying inequalities between 
industrialised and developing nations (Rennkamp 2020). One aspect of 
such inequality is the overrun of COPs beyond the schedule. COPs that 
overrun, since it is now a standard practice to drag negotiations into 
overtime, appear inefficient and unfair to the delegates of vulnerable 
countries such as Bangladesh, who have to return home after the official, 
prearranged timescale is over (Huq 2019). Invariably, the decisions 
made in the extra time are not in favour of vulnerable countries.
Figure 21 depicts the top 6 COP negotiations which were stretched 
beyond the schedule. COP25, the latest conference of the parties and 
the longest in history, could not achieve the intended outcomes with 
the negotiators failing to agree on the core issues, thus pushing further 
away the implementation of the Paris Agreement (Huq 2020).
Fig. 21. Top 6 Negotiations That Stretched Overtime. Image by Saleemul Huq, 
Fahad Hossain and Mimansha Joshi (2019), Dhaka, Bangladesh. ©ICCCAD, 
CCBY 4.0.
Despite having plenty of time to reach an agreement over the course of 
two weeks, the COP often runs into overtime in order to reach a result, 
depriving the vulnerable developing countries from participating (Huq 
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2020). While negotiators continue mulling over texts and punctuation 
and arguing over agenda disputes (as detailed for COP21 by Sullivan 
Chapter 3, this volume), local communities are left to suffer. There is 
evidence that this is a deliberate tactic of the developed countries to 
water down agreements by getting rid of vulnerable country delegates 
from the negotiating process (Vihma 2014). The rhetorical facade of 
hope from the rich and powerful emitting nations to achieve the targets 
of the COP21 Paris Agreement has been replaced by this blatant game 
played on behalf of fossil fuel companies (Huq 2019).
Global Climate Agenda is Transforming and UNFCCC 
Negotiations Should Follow
The lack of progress in negotiations in recent years, and the failure 
to obtain a universal agreement on emission targets, have made the 
UNFCCC negotiation process questionable (Mfitumukiza et al. 
2020). The recent failure of COP25 to allow the Warsaw International 
Mechanism on loss and damage to have an implementation and 
financing arm has made the vulnerable countries lose all hope 
(Mfitumukiza et al. 2020).
The current top-down approach of the UNFCCC negotiation 
process only deals with state actors, prioritising national demands 
over local needs questioning the efficacy of the process. But the 
potential of non-state actors (civil society organisations, communities, 
cities, businesses) to take on-the-ground climate actions is really high 
(Biasillo 2019).
Non-State Actors Transforming the Climate Agenda
While the negotiators continue to argue over agenda disputes, global 
greenhouse gas emissions have increased rapidly, making local 
communities more vulnerable (Huq 2020). But despite institutional 
evasion and government inaction, local climate actions are taking 
place around the world (Thew et al. 2020). Breaking from the popular 
notion of them as vulnerable victims to climate change-induced 
disasters, grassroot communities, together with local government and 
civil society organizations, are demonstrating locally-led adaptation 
measures (also see Lendelvo et al. and Sandover, this volume). 
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Researchers, academics and non-government organisations are 
also backing such initiatives by co-creating ground-level data and 
publishing the results. 
While the global negotiations continue arguing over connotation and 
punctuation, local communities are addressing climate risks through 
collective actions (Mfitumukiza et al. 2020). Given the insufficient 
action by major emitting countries to combat climate change, youth 
movements have also intensified over the past year (Moosmann et al. 
2020). Inspired by Greta Thunberg, young people around the world are 
engaging in school strikes drawing attention to the climate emergency 
and demanding justice and rapid political action. The ‘Fridays for Future’ 
movement, initiated by Greta Thunberg in 2018, brought thousands 
of students to the streets every Friday to demand intergenerational 
climate change justice. ‘Extinction Rebellion’ has also made a mark as an 
attempt to halt mass extinction and minimise the risk of social collapse 
(Moosmann et al. 2020)—as also documented in the chapters by North, 
Paterson and Gardham, this volume.
This community of practice, including grassroot organisations, youth 
networks, indigenous groups, researchers, civil society and NGOs—
sharing a common concern, and the passion to work on the same set 
of problems and enhance their knowledge and expertise by interacting 
with each other—is promising in terms of a “whole of society approach” 
towards solving the climate crisis (Iyalomhe et al. 2013).
Given the increasing evidence of climate-related stresses, the 
current negotiation process must be rectified. In the face of successful 
implementation of community-led climate actions and movements 
carried out by different groups, there is a need for a paradigm shift in 
the UNFCCC negotiation process from top-down and state-centric to a 
bottom-up, people-centric approach.
Reimagining COPs: From a Conference of Parties 
towards a Community of Practice
To increase the efficiency of the UN climate negotiations, it is time to 
reimagine the entire process and come up with alternative ways such 
big events are run. One way to do so is to introduce the concept of 
‘inside out COPs’, which calls for giving greater prominence to the 
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climate actions taken on the ground than via the political negotiations. 
In these ‘Action COPs’ as opposed to the ‘Negotiators’ COPs’, actors 
such as civil society, indigenous communities, private companies, 
cities and universities who are reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
as well as building climate resilience will take centre-stage, leaving 
the government negotiators on the periphery (Mfitumukiza et al. 
2020). Instead of skilfully weaving compromises, the action COPs will 
demonstrate results on the ground.
Over the course of two weeks of a COP, only around 5,000 technical 
government officials conduct the negotiations, later joined by the 
ministers. At the same time, thousands of people from different 
backgrounds attend different adjacent events taking place both inside 
and outside the COP venue (Wei 2017). From COP23 the world has 
started witnessing how the green zone, which features on-the-ground 
action, brings more energy than the closed-door blue zone where 
government negotiations take place (Huq 2020). These events provide 
opportunities to both practitioners sharing experiential knowledge, 
and researchers to tailor research according to local needs (Corcoran 
2020).
COP26: A Pilot Action COP?
While the global climate change discourse cannot bypass the 
government negotiation process, it is also important to start piloting the 
potential of alternatives. The COP26 to be held in Glasgow in November 
2021 provides the perfect opportunity to host a parallel ‘Action COP’ 
(COVID-19 constraints notwithstanding). The ‘Negotiators’ COP’ can 
be hosted by the British government while the ‘Action COP’ can be held 
elsewhere in Glasgow by the Scottish government. The aim of the action 
COP will be to bring together the communities of practice and facilitate 
peer learning.
In order to avoid repeating the mistakes of COP25, the organisers of 
the UK COP26 should confirm ahead of the event that the negotiations 
will finish on time, and that the remaining agenda will be dealt with 
at COP27. If overnight negotiations are required, these should be 
conducted in the middle of the week, rather than at (or beyond) the end 
of the official schedule.
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18. Local Net Zero Emissions 
Plans: How Can National 
Governments Help?
Ian Bailey
Since 2016, nearly 2,000 local government authorities in thirty-four 
countries have declared climate emergencies and begun initiating 
plans to reduce emissions in their areas. Local governments have 
the potential to make a major contribution to achieving global 
climate mitigation goals but they need greater support from their 
national governments. Assistance is particularly needed through 
the provision of supportive national climate policy environments, 
greater empowerment of local governments, and enhanced 
finance for local net zero transitions.
Introduction
In December 2016, Darebin Council in North Melbourne became the 
world’s first local government body to declare a climate emergency. 
Since then, over 1,948 local authorities across thirty-four countries have 
made similar declarations and initiated plans to reduce or achieve net 
zero emissions by or before 2050, and the number is still rising (Climate 
Emergency Declaration 2021). Local action on climate change is far 
from a new phenomenon. Initiatives like the Cities for Climate Protection 
campaign and ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability network have 
already demonstrated the potential for urban and regional initiatives 
to mobilise actors, catalyse capacity building and knowledge exchange, 
and promote policies and practical actions to address climate change 
© 2021 Ian Bailey, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.18
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and other sustainability issues (Bulkeley 2012). However, the current 
wave of local emergency declarations offers a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to unleash the capabilities of local actors to promote flexible, 
place-based, and democratically-informed approaches to achieving 
net zero or negative emissions (Davidson et al. 2020). In South Korea, 
for example, 226 local governments issued a joint climate emergency 
declaration at its National Assembly in June 2020, one of the largest 
climate declarations by any country in the world. Even in countries like 
the United States and Australia, whose federal governments have yet to 
declare climate emergencies at the national level, 12% and 36% of their 
respective populations now live in local government areas that have 
declared climate emergencies.
Local government powers in areas like land-use planning and 
infrastructure development provide vital tools for the development 
of practical strategies to reduce emissions. Local climate emergencies 
nevertheless remain a predominantly Global Northern phenomenon 
with just a handful of sub-national authorities from five countries in 
the Global South having declared climate emergencies. Equally, local 
governments’ capacity to act is heavily influenced by factors over 
which they often have limited control. Of particular importance is the 
support—or lack thereof—they receive from national governments. 
As such, the approach of national governments is likely to be critical 
in determining whether local climate emergencies become a driving 
force for reducing emissions or another false dawn for effective climate 
mitigation (Ghag 2019). 
This chapter examines three areas where support from central 
governments is essential for the future of local net zero plans: the creation 
of supportive national policy environments; ensuring local governments 
are granted and can exercise delegated powers to influence emissions; 
and the provision of finance to support emissions-reduction activities.
Supportive National Policy Environments
A growing number of countries have adopted framework climate 
legislation establishing emissions targets, carbon budgets, and other 
institutional arrangements aimed at giving clarity on the long-term 
direction of climate policy. Many governments have also introduced 
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‘Green Deal’ policies to stimulate green industrialisation, investment 
and public procurement, particularly in Asia, North America and 
Europe, and many have introduced national carbon taxes and trading 
schemes to target emissions more directly (Eskander and Fankhauser 
2020). However, although countries like the UK and Germany have 
made encouraging progress towards their decarbonisation goals, more 
concerted action is needed before the majority of countries can claim 
to have coherent and durable policy landscapes to support net zero 
transitions at either the national or sub-national levels.
National climate policies are also likely to be significantly influenced 
in the short-to-medium term by economic and fiscal responses to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. ‘Build back better’ has become a clarion call 
for ambitions to embed low-carbon investment and nature protection 
into COVID recovery programmes and was further underlined by the 
launch of the Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership at the 2021 
G7 meeting in June 2021 (The White House 2021). Yet governments 
also face strong pressures to regrow their economies as rapidly as 
possible, by both low- and high-carbon means (Hepburn et al. 2020). 
It is imperative that recovery programmes do not short-circuit climate 
mitigation and that investment and policy continue to flow towards 
climate goals in addition to addressing short-term economic and social 
concerns. The United Nations Summit on Biodiversity in September 2020 
offered further cause for optimism about governments’ commitments to 
integrate environmental protection into COVID-19 responses (General 
Assembly of the United Nations 2020).
However, such pledges will need to be supported by convincing and 
durable policies. One of the most important things national governments 
can do is to declare country-wide climate emergencies and develop 
action plans to achieve net zero, as New Zealand did recently with the 
publication of its Climate Change Commission’s first advice on carbon 
budgets and emissions reduction plan (Climate Change Commission 
2021). Other national policies to meet climate-change and green-
deal goals need to extend beyond national concerns to provide active 
support for local and regional net zero initiatives (also see Whitmarsh’s 
chapter, this volume). The widespread application of full-cost pricing 
to emissions generating activities will be crucial to ending subsidies 
for climate liabilities in areas like waste management and transport. 
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Financial support mechanisms for renewable and other low-carbon 
energy sources equally need to focus consistently on providing levels of 
reward and policy stability that will attract investment in infrastructure 
with long-term payback periods (Liu et al. 2019). This is especially the 
case for high potential but less commercially advanced technologies, 
such as tidal, wave and deep geothermal power, which will continue 
to require support for some years to realise their contribution to 
decarbonising national energy systems. Regulatory reforms are also 
needed to enable local authorities to capitalise on interest in local 
generation tariffs, peer-to-peer options, and other local energy supply 
models as part of efforts to create a supportive policy environment for 
local climate initiatives (Regen/Scottish and Southern Electricity 2020). 
Whatever approaches are adopted, central government policies need 
to provide clear and stable signals of their commitment to net zero 
transitions and avoid undermining the direction or stability of local 
government net zero plans.
Empowering Local Governments
Each country apportions governing responsibilities between central, 
regional and local government in different ways. However, areas like 
planning, transport, housing, and land use typically fall within the 
remit of sub-national governments and provide important levers 
for influencing emissions. Transport, housing and planning feature 
prominently in many local net zero carbon strategies (Davidson et al. 
2020) but, even here, local governments rarely operate independently. 
Local planning decisions in the United Kingdom, for example, need 
to demonstrate compliance with goals of the National Planning Policy 
Framework and sector-specific planning guidance issued by the central 
government, where local planning authorities are obliged to follow 
nationally determined interpretations of climate action and sustainable 
development. Local plans in the UK similarly require approval from the 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government—which also 
controls approvals for national infrastructure projects—while rejected 
planning applications may be appealed to the Planning Inspectorate, 
another central government executive agency (Berisha et al. 2021).
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Such checks and balances are commonplace and necessary for 
coordinating central and local government policy but reinforce the need 
for central governments to provide local governments with clear policy 
direction and powers to pursue net zero emissions. One example of 
ways to confer these powers involves ensuring planning policy allows 
local governments to demand that all new developments achieve zero 
or negative emissions criteria and do not compromise other critical 
objectives, such as nature protection and combating poverty (Friends 
of the Earth 2020). Another is to ensure local transport authorities have 
sufficient powers and coordinate with service providers, users and 
neighbouring areas to develop integrated public transport networks 
operating single ticketing systems that promote user-friendly ways of 
linking with non-motorised transport networks (Buehler et al. 2019).
Vertical coordination in the planning system is also vital to 
safeguarding against successful appeals—in other than exceptional 
circumstances—against development proposals local planning 
authorities reject as incompatible with net zero emissions. Removing 
ambiguity over when emissions-intensive developments, such as fossil-
fuel extraction and airport expansions, should be rejected is especially 
important to achieving climate-coherent planning systems. More 
generally, kneejerk planning-policy responses from central governments 
to the COVID crisis have the potential to lock in carbon-intensive 
infrastructure for decades, and may determine whether or not carbon 
neutrality by 2050 remains possible. Put simply, national land-use policies 
and regulations in areas like building construction and transport need 
to have zero emissions at their core and to be applied with conviction 
and consistency over the next thirty years if local net zero ambitions are 
to survive and thrive (also see Dyke et al. and Lankford, this volume, on 
these net zero ambitions and complexities).
Empowering local governments in the ways described above will 
require a combination of approaches and cannot happen just by central 
governments deciding which powers to grant and in what measure. 
More dynamic and creative relationships are only likely to emerge 
through open dialogue with local government representative bodies 
and other concerned groups, such as Canada’s Climate Emergency Unit, 
Australia’s Council Action in the Climate Emergency and the US’s The Climate 
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Mobilization, to share ideas on how to develop local climate emergency 
plans and capacities (Council Action in the Climate Emergency 2021).
Financing Local Net Zero Transitions
Studies of local climate initiatives frequently stress their role as 
crucibles for experimentation in technological, governance and social 
innovations, and their potential to provide ‘learning-by-doing’ in 
emissions reduction (Bulkeley and Castán Broto 2013). However, a 
large proportion of innovative approaches falter in their early stages 
and scaling-up successful experiments remains a major challenge. 
Local governments in many countries have additionally suffered 
sizable cuts in funding as a result of responses to the 2008–2009 global 
financial crisis, while their resources have been stretched further by 
the need to provide healthcare and other services during the COVID 
pandemic (Anand 2020). Additional and secure funding will be critical 
to whether local governments can support the low-carbon innovation 
and infrastructure development needed to stimulate a genuinely green 
recovery (on climate finance, see the chapters by Bracking, and Kaplan 
and Levy, this volume). 
Friends of the Earth (2020) estimates that £7 billion-£10 billion is 
needed per year in the UK alone to fund urban public transport and 
cycling and argues that substantial further investment is needed in 
low-carbon skills development in housing retrofits and heat-pump 
installation. Retrofitting programmes for existing buildings require 
significant funding commitments, though they are more cost-effective 
and quicker to achieve than many state-of-the-art building programmes 
(Zuo and Zhao 2014). Analysis of low-carbon transportation policy 
scenarios in California, for example, indicates initial additional 
investment of around $4 billion but potential long-term savings in the 
region of $23 billion by 2045, in addition to $28 billion in health benefits 
(Brown et al. 2021). 
The ability of councils to stimulate low-carbon employment will 
be severely restricted without greater direct funding from central 
governments, measures to encourage private low-carbon finance, and 
enhanced powers for local governments to raise more funds within 
their areas, for example, through road-user charging and local levies on 
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waste, single-use plastics and other emissions creating activities in their 
areas. In many countries, the lion’s share of environmental tax revenues 
flow to the central government and either contribute to general finances 
or are hypothecated for environmental or social investments (Cadoret et 
al. 2020). Although the latter (if targeted suitably) can increase overall 
expenditure on climate mitigation, these funds could gain greater and 
more nimble leverage by directing a greater proportion of funding 
towards local government to empower climate emergency response 
plans. Even where funds remain controlled by central government, 
higher direct investment in emissions reduction and green infrastructure 
(e.g. sustainable travel, renewable energy, and ecological restoration) 
could provide assistance to local authority net zero plans, cost-effective 
job creation and the generation of co-benefits, such as reducing fuel 
poverty, improving health, and flood prevention.
Conclusions
The recent surge in climate emergency declarations offers one of 
the clearest indications to date of the strength of grassroots concern 
about climate change. The simple—and uncontroversial—plea in this 
chapter is for national governments to be more energetic in supporting 
local and regional net zero initiatives. Three main priorities have been 
identified: a clearer and more reliable orientation of national policies 
towards net zero emissions; empowerment of local governments in 
planning, transport and other areas of delegated responsibility; and 
enhanced financial and practical assistance for local net zero initiatives. 
If governments fail to support the current enthusiasm for local net zero 
strategies, there is no guarantee this momentum will be regained in time 
for local governments to make a meaningful contribution to climate 
mitigation efforts. National governments need the support of local 
administrations as much as local governments need support from their 
national governments for net zero to become a reality.
Alongside practical considerations, how national governments 
approach climate politics in the future is also likely to have a direct 
bearing on the fortunes of local net zero initiatives. A number of recent 
studies have explored how experiences from the COVID crisis might 
inform responses to climate change (Howarth et al. 2020; Manzanedo 
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and Manning 2020). A common conclusion is that the pandemic has 
redrawn the boundaries of acceptable central government interventions 
and limits on personal freedoms to protect health and employment. 
However necessary these actions have been, an ethos of democratic 
deficit—where national governments bypass or overrule local 
governments—must not become pervasive. Responses to the climate 
crisis will need to be sustained over a protracted period and require 
long-term social mandates that are only likely to be achieved through 
dialogue rather than prescription. The need for zero-carbon strategies 
to reflect the emissions profiles and needs of individual regions 
adds further weight to arguments for dialogue within regions and 
between central and local actors, rather than overreliance on top-down 
approaches.
A further challenge is to broaden the geographical range of local net 
zero initiatives beyond their present concentration in a small number 
of affluent countries. At the time of writing, local governments from 
just three Latin American and three Asian countries (excluding Japan 
and South Korea) had declared climate emergencies according to the 
Climate Emergency Declaration database, although Bangladesh and 
Maldives had adopted national declarations. Relatively few climate 
emergency declarations had been made by local governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe, in contrast with 104 in Germany, 113 in 
Italy, and 510 in the UK. Soberingly given their exposure to climate 
risks, no African national or local governments had declared climate 
emergencies (Climate Emergency Declaration 2021). Local net zero 
initiatives in Asian, African and Latin American countries are likely 
to have different goals, action programmes, and working relationships 
with their national governments from those in the Global North, but this 
in no way diminishes their importance or the urgency of encouraging 
communities across the world to be actively involved in debating and 
shaping their climate futures.
Of equal importance is the need for all tiers of governance to avoid 
the partisan and even tribal climate politics that often has dominated 
discussions on climate change. One common feature of countries 
that have adopted national climate change acts is cross-party support 
for ambitious long-term action, even where disagreements persist on 
targets and implementation (Nash and Steurer 2020). A return to—or 
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the failure to break free from—ideological partisanship and short-term 
politicking on climate change risks undermining not only national 
climate policy but also the consensuses that enabled local politicians to 
agree on climate emergency plans in the first place. One of the greatest 
contributions national governments can make to local emergency 
response initiatives is to defend the idea that climate change is too 
important for party politics and demands new and more cooperative 
forms of political leadership.
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19. Reversing the Failures of 
Climate Governance: Radical 
Action for Climate Justice
Paul G. Harris
Addressing climate change effectively will require focused 
attention on the most vital sources of failure in climate governance. 
Much, if not most, of that failure can be attributed to a lack of 
climate justice—a lack of ecological and environmental justice, a 
lack of social and distributive justice, and a lack of international 
and global justice. Demands for justice began decades ago. 
Had they been listened to and acted upon then, radical action 
would not be required now. To avert climate catastrophe, climate 
governance must embrace and implement all forms of climate 
justice. 
Introduction
The governance of climate change has failed (Harris 2021). Apart from a 
temporary decline due to the worldwide economic fallout of the COVID-
19 pandemic, greenhouse gas emissions are still increasing globally, 
with concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reaching 420 
parts per million (ppm) in 2020—compared to the pre-industrial level 
of 280 ppm—the highest since measurements began (Monroe 2021). 
Global warming is continuing apace, already reaching 1.1°C above 
pre-industrial norms (World Meteorological Association 2020: 6) and 
likely to exceed 3°C, even if all of the promises arising from past climate 
negotiations, specifically pledges (i.e., Intended Nationally Determined 
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Contributions) toward the Paris Agreement, are implemented (United 
Nations Environment Programme 2019: 8). The impacts of climate 
change—wildfires, storms, droughts, pestilence and much more—are 
being felt with greater intensity, with the only prospect being that things 
will grow much worse in the years ahead (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change 2015). What is more, very little has been done to help 
the most vulnerable nation states, communities and individuals adapt to 
the inevitable, potentially existential, impacts of climate change. Recent 
events, notably widespread bushfires in Australia and forest fires in the 
United States, demonstrate that even the world’s affluent societies and 
individuals will have trouble avoiding the impacts of climate change. 
Many millions, perhaps even billions, of people in poor societies have 
little to no hope of doing so. 
Failed Climate Governance
After several decades of international negotiations, nation states still 
cannot agree to take concrete actions that will reverse climate change. 
Indeed, that lack of agreement helps explain the existence of the climate 
crisis, what many are now calling—justifiably—a climate emergency. 
The best that negotiations among governments have achieved—the 2015 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change—is a step in the right direction (on 
the Paris Agreement, also see Hannis, this volume). But it has followed 
many other steps resulting from international negotiations that have 
neither stemmed global greenhouse gas pollution nor mitigated climate 
change. Indeed, pledges by states to implement the Paris Agreement 
are a recipe for continued global warming. Certainly, international 
negotiations have failed to achieve the objectives of the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). That is, one 
cannot seriously argue that the negotiations have achieved anything akin 
to the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system” (United Nations 1992: Article 2). All of the science 
and on-the-ground reporting about the impacts of climate change prove 
that ‘dangerous interference’ is manifestly upon us already.
Many of those involved in international climate negotiations will 
acknowledge their failures up to now (see Dyke et al., this volume). This 
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underlying realisation is probably one factor motivating those involved 
in upcoming negotiations to strengthen national pledges toward the 
Paris Agreement and to agree on the means by which those pledges will 
be fulfilled and verified. Indeed, many hold out hope for the twenty-
sixth Conference of the Parties (COP26), scheduled to convene in 
Glasgow in November 2021, to produce much more robust agreement 
among the world’s governments to finally get to grips with the causes 
and consequences of the climate crisis—much as they held out hope for 
twenty-five previous conferences. It is likely that some progress will be 
made, but it is more likely that, as in all previous conferences, progress 
will still not be enough to prevent yet more dangerous interference with 
Earth’s climate system. 
Nationally, more governments are pledging to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, or at least limit increases in them, and a growing number 
have promised to achieve net carbon neutrality by mid-century, although 
few are on target to do so, and it is anyone’s guess whether governments 
that succeed them will implement those promises. Most significantly, the 
greenhouse gas emissions of all of the countries that have made pledges 
of carbon neutrality add up to a minority of total global emissions. What 
is more, the materially consumptive and energy-hungry lifestyles and 
ways of doing business that have caused climate change remain largely 
unchanged; indeed, despite calls for ‘green’ growth, those lifestyles are 
being advocated by governments and businesses as a means by which 
to grow the world economy out of the COVID-19 slowdown that took 
hold in 2020. Even as most of the world was wallowing in a COVID-
19-induced recession, China’s millions of upper-class and hundreds of 
millions of middle-class consumers returned to shops in force, snapping 
up new cars and luxury products. At the time of writing in mid-2021, 
those Chinese are already being joined by consumers in other countries 
as their national economies start to turn back toward growth. 
In short, the pollution causing the climate crisis, the behaviours 
causing that pollution and the impacts of climate change arising from 
it are all going in the wrong direction. All of these trends need to be 
acknowledged if there is to be much hope for climate negotiations to 
make substantial progress.
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Holistic Climate Justice
What is to be done? More of the same just will not be enough. The 
momentum of climate change and the pollution that causes it mean that 
efforts to address the climate crisis must be stepped up by orders of 
magnitude. Radical action is needed to avert and cope with the most 
dangerous consequences of climate change. Doing that will require 
focused attention on identifying the most vital sources of failure in 
climate governance and overcoming them. Much of the failure of climate 
governance can be attributed to a lack of climate justice (a.k.a. climate 
equity)—a lack of ecological and environmental justice, a lack of social 
and distributive justice, and a lack of international and global justice. 
Demands for climate justice began several decades ago and have 
been reaffirmed in climate negotiations ever since. That bears repeating: 
demands for climate justice have been ongoing for several decades. Poor 
states have repeatedly called for wealthy ones to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions and to provide robust aid to assist the poor states to adapt. 
Poor individuals and their advocates have for decades called for action 
to prevent climate change and to help the poor avoid suffering that was 
expected to arise from greenhouse gas pollution. Advocates for nature have 
called over and over again for action to protect ecosystems, biospheres, 
landscapes, seas, species and animals that are already suffering from 
climate change. Had these calls for different aspects of climate justice 
been heeded and acted upon to any substantial extent, radical action 
would probably not be required now. However, apart from mostly lip 
service—such as invocation of the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ in international climate change agreements—the calls were, 
in effect, mostly ignored. This pattern will have to change dramatically 
(also see Bond, this volume, for some suggestions in this regard). 
To avert climate catastrophe, climate governance must 
wholeheartedly embrace and robustly implement climate justice. Viewed 
holistically, climate justice would, by definition, entail all actors around 
the world doing what they can to prevent the climate crisis from 
becoming a climate catastrophe. This would include decarbonising 
the global economy very rapidly, thereby limiting global warming as 
much as possible, and helping everyone to adapt to unavoidable climate 
change. It would mean implementing environmental, ecological, social, 
distributive, international and global justice, as outlined below.
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Ecological Justice
Addressing the climate crisis effectively will require coming to terms 
with the inextricable connection between healthy societies and a healthy 
environment. As long as the non-human world is treated as merely a 
source of resources and a depository for society’s pollution, there is 
little hope of mitigating the worst effects of climate change. From this 
perspective, realising climate justice would entail putting the needs of 
the nonhuman world alongside—not beneath—the needs of humanity 
(Schlosberg 2019; Wienhues 2020). Such a view has gained traction 
among philosophers, and it has been advocated by Green parties in 
several countries (as well as being integral to indigenous cosmologies, 
as gestured towards in the chapters by Dieckmann and Sullivan this 
volume). Now and in the future, it needs to become a top priority of 
all actors—political, economic and social—and more explicitly a part 
of climate negotiations. Because the growth model of capitalism as 
practiced up to now is premised on perpetual extraction of resources 
from nature, doing this will inevitably require an alternative global 
economic paradigm. Climate negotiations intended to address the 
climate crisis effectively cannot avoid this challenging reality.
Environmental Justice
Addressing the climate crisis effectively must also involve concerted and 
successful efforts to eliminate environmental injustices experienced by 
people within states. This means that climate negotiations will have to 
work out agreement on how to facilitate this for real. Climate justice 
from this perspective would, at least, aim to prevent and alleviate the 
impacts of climate-changing pollution on disadvantaged communities 
(Bullard 2000; Nesmith et al. 2021). Much as poor and minority 
communities have always been the dumping grounds for society’s waste 
and the places where the most-polluting industries have been located, 
climate change and the pollution that causes it are already harming 
poor communities, whether they be favelas that are washed away by 
landslides and storm surges, or rural regions and coastal villages that 
must endure the impacts of fossil fuel extraction.
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Social and Distributive Justice
Addressing the climate crisis effectively will require that other 
injustices in societies be alleviated (Preston et al. 2014; Chancel 2020). 
Social injustice and economic inequity, with poor, minority and 
underrepresented members of society suffering the consequences when 
power and resources are concentrated in the hands of the wealthy and the 
well-connected, create the conditions for perpetuating climate injustice 
and inequity. Thus, climate negotiations must do more not just to pay lip 
service to, for example, the plight of the world’s poor, racial and ethnic 
minorities, and indigenous peoples; the negotiations must also reach 
agreement to genuinely end their plight and to more fairly share the 
world’s resources (including financial ones) so that they can have an 
active role in addressing the climate crisis. This sort of thing has been 
advocated by socialists and others for a very long time, but of course it 
has not been implemented widely because it challenges accepted notions 
of power and supposedly free-market economics. Achieving social and 
distributive justice, as part of realising holistic climate justice, would 
also require the world’s affluent individuals to temper their passions for 
consuming large quantities of stuff they do not need. None of this will 
be easy, not least because the climate negotiations themselves lack the 
official remit to deal with many of these issues. Nevertheless, negotiators 
ought not to shy away from them if they are to make real progress.
International Justice
Addressing the climate crisis effectively will require a fair and equitable 
international distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with 
climate change (Shue 2014; Okereke 2018). For many states, climate 
change is as much a matter of international (in)justice as it is one of 
environmental change. From this perspective, affluent states need to act 
aggressively to implement the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility that was codified in the seminal climate convention 
three decades ago and which has been invoked at each conference 
of the parties in word—and largely ignored in practice—ever since. 
International climate justice requires a fairer distribution of power and 
resources internationally so as to give the least well-off states the ability to 
negotiate on a relatively equal footing, and it requires that the injustices 
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associated with climate change suffered by states and their citizens, 
most obviously the costs and suffering that accompany the impacts of 
climate change, be ended (or, more realistically, greatly mitigated) and 
adequately compensated. This conception of climate justice is largely an 
extension of ideas about the need for international justice among states 
that have been argued by leaders, diplomats and scholars for most of the 
post-war period. International injustices that have existed for a century 
and more are multiplied by climate change. 
Global Justice
There is another form of climate justice that is less commonly discussed 
in climate negotiations. It is a type that might be labelled as cosmopolitan 
in the sense that it is about the needs, rights, responsibilities and 
obligations of all actors around the world, encompassing state actors (as 
with the forms of climate justice within and among states mentioned 
above) but also involving non-state actors, including individuals. 
After all, the proximate cause of the climate crisis was, is and will 
be the behaviours of individuals, whether those behaviours result 
in greenhouse gas pollution directly, such as when driving a car, or 
indirectly, such as when consuming things whose production, transport 
and/or disposal result in such pollution. The notion here is that all capable 
actors, regardless of where they are (whether in rich countries or poor), 
ought to be acting to address climate change effectively. This means, for 
example, that people who consume more things than they need ought 
to refrain from doing so, and those who are capable of aiding others 
affected by climate change ought to do so. Put another way, in addition 
to requiring action on the common but differentiated responsibilities 
(bearing in mind respective capabilities) of states, holistic climate justice 
also requires action on the common but differentiated responsibilities 
(bearing in mind respective capabilities) of individuals (among other 
actors), regardless of where they live, too. Thus, while affluent people 
in the Global North have obligations to act on climate change, so do 
affluent people living in the Global South. For climate justice to be truly 
holistic and to aid in effectively addressing the climate crisis, it needs to 
include this global form of justice (Harris 2016; Dietzel 2019; Moss and 
Umbers 2020).
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Prospects for Radical Action
None of the forms of climate justice outlined above, except, possibly, 
the last one, are unusual in any way. They have either been discussed 
since the earliest climate negotiations or at least promoted by activists 
and described by scholars for just as long. But all of these forms of 
climate justice have been practiced in the breach. Consequently, while 
propounding them is not at all revolutionary, to implement them, and 
perhaps even to approach negotiations in such a way as to assume 
that they should and must be implemented on the ground as soon as 
possible, would be. Just such a revolution is essential if coming climate 
negotiations are to achieve what must be, given the scale of the climate 
crisis, their supposed objectives: at minimum, to quickly reverse trends 
in greenhouse gas emissions, rapidly decarbonise the global economy, 
and, finally, take robust action without further delay to enable adaptation 
everywhere to the impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided. 
Negotiating holistic climate justice would help to create the conditions 
for making all of that possible. 
Holistic climate justice amounts to making the world fairer and 
more equitable. That might seem to be idealistic, even fanciful, and 
certainly historical precedent would support such a sceptical view. 
But historically the world has not faced a threat as grave as climate 
change. The time has finally come when the fates of societies will 
depend on whether there are serious attempts to implement varieties 
of justice that remove incentives to live unsustainably and enhance the 
conditions that allow people easily to live in ways that mitigate climate 
change and its impacts. Action to achieve these forms of climate justice, 
and thereby to mitigate the climate crisis, must be, by definition, 
radical—that is, thorough and far-reaching. The need for radical action 
derives, very simply, from the failure to take modest action over the 
past several decades as governments and other actors have responded 
to climate change at a glacial pace while global warming and climate 
change, not to mention the pollution causing them, have sprinted 
toward catastrophe.
While rapid movement toward realising all forms of climate justice 
is essential (the fact that they can never be fully realised is no excuse for 
not doing all that is possible to make them so), a good place to focus is 
on ecological justice. That is because everything arguably arises from it. 
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If we treat the environment, including non-humans, justly, we thereby 
protect the environment upon which humans depend. But ecological 
justice cannot be achieved without treating humans justly, too. People 
trying to survive, and even people who just want their fair share of the 
economic pie, are not about to prioritise environmental stewardship if 
they do not perceive a very clear and present stake in doing so. Likewise, 
nation states are not about to protect the environment if they feel the 
same way vis-à-vis other states, so we need international justice, too. 
We need global justice as well because it captures the realities of climate 
change: ultimately, people cause it through their behaviours (to wit: if all 
humans dropped dead this week from a pandemic, new anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas pollution would immediately cease). 
Conclusion
Climate change is an environmental problem, obviously. It is a political 
problem, locally, nationally and internationally. It is a social problem 
and, at its foundation, a human problem. But perhaps most of all it is a 
problem of justice, of treating others—other states, other communities, 
other races and genders, other individuals and other creatures (and 
their ecosystems) more fairly and equitably. The climate crisis is a crisis 
of injustice. Solving the climate crisis requires implementing climate 
justice (see Harris 2019). Whether climate negotiations can make that 
happen is an open question. Whether they try much harder to do so 
cannot be.
References
Bullard, Robert D., Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality (New 
York: Routledge, 2000).
Chancel, Lucas, Unsustainable Inequalities: Social Justice and the Environment 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2020). 
Dietzel, Alix, Global Justice and Climate Change: Bridging Theory and Practice 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019).
Harris, Paul G., Global Ethics and Climate Change (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2016).
Harris, Paul G. (ed.), A Research Agenda for Climate Justice (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2019). 
252 Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
Harris, Paul G., Pathologies of Climate Governance: International Relations, National 
Politics and Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 
Report (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015), https://
www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/.
Monroe, Robert, ‘Coronavirus Response Barely Slows Rising Carbon 
Dioxide’, Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Scripps.ucsd.edu, 2021), 
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/news/coronavirus-response-barely-slows- 
rising-carbon-dioxide.
Moss, Jeremy, and Laclan Umbers (eds), Climate Justice and Non-State Actors: 
Corporations, Regions, Cities and Individuals (London: Routledge, 2020). 
Nesmith, Ande A., Cathryn L. Schmitz, Yolanda Machado-Escudero, 
Shanondora Billiott, Rackel E. Forbes, M. C. F. Powers, et al., The Intersection 
of Environmental Justice, Climate Change, Community and the Ecology of Life 
(Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2021). 
Okereke, Chukwumerije, ‘Equity and Justice in Polycentric Climate Governance’, 
in Governing Climate Change: Polycentricity in Action, ed. by Andrew Jordan, 
Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt, and Johanna Forster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 320–37.
Preston, Ian, Nick Banks, Katy Hargreaves, Aleksandra Kazmierczak, Karen 
Lucas, Ruth Mayne, et al., Climate Change and Social Justice: An Evidence 
Review (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2014), https://www.jrf.org.uk/
report/climate-change-and-social-justice-evidence-review.
Schlosberg, David, ‘An Ethic of Ecological Justice for the Anthropocene’, ABC 
Religion & Ethics (Abc.net.au, 2019), https://www.abc.net.au/religion/
an-ethic-of-ecological-justice-for-the-anthropocene/11246010.
Shue, Henry, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014).
United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bonn: 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, 
1992), https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is- 
the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change.
United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2019 (Nairobi: 
United Nations Environment Programme, 2019).
Wienhues, Anna, Ecological Justice and the Extinction Crisis: Giving Living Beings 
Their Due (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020).
World Meteorological Association ‘WMO statement on the state of the global 





20. Climate Finance and the 
Promise of Fake Solutions to 
Climate Change
Sarah Bracking
This essay explores how promises of money from global 
institutions and governments have financialised people’s hopes 
and expectations of government action to adapt to climate 
change and slow the emission of greenhouse gases. Because of 
the cultural power of money in our understanding of the world, 
climate finance has had the particular job of signifying action 
while delivering very little. In order to move forward with the 
actual material changes to energy, infrastructure, production and 
income distribution that lie at the heart of an effective response to 
climate change, we need to accept that largely fictional promises 
of money that ‘can change things’ are a phantasmagorical 
expression of meaning—a firewall that prevents real change. 
In making this point, the essay traces the small disbursement 
figures for the main pots of climate finance and in doing so offers 
a stringent critique of the obfuscating power of the language of 
finance.
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Introduction
Finance is a key contemporary mediator of the relationship between 
humans, more-than-human natures and Nature.1 This chapter explores 
how promises of money from global institutions and government have 
financialised people’s hope and expectations of government action to 
adapt to climate change and slow the emission of greenhouse gases. 
Because of the cultural power of money in our understanding of the 
world, climate finance signifies extensive action. In practice, however, it 
is small and delivers even less (as also articulated by Kaplan and Levy, 
this volume). 
Material and foundational changes to energy regimes, infrastructure, 
production and income distribution lie at the heart of an effective 
response to climate change. In order to progress with these changes, 
we need to discard the largely fictional promises of money that ‘can 
change things’ which act as a phantasmagorical expression of meaning: 
becoming a ‘firewall’ or barrier that prevents real change. We are being 
offered a financialised spectacle of climate change action which obscures 
both the empirical reality of ecosystem and biodiversity loss, and the 
uncomfortable imperative of how our ways of living need to change (as 
also foregrounded by Halme et al. and Harris, this volume). This essay 
is intended as a plea to give up on the idea of money as our conduit for 
action in favour of real shifts in production and in human and more-
than-human relations.2
I proceed by exploring the definition, amounts and governance 
of climate finance that we currently have through a set of eleven 
propositions and their evidenced negation.
1  ‘More-than human’ refers to the subset of the whole of nature that is not human—
all other animals, trees, plants and so forth. For definitions of this term, and other 
related terms such as ‘beyond-human’, ‘other-than-human’ nature(s) or ‘nature-
beyond-the-human’ I draw on Sullivan (2015: 3). For an extended ontological 
discussion see also Sullivan (2017). 
2  This chapter updates an earlier version published in 2011 as the Green Climate Fund 
was being brought into existence in Durban, South Africa. See ‘Climate Change: 
Beware, large-sounding-sum-of-money approaching!’, https://www.theafricareport.
com/7959/climate-change-beware-large-sounding-sum-of-money-approaching/. 
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Proposition 1: Climate Finance is Big and Expanding 
The Paris outcome (COP21 2015) urged developed nations to mobilise 
US$100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing nations. 
Partly as a consequence, many commentators believe the volume of 
public and private finance addressing climate change is slowly rising 
in aggregate toward this number—particularly at the sub-national level 
and by non-state actors—but that there remains a significant and large 
investment gap (UNCTAD 2020). In this world view, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2017) has estimated 
an ‘infrastructure gap’ of US$95 trillion globally in the investment 
required for energy, transportation, water and telecommunications 
decarbonisation transitions by 2030 to address climate change, of which 
60–70% will be needed in developing countries. 
These and similarly large-sounding numbers have inspired a 
wide body of work discussing the merits of blended finance and 
climate congruent activities of non-state and sub-state actors, such as 
corporations and cities, in order to meet the financing challenge in a 
climate crisis that is multi-scalar. Many academics and the public 
have also been mesmerised by this idea that we are discussing large 
numbers—but we are not. Current climate finance for adaptation that is 
unique, additional, and concessionary is approximately, on a generous 
interpretation, US$29 billion per year globally (Buchner et al. 2019). 
But even this figure is inflated. The NGO Care International recently 
analysed the details of reporting and wrote that official figures were 
hugely exaggerated, arriving at $9.7 billion globally as a corrected figure 
for 2018 (Care International, 2021). Paltry at $0.0097 trillion.
Whether estimated in billions or trillions, however, money matters 
in context, and in relation to how you count. For example, whilst the 
‘infrastructure gap’ of US$95 trillion mentioned above evokes an 
emergency, it is in fact similar to ‘normal’ levels of investment that 
would be made anyway in a global economy of a ballpark $170 trillion. 
At best, these figures remind us of the real need to switch investments in 
type and purpose to decarbonisation pathways. Unfortunately, this switch 
is slow, and so far has been market-led as the price of energy generated 
from renewable technologies falls below the cost of energy generated by 
burning fossil fuels. The role of regulation and government action has 
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contributed very little to the speed of this shift (as also noted by Wright 
and Nyberg, and Newell, this volume). Few governments have forcibly 
closed coal mines or oil fields. 
Meanwhile, although the ‘billions’ figure for ‘climate finance’ from 
Paris sounds big, US$100 billion equates to only $0.1 trillion, and has not 
been implemented in practice. Indeed, the main purpose of the ‘huge 
gap + large-sounding commitment’ rhetoric appears to be to legitimise 
the next fashionable tinkering and boutique products of the climate 
finance market, and to privilege the private sector as a trustworthy 
handmaiden of change. 
Proposition 2: Climate Finance is Innovative  
and Bespoke
This fore-grounding of the private sector in climate finance fits a wider 
pattern as capitalist development faces a legitimacy crisis, which has 
in turn generated a green-washing or ‘green halo’ effect (Sörqvist et 
al. 2015), involving constant rebranding of ‘brown investments’ and 
the lauding of finance, technology and innovation as components of a 
growing green economy (Bracking 2012, 2019; Sullivan 2012, 2018a). The 
depiction of ‘greenness’, complexity and novelty within environmental 
finance products appears to hold its academic and wider audiences in 
awe. This is despite the continuation in practice of both the environmental 
injustices born of centuries’ old private property relations (see Lave 
2018; Bigger and Millington 2020), and the salience of traditional metrics 
for calculating financial return, such as the discounted cash flow model, 
where ‘green’ is still a poor add-on. 
Alongside grants, debt-based instruments have grown in type 
and apparent dedication, such as municipal bonds, habitat bonds, 
conservation bonds, species bonds, climate bonds, green bonds and 
more latterly transition bonds and sustainability bonds (Sullivan 2013, 
2018b; Bracking 2019). These last two are the latest products, saluted 
and enthroned as comprising a spectacularly growing asset class in the 
UNCTAD 2020 World Investment Report. Private sector involvement is 
also growing in insurance-based instruments: climate risk insurance 
and securitisation (Taylor 2020), catastrophe bonds, hazard and disaster 
risk insurance (Surminski and Architesh 2020), and even humanitarian 
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and pandemic health insurance (World Bank 2017; Erikson and Johnson 
2020), although many products are faltering without public sector 
involvement to subsidise the cost of risk and artificially create ‘demand’ 
from a body who can afford to pay (see InsuResilience 2020). Many of 
these instruments promise the incorporation of modern innovations in 
algorithmic and artificial intelligence, weather and risk modelling, earth 
observation and even blockchain and cryptocurrency technologies as 
providing efficiency gains in what is basically debt finance.
These convivial sounding bonds and insurance products, however, 
also act both as a firewall and fetish to protect against encroaching reality, 
and provide a new means of providing debt-based finance to entities 
often already in ecological and financial deficit (see Jones et al. 2020). 
They largely fund incremental shifts in industrial emphasis, rather than 
the seismic shifts needed for meaningful infrastructure decarbonisation.
Proposition 3: Climate Finance Is a Distinct and 
Additional Source of Finance
Although an internationally-agreed definition of ‘climate finance’ has 
been elusive, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) now refers to it expansively as “local, national or 
transnational financing—drawn from public, private and alternative 
sources of financing—that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation 
actions that will address climate change” (UNFCCC 2019: online). This 
definition signals the move in conception away from more traditional 
ideas of climate finance as principally flows of public development aid, 
concessional loans and grants, to a polycentric mix of public and private 
capital leveraged using financial technologies and institutions, governed 
by a range of actors in various combinations (Pattberg and Widerberg 
2015: 685). Put more critically, what is envisioned is a New Washington 
Consensus3 which subsidises investors in order to leverage and reward 
private capital (Mitchell and Sparke 2016). 
3  The ‘Washington Consensus’ refers to the agreed set of conditionalities structuring 
lending to states by International Financial Institutions, post-1989, which thus 
shape flows of finance directed towards reform and structural adjustment. 
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In terms of the private green bond market where money to alleviate 
the effects of climate change (adaptation finance) or slow down and 
reduce the things that cause it (mitigation finance) is raised as ‘climate 
bonds’, ‘green bonds’ or ‘transition bonds’ (to help dirty or ‘brown’ 
industries change to be cleaner and more ‘green’), the classification of 
what is ‘green’ is decided by the issuer in a ‘self-labelled’ action. Or 
it is classified according to what the money will be spent on—‘use of 
proceeds’—with some reference to either the issuers’ narrative or to a 
common ‘standard’ such as the Climate Bond Principles. This is kept 
deliberately vague, apparently so that market entrants are not deterred 
by too much regulation. 
In terms of the public sector, climate finance is different, or additional, 
to market-based loans only because of the provenance of the issuer and 
the context of the lending. Climate finance is a part of a bigger pool 
of money generically called concessionary finance from governments, 
which includes grants, loans, and more recently ‘blended finance’—a 
mixture of public and private money. Some call all of these categories 
‘aid’. The sums quoted are directly related to how it is counted and 
categorised, rather than to any actually growing amount of money 
or, technically, ‘liquidity’. When public money is joined with private 
money as ‘blended finance’, the claim to be green or developmental, or 
both, is decided by the issuer and the regulator of official development 
assistance (ODA, or ‘aid’), the OECD. In relatively new statistical rules 
implemented by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD 
2020a, 2020b), classification criteria were made more expansive, and 
reclassification of commercial flows as concessionary spiked, while actual 
grants have shrunk from most major countries. Now, anything looking 
vaguely developmental or climate-related can be added into the data as 
‘blended finance’, even if it transfers from seller to buyer (or donor to 
beneficiary) at market rates and above. In other words, blended finance 
can be more expensive than private finance, but can be seen as ‘green’ 
or ‘developmental’ just because of who is issuing it and the authority of 
their claim to be ‘green’, within the technical rules of classification for 
overseas development assistance. Actual global climate finance in the 
form of grants were a measly $27 billion per year for 2017/18 (Climate 
Policy Initiative 2019: 12). The OECD estimates climate finance grants 
from the ‘developed’ to ‘developing’ countries at only $12 billion per 
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annum from 2016–2018 (OECD 2020c: 9). Even here, we are including 
in the totals the salaries and overheads of the organisations delivering 
the money. On the ground, climate finance adaptation resources for the 
most vulnerable are as rare as an endangered species.
Proposition 4: Climate Finance Can Be Better as 
Blended Finance
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD 2020b) argues that 
blended finance is the answer to drops in bilateral and multilateral public 
finance and offers synergies for increased efficiency, augmentation and 
the alignment of public and private ambition. Blended finance refers 
to public funds pooled with private funds, largely under private fund 
management. It forms the centrepiece of the ‘billions to trillions’ narrative 
(World Bank 2015; UNCTAD 2019) of mobilising private finance to meet 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) ‘financing gap’ of USD2.5 
trillion per annum in developing countries (UNCTAD 2014). Often the 
public money is used to ‘de-risk’ the investment, which means that if 
it fails, the public sector takes the loss, and if the investment succeeds, 
the public sector has the last and worst dividend. It is a bonanza for 
private investors who enjoy highly competitive market rates on their 
‘tranches’. Within the blended finance realm, development and climate 
change management have morphed and merged into new categories 
depicting synergies and mutual co-benefits, often hiding contradictions 
in practice inherent to decarbonisation pathways.
In the context of climate finance, the official and hegemonic 
position dates from the Kyoto Protocol and sees an unproblematic 
synergy between market logic and public sector policy (Andrade 
and de Oliveira 2015). Current international climate governance thus 
emphasises partnerships, synergy with private actors, blended finance 
and leverage of private funds, alongside consensus-oriented governance 
driven by “[m]arket-oriented rationales” (Kuyper et al. 2018: 9). The 
Climate Policy Initiative compiles data on climate finance for their Global 
Landscape of Climate Finance report (Buchner et al. 2019). Their 
data for 2017–2018 show, for example, that finance for mitigation far 
outweighs adaptation, with the latter constituting only 5% of total flows. 
The former is paid to companies to clean up industrial processes to emit 
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less carbon, often quite incrementally, such as by putting in sulphur 
capture chimneys at coal-fired power stations. The 5% for adaptation is 
intended to help people ‘adapt’ and become ‘resilient’ to climate change 
as it undermines their livelihoods and ecosystems. For example, it might 
be a grant for drought-resistant seeds. Of the US$30 billion of climate 
change adaptation finance, grants from governments totalled US$29 
billion, reflecting that there is little money from the private sector 
to fund adaptation—there is no profit in it. By comparison, private 
sector actors contributed loans (debt) at market rates to mitigation 
projects worth US$223 billion; equity investment to projects worth 
US$44 billion; and balance sheet financing (debt and equity) worth 
US$219 billion, with these latter categories largely contributing to the 
US$537 billion for mitigation overall. All of this private sector climate 
finance used to be called (normal) debt and equity investment, made 
up of finance expecting a (normal) market rate of return. Counting this 
finance as ‘climate finance’ involves the self-labelling of climate-related 
‘improvements’, which in practice can be just about anything. At best it is 
funding alternatives to fossil fuel energy generation (with due regard to 
surrounding people, animals and ecosystems). At worst, it is financing 
such oxymorons as ‘clean coal’.
Proposition 5: Climate Finance Can Be Found  
in Private Debt Products
The illusion of money solving a problem is also maintained by the 
private markets in climate finance’s sibling products—the green bonds, 
transition bonds and sustainability bonds—all of which are apparently 
enjoying a boom (Sullivan 2018b; Bracking 2019). According to the 
UNCTAD World Investment Report (2020: v) “investment in the SDGs 
show that sustainability themed funds in global capital markets are 
growing rapidly. [… But] they show these finances are not yet finding 
their way to investments on the ground in developing countries”. The 
boom in green finance can be attributed to both classification issues and 
to trends in the immanent market. In terms of classification, a number 
of features wildly inflate the sense of ‘greenness’, including: that any 
investment can be ‘self-labelled’ green by its issuers; generally only just 
more than 50% of the principal needs to be ‘green’ for the whole bond 
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to be classified that way; and because ‘green’ can be applied on the basis 
of a ‘use of proceeds’ narrative which may inflate the climate change 
mitigation/adaptation potential of the investments. In terms of the 
market, there has been a shift in the underlying cost of energy generated 
from renewable sources versus energy generated from fossil fuels, and 
many climate bonds and green bonds are simply following this market 
shift and investing in renewables because of better returns. This is a 
good thing, but giving these debt instruments the ‘climate bond’ or 
‘green bond’ name makes it seem that investors are doing more than 
that; that they are in some way giving up a profit margin for the greater 
good. This is generally not the case.
In short, the private sector has been successful in continuing 
investments in existentially dangerous production practices, while 
simultaneously green-washing and reclassifying investments as green 
when the underlying asset and context has largely stayed the same. 
Meanwhile, all bond finance is still debt, and bonds issued in the Global 
South, particularly by municipal or sovereign authorities, ultimately 
extract from those least able to pay, and least likely to have historically 
caused planetary warming.
Proposition 6: Climate Finance Can be Found  
in Insurance
Climate finance also includes climate insurance, which is depicted as 
having several ‘benefits’ over other approaches to managing climate 
change. A loss and damage approach accepts that some people need 
compensation for losses that others have caused. Similarly, ecological 
debt and climate justice approaches endorse a variant of the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle where the victims of climate change are owed redress from 
the historical polluters (nations or companies). But climate insurance 
does not rest on these philosophical foundations, and for some this is 
seen as a benefit. For example, Horton (2018: 285) summarises in the 
Harvard-based Carbon and Climate Law Review, that climate insurance: 
“does not require that causation be demonstrated […] is oriented 
toward the future rather than the past, [… and is] contractual, rather 
than adversarial”. These three aspects make it look fair, based on the 
freedom of exchange that people widely associate with market-based 
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solutions—while obscuring all the responsibility and culpability that 
could otherwise lie with the historic polluters. 
But the limits to climate insurance are that if you are rich, and 
making profits fast and first, you can ignore the need for it by shifting 
costs to others, normally by effectively moving them into a time in the 
future. In Florida or Miami, for example, real estate investors build 
new towers by the waterside and then sell their stakes within a few 
years with no continued flood liability (Taylor 2020). Conversely, if 
you are poor, and in the absence of any other investments in basic 
goods or welfare, insurance is often not available, and weather and 
disaster prediction technologies are of limited use. For example, in 
some parts of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi advanced warning 
of the tropical cyclone ‘Idai’ in 2019 was ineffective as persons had 
few options to mitigate the outcome of the disaster. Another scenario 
where insurance is not an option is when the risk is certain and not 
probabilistic. For example, where inundation by the sea is already 
happening in small islands, and where it is seen as a certain outcome, 
insurance is not available to protect these first victims of climate 
catastrophe.
Theoretically, risk insurance algorithms and complex hazard and 
weather modelling, appropriately commoned, could assist the poor and 
vulnerable, if structured through a huge democratic risk-management 
and governance panopticon. This would only arise if action follows 
knowledge, in this case advanced modelling software of the likely 
weather. But under capitalism, action follows money, and it is more 
likely that these technologies will remain market edge and proprietary, 
allowing the owners of new complex predictive knowledge about the 
weather a financial advantage in futures trading. On the other hand, 
and metaphorically if not literally a world away, the poor and vulnerable 
may not get access to news about a pending hazard, or the resources to 
mitigate their risk. 
This inequality reproduces itself when risk is used to manage 
resources. As we saw above, one benefit of climate insurance for the 
privileged has already been collected: using insurance as a way of 
managing a changing climate applies a future-looking resetting of the 
clock on who will pay, while discarding calculations of ecological debt. In 
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this re-setting, risk pools for climate insurance bake in intersectionalities 
and hierarchies of economic inequality, postcoloniality, race and gender. 
Proposition 7: Climate Finance Is Managed by People 
with Expertise Using Modern Technologies
Within financial products, particularly in climate insurance and disaster 
risk insurance, the insertion of calculative devices is common, to affect 
probabilistic calculation, but also to perform worth and expertise, helping 
to legitimise the central role of financial managers in our everyday lives 
(cf. Munden Project 2011). As Larry Lohmann (2020) suggests, however, 
the effort to use automation and technology to entrain humans and 
other species in actual processes of accumulation is constantly fraught 
with confrontation, a push and pull between capitalist asset making and 
peoples’ resistance and acts of commoning. Some technologies end up 
working for capital, while others prove dysfunctional, and this depends 
largely on the class and power relations within the marketisation 
process. In particular, if a conservation, development or climate change 
project ‘on the ground’ seeks finance from a climate finance institution, 
its workers or ‘beneficiaries’ are then caught up in arrangements which 
make them subject to calculative technologies deciding risk and price. 
The product could involve earth observation and weather modelling, for 
example, with both or either of these becoming locked into parametric 
triggers for insurance pay-outs. Once climate change insurance becomes 
securitised and sold on as climate change catastrophe bonds, their risk 
will also be traded in markets using algorithmic ‘sniffers’ to check on 
the trading prices of the bonds, in the face of changing environmental 
conditions. 
These exotic tools of investment management are not the norm, 
however. Old technologies remain the most common. For example, 
while the Green Climate Fund is home to the ‘paradigm shift’ to 
‘transformatory change’ involving the co-production of climate change, 
environment, conservation and development co-benefits, it is also home 
to very orthodox calculative technologies, and extremely well-paid fund 
and project managers (Bracking 2015). 
Consider, for example, a very recent Green Climate Fund project 
worth over $1 billion, about one tenth of all its committed funds: 
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The High Impact Programme for the Corporate Sector (GCF 2020). This 
‘High Impact Programme’ is managed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and addresses what it sees 
as deficits in corporate capacity in respect of climate change planning. 
It supports the “integration of risk analysis and gender-responsive 
climate change consideration into strategic decision making, target 
setting and investment planning”, and aims to improve corporate 
climate governance and management by using apparently innovative 
‘High Impact Loans’, which incorporate flexible interest rates and 
link these to “financial performance, the innovation being the link 
to climate and corporate governance performance” (GCF 2020: 
3). Governance performance here is evaluated by the EBRD itself, 
using its own matrix and governance scorecard, a climate change 
governance (CCG) assessment tool that performs a gap analysis, finds 
entry points for low carbon strategy and then builds “low-carbon 
roadmaps” (GCF 2020: 5–13). The project will additionally promote 
“private-public sector dialogue […] sector-level decarbonisation 
roadmaps… [and] collaborative knowledge exchange” in a two-step 
approach: “shift 1—uptake of high climate impact technologies; and 
shift 2—behavioural change at corporate governance and management 
levels” (GCF 2020: 5). In other words, the fund uses orthodox 1990s 
performance management of roadmaps and impact assessment. It 
re-packages these slightly for the 2020s by using more recent signifiers 
for “impact investment” (cf. Chiapello and Godefroy 2017; Sullivan 
2018b), like “[p]aradigm shift potential: [where] The concessional 
loan has the potential to trigger behavioural change at corporate sector 
management level to incorporate climate change targets and corporate 
climate governance principles into strategic decision making” (GCF 
2020: 13). 
But behind this signalling of modernity and radicalism—the 
paradigm shift—is a stalwart mediocrity: the EBRD is spending $1 
billion to ask managers to consider climate change. This is hardly novel, 
but it is insulting that the grant component, small as it is, appears to 
fund the technical assistance that the EBRD provides for its own loan, 
i.e. its own management costs (GCF 2020: 15).
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Proposition 8: Climate Finance Is Spent with Due 
Accountability 
When climate finance is being dispersed largely through the private 
sector as blended finance, aspects of its accountability, authority 
and legitimacy are handed to financiers to determine, framed using 
privatised metrics and calculations. In this form of governance, the public 
and private sectors join in what Asiyambi (2018: 533–36) so cogently 
analyses, for the green economy more broadly, as spaces of mutuality, 
where durable processes of becoming generate new green assets.
Asiyambi (2018) uses Foucault’s idea of organising actions in his 
account of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries) to explore how environmental 
financialisation is constructed. For climate finance, public finance is 
authorised globally by multilateral development banks (MDBs) and 
bilateral aid and development finance institutions (DFIs), and is then 
combined with private equity or used to leverage debt with diverse 
non-state actors. The mutuality is then a co-dependence. Public finance 
is critical to non-state actors in their contribution to aspects of climate 
finance governance: to the underwriting of risk and debt (reducing 
costs for private actors), the legitimising of the mode of implementation 
and the authority ascribed to the venture. In turn, private financiers 
contribute to climate finance governance, in that products are 
increasingly operated, implemented and governed by them, using 
market-based logics and profits-based rates of return. 
The accountability of blended finance ex ante relates to contracts 
signed between the investors and the fund managers which are largely 
private as they contain ‘commercially sensitive’ data. There is also a 
process-based accountability found in corporate social responsibility 
monitoring and economic, social and governance scoring. Since fund 
managers themselves largely do this paperwork for their own investors, 
however, it is not a convincing exercise. It is self-reporting, as outlined 
above. Accountability ex post is largely financial and is indicated by 
the outcomes of the investment against the contract commitments on 
closure and any ESG and CSR scores attached. This again is largely 
private. In effect, given the opacity of all the metrics, peoples’ trust in 
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climate finance is largely a spectacle based on their trust in bankers and 
investors and the moral universe that they present. A spectacle of money. 
Authority is inscribed by the status and reputation of the fund 
managers and banks involved. The legitimacy of the fund is built by the 
‘narrative authority’ it produces (Leins, 2020), an account of itself which 
includes voluntary standards, disclosure, rankings, and ultimately 
financial performance. Thus the weakest area of research on climate 
finance governance is what happens once finance is co-invested and 
blended within the private financial sector, in this space of apparent 
mutuality. It is weak because researchers are rarely granted access 
to analyse these private transactions. This matters because scientific 
knowledge and climate justice concerns, and the civil society, government 
and academic actors who voice them (who are not mutually exclusive 
groups), are consigned to a weak power to comment on and influence 
how climate finance is spent. Without transparency there can be little 
accountability.
In climate finance provided through risk-based insurance, the 
opacity is a combination of conventional secrecy excused by ‘commercial 
confidentiality’ combined with the opacity of the automated machine of 
parametric insurance triggers, which few persons can see or understand. 
It is hard for the buyers of a product to work out how or why it may or 
may not pay out. Despite this uncertainty, insurance products use risk to 
socialise costs and privatise profits. In an interesting shifting calculation, 
risk shifts costs to sovereign states who pay premiums to access the 
insurance on behalf of their citizens. As the case of the Malawi drought 
in 2016 demonstrated, even in a famine a glitch in the model (in this case 
it being programmed on the basis of the wrong type of maize) might 
stop the insurance paying out (ActionAid 2017: 9–10, citing research 
from Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources). But 
the insurance must be paid for, and its cost is a sovereign liability which 
means it is passed on to citizens through the tax relationship. Often, the 
poor pick up this bill, particularly so in regressive tax systems where the 
burden of tax falls disproportionately on them, despite their being least 
culpable for climate change. In many countries this is not an accountable 
relationship as increasing sovereign liabilities is effectively a privilege 
of the political class (see Pogge 2007), rather than subject to democratic 
process.
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Proposition 9: Climate Finance Is a Public Good 
The mainstream position on climate finance delivery revolves around 
the efficiency of the private sector within a business model and its 
contribution to climate change governance (Figueres et al. 2017). 
Correspondingly, the dominant model for providing climate finance 
is lending through equity funds, which are often domiciled in secrecy 
jurisdictions, which is sometimes called the indirect or ‘fund-of-funds’ 
model (Bracking et al. 2010). This has several consequences for efficacy 
and morality at the supranational level. 
The first is that a significant amount of climate finance is used to 
pay for the management and service costs of the accrediting and 
implementing entities (DFIs, MDBs and so forth), and then again for the 
remuneration of fund managers if these are in the private sector (few 
are kept ‘in house’). The supply chain of climate finance is skewed in 
favour of the suppliers who claim most of the value, which represents an 
unacceptable loss to the finance available for work with climate-affected 
persons (Bracking et al. 2010, 2015). This problem is compounded by the 
opacity of the indirect investment and lending model itself. Specifically, 
the secrecy jurisdiction domiciles of much public development finance 
compromises transparent reporting and makes evaluation of value-for-
money challenging (NOU 2009; Bracking et al. 2010). In short, being 
a fund manager of climate bonds, even when issued nominally by a 
public institution, can be extremely lucrative. By comparison, many 
workers and ‘project participants’ at the site of the investment are very 
poorly remunerated and adversely incorporated, while their sovereign 
state may additionally become responsible for paying the loan back if 
the ‘business model’ for extracting an income stream from the project 
itself fails.
Proposition 10: Climate Finance Is Global and Inclusive
Citizens also become entrained in the representational language of 
climate finance, as ‘beneficiaries’ who are counted in order to express 
a figure for the worth and benevolence of the ‘donor’ financier. These 
narratives of climate finance and climate products are a ghostly 
reinvention of development power, where climate finance has inherited, 
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largely intact, the intersectional, race, gender and postcolonial signifiers 
from within the international development discourse. The Global South 
is represented as ‘lacking’ and ‘failing’ on a number of counts, including 
in expertise, resources and in the generation of ‘bankable projects’ and 
‘governance standards’. By contrast, the MDBs, DFIs and their private 
partners can ‘de-risk’, make ‘bankable’, and insist on ‘qualifying 
governance standards’ from their self-assigned positions of expertise. 
When this binary world connects in an issuance of climate finance, 
whether it be equity, bond or insurance, the economic outcome is also 
similar to that generated in the political economy of development: it 
can be five times as expensive as a commercial loan (Africa Climate 
Resilience Investment Summit 2021). Of course, access to even these 
loans is not given to the riskier, often poorer, nations without the 
handmaiden ‘leadership’ and imposed governance of the MDGs and 
DFIs.
Climate finance projects and ‘interventions’ have thus inherited 
the same institutions and sometimes people who were the ‘experts’ in 
the age of development. This is because the structures of global power 
and political economy through which climate finance now travels, are 
inherited from a past that was justified and legitimised through ideas 
and practices of development expertise, knowledge and power, despite 
the amazing post-development (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Crush 
1997; Escobar 1995; Ashish et al. 2019) and postcolonial critiques (Spivak 
1988) that punctured development discourse from the late 1980s. 
In sum, climate finance is managed within power structures 
which conditioned, and continue to do so, the political economy of 
development, through the institutional reproduction of economic 
inequality and vectors of race, coloniality and patriarchy (Bracking 
2009). It might be tempting to see the climate crisis as a wider or 
bigger ‘crisis’ than the development crisis, which has arguably become 
normalised in the eyes of the privileged as an ‘everyday’ structural 
violence of poverty and premature death. After all, the climate crisis is 
an existential planetary crisis of the whole more-than human biosphere. 
But this might not be helpful as humanity is now facing both—and 
they are closely connected. Perhaps if the development challenge had 
been equitably addressed—by changing the foundational structures of 
power and political economy globally—the newer climate crisis might 
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have been of a different disposition. The relationship between the two 
crises is complex, but the contributing underlying political economy of 
capitalism is the same. Also similar, is that the institutional arrangements 
currently directed toward the climate crisis are those that have already 
failed us in the development domain, and we can extrapolate that they 
will do the same again. In short, whatever its effect on climate change, 
the current arrangements for delivering climate finance mean a forecast 
of continued inequality, oppression and exclusion.
Climate financiers have replicated and extended the very old game 
of the development industry, where development, conservation and 
now climate change are marketised to suit the interests of northern 
financial institutions. This old game relies on projects with full 
operating costs recovery where a large proportion of funds are spent 
on consultancy, planning and management using northern-based firms 
or DFIs. Overpaid consultants make excessive claims for their own 
knowledge products while ignoring domestic capacities. Employment 
is generated in Europe, and the contribution of research money spent 
in Europe is double counted as Overseas Development Aid—but there 
is still no relief for the climate-stressed. The financiers make logframes 
and ‘roll out road maps’ that reproduce historical inequalities, while 
simultaneously retreating from the possibilities that new technology 
could be owned in common and democratised to produce outcomes 
in favour of the vulnerable. Instead, the application of risk calculation, 
folded into apparently ‘radical’ new concepts of ‘resilience’, ‘adaptation’, 
and ‘just transitions’, financialises nature at an abstract scale in order to 
provide dividends to people who own money and lend it out. 
These concepts are synergistic in style and design to a superstructure 
of eco-cybernetics, eco-modernism and biopolitics (see Braun 2014). In 
Europe we hear of sustainability-linked loans (SSL), or performance-
based financing (PBF), or the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD), the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and the 
Principles for Responsible Investing as if they were revolutionising 
the future. Changing the behaviour of directors through High Impact 
Loans with flexible interest rates is still a ‘paradigm shift’! The problem 
is that these initiatives, promoted as the most ‘advanced international 
272 Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
standards’ are not working in Europe, and shouldn’t be ‘rolled-out at 
scale’. 
These acronyms and other ‘inventions’, such as blended finance, 
transition bonds and sustainability bonds, will make up the (non)
signifiers, firewalls and black boxes in discussion at the upcoming 
COP26. But they have very little substance, and certainly no high science. 
Rolling out metaphorical roads and road maps hides inaction, and even 
the continued financing of actual roads and fossil-fuel infrastructure. 
Proposition 11: Climate Finance Works!
Unlikely.
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21. The Promise and Peril of 
Financialised Climate Governance
Rami Kaplan and David Levy
A recent development in climate governance has been the rise 
of investor-driven, or ‘financialised governance’ of corporate 
practices in relation to the natural environment. Investors and 
investment managers are demonstrating greater concern that the 
value of assets, from stock markets to real estate, are increasingly 
subject to climate risks. Financialised climate governance (FCG) 
puts investors and fund managers at the centre of efforts to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions, which suggests both the promise and 
peril of this advanced form of ‘climate capitalism’. We describe 
these developments and point towards the peril that relying on 
investors and business self-interest is unlikely to result in the 
rapid structural shifts needed for full decarbonisation. 
The Rise of Financialised Climate Governance 
A notable recent development in climate governance has been the rise 
of investor-driven, or ‘financialised governance’ of corporate practices 
in relation to the natural environment (as also invoked by Bracking, this 
volume). Investors and investment managers are demonstrating greater 
concern that the value of assets, from stock markets to real estate, are 
increasingly subject to climate risks. These include physical risks from 
rising sea levels, storms, wildfires, and disease, together with financial 
risks, such as the loss of ‘stranded assets’ and product obsolescence, due 
to technological and regulatory changes, which are inducing a rapid shift 
toward renewable energy and other low-carbon products and processes.
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In January 2020, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the largest private 
investment company in the world with more than $8 trillion in assets 
under management, warned that “Climate change is different. Even if 
only a fraction of the projected impacts is realized, this is a […] structural, 
long-term crisis. Companies, investors, and governments must prepare 
for a significant reallocation of capital.”1 In an even sharper letter in 
early 2021, Fink urged CEOs to take the COVID-19 pandemic as “a 
stark reminder of our fragility” and warned that companies that fail to 
quickly prepare for the net zero transition “will see their businesses and 
valuations suffer”2 (also see Böhm and Sullivan, this volume).
Alongside this rhetoric, BlackRock joined Climate Action 100+, a 
rapidly growing consortium of more than 500 asset owners and managers 
with over $50 trillion under management. The initiative’s strategy is to 
promote the greenhouse gases (GHG) reduction goals of COP21’s Paris 
Agreement by leveraging the financial power of signatory investors 
into reforming the practices of 160 corporate “systemically important 
emitters” that account for two-thirds of global industrial emissions.3 A 
hub of investor activism, Climate Action 100+ employs tactics ranging 
from formal appeals to boards, to filing shareholder resolutions, and 
action to remove uncooperative directors. The initiative claims to have 
already triggered a wave of commitments to adopt advanced disclosure 
standards and carbon reduction targets (Herd and Hillis 2019; Mooney 
2020). For example, British Petroleum has committed to cut its fossil fuel 
production by 40% by 2030 and substantially increase its investment in 
renewable energy and electric transportation (British Petroleum 2020). 
Shell has declared its “ambition” to halve its carbon footprint by 2050 
and stated that it will soon link executives’ pay to short-term carbon 
goals. Many other major companies have committed to achieve net zero 
emissions by 2050 (the complexities of which are traced by Dyke et al. 
and Bailey, this volume), and to move to 100% renewable energy (see 
also Wright and Nyberg, this volume). 
Financialised climate governance (FCG) puts investors and fund 
managers at the centre of efforts to limit GHG emissions, which suggests 
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(Newell and Paterson 2010). The promise lies in the centrality of financial 
mechanisms within capitalism; if climate indeed enters calculations of 
risks, returns, and asset pricing (Sullivan 2018), then FCG could have 
considerable leverage over corporate practices and strategies. Investors 
would be a major force in the low-carbon transition; operating with 
existing mechanisms and ideologies of corporate governance and 
shareholder value, FCG could be more effective than pressure from 
stakeholders or governmental and multilateral action. The peril is that 
relying on investors and business self-interest is unlikely to result in 
the rapid structural shifts needed for full decarbonisation, which will 
not always be profitable for individual companies and will require 
regulation to shape markets and large-scale government funding for 
new infrastructure. Moreover, relying on FCG shifts the balance of 
power in climate governance away from environmental activists and 
governmental agencies, with potentially dire long-term consequences.
The nexus between the financial world and climate change is not 
new. Funds specialising in ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI) have 
proliferated since the 1990s, in parallel to the emergence of disclosure-
based governance frameworks, such as certification schemes and 
sustainability disclosure initiatives (Bartley 2007, Levy et al. 2010; 
Depoers et al. 2016). From the 2000s, SRI and disclosure governance 
intersected around the emergence of ‘environmental, social, and 
governance’ (ESG) indices designed to inform investment decisions. 
According to several estimates, global assets under management 
integrating ESG considerations multiplied from roughly $10 trillion in 
2010 to $40 trillion in 2020, which is close to half of the world’s total 
assets under management (Social Investment Forum Foundation 2010; 
Basar 2020). The increasing concentration of the asset management 
industry—the top ten asset managers hold 34% of externally managed 
assets (Eccles and Klimenko 2019)—implies substantial pressure on 
corporate emitters. This concentration increases the leverage of activist 
consortia such as Climate Action.
Initiatives such as the Climate Disclosure Project and Ceres’ Investor 
Network on Climate Risk explicitly sought to leverage investor pressure 
to change corporate practices (Knox-Hayes and Levy 2011). However, 
these were widely perceived as activist rather than investor-led projects 
and hence had little impact on capital flows or corporate emissions. The 
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phenomenon of FCG is fundamentally different in that it represents a 
growing recognition of climate risks by investors and the mobilisation of 
the capitalist class more broadly, rather than just in response to external 
pressure. The original ‘values-based SRI’ has been displaced by ‘profit-
seeking SRI,’ which asserts that ESG investment is more profitable. ESG-
specialised investment management firms, indices, and professional 
associations have proliferated worldwide, and ESG strategies have 
diffused rapidly among general-purpose investment funds (Waddock 
2008; Meyer et al. 2015; Yan et al. 2019).
The mobilisation by elite organisational investors has been global 
in scope and coordinated with governmental and multilateral 
organisations. The Asset Management Working Group, representing a 
dozen major investors organised by the UN Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative, pioneered the development and diffusion of ESG 
standards worldwide (UNEP-FI 2004, Asset Management Working 
Group 2009). Another key vector has been Bloomberg’s Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which was launched in 
2016 by the Financial Stability Board, a coordinating body of national 
financial bodies and international standards organisations. The TCFD 
has legitimised and disseminated standardised climate risk management 
and disclosure internationally. Recently, the Big Four global accounting 
firms unveiled a unified reporting framework for ESG. 
Investors are increasingly engaging in shareholder activism to 
pressure companies over climate change. For example, a coalition of 
seven Climate Action 100+ members narrowly passed a shareholder 
resolution in 2019 at Chevron, against management’s opposition, to 
require the company to report on its climate lobbying expenditures 
and their alignment with Paris goals. A similar resolution was passed 
in May 2021 at the annual shareholder meeting of Phillips66, while a 
resolution passed the same month at the ConocoPhillips’ shareholder 
meeting called for the company to set Scope 3 emission reduction 
targets, in other words, to take responsibility for the consumption of 
oil downstream.4 The most surprising upset of 2021 was the successful 
effort by a relatively small activist hedge fund, Engine No. 1, to nominate 
and elect three new directors on to Exxon’s twelve-person board. The 
4  https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/historic-votes-shareholders- 
demand-strong-climate-action-us-oil-and-gas.
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hedge fund only held a 0.02% stake in Exxon but succeeded in winning 
the support of large state pension funds.
While some of these shareholder resolutions are non-binding, such 
open conflict between capitalist investors and fossil fuel companies 
is unprecedented and constitutes a marked shift from the prior use 
of shareholder activism by labour or church groups. The investor 
activists have claimed that corporate lobbying threatens governments’ 
commitment to the Paris goals, which in turn threatens economic 
stability (BNP Paribas et al. 2019). This approach breaks strikingly from 
the traditional corporate preference for voluntarism (cf. Kaplan and 
Kinderman 2019, 2020; Kaplan and Lohmeyer 2020) and acknowledges 
a governmental role in addressing systemic financial and economic risks 
of climate disruption.5 The activists also argue that the target companies 
need more visionary leadership to develop the comprehensive and far-
reaching strategies required to survive and prosper in the low-carbon 
future.
Another remarkable development is the contestation around the 
status of ESG as a legitimate risk management criterion. In its final year, 
the Trump administration moved to restrict the use of ESG criteria in 
pension plans by requiring proof that ESG enhances profitability, and the 
investor community mobilised against this (Umpierrez 2020; Quinson 
2020). The administration’s action apparently responded to pressure 
from the fossil fuels sector, which was concerned about carbon divestment 
campaigns amongst activists and organisational investors (Quinson 
2020). The contestation between the Trump administration and the asset 
management industry was remarkable because it centred on questions 
of shareholder value and risk calculation rather than the environmental 
and social impact of corporations. The Trump administration argued 
that ESG-informed investment reflected non-financial objectives and 
thus violated the fiduciary obligation of money managers; investment 
managers countered that ESG risk was fundamental to evaluating the 
long-term performance of investments. The Biden administration has 
since announced that it will not enforce the Trump rules restricting 
retirement investments and will revisit the issue. These developments 
express how the struggles over climate change are reframed and 
5  https://www.ft.com/content/e6ad62f2-a9f3-4aec-b359-b662a07f5d01.
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translated into the financial terrain, and the growing commitment of 
investment managers to ESG-informed financial strategies. 
Critics of FCG will be quick to point to the historical failures of 
corporate self-regulation and the constraints on managerial action 
operating within profit maximising firms and the discipline of capital 
markets. FCG is unlikely to drive the structural and systemic changes in 
lifestyles and values, as well as production and consumption, that are 
urgently needed. Fundamentally, critics emphasise the contradictions 
inherent in expecting the stewards of capitalism to fix problems that 
arise from the system itself. 
First, the financial interests of investors are not fully aligned with 
those of society, and this is clearly the case for climate change. While 
some investors and financial regulators are waking up to the systemic 
financial risk from climate change, action by individual companies is 
constrained by the large externalities associated with fossil fuels and 
the problems of collective action and free riding. At the firm level, 
climate change is often viewed as a long-term and rather abstract risk, 
especially if they do not face a substantial price on carbon emissions. 
In other words, ‘win-win’ climate opportunities can be more elusive 
than advocates sometimes claim. Companies can find profitable low-
hanging fruit in areas such as energy efficiency and improving logistics, 
but moving towards 80% reductions or carbon neutrality is far more 
difficult, requiring a major structural shift in products and production 
processes, or a reliance on dubious carbon-offsets (Böhm and Dabhi 
2009). 
Moreover, the companies that will flourish in a zero-carbon economy 
are unlikely to be the same as those who will lose out—coal, oil, and 
gas companies have not fared well in clean energy and are likely to be 
replaced by those specialising in wind, solar, geothermal and energy 
storage. Traditional automobile companies will find it hard to compete 
with upstarts like Tesla that focus on advanced batteries and software. 
From a strategy perspective, the new low-carbon businesses have very 
different technologies, business models, and required competencies, 
making it difficult for incumbents to make the transition. A senior 
portfolio manager at Adams Fund, an investment company focused on 
the energy sector, commented after the successful activist campaign to 
appoint three new directors to Exxon’s board that “[p]eople who are 
expecting substantive changes soon will likely be sorely disappointed 
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[...]. Repositioning XOM from a company focused on oil to one focused 
on climate change issues will take a long, long time.”6
A second major limitation of FCG is that, in common with corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and other sustainability efforts, it is open 
to ‘greenwash’, the disjuncture between corporate efforts to burnish 
their environmental reputation and actual outcomes (Berliner and 
Prakash 2015; Raghunandan and Rajgopal 2020). Institutional theorists 
refer to ‘decoupling’ along the implementation chain between public 
pronouncements, internal policies and targets, corporate practices, and 
actual emissions (Lyon and Montgomery 2013). It is true that FCG, as 
‘insider’ corporate governance that demands more rigorous corporate 
disclosure of climate metrics, likely provides more credible verification 
of corporate practices than NGO-led initiatives such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) or CDP. But companies can also game ESG 
reporting to satisfy external stakeholders. While investors themselves 
gain reputational value from signing on to initiatives such as Climate 
Action 100+, they do not have an incentive to press companies for 
emission cuts that are unprofitable, require reduction in sales, or even 
threaten continued viability. This may result in the institutionalisation of 
“organized hypocrisy” (Lim and Tsutsui 2012) that involve ‘ceremonies’ 
of corporate disclosure that are legitimised by investors, standard-setters 
and auditors. In one recent instance, Climate Action 100+ and Total’s 
management issued a joint statement promoting a modest sustainability 
policy, which preempted a more aggressive resolution advanced by 
proxy activists (Mooney 2020). Indeed, it was the perception of such 
hypocrisy that helped drive the recent shareholder resolutions at Exxon 
and Shell.
A third source of caution regarding the potential of FCG is that it is 
incompatible with a transition to an economy and value system based on 
“sustainable lifestyles” (Levy and Spicer 2013) (as also highlighted in the 
chapters by Halme et al., North, Paterson and Sandover, this volume). 
Movements for sustainable consumption, localism, and more recently 
‘slowness’ (Van Bommel and Spicer 2011) have been growing in recent 
years, inspired by visions of a simpler, less materialistic life that is more 
oriented toward leisure and community. It also envisages alternative 
6  https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/engine-no-1-win-third-seat-exxon- 
board-based-preliminary-results-2021-06-02/.
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economic structures and market forms based on small-scale production, 
co-ops, widespread sharing and re-use of assets, and community-based 
services (Schor and White 2010). According to Jackson (2011: 35), 
[t]he prevailing vision of prosperity as a continually expanding economic 
paradise has come unraveled […]. This chapter searches for a different 
kind of vision for prosperity: one in which it is possible for human beings 
to flourish, to achieve greater social cohesion, to find higher levels of well-
being and yet still to reduce their material impact on the environment. 
Such a radical transformation cannot easily be reconciled with investor 
demands for exponential economic growth and rising profits. 
The fourth and final concern is that FCG shifts the balance of power 
in climate governance toward business and investors and away from 
environmental NGOs, activists, governments, and multilateral agencies. 
It is a continuation of the trend toward the privatisation of governance 
and self-regulation, with little inclusiveness or accountability (Bartley 
2007; Levy and Kaplan 2008; Levy et al. 2010). Corporations have often 
pushed for self-regulation as a means to deflect external pressure, pre-
empt governmental intervention (Malhotra et al. 2019), and increase 
business control over the political environment (Levy 1997; Sapinski 
2015; Kaplan and Kinderman 2019; Kaplan and Lohmeyer 2020). The 
rise of FCG can be understood as an accommodation with the external 
pressures and financial risks of climate change but one that reaffirms the 
hegemony of capitalism and traditional modes of corporate governance 
by reasserting the confluence of corporate, investor and societal interests. 
In conclusion, while the rise of FCG signals the mainstreaming of 
climate concerns in the business and investor communities, it also holds 
profound limitations that constrain its effectiveness in achieving the 
rapid transition to a low-carbon economy that is urgently needed. As 
Levy et al. (2016) observed in relation to the corporatisation of CSR, 
the paradox of FCG is that, while it accelerates incremental change in 
corporate practices, its inherent limitations will prevent the deeper 
systemic and structural shifts required in norms, corporate forms and 
governance, and patterns of production and consumption. 
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22. What Is to Be Done to Save 
the Planet? 
Peter North
This chapter uses the opportunity of the COP to take stock of the 
successes and failures of climate activism over the past decade. 
The COPs provide an opportunity for activists to meet, pressure 
COP delegates to take the action needed to avoid climate action, 
and discuss what a better world can look like. They can ‘take 
stock’ at a point in time about what they have done well, what 
did not work so well, and what still needs to be done. The chapter 
reviews mass and ‘elite’ communicative forms of direct action, 
and the longer-term programme of building community-based 
prefigurations of what could be. It argues that this taking stock 
and pressuring elites to act matters, but is not an alternative to 
building locally to transition to a world in which all, human and 
non-human, can live well. 
Introduction
The “great acceleration” (McNeill and Engelke 2014) grows apace. 
Climate catastrophes intensify in the form of seemingly inexorable 
temperature and sea level rise, species extinction, ice sheet melting, 
and methane emission. Over the last couple of decades a wide-ranging 
set of social movements have emerged in a number of places globally 
to grapple with the politics of climate change, using a range of protest 
techniques, and with different conceptualisations about what to do. 
While to some extent put on pause as a result of COVID-19, this climate 
activism is a diverse space within which organisations, networks and 
© 2021 Peter North, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.22
292 Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
activists act independently, coalesce, act together, disperse again, and 
emerge somewhere else later. Sometimes they organise in the streets—
the classic protest march aimed at communicating a message to mass 
society and putting pressure on elites to act. Direct action is carried out 
by long-standing groups like Greenpeace or Earth First!, by anti-airport 
protesters such as ‘Plane Stupid’, by anti-coal protesters like ‘Leave it in 
the ground’ or anti-fracking groups, and more recently by Extinction 
Rebellion (XR). A third strategy, complementary to protesting ‘against’ 
catastrophic climate change, is that of community-based ‘Transition 
Initiatives’ that work at a grassroots level to develop fulfilling livelihoods 
based in more localised low-carbon economies (as also pointed towards 
by Sandover, this volume). They have created their own local currencies, 
local power and food initiatives and the like in an effort to prefigure the 
kind of low-carbon, localised and convivial economy they would like to 
see if dangerous climate change is to be avoided. 
That many climate activists seem stereotypically ‘middle class’ 
means that the movement has its critics (as Gardham discusses, this 
volume). In contrast, I argue that globally-privileged citizens in high 
income, developed northern countries engaging with the geographies of 
their responsibility for the emissions that lead to anthropogenic climate 
change are to be applauded. There is nothing new about ‘middle class 
radicalism’. What matters is how well the movement is doing, given 
the severity of the existential crisis humanity faces. This chapter aims 
to address this issue. While many of the examples below are based on 
what I know about activism in the UK, I hope my comments will be of 
wider interest to those with their eyes on the COP in Glasgow. 
It Can All Come Together at the COPs
In their intensity and urgency, claims about the climate crisis echo 
concerns about the catastrophic nature and imminence of nuclear war in 
the early 1980s. Yet, while anti-nuclear, anti-war and anti-globalisation 
movements regularly mobilised upwards of 250,000 protesters, the 
numbers of protesters taking part in climate action marches, led by school 
and university students and XR, have not been at a level necessary to 
force the changes that the protesters (and I) feel are needed. The annual 
Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings provide a useful place and 
time to address that. At the COPs, a generally fissiparous ‘movement’ or 
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series of ‘convergence spaces’ (Routledge 2003) join together or converge 
to reinforce and underline the existence of the existential threat of the 
climate in a world of competing issues for contestation. 
The COPs enable climate activists to demand “meaningful, 
co-ordinated and urgent policy action” commensurate with the threat 
(Chatterton et al. 2012), take stock, meet like-minded people, discuss 
alternatives, and plan action. They can point to unequal geographies 
of responsibility for historic and contemporary emissions and 
environmental destruction, expose global inequalities and capacities to 
act in the face of this existential threat, demand global climate justice, 
and express solidarity. They enable local activists to focus on an issue of 
particular salience for them, for instance coal in Poland at the Katowice 
COP in 2019. They create a space where activists can lobby states, and 
spaces where corporate and business elites showcase technological 
solutions in line with neoliberal conceptions of how to live well (or 
cover up their nefarious activities, depending on how anti-capitalist or 
paranoid you are). 
More resistant conceptions of how to live well in the Anthropocene 
are developed in the sometimes hidden, sometimes open autonomous 
Alternative Climate Forums, which act as spaces in which new 
knowledges (Melucci 1989) or grassroots innovations (Seyfang and 
Smith 2007) develop. The streets can be spaces for demonstrations 
where change can be demanded. Some activists believe that when 
they are, sometimes pre-emptively, attacked by local police forces this 
exposes the hidden violence of the seemingly liberal, democratic state 
supposedly committed to solving the climate crisis through a rhetorical 
commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Given 
that the SDGs are simultaneously utopian yet insufficiently concrete, a 
rhetorical commitment to them is at best a cruel hoax, at worst a cover 
for slow violence, or even social murder, that the failure to avoid climate 
catastrophe represents. 
Taking Stock 
Activity at the COPs does not spring from nowhere—they provide a 
space in which this movement can emerge and converge, building on 
what has gone before. Social movement theorists Turner and Killian 
(1987) point to the emergence of new norms, timeliness and feasibility 
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that help us move from a feeling that something is wrong to ‘yes, we 
can’ do something about it. This helps explain why an issue emerges in 
the first place, and then how it can be made to stay on the agenda. The 
COPs provide an opportunity to mark a time to restate a problem and 
come to a view about what is being done about it. It might therefore 
be useful at such a point to review what we know about how climate 
change has been contested, and how it has moved up and down agendas 
in competition with other issues, given that we live in a less than perfect 
world. 
While climate change as an issue has been known in scientific circles 
for many years, a perception of its urgency, a feeling that ‘something is 
wrong’, emerged as the scale of problems associated with climate change 
began to be discerned in the early part of the twenty-first century. Global 
long-series temperature readings rose inexorably, culminating in a series 
of ‘hottest ever’ years and observable extreme weather events from 
the mass deaths from heatstroke in Europe (2003), Hurricane Katrina 
(2005) and Cyclone Nargis (2008), forest fires in Greece and California 
(2009), not to mention longer-lasting droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Australia. Al Gore’s (2006) documentary An Inconvenient Truth 
communicated the issue to a wider audience, while the contemporaneous 
publication of IPCC’s fourth report and the Stern Review, both in 
2007, showed that global warming was accepted as happening by the 
overwhelming majority of climate scientists, and that something should 
be done. Climate activists used extreme weather events to suggest that 
global warming represented a clear danger to life itself. Mark Lynas’s 
book Six Degrees (2007) constructed activist knowledge about what 
abstract phenomena like increasing global temperatures or atmospheric 
CO2 levels mean in concrete, and increasingly apocalyptic, terms. Hot 
weather and extreme weather events suggested that ‘something was 
wrong’, and marches, spaces of grassroots innovation and direct action 
suggested that ‘something could be done’ and that action was ‘timely’ 
and ‘feasible’.
Just as hot weather suggested that the planet was warming, a period 
of cold weather hit the northern hemisphere mid-latitudes during early 
2010 and the years after were cooler. Newly confident climate denialist 
coverage in the media suggested that the need for ‘something to be done’ 
did not seem so pressing, and the severity of the issue was less clear cut. 
 29522. What Is to Be Done to Save the Planet? 
Denialists argued the environmentalists were hysterical anticapitalist 
‘watermelons’ (green on the outside, red on the inside) who, with the 
fall of communism, had lost the global battle for ideas and were now 
trying to re-impose their ideas in a new guise (Dellingpole 2012). Then, 
the global financial crisis hit in 2008, and in the UK at least the coalition 
government introduced austerity, and a long-term issue like the climate 
struggled to get visibility compared with other issues. Austerity led 
into Brexit. Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party seemed to provide hope for 
many younger activists, promising action, including a Green New Deal. 
This showed that, wherever you are, other political issues and climate 
interact in complex ways that affect how activists can effectively mobilise 
against the climate crisis. In other places issues like environmental 
racism, struggles against right-wing populism, trade union struggles 
and organisations around gender are more prominent. For example, in 
contemporary Poland, environmentalists organise strongly against the 
climate crisis and against restrictions on women’s reproductive rights, 
while the Solidarność trade union lobbies and marches in favour of coal. 
On the other hand, the climate did not ‘go away’. In the UK the focus 
moved on to airports and flying. Protests at Heathrow Airport in July 
2015 and 2016 London City airport raised the issue of climate justice, 
pointing out that the victims of the climate catastrophe now, not in the 
future, are black and brown people in the majority of the world. But, 
on the other hand, extreme weather events seemed to be part of a ‘new 
norm’—an unstable, changing climate that we could do little about and 
would have to adapt to. Methane continued to be released in the boreal 
high latitudes, ice melted, floods and fires continued, but not at an 
intensity that people believed that ‘we could not go on like this’, given 
that the world is imperfect and there are many problems to address. 
Then, in the summer of 2018, one Swedish young woman with good 
communication skills, clarity of thought, and connected to people able 
and willing to get her message out, explained how angry she was at 
the situation. Many other young people agreed, took time out of school 
and university, and hit the streets in their thousands. Greta Thunberg’s 
actions were presented in ways that mobilised others to believe again 
that action was ‘timely’, and not only ‘feasible’ but necessary—obligatory 
even. Many older people felt guilty enough to do something about it, 
and able to. The result was Extinction Rebellion (XR), which made a 
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Declaration of Rebellion and launched its protest in Parliament Square 
in October 2018. The 2018 IPCC reported the worsening situation in 
stark terms. The 2018 WWF annual Living Planet Report suggested a 
60% decline of vertebrate species since 1979. This time, the driver was 
not urgency and optimism—if we recognise the problem we can use 
the creativity we used to build fossil fuel capitalism to build a more 
convivial alternative—but catastrophism and disaster. Young people 
were told they would probably not see their old age unless they rebelled 
(Doherty et al. 2020). They were understandably outraged about this.
XR’s leaders had cut their teeth on climate and anti-austerity 
activism. Inspired by Chenoweth and Hayes’s (2018) argument that 
3.5% of the population engaged in non-violent direct action (NVDA) 
could force elites to change, they demanded that the government tell the 
‘truth’ about the immediacy and potentially catastrophic nature of the 
climate crisis, commit to net zero carbon emissions by 2025, and create 
citizens’ assemblies to make decisions about what should be done. They 
called on large numbers of people to take emergency action to compel 
politicians to act, including mass arrests to overwhelm the police. Many 
older people who felt that their complacency had led to this emergency 
believed that they should do something about it, recognising that retired 
people with time, money and no work or caring commitments can and 
should act for young people. For older people, guilt was a driver that 
fused with younger people’s anger at what they believed was an awful 
fate. 
For a time XR was successful. Mass actions in November 2018 and 
then in April and October 2019 saw mass NVDA and a large number of 
arrests in central London, with other less high-profile events around the 
world. Then, in November 2019, radical Islamists carried out another 
terrorist attack on London Bridge. And, in the spring of 2020, COVID 
hit, and seemingly the world was locked down. The 2020 COP planned 
for Glasgow in November was postponed for a year. At the time of 
writing (June 2021), it is not possible to know what opportunities for 
climate action will present themselves (although there were protests 
against the G7 meeting in Cornwall in June 2021), but we can take the 
opportunity to review what we know from this historical sketch of 
climate activism. 
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Reviewing Strategies and Tactics
Why do we go to the COPs? Coming together in convergence spaces at 
the COPs, particularly if this entails significant carbon emissions from 
long distance travel, might be seen as both unsustainable and ineffective 
politics, compared with locally- or community-based activism in which 
you work locally to prefigure the world you want to see (Taylor Aiken 
2017). A focus on a ‘once-in-a-lifetime deal’ at key COP meetings might 
be ineffective if it is judged that global elites are not yet ready to make 
the fundamental changes in the global political order that activists 
claim are necessary (and they almost certainly are not). A focus on 
the annual merry-go-round of the COPs might distract from the hard 
work of grassroots activism, prefiguring the future that we want to see, 
building system change (see also Mannan et al., this volume). This is 
not to say that going to the COPs is a waste of time, but it might be that 
just raising the issue is not enough if nothing otherwise changes at the 
scale necessary to solve the issue.
Many anarchist-inspired ecoactivists have, for some time, had little 
faith in the capacity of demonstrations, even large ones, to make change 
by politely lobbying elites to change their mind (Wall 1999; Seel et al 
2000). This perception was reinforced by the failure of the globally-
coordinated demonstration of February 2003 to stop the war in Iraq. A 
wider range of activists began to feel that polite lobbies and attempts of 
persuasion are not enough—direct action to force change is necessary. 
This then suggests, ‘what kind of direct action, by whom, and to what 
end?’ Analytically, we can distinguish between openly organised or 
spontaneous acts of direct action involving all who wish to participate, 
and clandestinely-organised communicative direct action. What Barker 
et al. (2001: 21) call “exclusivist” direct action is planned and executed 
by an inner circle of activists, as distinct from the wider movement. 
Classic ‘resource mobilisation’ approaches to the organisation of social 
movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977) suggest that the role of an 
outer periphery is to support the core’s decisions, providing material 
support and admiration. Those who undertake direct action lead by 
example, rather than by the interaction of persuasion. Organisations like 
Greenpeace have long organised stunts in which activists communicate 
to the wider populace through the media—for instance parachuting into 
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a football stadium at the Euros, unfurling a banner on top of a power 
station chimney, or projecting a slogan on a building. They act for the 
passive masses who are framed as apathetic and self-interested. 
Thus, we might distinguish between a small number of ‘heroic’ XR 
activists in London locking themselves on to an old boat painted in a 
pastel colour and named after a prominent environmental activist that 
has been clandestinely placed at a strategically important road junction 
early in the morning; and thousands of activists collectively blocking 
Westminster Bridge, getting arrested, filling the jails and declaring that 
this is ‘not in my name’. One involves thousands in activity; the other 
communicates ‘to’ the passive majority. Another example is hundreds 
of young people in canoes stopping coal ships from leaving Newcastle, 
Australia. One is bodies on the line saying ‘not in my name’ and forcing 
change, the other is communicating the need for change by using a boat 
to block a junction, which does not require lots of people to produce a 
media stunt, and instead relies on the hope that elites will agree and act. 
Of course, they do not. 
Individuals standing up to power, perhaps in heroic circumstances, 
matter—Tiananmen Square’s ‘Tank Man’ comes to mind. Activists are 
also right to argue that an individual can march, take direct action, and 
engage in prefigurative politics at different times and in different spaces. 
But there are tensions. ‘Muscular’ forms of mass direct action and a refusal 
to negotiate with authorities within a political opportunity structure 
framed by the global ‘war on terror’ can bring down repression from 
the authorities on those they (wrongly, of course) label ‘ecoterrorists’. 
Attempts by climate activists to temporarily shut down Kingsnorth 
Power Station in the UK were successfully thwarted by the police, and 
in uncompromisingly vigorous, if not violent, ways. This showed that 
the authorities can successfully defend a target named in advance, and 
control (repress) an activist camp in open countryside. Many people 
who are otherwise committed to low-carbon lifestyles might be put off 
from participating in an action that might involve significant levels of 
police harassment or even violence. There are complex trade-offs and 
debates about the extent to which radical disruptive direct action raises 
new issues, inspires and mobilises supporters, and creates new ways 
of understanding issues by social movements as ‘knowledge producers’ 
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991), or puts off potential supporters and 
provokes the authorities into taking measures that limit or close off their 
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ability to organise and room for manoeuvre. There are consequently 
debates about the extent to which this is an effective tactic for social 
movements aiming at mass support (North 2011). Others argue that a 
‘radical flank’ can open up spaces in which more moderate voices can 
make deals or advance policy goals in more pragmatic ways (Hains 
2013; Mueller and Sullivan 2015).
On the other hand, media pictures of protesters being attacked can 
reveal the unsustainable and repressive face of the seemingly liberal 
state and of the slow climate violence, if not social murder, of ecocidal 
capitalism (White 2014): a key objective of the politics of anarchist-
inspired direct action. Individual witness, saying that what is being done 
is ‘not in my name’, is important and has a long pedigree, especially in 
the peace movement. This is easier to achieve on Westminster Bridge 
than in a field far from the media. Many members of XR are older, 
middle-class, retired professional people from the south of the UK with 
the time, social capital and resources to take direct action that others—
mainly younger people—lack. Negatively racialised male bodies will 
be treated more harshly than older, white, grandmotherly ones. But 
breaking the law, being arrested, charged, and prosecuted is stressful, 
time consuming, and expensive. The assumption that the costs of 
protest are undertaken by kindly older, generally white grandmothers 
suggests a rather liberal view that the police can be expected to act in a 
gentlemanly way that negatively racialised people can find problematic. 
The repression this form of activism can call down can also put off those 
less able or willing to put their bodies on the line through direct action, 
and in time the inconvenience caused to people trying to go about 
their everyday business, perhaps on minimum wages on a zero hours 
contract, will mean that sympathy for the aims of the protesters will 
wear thin, as in the case of the XR activists who stopped a Docklands 
train in the commuter rush hour. The media will lose interest. 
The alternative to a march, which the media may cover but elites 
will ignore, and direct action, which lacks the capacity to force elites 
to change tack and which, in time, loses its efficacy is, of course, the 
slower work of movement building; the development of power to 
create the system change that we want to see rather than merely protest 
against the status quo. The problem here is that the prefigurative local 
activisms of Transition Towns and the like, Melucci’s (1989) “nomads of 
the present”, can be too small-scale, too hidden from view, and involve 
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too few people promoting lifestyles that are not attractive enough to 
millions to trigger a systemic move to a low-carbon economy and society, 
avoiding catastrophic climate change and resource crunches. While 
much of this local activism is hidden from (the analysts’) view, it must 
be remembered that activists happily work at a number of scales and 
use a variety of techniques utilising new communications technologies, 
to get their point across. Of course, festivals like the alternative COPs 
provide a space to do this, and this is massively important. 
Conclusion
Avoiding dangerous climate change is not an issue that can be solved 
easily or quickly. No one demonstration at any one COP could ever 
be seen to ‘succeed’. Adaptation to unavoidable climate change and 
mitigation of its worst effects requires a fundamental transformation 
of the way we organise human society. The real issue is to follow the 
effectiveness of these experiments, and use the spaces at the COP to 
come together to take stock of what has been done, how effective it has 
been, and what is still to be done. Adding COVID-19 to the mix suggests 
some possibilities for the development of a new politics of hope to be 
developed online rather than in convergence spaces and streets, to ask 
what the pandemic has stopped that we are happy to see stopped, and 
how we ‘build back better’ rather than succumbing to catastrophism. I 
look forward to watching this process unfold in Glasgow, online, or in 
person.
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23. Climate Politics between 
Conflict and Complexity
Matthew Paterson 
Climate politics needs both moments of sharp, highly politicising, 
even over-simplifying moves, to keep pressure up, but at the same 
time a sort of patient, careful attention to the complexity of socio-
technical systems to work out how to generate radical shifts in 
infrastructure and practice. But these logics stand in quite a lot of 
tension—the post-political/agonistic logic can reduce to slogans 
and abstract from the details of how you actually decarbonise, 
while the complexity approaches can culminate in even more 
complex technocratic projects. This chapter navigates questions 
of how to keep both of these logics alive in climate politics. 
On Climate Movement Rhetoric
An important undercurrent of recent climate movement rhetoric, echoed 
in sympathetic media, focuses on a specific number of global companies 
that are responsible for a particular percentage of global emissions. 
“Just 90 companies caused two-thirds of man-made global warming 
emissions”, was the headline to one of the earliest media renditions of 
this argument (Goldenberg 2013). More recently, just to continue with 
material from The Guardian (where these claims are most prominently 
produced), we have had “[j]ust 100 companies responsible for 71% of 
global emissions, study says” (Riley 2017) and “[r]evealed: the 20 firms 
behind a third of all carbon emissions” (Taylor and Watts 2019). These 
claims have then circulated more broadly because of Extinction Rebellion 
(XR) strategies and particularly their use by philosopher Rupert Read 
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within an XR context (as reported for example in Newsweek, see 
Mahmood 2020).
These claims are underpinned by pioneering research by Richard 
Heede, in particular in an article in Climatic Change (Heede 2013), 
and then maintained via the Carbon Majors Project of the Climate 
Accountability Initiative,1 an organisation established by Heede, along 
with prominent analyst of climate denial, Naomi Oreskes (Oreskes and 
Conway 2011) and Greg Erwin. 
Other similar narratives have been deployed. American anarchist, 
Utah Phillips, is often invoked: “[t]he earth is not dying, it is being killed, 
and those who are killing it have names and addresses” (see e.g. Climate 
and Capitalism 2009). Personalising the issue beyond the corporations 
to their chief executives, a world map has circulated widely with the 
“names and locations of the top 100 people killing the planet” on it, 
superimposed on a map with the country size representing cumulative 
emissions of that country from 1850 onwards.2 
This sort of narrative represents a particular way that activists, 
and allied researchers, have sought to ‘repoliticise’ climate change in 
a specific way—to identify it as an existential struggle where specific 
organisations, even individuals, are the causal powers of climate 
collapse that need to be resisted and opposed. As Malm (2020: 15) 
succinctly and precisely puts it, “the enemy is fossil capital”. This sort of 
repoliticisation, often entailing the identification of such a clear enemy, 
can be seen plainly in the school strikes for climate, XR, the Sunrise 
Movement, oil pipeline activism, and fossil fuel divestment activism 
(also see North, this volume). Analysis of divestment discourse shows 
that the dominant narrative is a war/enemy narrative, where fossil fuel 
producers are pitted against the rest of humanity (and occasionally 
beyond) in an existential struggle (Mangat et al. 2018; also Wright and 
Nyberg, this volume). 
In academic debates about climate change politics, this is reflected in 
various literatures that have recently highlighted the conflictual qualities 
1  See Climate Accountability Institute website (Climate Accountability Institute, no 
date), https://climateaccountability.org/carbonmajors.html. 
2  See e.g. Decolonial Atlas, ‘Names and Addresses of the Top 100 People Killing the 
Planet’ (decolonialatlas.wordpress.com, 2019), https://decolonialatlas.wordpress.
com/2019/04/27/names-and-locations-of-the-top-100-people-killing-the-planet/). 
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of climate politics, and specifically the conflicts between corporate/
fossil interests and the pursuit of climate policy. This is not entirely 
new—some analysts have made the power of fossil corporations central 
to their analyses of climate politics for a long time (Paterson 1996; Egan 
and Levy 1998; Newell and Paterson 1998, 2010; Newell 2000; Levy and 
Newell 2005). But there is a noticeable spread of this sort of focus in how 
academic analyses of climate change are conducted. This literature is 
various, encompassing: detailed empirical analyses of how corporations 
have blocked policy development in various countries, for example in 
the US (Stokes 2020; Mildenberger 2020), but also in Brazil and South 
Africa (Hochstetler 2020), as well as the large literature on corporate 
roles in climate denial, often with the frame of ‘Exxon knew’ (e.g. 
Supran and Oreskes 2017); broad attempts to theorise these empirical 
dynamics in general (Scoones et al. 2015; Breetz et al. 2018; Colgan et al. 
2020); an argument derived theoretically from Chantal Mouffe’s well-
known arguments about democratic politics as intrinsically “agonistic” 
(Mouffe 2005; Machin 2013); and arguments that dominant forms of 
climate change response are ‘post-political’, that is, that they seek to take 
climate change decision-making out of the realm of democratic, public, 
decision-making and govern climate technocratically, while at the same 
time presenting climate change as a consensual issue in the interests of 
all humanity (see most notably Swyngedouw 2010; Kenis and Mathijs 
2014; Macgregor 2014). In slightly less stark terms than the last of these 
claims, the argument that climate change is often depoliticised—actors 
seek to present responses as consensual, technocratic, in the interests 
of all—is widespread (e.g. Pepermans and Maeseele 2016; Mann and 
Wainwright 2018; Willis 2020).
Limits of the ‘100 Companies’ Story
This return to an emphasis on the conflicts inherent in addressing 
climate change is welcome and has helped to mobilise climate activists 
in important ways—by articulating a sense of ‘an enemy’, enabling 
motivation for activists and highlighting key targets and goals. Even 
within the trajectory of movements, it has helped to direct action in more 
focused ways, as in the shifts in focus of XR actions towards corporate 
targets—banks, oil companies, for example—over time. So there is a 
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good case for saying that this sort of repoliticisation of climate change 
is a crucial component in the search for more ambitious and adequate 
responses to climate change. 
But at the same time, there is an important piece missing from the 
underlying narrative. We need to return to the ‘100 companies’ story. 
A key component in the underlying analysis that has generated this 
frame is how emissions have been associated with these companies 
(and then, in the individualising version, to their CEOs). Specifically, 
what the analysis does is trace not only all emissions associated with 
the production activities of these companies, but also the consumption 
of all of their products over time, by individuals, other companies, 
governments and so on. This is what is called ‘Scope 3’ emissions in 
carbon accounting terms, ‘Scope 1’ being direct emissions by an entity, 
and ‘Scope 2’ being directly bought-in emissions as, most obviously, in 
electricity consumption. The ‘100 companies and their CEOs’ analysis 
is an extreme version of a Scope 3 accounting procedure, which 
would normally include things like the commuting emissions of a 
company’s workers, or travel emissions for work-related travel (in lots 
of organisations like universities, these latter emissions completely 
dominate overall organisational emissions). Inevitably there is all sorts 
of double-counting going on—the emissions of someone commuting 
by car are Scope 3 emissions for their employer, but Scope 1 emissions 
for themselves. But it is rare to associate downstream emissions from 
consumption with the producing organisation. The double-counting 
becomes even more complicated if we are also now saying that the 
commuter’s emissions are Scope 3 emissions both for their employer 
and the oil company that sold them the fuel.
While we can clearly ‘trace’ those emissions from a car tailpipe back 
to Exxon, Shell, or whoever, as Heede and the Carbon Majors Project 
have done very effectively, it does not follow that there is a neat causal 
chain from Exxon to those emissions. There is a clearly overly simplistic 
causal narrative going on here to make this claim. Is Exxon really 
‘responsible’ for the emissions by all the car drivers (individual and 
corporate) who buy their petrol? While it has been rhetorically really 
important for mobilising activists, and the basic claim about corporate 
power remains a powerful one, it is insufficient for thinking fully about 
what the politics of actually decarbonising the global economy entails 
(as also considered in Sullivan Chapter 11, this volume). 
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While activism focused on identifying key actors blocking policy 
change and undermining their political power is important, it needs 
to be supplemented with political action focused on the complexities 
of the large-scale socio-technical systems which constitute high carbon 
worlds, where the causal processes generated by emissions are not so 
neatly identifiable with specific agents, but are emergent properties 
arising out of the complex interactions between corporate strategy and 
power, ideology, technical change, social practices, and governance 
systems, irreducible to any one of those elements. These systems are also 
themselves quite heterogeneous—including food, transport, electricity, 
construction, raw materials extraction, and so on (also see Halme et al., 
this volume). These are all complex systems with their own specific 
sets of corporate structures and strategies, technical qualities, and daily 
practices that interact in specific ways. Interventions to shift them to get 
rid of fossil fuels and carbon will need to be differentiated accordingly. 
They may all be capitalist in important ways, but this does not therefore 
capture the specificities of their dynamics adequately. As a consequence, 
while agonistic activism and its associated rhetoric may shift one or two 
of these elements, it is implausible that it can shift the system as a whole, 
on its own. It may sometimes even get in the way of identifying ways 
forward by, in effect, mis-specifying the challenge. 
Limits of Avoiding Conflict
On the other hand, there is plenty of reason to believe that the existing 
approaches that do take this socio-technical complexity seriously—most 
commonly going under the rubric of ‘low carbon transitions’—fail to 
adequately incorporate the question of conflict and power relations. In 
Harriet Bulkeley’s Accomplishing Climate Governance (2016), for example, 
the shift in focus to climate governance has a tendency (despite, I think, 
her intention) to present responses to climate change in depoliticised 
ways—with politics understood in terms of the interplay between 
agonistic conflict, power relations, and public democratic decision-
making.3 Bulkeley’s account, arising out of a largely Foucauldian 
approach, is to think of climate politics in terms of the operations and 
3  I develop this specific point, as well as some of the other arguments in this short 
piece, in more detail, in Paterson (2021).
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effects of power—how it is exerted in climate governance, or how, in 
her terms, climate governance is “accomplished”, at the expense of 
(if not total exclusion of) other dimensions of politics, notably public 
deliberation and conflict. She argues that climate politics “is not the 
politics of vested interests and decision points, but a slow burning, 
unfolding, enveloping and ongoing form of the working of power” 
(Bulkeley 2019: 14). But there does not need to be the choice that she 
presents here—rather, it is both the “politics of vested interests” (and 
therefore the contestation of those interests) and the “slow burning, 
unfolding” that helps us understand the dynamics of climate politics.
Bulkeley’s is the most sophisticated of this sort of approach. Others 
collapse much more readily into a depoliticised, technocratic account 
of low-carbon transitions. There has been an undercurrent of critique 
of the transitions approach for underplaying questions of politics 
(Meadowcroft 2009), and clear attempts by leading transition scholars to 
respond to this critique and incorporate questions of politics (Geels 2014; 
Roberts et al. 2018). This has been mostly limited to thinking about the 
ability of incumbent actors to undermine transformational processes—
“regime resistance” in Geels’ (2014) terms (for a detailed analysis of 
this literature focused on how it thinks about incumbency, see Stirling 
2019). But much of this literature is nevertheless dominated by a desire 
to elaborate models of complex systems, where the methodological 
devices of these modelling exercises obscure the ability to think fully 
about the political dynamics of such transitions. We are thus left with 
depoliticised accounts of path dependencies, lock-in processes, tipping 
points, niches and innovation, and so on. 
Combining Conflict and Complexity
The challenge then seems to me, on the analytical or academic side, 
to work out how these two elements in climate politics—the detailed, 
focused, attention on governing and transforming large-scale, 
heterogeneous high-carbon systems, and the deeply contested questions 
of power, inequality and justice—interact. And on the practical politics 
side, to work out how the energy mobilised by the sharpened focus on 
‘fossil capital as the enemy’ can enable not only continued pressure 
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on politicians, corporations, and the like, but feed through into more 
concrete action to transform those high carbon systems (as discussed 
in the chapters by Halme et al., Sandover and Whitmarsh, this volume). 
On the academic side, the implications of this argument are to 
generate a number of questions we might usefully focus our attention on. 
For example, we could focus more research attention on the conditions 
under which depoliticised governance ‘works’, and when it gets stuck 
because of incumbent resistance. Are there general lessons we can learn 
from these patterns? Do some aspects of the climate challenge lend 
themselves more readily to this sort of depoliticised governance than 
others? We could also ask, conversely, what types of repoliticisation 
actually shift the practices of governments and corporations? Or 
what types also generate novel initiatives that shift power relations 
in important ways and enable us to pursue more radical and rapid 
decarbonisation? For example, do community renewable energy or agro-
ecology initiatives generate new sorts of social relations that undermine 
the power of fossil fuel corporations? What are the key moments in 
climate policy trajectories where activist pressure might have the most 
impacts? Finally, we could ask questions about whether, and how, novel 
institutional arrangements like citizens’ climate assemblies, enable this 
sort of conflictual politics to be ‘embedded’ in formal climate policy and 
governance arrangements, and thus reshape the political landscape, 
more broadly favouring rapid change to accelerate decarbonisation?
I am not best placed to advise social movements on strategy, but it 
seems to me that the implications of this sort of argument are that we 
should work on activities that seek not only to put immediate pressure 
on governments and corporations, through the variety of well-known 
strategies we see in for example XR, divestment, or school strikes (and 
their analogies in earlier periods of climate activism), but also to generate 
initiatives that act more directly to shift power away from corporate and 
government actors—community energy or land ownership, community 
forestry or agriculture, and so on, that might both keep climate political 
in important ways but also start to build more long-term sustainable 
solutions. Many of these initiatives of course already exist, but perhaps 
need to be understood more deeply as political interventions in ways 
that they are often not. 
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24. Sustainable Foodscapes: 
Hybrid Food Networks Creating 
Food Change 
Rebecca Sandover 
Food matters, from modes of production to global supply chains, 
what we eat and how we address food waste. Food practices shape 
not only climate and ecological breakdown but also human health 
and well-being including within our food producing communities, 
unequal access to food, food justice, animal welfare and more. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) activities 
account for 21–37% of total net anthropogenic GHG emissions 
(IPCC 2019). Considering these ‘wicked issues’ in the UK, and 
how to work for more sustainable food systems, centres debates 
on intersecting issues of land use, food distribution, community-
based innovation and social justice amongst others. Within the 
present food policy vacuum in England, place-based community 
groups have been self-organising and connecting with different 
national organisations whose campaigns overlap to form hybrid 
food networks. Hybrid food networks focus on central food issues, 
such as sustainable local food supply chains, access to sustainable 
local food, household food insecurity and more. These networks 
intersect at a place-based scale where locally acting communities 
take forward programmes of work to enact sustainable food 
change, whilst also linking to the campaigns of national and 
translocal networks and frameworks. This essay will explore the 
dynamic potential of these hybrid networks in working towards 
place-based sustainable food solutions, via a case study of Devon. 
© 2021 Rebecca Sandover, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.24
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Introduction 
Food has become an organising principle through which we measure 
the impacts of crises on our lives in a time of multiple emergencies. 
From issues of effective food supply chains and access to food during 
the UK COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, to contestations around how 
to eat for a sustainable planet. Food, how it is produced, and how we 
get access to it as consumers, is of central concern when considering a 
time of multiple emergencies. Action to address these critical issues has 
been seen at a place-based scale, from climate assemblies and juries1 to 
local civil society food organisations collaborating to effect food change, 
including forging partnerships with local authorities to support place-
based food assistance programmes.2
Local food initiatives are now collaborating at a range of scales 
across the UK, from city level, to borough or countywide projects, as 
exemplified by The Sustainable Food Places, Food Power Alliances and 
Feeding Britain projects. Intersecting actions of civil society organisations 
via hybrid food networks act as an increasingly important mechanism 
to link food actors, community-based organisations and policymakers 
in addressing the critical food issues faced by communities in the 
UK today. Civil society food organisations are concerned with issues 
of boosting sustainable food production, household food insecurity, 
access to fresh food, diet-related ill-health, promoting sustainable diets, 
boosting community food resilience, and more (Blake 2019; Sandover 
2020a) (also see Halme et al., this volume). Self-organising local food 
initiatives connect place-based organisations with nationwide bodies 
to form hybrid networks working for food change, linking grassroots 
community organisations with policymakers (Moragues-Faus and 
Sonnino 2019; Santo and Moragues-Faus 2019). By being comprised 
of actors representing a range of community groups, hybrid food 
networks are able to generate community-based knowledge and work 
to effect policy change (Moragues-Faus and Morgan 2015; Sonnino et 
1  Recent and current examples here include Leeds Climate Change Citizens’ Jury, 
Adur and Worthing Climate Assembly, Kendal Climate Jury, Devon Net Zero 
Citizens’ Assembly and others.
2  See the work of Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, La Via Campesina, EAT Nordic Cities 
Initiative, African Food Security Urban Network for examples of trans-local and 
regional food policy organisations.
 31524. Sustainable Foodscapes
al. 2016; Sandover 2020a). At a wider scale, place-based food networks 
are common features of a number of countries’ food policy landscapes, 
including USA and Canada, and they often intersect with trans-local 
food networks, enabling international knowledge sharing and target 
setting for place-based sustainable food action (Santo and Moragues-
Faus 2019).
This essay explores how food traverses debates focused on taking 
action on climate change, specifically issues of governance and the 
role of civil society organisations in shaping sustainability agendas. In 
particular, it focuses on hybrid food networks and the dynamic potential 
of these hybrid networks in working towards place-based sustainable 
food solutions that also consider imperatives of food justice. 
Hybrid Food Networks
City-regions, and other local administrative areas, have been recognised 
as being ideally placed to promote localised food strategies and to join 
up the disparate actors working towards similar ends (Morgan 2013). 
Recent scholarship has focused on the development of effective food 
governance frameworks in the cities of London, Toronto and New 
York, city-regions of Bristol, Brighton and Hove, Glasgow, and trans-
local frameworks such as The Milan Urban Food Policy Pact and the 
C40 Cities network, who work for more just and sustainable policies 
(Morgan and Sonnino 2010; Sonnino et al. 2016; Santo and Moragues-
Faus 2019). A more integrative approach to food policy thinking is 
being progressed via city-based and place-based initiatives that 
enable policymakers to work with civil society actors and trans-local 
networks on common issues (Betsill and Bulkeley 2007; Morgan and 
Sonnino 2010). Place-based and trans-local networks of civil society 
food actors are emerging as coherent voices for a reconfigured food 
system (Sonnino et al. 2016; Moragues-Faus and Morgan 2015; Santo 
and Moragues-Faus 2019).
Hybrid food networks focus on central food issues such as 
sustainable local food supply chains, access to sustainable local food, 
household food insecurity and more. Many food-focused activist 
and campaigning networks such as Sustainable Food Places (SFP), 
Landworkers’ Alliance, Food Power, La Via Campesina, and others 
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intersect at a place-based scale where locally acting self-organising 
communities take forward programmes of work to enact local food 
change, whilst also linking to the campaigns of national and translocal 
networks and frameworks. National UK networks, like SFP and Food 
Power, assist place-based civil society organisations’ action for food 
change by offering support, limited funding and sharing tools such as 
evidence-based reports (Sonnino et al. 2016; Santo and Moragues-Faus 
2019). In the UK, SFP have been working since 2013 with localised 
food partnerships to work towards transforming food cultures and 
food systems. The network has grown from the first six cities in 2015 
to the over fifty-five places that are working today towards common 
goals of implementing and supporting sustainable and fair food 
systems that meet the needs of local communities (Moragues-Faus and 
Morgan 2015). SFP has the potential to promote access to sustainable 
and healthy food by influencing policy makers, local communities and 
local businesses. There are examples of enduring and impactful work 
by local food networks across the UK, which in England have partly 
arisen in response to the policy vacuum, although there is hope that 
this will change via the work of the National Food Strategy (2020), 
plus progressive food policy action in the devolved nations.3 Examples 
include Bristol Food Network, Brighton and Hove Food Partnership, 
Manchester Food Board, Sheffood, Food Durham, Food Cardiff, 
Glasgow Food Policy Partnership and others 
In recent years, Sustainable Food Places have also linked to other 
national movements for food change. In particular, the Food Power 
and Feeding Britain movements have connected with sustainable food 
cities, and independent self-organising communities to work together 
on the rising issue of UK household food insecurity. These networks 
share commonalities of objectives but have differences in terms of their 
wider aims and ambitions. By working together on specific objectives 
and in the absence of effective government policies in England, these 
organisations are creating hybrid food networks that address complex 
concerns that require a multi-partnership, multi-issue response. 
3  See https://www.nourishscotland.org/ and https://www.foodsensewales.org.uk/ 
for insights into different political approaches within the UK.
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Action on Food at a Place-Based Scale: Food Exeter 
The formation and operation of hybrid food networks are visible in the 
recent history of Food Exeter, which was established as a sustainable 
food city in 2014 (previously known as Exeter Food Network) to work 
towards sustainable and healthy food for all in the city. In 2018 Food Exeter 
also became a ‘Food Poverty Alliance’ after securing funding from Food 
Power and began a dialogue process to explore a cross-city approach 
to addressing household food insecurity. In a time of COVID-19, Food 
Power funding enabled Food Exeter to begin working with emergency 
food providers, on their ‘Signposting Project’ to begin first steps in 
exploring ways of reducing disjointed operations across the city. Food 
Power funding has also assisted Food Exeter work with other regional 
organisations working to address household food insecurity. The South 
West Food Power Alliance supports the sharing of best practices and 
exploring common experienced challenges for organisations working 
on access to food and food equity across the region.
Local governance structures in Devon have shaped Food Exeter’s 
independence as a civil society organisation working without formal 
links to local authorities. In the county of Devon, public health 
responsibilities around food and health sit with the county council, 
reducing pathways to engagement with Exeter City Council. However, 
the COVID-19 crisis and mass climate emergency protests in 2019 have 
impacted the urgency with which food issues are now perceived by local 
authorities, with both Devon County Council and Exeter City Council 
taking steps forward in establishing food strategies or food partnerships 
in late 2020 and early 2021. Cascading government funding on food 
support, Devon County Council have funded organisations at each 
district council level to run short programmes to join up emergency food 
providers and trial programmes in order to prevent household food 
insecurity. In Exeter, Food Exeter are working with Exeter Community 
Initiatives to run this programme in collaboration with emergency food 
providers and agencies. 
Devon County Council also supports a multi-stakeholder 
partnership, Devon Climate Emergency, to run a Carbon Plan process in 
the wake of all councils in Devon declaring a climate emergency in 2019. 
The Carbon Plan process is a multi-faceted approach with the Devon 
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Climate Emergency Response Group, made up of all local authorities 
in Devon plus other key environmental, land-use and business 
membership groups, managing the process. Alongside them, The 
Devon Climate Emergency Taskforce operates as an independent group 
of experts weighing up the evidence sourced from expert hearings and 
public consultations. Between them they have agreed an Interim Devon 
Carbon Plan, with key controversial issues, such as sustainable food 
production and consumption issues being deliberated by a Climate 
Assembly in summer 2021.
Alongside their focus on access to food and household food insecurity, 
Food Exeter are focused on action to build capacity for sustainable 
food in the city. In 2020, Food Exeter supported the establishment 
of a new community benefit enterprise, Good Food Exeter, to set up 
neighbourhood farmers’ markets in communities where good-quality, 
fresh produce was less available. With the uncertainties of lockdown and 
with the support of ‘Veg Cities’ funding from The Sustainable Places, 
Food Exeter decided to turn this into an online farmers’ market where 
customers made online orders based on what produce was available and 
then collected from a designated collection point on a set day or received 
their delivery by e-cargo bike. With forty (and growing) Greater Exeter 
local and micro-producers supplying them with affordable, high quality 
produce, the market has won loyal support from local customers. A 
difference between Good Food Exeter and other online food suppliers 
is that Good Food Exeter’s producers include micro-producer startups 
who may have a limited weekly stock. This enables micro-producers to 
sell as little or as much as they can and so support their first steps as a 
sustainable food producer.
The Networks Powering Local Food Initiatives
COVID-19 has shown that local food producers, distributors and shops 
have proved to be “small and nimble and people-powered” (Tom Steele 
of the Kentish Town Box Scheme), highlighting that their ability to 
provide access to food relies on their adaptability and their community 
embeddedness. Independent, local food shops source produce from a 
diverse range of suppliers including wholesalers, local producers and 
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micro-producers. Food initiatives enact community embeddedness 
that forge strong relationships both with their suppliers and with their 
customers. An innovative local food market, Good Food Exeter draws on 
the enduring relationships of their sister organisation, Food Exeter with 
the UK-wide Sustainable Places network, who host a range of channels 
for sharing best practices and learning from other place-based food 
policy organisations. Enduring relationships with local food producers, 
shops, charities and community centres in Exeter also created the local 
knowledge networks needed for Good Food Exeter to be formed. The 
networks underpinning the responsiveness and adaptability of the local 
food economy may be place-based and contingent, however sustainable 
food networks, producer membership organisations and associated 
charities enable the building of capacity within the local food economy. 
This in turn builds the potential to invigorate food security at regional 
and local scales via relocalised supply chains. Local food initiatives have 
proven themselves to be innovative, adaptable and creative in a time of 
crisis. However, a longer-term flourishing of the local food economy will 
require more than the dedication and ingenuity of local food leaders. 
In her new book, Sitopia, Carolyn Steel (2020) calls for a redesigning 
of the local food market in collaboration with local authorities, who 
have the ability to support the local food economy via policy and 
planning. Multi-purpose covered markets, rate reductions for local food 
shops, supporting pop-up micro food businesses, exploring access to 
land for new entrants, and more, would enable the visibility of local 
food producers within our high streets. By providing access to popular 
shopping spaces, policies that support local food producers would also 
have the potential to boost the vibrancy of these spaces, in line with 
thinking on the experience economy (Poulsson and Kale 2004). A 
decentralised approach to food policy and redesigning local food retail 
spaces needs to go hand-in-hand with national policies that support this 
sector. The COVID-19 crisis shows that an over-reliance on supermarkets 
for the nation’s food needs has created fragile agri-food supply chains 
that are not only vulnerable to disruption but also hamper the placing 
of local, sustainable and regional fresh produce at the heart of our 
communities (Sandover 2020b).
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Conclusion 
In 2019/2020 national and local authorities made declarations of a 
climate emergency and as outlined here at a regional level, Devon is 
taking steps to address the role of food in the climate change emergency. 
Alongside this, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated action to address 
household food insecurity and promote sustainable food supply chains. 
Drawing on its history of work funded by SFP and Food Power, Food 
Exeter found itself at the centre of this place-based action for sustainable 
and equitable food change. National linkages provided Food Exeter with 
essential opportunities to learn from other place-based food networks. 
Local linkages and its history of operation enabled it to move swiftly to 
innovate new programme areas of work, such as the new emergency 
food project and the establishment of Good Food Exeter. 
Taking a civic-led and bottom-up approach, local and regional food 
and health programmes can bring together networks of organisations 
to work collaboratively on pressing food issues within their localities. 
Working with local authorities, key decision-makers and regional 
bodies, hybrid food networks support place-based food networks to 
realise the goal of transforming local and regional food systems whilst 
working to address climate change. Developing a regional, sustainable 
food plan would support these hybrid food networks to build capacity 
in the supply and sale of local, sustainable food, including increasing 
the procurement of local, sustainable food by public bodies and anchor 
institutions.
Spatially, these models increasingly act as nested partnerships, 
where place-based networks engage with partners within regional and 
national frameworks based on agreed aims and objectives. Through 
these actions of network formation and co-producing knowledges, 
hybrid food networks can influence and implement locally adapted 
programmes and policies that enact sustainable food change.
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25. Telling the ‘Truth’: 
Communication of the Climate 
Protest Agenda in the UK  
Legacy Media
Sharon Gardham 
This essay draws on the results of a thematic discourse analysis 
of UK media coverage of climate strike actions that took place in 
2019, and reflects on the importance of the framing of protester 
claims-making and identity for wider adoption of climate protest 
messages. It revisits a key question for the organisers of such 
protests regarding how they can overcome the potential conflict 
between ensuring their actions pass the test of newsworthiness 
required to ensure media attention, without failing the tests of 
claims-making legitimisation necessary for an issue to become 
accepted as a societal problem that requires urgent resolution.
Introduction
The momentum of climate protests grew exponentially throughout 
2018 and 2019, culminating in two key climate protest actions in the 
autumn of 2019: the Fridays for Future (FFF) Climate Strike, which was 
the biggest climate strike ever held (Laville and Watts 2019); and the 
Extinction Rebellion (XR) International Rebellion, which saw acts of 
civil disobedience take place in cities around the world over a two-week 
period.
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Despite the size and scale of these protests, in the UK at least, issues 
surrounding the environment failed to make any obvious political 
headway at the extraordinary general election held in December of 
that year. Instead, the Conservative Party enjoyed a landslide victory, 
despite the relatively scant coverage of environmental issues in their 
campaigning or manifesto (Richards 2019). This situation was reflected 
in the media, whose coverage in the run up to the election was dominated 
by Brexit and leadership personalities, with the environment way down 
the list of news priorities (Loughborough University 2019). 
This gap in reporting raises the question of where and how the 
protest momentum stalled, and what role the press has in setting the 
environmental agenda for their readership. 
For the protest organisations involved, this issue begs the question 
of how they can strike a balance between creating an “image event” 
(Cox and Schwarze 2015: 76) sufficient to ensure it earns media 
coverage, whilst gaining enough claims-making legitimisation to 
promote environmental issues to recognised social problems (Hansen 
2015). How can protesters “command attention, gain legitimacy and 
invoke action” (Hansen 2015: 30) against the backdrop of a media who 
“more often than not, prefer to maintain and reproduce the dominant 
mainstream frames and cultural codes” (Hannigan 2014: 137), and who 
are naturally wedded to the reporting of newsworthy content in rapid 
news cycles, which the relatively slow-moving issue of environmental 
degradation does not seem to support (Carvalho 2010)?
This chapter presents the key findings of a thematic discourse 
analysis carried out on UK newspaper reporting of the two climate 
protest actions mentioned above that took place in the autumn of 2019. 
More than 4000 excerpts were coded using a six-stage method (after 
Braun and Clarke 2006), examining the balance of event reporting in 
comparison to underlying communication of protester claims-making, 
the presentation of protester motivation and identity and the potential 
politicisation of protest news reporting.
Analysis was carried out on legacy media1 publications from 
across the political spectrum in the UK (The Guardian, BBC Online, The 
Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail), and on protester organisation press 
1  I.e. traditional print or television media news organisations that predate online 
formats.
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releases, covering four events: FFF’s Climate Strike, XR’s International 
Rebellion opening actions, XR’s Tube action and the outcome of XR’s 
legal challenge to the Metropolitan Police on their London-wide ban on 
protesters meeting in groups.
Key Findings
The analysis showed that media coverage of the events was highly 
politicised, demonstrated by the proportion of coverage given to voices 
in support of, or opposition to, protest, which was directly relatable to 
the political bias of the various publications. For example, for one coded 
item ‘Protest or protester opposition directly quoted’, 77% of excerpts 
came from the right-leaning publications studied (The Telegraph and 
Daily Mail). This propensity towards confirmation bias was evident 
across publications and across events, with various methods employed to 
promote established positions, and reinforce the views and expectations 
of the paper’s readership. 
In fact, all publications appeared to stay firmly within a preferred 
narrative, whether they were reporting on FFF or XR actions. For 
example, The Guardian stuck to its depiction of protests as peaceable and 
non-violent, even when violence broke out during the XR Tube action 
(detailed below), instead focusing the majority of its coverage on the 
peaceable actions that took place as opposed to the assault perpetuated 
on protesters by members of the travelling public (Gayle 2019). The Daily 
Telegraph, on the other hand, focused its coverage of protests on issues 
relating to law and order, with even legal protest actions being likened 
to criminality via comments that protests were taking police away from 
dealing with ‘serious crime’ (Sawer and Roberts 2019). Whilst a focus 
on matters of law and order may be understandable when reporting on 
XR actions for which disruption and arrest are deliberate tactics (Taylor 
2020), it is perhaps more telling of a commitment to a preferred narrative 
when it is used to report on the FFF action. This action saw very few 
arrests, with a Metropolitan Police commander quoted as saying that 
“overall the day ran smoothly” and any real disruption was attributable 
to a “tiny minority” of protesters (BBC Online 2019). A focus on law-
and-order issues at this protest would therefore seem incongruous, 
unless it is deployed in order to support a predefined position.
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The protest organisations themselves were no less inclined to stick 
to the script when it came to their own publications. FFF displayed a 
strong bias towards an environmental injustice narrative, enough so to 
frighten The Daily Telegraph into branding their claims as “anti-science” 
and “hugely dangerous” (Sawer and Roberts 2019). XR on the other 
hand avoided any direct challenge to the status quo (at least in the texts 
I studied), relying instead on what Hannigan (2014) terms the Arcadian 
narrative, rallying supporters around a sense of history and a love of 
land, as well as self-sacrifice for the greater good (Extinction Rebellion 
2019).
These favoured narratives fail to make much impression on news 
reporting, however, instead becoming either lost in translation or else 
eclipsed by protest event-driven news coverage. Aside from The Daily 
Telegraph’s slightly alarmist reporting on the demands of the UK Student 
Climate Network, communication of underlying protester claims-making 
was far less evident than reporting on other so-called newsworthy 
items. In fact, if we exclude the protester press releases, just 3% of the 
analysed excerpts related to the communication of underlying protest 
messages. Given that media framing is so important to the recognition 
of an issue, particularly where there is little perceived direct experience 
of it (Happer and Philo 2013; Hansen 2015; Whitmarsh 2015), this gap 
should be considered a problem for these organisations.
On this note, analysis of mention of the specifics of environmental 
problems showed that scientific explanation or legitimation of 
environmental issues accounted for fewer than 1% of all excerpts, 
including the statements of the protester organisations. General 
comments about the issues were more prevalent, but specifics were thin 
on the ground. The reasons for this absence are not clear: perhaps the 
British public are already considered familiar enough with the specifics 
of the issues so as not to need further explanation, as Jukneviciute et 
al.’s (2011) comparative study of the Swedish and Lithuanian media 
suggests, or perhaps the science narrative is not favoured due to a 
perceived mistrust of science, even though ‘empirically […] blanket 
mistrust of scientists is rare in most countries’ (Fairbrother 2017: 3). 
In terms of who or what was responsible for either the cause 
or resolution of environmental issues, the government were most 
commonly blamed, with the economy and personal responsibility 
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coming a distant second and third. Very occasional mention was made 
of corporate responsibility. Considering that corporations are in fact 
responsible for so much environmental damage (Riley 2017), and that 
they wield considerably more power in some cases than nation states 
(Rodionova 2016), this is both surprising and worrying. 
Stahel (2016) suggests that whilst state responsibility is key to 
environmental agreements being made, the state-centred approach 
to change is less relevant in today’s global markets (as also alluded to 
in Bracking’s chapter, this volume). If FFF’s environmental injustice 
narrative is to be credible, however, surely corporate responsibility 
should feature more prominently? 
There were also distinct differences in the amount of coverage given 
over to questions of responsibility in the different sections of the press, 
with The Guardian and BBC Online together accounting for 42% of 
excerpts on this issue, compared to 7% for The Daily Telegraph and Daily 
Mail. 
Another consideration is the propensity towards a binary journalism; 
a presentation of us and them where journalist and reader combine in 
juxtaposition to an enemy other, with one single view claimed as the only 
worldview; a style of journalism which, according to Sonwalker (2005: 
262) “came out of the closet after 9/11” and which is evident today, 
not only in the media, but in popular politics, not least during the 2020 
US presidential election. The identification of protesters as other was 
strongly evident, particularly in the right-leaning press. Various tactics 
were used to perpetuate this view, with FFF protesters largely othered 
on the grounds that they were naïve truants out for an educational day 
trip, despite the fact that the September FFF Climate Strike was an inter-
generational effort. This fact is in line with the depiction of FFF protesters 
found in the media of both Germany (Bergmann and Ossewaarde 2019) 
and Sweden (Jacobssen 2019).
XR protesters are similarly othered in some publications, on occasion 
via direct name calling. The Daily Mail, for example, described XR 
protesters as an “eco-mob” of “nose-ringed crusties” (Sinmaz et al. 
2019). The Daily Telegraph described XR protesters as engaged in various 
activities (e.g. yoga, drumming and chanting, lighting incense (Dixon 
and Lyons 2019)) that might be juxtaposed against the hard-working 
parents, commuters, hospital patients and gig-economy workers 
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presented at odds with the protesters: the “people like us” whose lives 
and livelihoods are disrupted by the actions of protesters. Alternatively, 
protesters of all types are at times depicted as deviant or criminal. In fact, 
reporting of protesters as either naïve children or figures of fun often 
sits alongside depictions of protesters as being complicit in violence 
or being likened to criminality without the slightest irony or sense of 
contradiction. 
Even when protesters were the victims of criminal acts there was 
little sympathy expressed for them either on a personal level, or in terms 
of their cause. The XR Tube action on 17 October 2019 saw protesters 
dragged from the roof of a train at Canning Town and beaten and kicked 
on the platform (Gardner 2019). Despite this reality, all publications 
mentioned the arrest of protesters rather than their assailants. The 
messages of protest were all but drowned out, with communication of 
underlying claims-making at this event barely registering. 
Similarly, the successful XR legal challenge did not garner much 
sympathy for protesters from some corners of the press, who, despite 
their recent vociferous defence of democracy when threatened by direct 
XR action in the autumn of 2020 (The Daily Telegraph 2020), failed to 
defend the democratic right of peaceable protest. It instead quoted 
Scotland Yard as saying that it required “new powers to help it shut 
down future green protests”, making much of the fact that protesters 
who were wrongly arrested could now sue the Metropolitan Police, 
thereby placing additional burdens on taxpayers who “already face 
a bill of at least £24 million” as a result of the International Rebellion 
(Ledwith 2019: online). That the overreach of police powers might, 
in itself, pose a threat to democratic rights was only mentioned in The 
Guardian.
Whilst the right-leaning press seem to resort to scare-tactics or 
othering of protesters in some cases in order to disguise or delegitimate 
protester claims-making, more sympathetic treatment was evident in 
the left-leaning publication. The Guardian’s coverage of the FFF march 
was both enthusiastic and extensive and whilst their reporting on XR’s 
actions was less so, it was certainly more measured in tone than reporting 
found elsewhere. BBC Online coverage, however, was very event-driven. 
Whilst extensive, it appeared to be the most neutral, perhaps reflecting 
its wish to avoid accusations of bias to which, as a public broadcaster, 
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it is particularly sensitive, so much so that its new Director General has 
introduced new stringent rules on impartiality amongst staff, that even 
extend to their personal lives (Waterson 2020).
Given that the right-leaning publications with their potentially 
greater readership reach are more vociferous in opposition to protest 
than other media outlets,2 the implications are that the clearest statement 
to the largest audience is one of protester message de-legitimation and 
incitement of opposition to protest, drowning out the less strident 
voices of support. BBC Online’s greater reach3 is negated by its focus 
on neutrality. Whether the recent XR blockade of Murdoch-owned 
publications, with its subsequent chorus of approbation, was the right 
way to redress this balance is debatable, however, since it allowed the 
right-leaning press the chance to play the victim and, perhaps justifiably, 
accuse the protesters of being actively anti-democratic. 
Conclusion
There will always be competing items clamouring for media coverage, 
with the next big story always just around the corner. After five years 
of Brexit dominating the UK news and political debate, we might have 
longed for an alternative story. That it comes along in the shape of a 
deadly, life-limiting global pandemic is something that few would have 
anticipated and that even fewer would have desired. Against this fierce 
competition for column inches, the environment often does not just play 
second fiddle, but instead barely makes the line-up at all. 
The efforts of FFF and XR to redress this balance, to give voice to the 
often voiceless other-than-human world, should therefore be admired 
(see also North and Paterson, this volume). As this research demonstrates 
however, it is debatable how much this voice is heard amongst the noise 
of other aspects of protests—those “image events” (Cox and Schwarze 
2015) that may capture headlines, but do not necessarily win the hearts 
and minds of the public, or at least not enough to represent an electoral 
threat to government. 
2  The Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail had a 1.6 million circulation between them during 
2019, compared to The Guardian’s 141,000 (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2020).
3  In 2015 its news app was used by 51% of UK smartphone users (National Union of 
Journalists 2015).
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In addition, whilst the deployment of ever more disruptive and 
spectacular tactics may gain column inches, the greater shock value may 
mean that the fewer of those inches are dedicated to communicating 
a sympathetic message of protester claims, even when protesters have 
been attacked or legally wronged. These events may instead distract 
from the underlying message, meaning that even the determined 
reader might struggle to discover any real details of the issues, let alone 
suggestions for their resolution. Reporting in effect becomes less focused 
on messages that may aid the legitimation of protester claims-making, 
and more on the reporting of the sensational aspects of those events, or 
else on direct denigration of protesters and their messages in support of 
the status quo. This observation, however, is not intended to detract from 
the equally important experiential and community-making dimensions 
of participation in protest events, which are critical elements of building 
‘social movement potency’ regarding environmental justice concerns 
(cf. Salter and Sullivan 2008; Mueller and Sullivan 2015). 
XR and FFF both request that a citizens’ assembly is formed with a 
focus on the environment, showing their recognition that protest can 
only be a short-term strategy in striving for urgent and meaningful 
change. That we have been discussing climate change for more than 
thirty years, that the main NGOs have already traversed the path from 
protest to a seat at the table, and that despite all this we have moved 
during that time from anticipated problems with climate change to a 
real and present climate crisis, should be a warning to those who see the 
chance for direct political participation as an outcome in itself.
In majoritarian democracies such as the UK, political change can be 
brought about by the perception of an electoral threat (Vliengenthart et 
al. 2016). Winning sufficient public support from all sections of society is 
necessary if we are to signal this electoral threat to whichever incumbent 
government is in power, such that they do indeed make decisions on 
behalf of the environment that override purely economic considerations. 
For corporations that continue to perpetuate environmental degradation 
and social injustice, consumer and shareholder pressure, combined with 
widespread public support for globally-agreed governmental controls 
and legislation, are necessary to bring about a change in attitude and 
strategy.
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The fact that transnational corporations control such a high 
proportion of the media (Stahel 2016), the media’s propensity to remain 
within hegemonic norms (Sonwalker 2005) and readers’ preference 
for affirmation of their pre-established views rather than seeking a 
challenge to them (Happer and Philo 2013), all suggest that garnering 
media coverage is currently of limited use in the urgent fight to reverse 
our increasingly disastrous environmental trajectory. Media from 
across the political spectrum will deliver the news that it thinks reflects 
the priorities and views of its readership and its corporate owners. 
Circumvention of the legacy media via a restoration of faith in the 
democratising influence of the Internet and the citizen journalist may 
provide one way forward. Following this logic, if the environment can 
be made to be a priority for readers, voters and consumers, then the 
news, corporate behaviour and the political will to make fundamental 
changes should follow.
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26. Climate Justice Advocacy: 
Strategic Choices for Glasgow 
and Beyond
Patrick Bond 
The Paris Climate Agreement and subsequent United Nations 
follow-up conferences have not taken seriously the ecological 
crisis now unfolding. Not only does prominent scientist James 
Hansen describe its tokenistic measures in scathing terms, but 
those seeking climate justice have long despaired of multilateral 
climate policymaking dominated by imperial and sub-imperial 
elite negotiators from high-emitting economies. Mid-2021 
negotiations confirmed the lack of UN progress. Instead, there 
are two strategies worth considering: delegitimisation of elites, and 
‘Blockadia’ of high-carbon projects. Both are proceeding but both 
need more clarity in strategic approaches—as in the ‘Glasgow 
Agreement’ promoted by leading civil society activist groups—
that apply to the 2021 climate summit and many other struggles 
beyond.
Introduction
In June 2019, at the first Climate Justice Forum dedicated to scholars 
now embracing the field, I had the opportunity to speak following 
Mary Robinson’s opening plenary address to the Glasgow Caledonian 
University Centre for Climate Justice (2019). The former Irish president 
and UN Human Rights Commissioner was as eloquent as ever. Her 
most powerful advice to the group, with regard to a strategic advocacy 
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agenda, was that since the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was a useful 
start to decarbonising the world economy, the critical next step was to 
relegitimise Paris by compelling national governments to shift its ‘non-
binding’ provisions to binding. 
Robinson’s approach would entail returning to an essential principle 
of UN treaties dealing with global ecological crises: for example, the 
1987 Montreal Protocol that banned CFCs to prevent catastrophic 
ozone hole growth, or the Kyoto Protocol’s 1997 binding conditions. 
She proposed transcending the sleazy back-room deal permitting 
‘bottom-up’ voluntary emissions commitments made in December 2009 
by leaders of the United States, Brazil, China, India and South Africa—
i.e., a “league of super-polluters and would-be super-polluters”, as Bill 
McKibben (2009: online) of 350.org put it—at the fifteenth Copenhagen 
Conference of the Parties. (From then on, the nickname Conference of 
Polluters would often be used by critics to describe the UNFCCC’s annual 
gathering.) Nevertheless, insisted Robinson, such a reform to ensure 
binding non-voluntary adherence to Paris should be the orientation we 
adopt as scholar-activists, so as to incrementally strengthen the case that 
the planet can be saved, top down.
Against this approach, I pointed out, were dilemmas associated 
with implementation mechanisms implied at Paris, such as ongoing 
emissions trading and offsets to maximise Northern emissions’ 
efficiency (no matter the speculative bubbles forever roiling their 
price), or sequestering CO2 through dubious “carbon neutrality” 
gambits (see chapters by Hannis and Dyke et al., this volume). These 
strategies she has supported in the past under the rubric of climate 
justice (CJ), even though the CJ movement universally opposed 
carbon markets and so-called “false solutions” (Bond 2012a). She 
did not acknowledge that the mere act of signing the Paris Climate 
Agreement meant acknowledging no accountability mechanisms or 
penalties (such as “border adjustment taxes” on climate scofflaws), as 
Donald Trump showed in June 2017 when he pulled the US out of the 
agreement. Robinson was not concerned that when countries signed 
the Paris deal that meant they legally forgave the West and BRICS for 
what is their historic “climate debt” (i.e., ecological reparations to the 
victims of the correlated “loss and damage”). She did not grapple with 
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the three missing sectors conveniently left out of the Paris Climate 
Agreement: military, shipping and air transport. Nor was the failure 
of Paris to include a Just Transition for workers in carbon-intensive 
sectors to find alternative employment in a greener economy worth 
mentioning. Nor did Paris mention the urgent need to force fossil fuel 
firms into accepting that there is vast “unburnable carbon” in their 
portfolios, that in a sane world would be adjusted radically downward 
in valuation accounts (as “stranded assets”). The divestment pressures 
that were building up in civil society——removing funds from firms 
and financiers that refuse these logical capitalist self-correction 
mechanisms—were not considered, nor did Paris negotiators pay due 
respect to activists, especially those in grassroots, indigenous, anti-
extractivist struggles and especially the youth.
Although the university’s Centre for Climate Justice has firmly 
defined its field on the progressive end of the spectrum, some of the 
gathered intellectuals seemed quite content with Robinson’s approach. 
It would allow them ongoing participation within the mainstream 
of global climate policy, and hence sustained potentials for receipt of 
research and education grants, more rapid academic publications and 
membership in the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
As a result, without properly interrogating the politics of Paris, some 
intellectuals proceeded to take debates into the standard explorations 
of justice applied to climate: procedural, recognition, distributive, 
compensatory, restitutive and corrective. To be fair, some scholars 
also acknowledge the dangers that “neoliberal justice” would become 
a potentially dangerous trajectory (see Khan et al. 2020, for a review 
applied to climate finance; also see Harris, this volume). But there 
was a solid bloc of academics who were satisfied with the prevailing 
wisdom that the Paris Climate Agreement is essentially sound, and if 
the ambition is ratcheted up in quinquennial revisions of Nationally 
Determined Contributions, the central goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and maintaining temperatures below a rise of 1.5 degrees 
above pre-industrial levels during this century, is achievable. 
Not everyone sees the framing in this way. If the Paris parameters, 
instead, offer a profoundly unsound basis for making climate policy—
from global to local scales—then a very different set of principles, 
analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances (PASTA) should present 
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themselves. And if the presumption that global climate policy does 
far more harm than good is correct, Greta Thunberg (2020) put her 
finger on the problem: “we are still in a state of complete denial, as we 
waste our time, creating new loopholes with empty words and creative 
accounting.” As she accused the United Nations in 2019, “[w]e are in 
the beginning of a mass extinction and all you can talk about is money 
and fairytales of eternal economic growth. How dare you.”
A change is needed. For if the flaws in global climate policy processes 
and content identified above (as well as others), then no matter how 
much debate proceeds on injecting various justice framings into the 
UNFCCC, it will be impossible to generate an outcome worthy of 
human endeavour, and planetary survival will be moot. That outcome 
appears, in mid-2021, far more likely than any other, so a Plan B is 
needed based on an entirely different strategy to Robinson’s: i.e., a 
strategy to delegitimise Paris and its elite negotiators, and instead 
turn to immediate direct actions, more flexible scales of international 
engagement, and more creative strategies for bottom-up activism. 
The challenge is simple: how to most rapidly overturn what can be 
considered climate-policy mal-governance. Is one of the approaches to 
delegitimise the UNFCCC and especially the COPs? If so, what to put 
in its place?
The Case of the Glasgow Agreement
Climate Justice (CJ) is typically the alternative to “Climate Action” of 
the sort the UNFCCC promotes. Three of the most famous activist-based 
statements on CJ came from meetings of the Durban Group for Climate 
Justice (hosted in South Africa) in 2004, the Bali (Indonesia) COP in 
2007, and the Cochabamba (Bolivia) alternative climate summit in 2010 
(Bond 2012a). They were ambitious. The Cochabamba statement, for 
instance, made concrete demands for reparations, emissions-cutting 
targets and institutional mechanisms such as ecocide courts, amplifying 
Indigenous People’s power, and formal Rights of Mother Earth.
In subsequent years, less systematic approaches by the movement 
were taken at various COPs and occasional meetings in between. 
There was a systemic failure in the CJ movement to generate the kind 
of global coordination achieved by, for example, La Via Campesina 
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whose main force was the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement but 
which successfully moved the federated network’s global headquarters 
around affiliates. However, despite CJ movement complaints that the 
UNFCCC should no longer be a central focus of global organising 
initiatives, that was the terrain of struggle from Bali in 2007 until at 
least Warsaw COP in 2013. Then in September 2014, a march of 400,000 
climate activists in New York coincided with the UN General Assembly 
heads of state meeting, and while the November-December period 
was invariably one of global days of action and critique, September 
2019 became the most active month of global climate action yet, 
thanks to the campaigning of Fridays for Future. Unlike other CJ local 
actions which failed to generate global-scale coordination, the youth 
were successfully catalysed by Greta Thunberg’s weekly sit-in at the 
Swedish parliament from mid-2018.
In late 2020, as COVID-19 continued to disrupt the potential for wide-
scale, coordinated and increasingly radical climate activism, a “Glasgow 
Agreement” was offered by leading forces driven especially from 
within southern Europe’s CJ movement. It caught on internationally, 
with participation and Agreement sign-on from 170 mainly grassroots 
environmental movements across the world. Several of the agreement’s 
features help to define what we can consider—following the French 
sociologist Andre Gorz (1967)—the distinct terrains of “reformist” and 
“non-reformist” reforms: 
The People’s Climate Commitment: The Glasgow Agreement (main excerpts)
The purpose of the Glasgow Agreement is to reclaim the initiative 
from governments and international institutions and create an alternative 
tool for action and collaboration, for the climate justice movement…
The institutional framework used by governments, international 
organisations and the whole economic system to address the climate 
crisis is failing in keeping global warming below 1.5 or 2°C by 2100. From 
its onset, developed countries and polluting corporations like the fossil 
fuel industry have orchestrated the repeated failure of this institutional 
framework. 
Instead, an illusion of climate action was created while decisive steps 
were delayed and greenhouse gas emissions were allowed to continue 
rising. As a result of decades of interference by these actors, weak 
commitments have been continually dishonoured, and thus the main 
institutional arrangements on climate change, namely the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement, have not produced the reduction in global 
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greenhouse gas emissions required to halt the worst impacts of climate 
change. 
The Paris Agreement is only a procedure, and will not be able to 
achieve its stated goal of preventing the worst consequences of climate 
change.
Hundreds of governments, municipalities and organisations have 
declared a climate emergency. Massive protests in streets all around 
the world have repeatedly called for decisive action for climate justice 
inside the deadline of 2030, with scientific consensus on the need for 
a minimum cut by 50% of global greenhouse gas emissions within 
this period. To achieve any measure of these objectives, no new fossil 
fuel (coal, oil and gas) projects or infrastructure can be developed. A 
powerful climate justice movement needs new and enhanced tools to 
address these fundamental contradictions and to reverse the global 
narrative from institutional impotence into social power that brings 
about lasting change. 
As such, the undersigned organisations and social movements 
assume:
1. The political framework for the required cuts and climate action 
will be that of climate justice, which is defined as a social and political 
demand that advocates for the redistribution of power, knowledge and 
wellbeing. It proposes a new notion of prosperity within natural limits 
and just resource distribution, advocating for a true connection between 
traditional and westernised knowledge systems. It calls for a public and 
participatory science to address the needs of humanity and of the earth, 
principally to stop the climate crisis.
In this respect:
• It recognises the interdependence between all species 
and affirms the need to reduce, with an aim to eliminate, 
the production of greenhouse gases and associated local 
pollutants;
• It acknowledges and integrates the care economy into daily 
life, with the shared responsibility of persons, regardless of 
their gender identity, for care and maintenance activities, 
both inside homes and within society—climate justice puts 
life at the centre;
• It supports the structural changes in society to redress 
centuries of systemic racism, colonialism and imperialism—
climate justice is racial justice;
• It perceives the economy to be under the rules of the 
environment, and not the other way around, defending 
democratic planning based on real needs, replacing 
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oppression, imposition and appropriation for cooperation, 
solidarity and mutual aid;
• It defends a just transition for workers currently employed 
in the sectors that need to be dismantled, reconfigured or 
downsized, providing support to these workers in different 
economies and societies, introducing energy sovereignty 
and energy sufficiency. This transition must be just and 
equitable, redressing past harms and securing the future 
livelihoods of workers and communities, approaching the 
necessary shift from an extractive economy into a climate-
safe society, to build economic and political power for a 
regenerative economy;
• It means to recover knowledge from indigenous 
communities, promoting the pragmatic human activity that 
has beneficial effects on life cycles and ecosystems;
• It defends the introduction of reparation for communities 
and peoples at the frontlines of colonialism, globalisation 
and exploitation, acknowledging that there is a historical 
and ecological debt that must be paid to the Global South, 
and that the origins of said debts need to be stopped;
• It recognises that the effects of climate breakdown are 
here and now. The poorest communities in the world are 
experiencing loss of their homes and livelihoods, damage to 
their lands and culture, and are in urgent need of funding. 
Global solidarity and pressure is needed, to shine a light on 
the corporations and governments responsible for loss and 
damage, and to uplift the voices of the people and places 
most affected;
• It defends the full protection, freedom of movement, and 
civil, political, and economic rights of migrants;
• It defends food sovereignty as the peoples’ right to define 
their agricultural and food policies, without any dumping 
vis-à-vis third countries;
• It opposes exponential and unbound economic growth—
contemporarily reflected in the sovereignty of capital—
understanding capitalism as incompatible with the 
principles of life systems;
• It refuses green capitalism and its proposed “solutions” 
(whether “nature based,” geo-engineering, carbon trading, 
carbon markets or others), as well as extractivism. 
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2. Taking into their own hands the need to collectively cut greenhouse 
gas emissions and keep fossil fuels in the ground. While participating 
in the Glasgow Agreement, organisations will maintain their main 
focus away from institutional struggle—namely from negotiations with 
governments and the United Nations;
3. The production of an inventory of the main sectors, infrastructures 
and future projects responsible for the emissions of greenhouse gases 
in each territory, that will be nationally and internationally publicised. 
There will be a technical working group to support and follow-up the 
creation of this inventory;
4. The production of a territorial climate agenda based on the 
inventory. The climate agenda is an action plan, designed by communities, 
movements, and organisations working on the ground, that is informed 
by the inventory of the biggest greenhouse gas emissions sources 
(existing and planned) in its area of concern. It aims to set us on track for 
staying below 1.5ºC global warming by 2100 inside a clear framework of 
climate justice;
5. That political and economic noncooperation, as well as nonviolent 
intervention, in particular civil disobedience, are the main tools for the 
fulfilment of the Glasgow Agreement. At the same time, we recognise 
that for oppressed groups and those living in more oppressive societies, 
it is much more difficult to partake directly in civil disobedience. The 
tactic of civil disobedience is only one of the tactics through which 
the Glasgow Agreement’s objectives can be fulfilled. Additionally, we 
acknowledge that the strategy of civil disobedience has long been used, 
under various names, by many before us, particularly in marginalised 
communities and in the Global South, and we would not be able to join 
this struggle without these historical and contemporary sacrifices, and 
continuous action against climate change through struggles to keep 
fossil fuels underground and resistance to other industrial causes of 
global warming;
6. Support each other and coordinate to define their own local and 
national strategies and tactics on how to enact the climate agenda, and 
to call for the support of other member organisations of the Glasgow 
Agreement (nationally and internationally). The organisations from 
the Global North underline their commitment to support those in the 
Global South, through solidarity with existing struggles and by directly 
addressing projects led by governments, corporations, banks and 
financial institutions based in the Global North…
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Glasgow Agreement Gaps
The Glasgow Agreement is a profound, eloquent input into global 
climate politics, one that various strains of progressives and radicals 
right through to eco-socialists could warm to. However, the emphasis 
on leaving fossil fuels underground—absolutely essential as a first 
priority—means that, like the Paris Climate Agreement, some critical 
areas (e.g. cutting emissions that emanate from militaries, air and 
maritime transport) are left out. For example, there is no gender analysis, 
which is a huge flaw.
Below, however, let me address four other central points that are vital 
for future drafters: the balance of forces represented by Washington’s 
return to COP leadership; intergenerational equity; tactics; and the need 
for alignment with growing anti-extractivist movements. In taking up 
the latter four shortcomings, a broader concern arises, associated with 
a warning from the militant eco-feminist group Accion Ecologica from 
Quito, Ecuador. Its founder expressed frustration at the agreement’s 
prioritisation of an ‘emissions inventory’ that distracted from root 
capitalist causes of the climate crisis (Yanez 2021).
First, the agreement could better alert readers to the current balance 
of forces—and how to change that array of power. After all, there is a 
dangerous new factor that became apparent in January 2021: the US 
corporate-neoliberal re-entry to the UNFCCC, led by Joe Biden and his 
climate envoy John Kerry (former Secretary of State in 2015 at Paris) 
(Bond 2021a). One result of the shift from Trump climate denialism to 
this new regime is renewed emphasis on market strategies and ‘net zero’ 
accounting gimmickry. Such “green capitalism” and associated false 
solutions are noted in the agreement’s final statement of principles—and 
flagged in much more detail by, among others, Corporate Accountability, 
Global Forest Coalition and Friends of the Earth International (2021).
Second, the Agreement does not address rights of future generations, 
notwithstanding rising youth rage. This is an absolutely critical new 
factor in climate politics, so it represents a surprising gap given Fridays 
for Future’s potential and the clarity with which Thunberg and her 
allies continue to express exceptionally tough critique. Thunberg’s 
successful approach, based on speaking truth to power at elite events 
that gain her unprecedented publicity for the climate cause, has thus far 
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focused on delegitimising the corporate and multilateral establishment. 
To illustrate, when in mid-2021 Kerry was quoted endorsing mythical 
technofix strategies—“I am told by scientists, not by anybody in politics, 
but by scientists, that 50% of the reductions we have to make are 
going to come from technology that we don’t yet have”—she tweeted, 
“Great news! I spoke to Harry Potter and he said he will team up 
with Gandalf, Sherlock Holmes & The Avengers and get started right 
away!” The anger and sense of urgency that leading youth activists can 
generate stunned the world since her Stockholm sit-ins began mid-2018, 
especially in September 2019 when seven million protesters coordinated 
international events over the course of a week. No one can doubt how 
desperately we need a post-COVID revival of that spirit, especially 
given internal divisions in the US Sunrise Movement on the one hand, 
but on the other, a rising network of Global South youth preparing to 
take greater leadership once COVID-19 threats to unified international 
actions recede.
Third, in relation to tactics, the agreement’s framing is unsatisfyingly 
narrow. The authors do not acknowledge that, unfortunately, there’s 
a long-standing style of tokenistic climate-related civil disobedience 
(CD): set-piece, pre-negotiated arrests that are mainly publicity 
enhancing. Such predictable, non-disruptive CD characterises leading 
currents within climate-action politics and also some strains within 
Climate Justice. It needs rethinking since the approach is so readily 
assimilated, with accompanying platitudes, by those wielding power 
(also see chapters by Gardham and Paterson, this volume). Indeed, 
CD as practiced in this way provides diminishing public-educational 
opportunity, much less the capability to actively threaten status quo 
polluting activities (Malm 2021).
So, on the one hand, the agreement certainly recognises that many 
activists in vulnerable situations cannot take steps toward CD for fear of 
extreme repression. But, on the other, the agreement is not quite brave 
enough to openly address a different, more militant approach: blocking 
and even sabotaging extraction, transport, refining, combustion and financing 
of fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
This is not terribly unusual activism against fossil fuel corporations, 
as in the Global South such uncivil disobedience was pioneered against 
oil extraction during the early 1990s by Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Movement for 
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the Emancipation of the Ogoni People in the Niger Delta (before his 
execution in 1995). Disruptive CD is increasingly being practiced by 
many others, for example XR in countless sites of corporate power, the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe against the Dakota Access Pipeline, or Ende 
Gelände in Germany’s coal fields. For Naomi Klein (2014), this spirit 
deserves the term “blockadia,” and the Environmental Justice Atlas at 
http://ejatlas.org documents hundreds of such cases.
When it comes to this contradiction, there is a need to rebalance 
the always-uncomfortable division of labour between rigorous tree-
shakers—hard-core activists who are ready to disrupt power and face 
jail time in the process—and jam-makers on the inside of the COPs, 
doing more polite advocacy. Of the many civil society COP attendees, 
several prominent Glasgow Agreement signatories are typically leaders. 
Yet notwithstanding all their passion and strategic insight, they rarely 
attempt to actively empower the tree-shakers by paying tribute to their 
most radical actions.
The COP17 People’s Space in Durban was a good case site to 
understand these flaws. Our comrades and I (as a university-based host 
of the People’s Space) (Bond 2012b) failed miserably along these lines. 
Although our South African and African CJ forces possessed powerful 
principles and sound analyses, the team was distracted when it came to 
establishing effective strategies, tactics and alliances. Counter-summitry 
and protests were impotent, in part because distinctions between 
tree-shakers in the People’s Space, and jam-makers inside the Durban 
International Convention Centre, were never clearly established by the 
C17 network, one that sought unity over clarity. Most subsequent COP 
outside-protest and inside-advocacy scenes reflected the same failure, 
leading in Paris to confusing stances within the “climate movement,” 
reflecting uncivil society militantly promoting CJ on the one hand, and 
on the other, civilised society groups begging for mere climate action 
(Bond 2018). The problem has persisted to this day, in Africa generally 
and South Africa specifically (Mwenda and Bond 2020).
Fourth, there is a profound challenge from Accion Ecologica, a 
signatory whose April 2021 letter from the eco-feminist organisation’s 
co-founder Ivonne Yanez (2021) warns that by lacking clarity on 
broader ideology, the agreement risks “colliding with the anti-
extractivist movements in the world.” These include many struggles 
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Yanez herself supports across the Andes, especially Ecuador. The 
specific contradictions relate to how “minimally-necessary mining” 
might be defined, and whether some of the ingredients necessary for 
a decarbonised economy—lithium for batteries, titanium dioxide for 
highly-reflective white paint, palladium and rhodium for so-called 
“green hydrogen” fuel cells, and other rare-earth minerals—themselves 
are being contested in sites like the Andes and several South Africa 
anti-mining conflicts (also see Dunlap, this volume). For Yanez (2021), 
“asking anti-extractivist social movements—mainly in the South—to 
‘make inventories of emissions’ is like asking us to take inventories of 
future forms of dispossession and exploitation.”
Like many who soon tired of COP-oriented advocacy work, Yanez 
(2021) instead adopts—and amplifies—the tradition of delegitimisation: 
As for the Paris Agreement, and its predecessors, they were designed 
precisely to confuse. And they succeeded. They were conceived so that 
organisations, instead of talking about how to confront extractivism, how 
to end injustices and inequalities, would be busy talking about degrees of 
temperature, and calculating tons of CO2. The Paris Agreement and the 
absurd and malevolent proposals it entails divert attention from what 
is important: confronting patriarchal, neo-colonial and racist capitalism. 
They have succeeded for almost 25 years in distracting attention. And so, 
we end up thinking that first come the IPCC numbers with an army of 
experts counting molecules and in second place come the anti-capitalist 
extractivist resistances.
To confront climate change we have to confront the capitalist system 
that is institutionalised (for example, through the Paris Agreement) and 
global. But who are the anti-capitalist movements? The main ones in 
the world today are anti-extractivist movements, anti-capitalist labour 
movements, territorial and community-based feminist movements, anti-
white supremacist movements, anti-colonial movements, movements 
fighting for water, anti-debt movements, anti-agribusiness movements... 
A movement to reduce emissions falls short among this tide of struggles, 
and I doubt it will make much difference in the struggle against 
capitalism. And while the Glasgow Agreement takes up many ideas, 
the anti-capitalist, concrete and territorial struggles that are also global 
are more important. Learning and listening from these frontline climate 
movements is a task. 
As a final point, although Accion Ecologica does not advocate overly-
technicist work such as the agreement’s proposed census of emissions, 
there are nevertheless two rationales for doing so if conjoined with 
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anti-extractivist struggles. The first is to identify whether a given 
country’s activists have been maximising their potential to link up 
and challenge their economy’s most egregious polluters, in the form 
of an accompanying inventory of anti-emissions campaigning. This 
is something that autonomist-style blockadia strategies require better 
networking to achieve: linkage of their local organic (and sometimes 
atomised) struggles for maximum impact, including tackling various 
national state subsidies, regulatory fora, legislation, and more generally, 
politicians’ (and often police or even army) support for extractive 
industries.
The second rationale is one that appeals to eco-socialists, namely 
the planned reduction of emissions—a process which would otherwise be 
accomplished erratically and unreliably through either protest (rarely) 
or market forces. The danger of relying on the latter was evident in April 
2020 when there was great cheering by climate activists at the collapse in 
fossil fuel prices, but disillusionment when they very quickly recovered.
Conclusion: A Routing from Climate Injustice to 
Eco-Socialism
The UNFCCC continued to disappoint reformers into mid-2021 as 
COVID-19 dragged on. After eighteen months of no negotiations, the 
Bonn intersessional was conducted via Microsoft Teams. “Progress is 
pretty slow if not non-existent at this session, but I wouldn’t just blame 
it on the virtual format,” one analyst told Climate Brief (2021). (But 
the distanced format, worsened by time zone difficulties, did reduce 
the impact of some crucial Global South negotiators who suffered 
communication interruptions). As the US West witnessed record heat-
waves and another terrible fire season loomed, the leaders remained 
hesitant to tackle critical problems of adaption and finance, leaving 
“nothing substantive” to agree on in the Glasgow COP26, according 
to Bangladeshi negotiator Mizan Khan. The “vast majority” of poor 
countries voiced objections to Western sabotage of the talks, given that 
the latest climate loss and damage accounts (from 2019) showed that 
when the Global North suffered, 60% of the damage was commercially 
insured, in contrast to 4% in the Global South. And as Carbon Brief 
(2021) reported, “it is universally assumed that climate finance is 
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currently falling short of the $100 billion goal” for annual disbursements 
especially if grant (not loan) finance is considered independently of 
prevailing aid. In sum, the insider strategy had met its limits.
A revealing French working-class strategic choice in earlier (mid-
1960s) battles—as articulated by Gorz (1967)—was whether activists 
could identify opportunities for non-reformist, transformative reforms, 
or instead settle for ‘reformist reforms’ that in turn strengthen the 
assimilationist power of the status quo. Most climate activists working 
at global scale have only achieved reformist reforms to date, and the 
cost—legitimising the counterproductive Paris Climate Agreement—
is enormous. But when it comes to the UNFCCC, or even micro-
campaigning against specific emitters, ‘fix it or nix it’ choices, and 
resulting openings for more radical reforms, i.e. to break not polish the 
chains of oppression, sometimes arise when least expected.
Typically there are two contrary directions for framing campaigns. 
First, reformist reforms
• strengthen the internal logic of the system, by smoothing 
rough edges,
• allow the system to relegitimise,
• give confidence to status quo ideas and forces,
• leave activists disempowered or coopted, and
• confirm society’s fear of power, apathy and cynicism about 
activism.
But second, in contrast, non-reformist reforms (or ‘transformative 
reforms’)
• counteract the internal logic of the system, by confronting 
core dynamics,
• continue to delegitimise the system of oppression,
• give confidence to critical ideas and social forces,
• leave activists empowered with momentum for the next 
struggle, and
• replace social apathy with confidence in activist integrity 
and leadership.
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We have seen this in South Africa on occasion, such as in the defeat of 
apartheid. In 1983, as economic crisis began to worry the country’s white 
leaders, several wide-ranging reformist reforms were offered by the 
apartheid regime to black voters: assimilationist seats offered in second-
tier sites of representation (segregated parliamentary bodies, satellite 
municipalities and Bantustan pseudo-countries). Black liberation 
activists rejected these, for as Archbishop Desmond Tutu put it, these 
reforms represented “polishing the chains of apartheid,” when the 
chains needed to be broken. Principled activists campaigned for a non-
reformist principle: one person, one vote in a unitary state. In 1994, with 
Nelson Mandela by then free from his 1963–1990 jail term and leading 
the broad-based anti-apartheid movement, they changed the balance of 
forces sufficiently to win democracy. Since the early 2000s there have 
been similar battles and victories. When South African activists waged 
struggles against state and capital to gain free anti-retroviral AIDS 
medicines in the early 2000s or free tertiary education for the working 
class in 2015–2017, these entailed successful national coordinations of 
localised grievances (Ngwane and Bond 2020).
With this in mind, my own sense is that the Glasgow Agreement 
principles are very appealing. Yet there is a vagueness when it comes to 
analysis, strategies, tactics and alliances, beginning with the very obvious 
question of whether the COP26 and future UNFCCC events will be sites 
of clarity—or instead confusion—over legitimation or delegitimation. 
This difficult choice is shared by virtually all the climate movements I 
have seen working towards some form of influence over the Glasgow 
COP26 in 2020–21. The groups involved in the agreement are generally 
the most admirable from the perspective of CJ, but all remain unclear on 
whether and how to pursue the delegitimation strategy Thunberg has 
embodied so eloquently.
The alignments of this PASTA framework are vital in the cases I 
have seen in South Africa—against both apartheid and post-apartheid 
socio-economic oppression—and are parallel to what is now needed 
for global and local CJ movements, given the UNFCCC’s failures. No 
matter how much 2021 propaganda is offered about bandaging the 
Paris deal at Glasgow COP26 or subsequent COPS, the power relations 
remain terribly adverse. In this context, the PASTA framing for climate 
justice takes two forms, one based on past activist practice, including 
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limitations; and the other based on the contradictions between CJ and 
“ecological modernisation” strategies, in which a dialectical resolution 
in eco-socialism can be theorised (Bond 2021b).
Without the space here to address how difficult a process that is (e.g. 
in technological choices or use of ecological valuation techniques), it 
should nevertheless be obvious that a major problem confronts CJ and 
efforts like the Glasgow Agreement. The arguments above presume 
increasing clarity over the major differences between what CJ advocates 
historically insisted upon, by way of non-reformist reforms that can end 
the climate crisis in a manner that is just both globally and locally, and 
the UNFCCC COP26 agenda of reformist reforms based on market and 
technological strategies. But the latter, even when articulated by the 
most enlightened elites (like Mary Robinson), are “designed precisely 
to confuse,” to recall Yanez.
So to arrive at such far-reaching reforms—parallel to South Africans 
ending apartheid and then decommodifying essential state services 
using an anti-neoliberal, proto-socialist “commons” approach—the 
activists must first confront and defeat the reformist reforms put in their 
way. Delegitimation of the elites, as Thunberg and Glasgow Agreement 
authors agree, should both embrace and transcend personal insults, and 
from there, rapidly address the full set of divergent principles, analyses, 
strategies, tactics and alliances that distinguish CJ from the elites’ self-
proclaimed climate action, which in reality is so passive that the future 
of humanity and all other species is, increasingly, in question.
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27. Public Engagement with 
Radical Climate Change Action
Lorraine Whitmarsh
The role of people in addressing climate change is often relegated 
to merely consumers. While adopting electric vehicles and heat 
pumps, for example, will indeed be critical for reaching climate 
targets, people will also need to engage as political, social and 
professional actors to achieve the scale of societal transformation 
needed. This includes actively engaging in both decision-making 
and in delivery in respect of climate action. Here, I discuss the 
varied roles that the public can play in decision-making and 
in taking rapid and radical climate action, their current levels 
of engagement with climate change, and how to foster further 
public action. I argue that we have a unique opportunity as we 
build back society post-COVID-19 to lock in low-carbon habits 
created during the pandemic, and to build on the growing social 
mandate for bold policy action to support sustainable lifestyles.
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the multiple roles the public can play in 
climate action—as consumers, citizens, parents, community members, 
employees and professional decision-makers—and how we can better 
engage the public in decision-making and action to achieve rapid and 
significant emission cuts to mitigate climate change. I argue that public 
engagement is critical both for building a public mandate for radical 
social change, but also for achieving profound lifestyle, community, 
organisational and policy transformation. Public engagement is 
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potentially a very broad concept that captures: (a) engagement in 
decision-making (including policy-making) about how to reach net zero; 
and (b) engagement in delivery of action to reach net zero (i.e., ‘behaviour 
change’ in its broadest sense, including lifestyle change, technology 
adoption/use, policy support, activism, and awareness raising). These 
two forms of engagement are interlinked—if we have joined-up thinking 
and a national conversation on these issues (i.e., engagement with 
decision-making) that would also help with the delivery of net zero 
since it provides the context and rationale for specific behavioural and 
structural interventions; and fosters collective efficacy and trust (Dietz 
and Stern 2009; Capstick et al. 2019). 
Evidence shows a key predictor of policy acceptance by the public is 
perceived fairness, including procedural fairness (i.e., involving people 
in decisions that affect them; Dreyer and Walker 2013; Schmocker et al. 
2012). This means that we cannot have a net zero transition without 
the public ‘noticing’ (i.e., via supply-side change and consumer 
nudges); indeed, social/behavioural change is required for the majority 
of measures to reach net zero (CCC 2019). Reconfiguration of urban 
environments, food and transport systems, energy technologies, and 
provision of goods and services, are hugely disruptive to lifestyles and 
may require changes in values and norms. Developments that may 
be less disruptive to lifestyles but still pose risks and costs to society 
(e.g., supply-side and negative emissions technologies) also require 
public buy-in (RCUK 2010). Thus, the inevitably visible, disruptive and 
risky transformation to net zero requires a public mandate—hence active 
engagement with publics to co-produce net zero futures and pathways, 
including collectively assessing their risks and benefits, and to achieve 
buy-in to their delivery (also see Halme et al., this volume).
How Engaged Is the Public?
So, how ‘engaged’ is the public with climate change at the moment? The 
last few years have seen a significant rise in public concern about climate 
change: polling in the UK and elsewhere showed unprecedented worry 
about climate change during 2019, which has been maintained into 2020 
despite competing concerns over COVID-19 (BEIS 2019; Leiserowitz et al. 
2020; Ipsos MORI 2020). In fact, one UK survey (Whitmarsh et al. 2020) 
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found that the perceived urgency of tackling climate change was higher 
during the pandemic (May 2020) than in August the previous year (74% 
up from 62% seeing it as an ‘extremely high’ or ‘high’ level of urgency). 
Furthermore, support for climate change mitigation policies, including 
measures to decrease meat consumption and flying, was higher during 
the pandemic (67% and 85%, respectively) than in 2019 (53% and 67%, 
respectively). This apparent support for ambitious action to address 
climate change has been reflected in (and strengthened by) high-profile 
public protests and ‘school strikes’ around the world (Thackeray et 
al. 2020), as well as a shift in media language and societal discourse 
to reconceptualise the issue as a ‘climate emergency’ (Carrington 2019; 
Zhou 2019). 
There has also been a growth in deliberative democracy activities 
that provide a stronger voice for the public in national and local 
policy-making on climate change, notably the Climate Assembly UK, 
the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate, and various regional 
and city-level citizens’ assemblies and juries (Capstick et al. 2020). 
These engagement activities seek to elicit informed public opinion on 
low-carbon visions and pathways, and have shown strong support for 
ambitious climate action (e.g., CAUK 2020; Citizens Convention on 
Climate 2020). Yet, it is widely acknowledged that stated preferences 
(via polls, interviews, deliberative discussions, etc.) often diverge from 
actual behaviour—the so-called ‘value-action’ gap (Blake 1999). Indeed, 
despite people’s good intentions, there remain significant structural and 
social barriers to engagement with climate change at the behavioural 
level (e.g., Lorenzoni et al. 2007). Demand for material goods, car travel 
and aviation, for example, have grown rapidly in recent years; while 
low-carbon behaviours—such as walking and cycling, eating a plant-
based diet, and reduced consumption—often remain inconvenient, 
inaccessible, socially and/or economically costly (CAUK 2020; Whittle 
et al. 2019). 
Here, I provide some concrete suggestions for how to build public 
engagement with climate change, both in terms of providing a stronger 
role for the public in decision-making, and in public participation in the 
delivery of action to achieve the UK’s net zero goal. These suggestions 
are grounded in psychological, sociological, economics and political 
science literatures which provide insights on public participation and 
behaviour change in its broadest sense.
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Engagement in Decision-Making
In the case of engagement in decision-making, this would ideally 
involve local deliberative processes to identify tailored solutions and 
build community participation, as well as an overarching ‘national 
conversation’ on options for reaching net zero, including supply-side and 
demand-side changes. This would require being:
a. Joined up across sectors and scales (i.e., consistent messaging 
and policies embedded across government departments, 
devolved governments, local authorities, etc.). This could 
involve co-development of a shared vision and ‘branding’ 
around net zero (similar to the ‘Energiewende’ in 
Germany; Moss et al. 2015) that provides the coordinated, 
overarching, joined-up vision demanded by citizens 
(CAUK 2020), tying together the variety of changes people 
see and are asked to make, and giving a sense of collective 
efficacy and ownership; and
b. Timely in influencing decision-making—i.e., upstream 
engagement in policy-making at national and local 
levels (using deliberative approaches, such as citizens’ 
assemblies/juries, online deliberative polling, etc.; Dietz 
and Stern 2009).
Engagement in Delivery
Behaviour change is a central element of delivering net zero, so public 
engagement is key for realising this goal (CCC 2019). Behaviour 
change, though, is not only required for consumer-citizens, but also 
other individuals and groups across a range of contexts (e.g., parents, 
communities, employees, employers, political actors; Whitmarsh et 
al. 2010). Behaviour change is not only about adoption of net zero 
technology—though consumer behaviour is important. It more fully 
encompasses:
c. Adoption of low/no-carbon technology and products (in 
personal or professional contexts);
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d. Use and disposal of low/no-carbon technology and products 
(in personal or professional contexts);
e. Acceptance of (or demand for) large-scale low/no-carbon 
infrastructure, including supply-side and greenhouse gas 
removal technologies;
f. Political action to support or demand climate change action 
(voting, protesting, boycotting);
g. Community and voluntary action to promote low-carbon 
choices (hosting or owning low/no-carbon developments, 
volunteering for climate causes, etc.); and
h. Creating and disseminating climate change narratives/
discourses that normalise and promote low-carbon 
lifestyles, call out inaction (by people, businesses, 
policy-makers, schools, family members, etc.), and raise 
awareness through conversations, as well as modelling 
change through action.
There is a vast literature on how to change behaviour, and much can 
be learnt from historical and international examples of transformation 
(e.g., tobacco control, urban sustainable transport). Key findings from 
this evidence base include: 
a. Change is required across multiple levels and using various 
levers (information and incentives alone will not be 
sufficient; broader social, infrastructural, technical, and 
regulatory interventions are also required; Lorenzoni et al. 
2007; Corner et al. 2019); 
b. Interventions should exploit and be framed around 
co-benefits or win-wins (e.g., wellbeing/health, equity, 
cost-saving/profit; Bain et al. 2016; Maibach et al. 2010; 
Whitmarsh and Corner 2017); 
c. Interventions should be timely at the point of decision-
making (e.g., buying a car or appliance; renovating a 
house) and when habits are disrupted/malleable (see 
below; Graham-Rowe et al. 2011; Wilson et al. 2015); 
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d. Changing social norms through leadership, exemplifying/
disseminating innovations and good practice through 
networks, and using trusted messengers to communicate, are 
important (Clayton et al. 2015; Corner et al. 2019; Pettifor 
et al. 2017); and 
e. Building public support is key to leveraging government 
action for behavioural interventions (particularly if there is 
industry resistance; Willis 2017; Corner et al. 2019).
Moments of Change and COVID-19
A growing literature points to the importance not only of how to 
intervene to achieve social and lifestyle change, but also when. Much 
of our behaviour is habitual—unconscious routines triggered by 
contextual cues (e.g., ‘it’s 8am, time to drive to work’) rather than 
conscious deliberation of alternatives (e.g., ‘which mode of transport 
would be best today?’; Kurz et al. 2015). Habits are one of the 
strongest impediments to lifestyle change, acting to ‘lock in’ behaviour 
(Marechal and Lazaric 2011). Many interventions (e.g., information 
campaigns) are ineffective because they are not strong enough to 
disrupt habits (Verplanken et al. 1997). But since habits are cued by 
stable contexts (i.e., the same time, place and/or social group; Wood 
et al. 2005), change in context disrupts habits (Verplanken et al. 2008). 
Consistent with this observation, ‘moments of change’—defined as 
“occasions where the circumstances of an individual’s life change 
considerably within a relatively short timeframe” (Thompson et al. 
2011)—have been identified as one of the most important levers for 
lifestyle change (House of Lords 2011; Capstick et al. 2014). Research 
shows that disruptions—whether concerning a person’s life-course 
(e.g., moving home) or structural (e.g., economic downturn, extreme 
weather events)—can provide opportunities to recraft social practices 
in new directions (Verplanken et al. 2018; Birkmann et al. 2010), for 
example shifting from commuting by car to home-working (Marsden 
et al. 2020). Furthermore, interventions targeted to moments of 
change are more effective than at other times (Verplanken et al. 2018). 
Several studies show that mobility interventions are more effective 
when targeted to relocation (Thøgersen 2012; Ralph and Brown 2017; 
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Bamberg 2006). Other low-carbon behaviours, such as energy efficiency 
and wasted reduction measures, have also been shown to be more 
effectively changed using low-cost interventions in the twelve weeks 
following relocation (Verplanken and Roy 2016; Maréchal 2010), as 
well as at other moments of change, such as buying an electric vehicle 
(Nicolson et al. 2017). Other such opportunities to intervene include 
temporal milestones (e.g., New Year, becoming an adult), having 
a child, retiring, infrastructure disruption (e.g., road closures), and 
COVID-19 (e.g., Verplanken et al. 2018; Burningham & Venn 2020).
COVID-19 and measures to respond to it may be the most significant 
disruption to lifestyles since World War II. Citizens are working, 
consuming and interacting in new ways, some of which may be more 
desirable both personally and environmentally (e.g., commuting less). 
For example, one UK study (Whitmarsh et al. 2020) found that during 
lockdown: online food shopping more than doubled; food waste and 
consumption of energy and goods reduced; working from home rose 
significantly and most people found this a positive experience. In line 
with this, around a third said they intend to increase the amount they 
work from home (compared to pre-lockdown) once restrictions are 
removed, and even more plan to socialise more online (43%) and to fly 
less on holidays (47%). Importantly, of course, intentions do not always 
manifest in behaviour change (Whitmarsh 2009). Since new habits 
take two to three months to form (Lally et al. 2010), lockdown periods 
in most countries have been long enough to establish new routines. 
However, when lockdowns are lifted, there is a risk of recidivism into 
pre-existing habits (Carden and Wood 2018), particularly if economic 
stimulus measures promote unfettered, high-carbon consumption 
(Peters 2020). So, while COVID-19 may represent a unique window 
of opportunity to promote low-carbon lifestyles, this is only likely 
to occur with appropriate infrastructure, incentives, and norms to 
encourage and lock in new low-carbon routines. Fortunately, there is 
strong public support for net zero policies (e.g., shifting to low-carbon 
transport; reducing red meat consumption) and a green recovery 
(CAUK 2020; Whitmarsh et al. 2020), which provides a mandate for 
policy-makers to take bold climate change measures to establish and 
lock in low-carbon habits. 
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Conclusion
Public engagement in decision-making and action is essential for radical 
societal transformation to address climate change. While public support 
for climate action has grown in recent years, demand-side emission 
reductions lag far behind supply-side reductions, highlighting the 
need to focus efforts on achieving society-wide behavioural change 
(CCC 2019). Much can be learnt on how to engage the public with 
climate change from COVID-19; however, there are unique challenges 
associated with climate change that make it a “different kind of crisis” 
(Howarth et al. 2020). Although the pandemic has shown that measures 
to change behaviour and society can be taken rapidly, we require a social 
mandate for such radical interventions to be implemented for the longer 
term, for example via further deliberative democratic opportunities 
and a coherent national conversation on climate change. COVID-19 as a 
‘moment of change’ has also created many low-carbon habits that could 
be locked in with the right policy measures, such as reallocating road 
space from cars to active and public modes, economic (dis)incentives to 
promote consumption of low-carbon products and services, and support 
for businesses to encourage more flexible working and teleconferencing 
(e.g., Cairns et al. 2002; Henderson and Mokhtarian 1996; Capstick et 
al. 2014; CAUK 2020). Embarking on a green economic recovery from 
COVID-19 requires using the insights outlined here on how to engage 
the public to achieve a low-carbon societal transformation. 
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28. Five Questions whilst 
Walking: For Those that Decided 
to Participate in Agir Pour le Vivant
 Isabelle Fremeaux and Jay Jordan
This chapter republishes an intervention to clarify our choice 
to ask participants to desert a big festival of ideas, Agir Pour le 
Vivant (Action for the Living), that took place in Arles in France 
in August 2020. We felt that the festival’s intention of ‘action for 
the living’ was dissonant with the event’s sponsorship by a series 
of toxic corporations. Our demand precipitated a series of public 
responses, ending with this final letter by us that asked a series of 
questions, our intention being to foreground the sorts of difficult 
choices that need to be made if we are collectively to walk away 
from the forces propelling global ecological crisis.
I Am a Boycotter
I am a boycotter. I am and always have been for some worlds and not 
others.
If ever there were a time for life-affirming anti-capitalism it is NOW 
(Donna Haraway).1
This chapter republishes an intervention to clarify our choice to ask 
participants to boycott an event, Agir Pour le Vivant (Action for the 
1  Personal correspondence between Donna Haraway, Isabelle Fremeaux and Jay 
Jordan, August 2020, quoted with permission.
© 2021 Isabelle Fremeaux and Jay Jordan, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0265.28
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Living) that took place in Arles in France in August 2020. The event’s 
description and intention were advertised as follows:
A large festival open to all and rooted in its territory, AGIR POUR LE 
VIVANT creates a new space for reflection and discussion beyond 
ideologies. For a week, it combines approaches, crosses the skills and 
proposals of writers, philosophers, scientists, gardeners, botanists, 
agronomists, herbalists, entrepreneurs and environmental activists who 
are trying to renew the great history of man’s relationship with nature. 
They redefine the place of rivers in the world; claim royalty-free and 
reproducible organic seeds; campaign for the recognition of herbalism, 
for social and climatic justice or for a decolonial ecology; imagine resaving 
humanity; support the transition of companies, territories… 2
We felt this statement to be dissonant with the event’s sponsorship by a 
series of toxic corporations and financiers. Our open letter demanding 
people not to participate was published in terrestres.org as ‘Choosing 
which Culture to Feed: An Open Letter about Friendships and a Call to 
Desert”3 (Fremeaux and Jordan 2020). It became something of a cause 
celèbre, being shared widely on social media and precipitating further 
published letters between ourselves and participants who decided to 
attend the event but managed to eject one of the funders (for example, 
Fremeaux and Jordan 2020; Morizot and Zhong Mengual 2020). We 
share here the final letter of the exchange that poses a series of questions 
to foreground the sorts of difficult choices that need to be made if we are 
collectively to walk away from the forces propelling the global ecological 
crisis. 
Question 1: What about the Forest?
I’m lost in a forest
All alone
The girl was never there
It’s always the same
I’m running towards nothing
(Again and again and again and again)4
2  https://www.agirpourlevivant.fr/copie-de-programme-2. 
3  An English version is here: https://www.terrestres.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/08/Choosing-which-culture-to-feed.pdf.
4 The Cure, ‘A forest’ (1980), ppm 337.
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Let us begin with celebration and joy. Joy that words have led to action 
as they always should. The action being that one of the sponsors of 
Agir Pour le Vivant has had to retreat and has thus liberated the forum 
from one of its toxic ties. BNP Paribas’s logo has been taken off the 
website and its money will be returned. “We would like to thank 
them here for their commitment to the living”, says the forum’s page, 
covered in logos.
BNP Paribas’s “commitment to the living” would have cost them 
20,000 euros—a little under 10% of the 270,000 total budget of the 
festival we learn from the article in the Arlesian local paper about this 
controversy (L’Arlesienne 2020). For a company whose 2019 revenue 
was 44.6 billion euros, and profits 8.17 billion, their support is a drop 
in the ocean, but their retreat is significant. What is just as significant to 
us is that their staff will not be present at the forum, nor speaking at the 
public events, nor in the closed-door workshops such as “L’empreinte 
naturelle des entreprises” (“The natural imprint of companies”), where 
they would have met with the other staff and CEOs of corporations 
for what is called an ‘atelier de travaille’5 (a ‘working work-shop’). Of 
course, this event does not appear on the website’s programme, and is 
not accessible to the public, even to those who have payed fifty euros for 
their special access pass, but it is perhaps the place where the real work 
of the greenwashers takes place and the false suicidal solutions to this 
omnicidal crisis are dreamt up and planned.
Nonetheless, this is an historic victory. It joins the growing list of 
cultural institutions that have liberated themselves from the funders 
and drivers of this culture of extinction over the last few years. In the 
UK alone both the Tate Museum and the Royal Shakespeare Company 
have freed themselves from British Petroleum’s sponsorship, London’s 
Science Museum, National Theatre and National Gallery have ended 
their relationship with Shell, the Edinburgh Science Festival has severed 
ties with ExxonMobil and Total. In the Netherlands, the Dutch art 
museum the Mauritshuis, the science and culture museum Museon, 
and—close to the heart of Arlesians—Amsterdam’s Van Gogh Museum, 
will no longer accept Shell’s sponsorship money.
5  See https://www.eterritoire.fr/detail/activites-touristiques/agir-pour-le-vivant-
jour-3/666132924/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur,bouches-du-rhone,arles(13200).
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Of course, none of these institutions did this voluntarily. They 
changed their behaviour and let go of their sponsors because of 
uncomfortable words written to them, and most importantly because 
people acted on their ideas and put their vulnerable bodies on the line, 
often with stunningly beautiful performative protests6 and creative 
disruptions. Many of these disobedient bodies belonged to artists, 
intellectuals and researchers who, by entering into conflict with these 
institutions, were biting the hand that fed them. But they had decided 
that their individual cultural capital was less important than being part 
of a culture of resistance against those who, as Donna Haraway writes, 
“greenwash the exterminators”.7
The other thing that brings us joy is that some participants have 
chosen to desert, to walk away, including AfroEuropean anthropologist 
Dénètem Touam Bona and landscape architect Giles Clément. We say 
joy in contrast to the neoliberal duty of happiness, because as Silvia 
Federici says, joy is
not satisfaction with things as they are. It’s part of feeling power’s 
capacities growing in you and growing in the people around you. It’s a 
feeling, a passion, that comes from a process of transformation [...] You 
feel that you have the power to change and you feel yourself changing 
with what you’re doing, together with other people. It’s not a form of 
acquiescence to what exists (Federici et al. 2017).
For us this feeling of power to change our lives and circumstances is at 
the core of collective resistance and the construction of forms of culture 
and life that affirm the living.
One of the other conditions that Baptiste Morizot, Estelle Zhong 
Mengual and their friends (including Rob Hopkins, Cyril Dion and 
Vinciane Dépres), set to the organisers of the festival in their open letter 
—Quel trouble voulons-nous habiter? (Which Trouble do we Want to Inhabit?) 
(Morizot and Zhong Mengual 2020)—was that all the corporate logos 
must be taken off communications. We are writing this nearly a week 
later, and not only are the other logos still on the website, but there are 
now thirty-three of them, as opposed to the twenty-six that were visible 
6  See, for example, https://www.liberatetate.org.uk/ and https://www.
fossilfreeculture.nl/. 
7  Personal correspondence between Isabelle Fremeaux, John Jordan and Donna 
Haraway, 13 August 2020, quoted with permission. 
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when we wrote the first letter. What is surprising and somewhat absurd 
is that it seems as though as one bank left another one came in, not 
even through the back door, but right on the front page of the forum’s 
website. Amongst these new additions is the logo of Crédit du Nord, 
which is entirely owned by Société Générale, by far the biggest funders 
of North American shale gas. Since the signing of the UNFCCC COP21 
Paris Agreement in December 2015 they have pumped over 11 billion 
euros into this death-dealing industry (Chocron and Wakim 2020). 
What is the difference between Société Générale and BNP Paribas (“The 
bank for a changing world”8)? (also see chapters by Wright and Nyberg, 
and Bracking, this volume).
We do not want to bore anyone with another cartography of poisonous 
sponsors. But to change something you need to know the texture of 
that thing. For us, this means being attuned and deeply sensitive to the 
specific details of situations and particular relationships in which we 
are enmeshed. The philosopher Spinoza, who we must never forget was 
despised by most of his contemporaries, taught us that such situated 
understanding enables us to move along in accordance with what is 
required in that moment. Surely this is the key to ethics. We are not 
interested in those old forms of rigid radicalism which try to control 
things, but in response-ability, in building our capacities to remain 
responsive to specific changing situations and opening up common 
spaces that support, rather than control, mutual transformation. The 
key is surely that we feel more alive together.
And we certainly do not feel such joy when we see that all the other 
corporations remain and three of the new logos include Faber and 
Novel, a talent and technology company whose clients include Total.9 
Fondation Yves Rocher, who expose low-paid workers to pesticides 
and recently sacked 132 Turkish women workers because they joined a 
union (Billette 2019). And last but not least, the great polluters of public 
space and our imaginaries, dealers of the dangerous drug of endless 
consumption, the world’s largest outdoor advertising corporation, JC 
Decaux.
Was the felling of BNP Paribas the tree that is hiding the forest?
8  https://group.bnpparibas/en/.
9  https://www.fabernovel.com/fr/clients/cases. 
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Question 2: Is It Just about Fossil Fuels?
You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. 
And yet I’m one of the lucky ones. People are suffering. People are dying. 
Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass 
extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal 
economic growth. How dare you! (Greta Thunberg speaking at the UN 
Climate Action Summit in New York City, September 2019).
We disagree with the assertion in Quel trouble voulons-nous habiter? that 
“after analysis, the other sponsors do not seem to have the same degree 
of seriousness at all” (Morizot and Zhong Mengual 2020). Does this 
suggest that, by removing the most obvious ‘exterminators’, it is OK 
for you to keep cooperating with the others by attending the forum? 
Is the designing of airports and supermarkets and the creation of new 
financial markets in water, air, soil and forests—and thus the effective 
privatisation of nature—really less serious? Is this not about wielding 
the great magical rootless tool of the new spirit of ‘green’ capitalism: 
offsetting?
We have been involved in the climate justice movement for a quarter 
of a century. When we were setting up climate camps over a decade ago 
(Fremeaux and Jordan 2011), merging the yes and the no, entangling 
the creation of alternatives with resistance, demonstrating forms of non-
hierarchical ecological life, and simultaneously taking action against 
airport expansion and coal-fired power stations, we still had to convince 
people that climate change existed: ‘keep the oil in the soil’ was seen 
as a radical statement. Now such words are commonly heard in board 
rooms and chanted by the biggest youth movement in world history 
on our streets, calling for “system change not climate change”. We can 
only celebrate the fact that fossil fuel corporations and their funders are 
rapidly losing their social acceptance and a fossil fuel-free future is no 
longer just the dream of rebels. But there is a blind spot. When those 
in power talk of ‘anthropogenic’ climate it would be infinitely more 
accurate to refer to it as capitalist climate change (Tanuro 2014). As one 
of the beautiful pink and green banners at climate camp proclaimed, 
“capitalism is crisis”.
Whether capitalism comes in red, pink or green, it is its cancer-
like logic of limitless growth that is at the heart of the problem. In 
This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, which brilliantly 
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details how the economy is at war against life, Naomi Klein (2015: 21) 
wrote “[w]hat the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in 
humanity’s use of resources; what our economic model demands to 
avoid collapse is unfettered growth”. This contradictory, suicidal logic of 
capitalism, a legacy of colonialism, patriarchy and dispossession, cannot 
be smoothed over by words that demand us to “inhabit incoherence”. 
This contradiction is rendering this world uninhabitable.
Scientists everywhere tell us there are limits and key planetary 
boundaries that must be respected to avoid triggering collapse, but we 
should no longer fear, because a new panacea has been found, namely, 
‘green growth’. This buzz word is now the core tenet of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals, and since 2012 has been promoted by institutions 
such as the World Bank and the OECD. The goal is to achieve “absolute 
decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources. The trouble 
is that three recent empirical studies (Hickel 2018) (including one by 
cheerleaders of green growth, the UN Environment Programme), 
show that this seemingly elegant solution to the catastrophe is a pipe 
dream. Even under the best conditions—including state-of-the-art, 
government-supported technological innovation to develop absolute 
energy efficiency, massive taxation raising the price of carbon from 
$50 to $600 per metric tonne, and taxing resource extraction—every 
computer model of the figures pushed us way over the planetary limits. 
As Sian Sullivan (2013) writes:
[t]he utopian vision here is that capitalism will thus become better 
aligned with ‘nature’, so as to generate the multiple wins of a ‘green 
economy’ wherein economic growth is maintained and ‘natural capital’ 
is too.
In the new documentary, Fairytales of Growth, sixteen-year-old Tokatawin 
Iron Eyes, President of Standing Rock Youth Council, looks into the 
camera.10 Her life-giving land is threatened by the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, initially funded in part by international financial services 
firm Natixis, owners of Mirova, the sponsors whose ‘#naturalcapital’ 
belief system could not be further from her world and her community 
of “water defenders” who risked everything to keep life flourishing 
on their land (Earthjustice 2020). The belief that humans will only 
10  https://www.fairytalesofgrowth.com. 
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protect nature if it is measured, valued and becomes integrated into a 
profit-making market accounting system, could not be further from her 
life-affirming culture, where people did “did not own land individually, 
but instead believed in the importance of honoring the earth as our common 
home and sharing its resources responsibly” (Ignatian Solidarity Network 
2019). “One of the biggest things that anybody can learn from this youth 
climate movement right now, being built on the work of indigenous, 
black and brown communities is the fact that it is an issue of priorities”, 
she gesticulates with calm rage, “[b]ecause when we want to talk about 
economic growth over people having clean water and the right to a 
livable future and planet that is a sign that something is wrong”. 
Question 3: Who Is Contaminating Who?
Friendship will be the soil from which a new politics will emerge 
(Ivan Illich n.d., quoted in bergman and Montgomery 2017: online).
The mechanism to gain social licence to operate in an event such as 
Agir pour le Vivant seems not to have been understood. It is neither a 
question of an indirect contact with an economic actor being turned into 
a sort of recruitment operation, nor of participants becoming spokes-
people despite themselves being ‘contaminated’ and losing their critical 
intelligence and lucidity. What we are pointing to is actually the reverse: 
it is your critical intelligence, your dazzling analyses, your innovative 
proposals that positively spill over on to them. Simply by association, 
they repair their often shaky reputation.
The very notion of social licence to operate is not an activist concept, 
infused with ‘ideological’ or ‘theological unconscious’: it was born in 
corporate offices. For instance, Henderson and Williams (respectively 
Shell’s Project Director for External Affairs, and Chair of corporate PR 
firm Fishburn Hedges) described it thus when they were in charge of 
“a global reputation management programme to ‘build, maintain and 
defend Shell’s capital’”, after the Brent Spar debacle:11 “[i]t is opinion 
formers that grant the licence to operate and often set the tone for how 
11  In which in the mid-1990s Shell controversially proposed to decommission the 
Brent Spar oil rig in the North Sea by simply sinking the platform into deep water 
in the North Atlantic, causing an outcry amongst environmental campaigners, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brent_Spar.
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the general public hears about and assesses companies” (Henderson and 
Williams 2002: 12, quoted in Evans 2015: 79). Putting their strategy into 
action, Shell went on to sponsor a large number of cultural institutions 
and high-profile cultural events in the fifteen years that ensued. 
Allowing ourselves an analogy with COVID-19, the problem is not 
becoming representatives of the virus but finding oneself aiding its 
spread. We need to stop the infection of all corners of life with capitalist 
logic. What is being called for here is some ‘social distancing’, so as to 
not unwittingly become ‘spreaders’, even if one can feel proud of being 
asymptomatic.
Question 4: Which Friendships Are Fertile for Whom?
It was never for us a question of issuing an ultimatum about friendship, 
a sort of emotional blackmail. To imagine that such a thing could be 
a real political lever would have been rather presumptuous. For us, 
friendship is not the neoliberal “banal affair of private preferences 
[…] with those who are already like us, [with whom] we keep each 
other comfortable, rather than becoming different and more capable 
together”, as bergman and Montgomery (2017: 96) sum up so sharply: 
friendship is a “relationship crucial to life, worth fighting for”.
That said, we do not subscribe to the Bush-like logic that seems to 
be attributed to us—“you are either with us or against us”—because we 
are not confused as to whom the real enemies are. The aim of our call to 
desert the event was not to sort out friends from foes, allies from traitors; 
it was to defuse the nefarious organisations’ strategy of gaining a social 
licence to operate.
As Dénètem Touam Bona, the first deserter, underlined to us in his 
reading of Which Trouble Do we Want to Inhabit? (Morizot and Zhong 
Mengual 2020),
[t]here is an assumption here that ‘attachments’, bonds are good in 
themselves, and that out of their proliferation, salvation will inevitably 
be born. As far as I am concerned, my conception of the lyannaj 
[coalition] cannot be dissociated from what I call ‘maroon secession’. 
The maroonnage that I conceive of as ‘running away’, as forms of life 
and resistance in a minor mode, is an operation of subtraction, similar 
to that La Boétie already praised in his Discourse on voluntary servitude, 
or to that Foucault evoked when he linked becoming-fascist with falling 
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in love with power (and recognition, prestige, honours... are part of the 
attributes of power) (Personal communication).
In the end, we are actually in complete agreement with Donna Haraway 
who wrote to us about the call out and its response:
I am a boycotter. I am and always have been for some worlds and not 
others. If ever there were a time for life-affirming anti-capitalism it is 
NOW […] I also affirm the ongoing possibility of future alliances with 
people who did not boycott, and who disagree, but not on just any terms. 
Coming together is always finite, fragile, open to change. It is not easy not 
to demonize after fierce disagreement, but it is crucial. But sympoiesis is 
not a grand neoliberal festival of co-becoming (Personal communication, 
13 August 2020).
Question 5: What Are We Capable of?
First of all, to clarify, as it is one of several reversals of our arguments: we 
did not ask for coherence from our addressees. We explained that what 
has often motivated our numerous non-collaboration decisions was a 
need for coherence. Not to alleviate guilt, but as care for mental health 
(which has little to do with ‘psychological comfort’). George Orwell, 
who knew what it meant to embody words and ideas and was prepared 
to die for them on the anti-fascist front of the 1936 Spanish Revolution, 
coined the term “doublethink”, in his dystopian novel 1984 (1949). 
An imposed practice at the heart of maintaining a totalitarian regime 
founded on inequality, ‘doublethink’ was “the power of holding two 
contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both 
of them” (Orwell 1949: 244; also see Sullivan’s Chapter 11, this volume). 
For Orwell, with ‘doublethink’ came the mental state necessary to make 
sure a society of equality could never be put in place: he called this 
managed authoritarian deferral, “controlled insanity.”
There is no doubt that the moralistic hunt for daily incoherences is 
absurd at best, most often noxious. We certainly also strive for a world 
where contradictions can be “melting pots and sources of creative 
tensions”: yet, and as Dénètem Touam Bona also remarks, “[t]he praise 
of trouble must not serve the nihilistic mechanics of general equivalence 
of capital” (personal communication); it cannot be a handless concept, 
as Baptiste Morizot would say.
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It is indeed crucial and urgent to embrace ‘an art of consequences’: 
we are not calling for much more. And maybe the question at the core of 
such an art would no longer be ‘what should one do?’ but ‘what is one 
capable of?’
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